A CRITIQUE
OF
THE BRAHMASŪTRA

PART I

INTERPRETATION OF THE SŪTRAS (III. 2. 11-IV)

P. M. Modi.

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of
THE BRAHMASŪTRA
(III. 2. 11-IV)

(With special reference to Śaṅkarācārya's Commentary)

PART I

INTERPRETATION OF THE SŪTRAS (III. 2. 11-IV)

By

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With
A FOREWORD
By

Prof. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta

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PREFACE

WHILE writing my thesis for Ph. D. and surveying the history and development of the conception of Akṣara Brahman, I hit upon certain passages in the Brahmasūtra which I tried to interpret independently of any commentator. I showed the interpretation to my Professor Dr. Schrader who, after comparing the same with those of Thibaut and Deussen, not only accepted it as a part of my thesis, but advised me to write a critical interpretation of the entire Brahmasūtra after my return to India. Accordingly I prepared an interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 2 and sent the typescript to Professors Dr. S. N. Dasgupta (Calcutta) and M. Hiriyanna (Mysore) and discussed it personally with Prof. R. D. Ranade (Allahabad) and the late Dr. A. B. Dhruva, who was then Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the Benares Hindu University. All these distinguished authorities encouraged me in my undertaking, remarking in general that my conclusions were 'reasonable' and my interpretation was 'plausible'. This was their opinion about only a very small part of the work, which I could prepare during my leisure hours along with my college duties. But for writing down my views on a sufficiently large portion of the Brahmasūtra, I thought I should work under the guidance of one of the above-mentioned scholars. I, therefore, applied to the Bombay University for a research grant, which was kindly sanctioned. For a similar encouragement and for leave on duty for six months, in 1935-36, I approached the late Sir P. D. Pattani, the President of the State Council, Bhavnagar State, on whose recommendation the Bhavnagar Darbar generously granted my request. Dr. Dasgupta whom I first approached for

guidance had to sail for Europe. The late Dr. Dhruva happened that very term to retire from Pro-Vice-Chancellorship of the Benares Hindu University and on my request he asked me to immediately go to Ahmedabad, promising to work with me two hours a day during my stay with him. The result of all this is the present book on the *Brahmasūtra*.

During these six months of my stay with the late Dr. Dhruva we met almost every day and I can say that almost every line of the work, which I wrote out every day beforehand and which is being published herewith, was discussed with him. Those who have studied under him know that he had the great commentaries (*bhāṣyas*) and the sub-commentaries by heart. Thus, not only that he remembered the views of Śaṅkarācārya and Rāmānujācārya, but he could also immediately point out the interpretation of these views given in the *Bhāmati*, the *Ratnaprabhā, etc., etc.* Not only that he would make me refer to these to assure myself of my properly understanding Śaṅkarācārya's *bhāṣya,* but he would also ask me to see if the Sūtras can be interpreted as favourable to the Śāṅkara System independently of the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya.* I always remember how he made me read works like the *Jaiminisūtras* and their *bhāṣya* by Śabara, even when I discussed with him the meaning of the *Brahmasūtras* which though explained by Śaṅkarācārya by quoting or referring to the *Jaminisūtras, etc.*, cannot but in my opinion refer to the *Upaniṣads*. The fact that I happened to have discussed with him the major portion of this book in its original draft strengthens me in my belief that I have rarely misunderstood or misrepresented the views, on the *Brahmasūtra*, of this greatest of the Ācāryas.

Apart from this scholarly contact with the late Dr. Dhruva, there was another, not less enjoyable, side of my experience of him during this short stay with him as his neighbour in the Parimal Society, Ahmedabad. It was for me something which I had never experienced during my three

years' studentship when I studied for B. A. and M. A. under his guruship (in 1920-23) at Ahmedabad and at Benares. Those who have been merely students of the late Dr. Dhruva know that there was always a curtain, as it were, between them and their teacher. This curtain was, I believe, lifted when I stayed with him as his neighbour in Ahmedabad and when every day after about two hours' discussion of my subject, he was pleased to tell me or talk to me about his views on many other subjects or his experience of many great personalities of India, during the time that he prepared to go out for a walk. This side of my personal contact with the late Dr. Dhruva has left behind an indelible impression on my mind; it was unique in the sense that I got from the late Dr. Dhruva something at once more lovable and elevating than what I had done till then from any body else. I always love to remember it and I feel I would be ungrateful if I publish this book without a mention of it in this preface.

During recent years I showed this work to Prof. Ranade and to Dr. Dasgupta and at their suggestion I prepared another book on the same subject. Thus, I have divided the work into two Parts. The main work is entitled '*A Critique of the Brahmasūtra* (III. 2. 11-IV) and the first and the second Parts are respectively called '*Interpretation of the Sūtras*' and '*The System of the Sūtrakāra*'. The first Part published herewith gives an interpretation of *every word* in *every Sūtra* of *Bra. Sū.* III. 2. 11-IV and the second Part which is ready for the press contains a summary, in twelve chapters, of the conclusions arrived at from the interpretation discussed fully in Part I. I am thankful to both these scholars for their kind interest in my work and for their useful suggestion to present the subject matter into two Parts. I have shown both the Parts to Principal R. D. Karmarkar, Poona, and he has also approved of the idea of publishing the work in two Parts.

I am greatly indebted to Dr. Dasgupta for his learned foreword to Part I of this book. He was kind enough to go through the typescript of the earliest portions of my work even before I made up my mind to write it in its present form. When the book was ready, he had a glance at the manuscript of the whole of Part I. He has been taking keen interest in my research work ever since I read a Paper on the *Gauḍapāda Kārikās* in the Lahore Session of the All-India Oriental Conference (1928) under his Presidentship. I have always derived inspiration in my studies from his answers to my queries whenever I wrote to him. His foreword has immensely added to the value of my work.

Prof. M. Hiriyanna has kindly interested himself in my work since I published my thesis for Ph. D. He minutely goes through my letters and while he opined that my inferences were 'reasonable' he raised certain questions about the possibility of the loss of tradition, *etc.*, implied in my interpretation offered in the present work and has thus made me discover and suggest a possible answer. In particular Sūtras also (*e. g.*, *Bra. Sū.* III. 3. 23) he convinced me that Śaṅkarāc¯rya's *viṣayavākya* was correct. My correspondence with him has greatly profited me in the preparation of this book. I am very thankful to this revered senior colleague for his closely scrutinizing my views, which has always encouraged me in my studies.

I cannot underrate my debt to the works of Thibaut, Deussen, Ghate, Teliwala and others in the same field of research. I have been also considerably benefited by the study of the learned works, on the *Brahmasūtras*, of Dr. Belvalkar.

It would be unfair on my part if I do not associate the names of two of my students, Messrs N. M. Mehta and J. M. Ashar, with the preparation of this book. Occasionally I come across students in teaching whom I also learn. They were such students. With them I read the book ready for the press and on one or two occasions I thought it better to

revise my interpretation. Mr. Ashar is also responsible for preparing the Indices to this volume. I regret to note that Mr. N. M. Mehta is no more when this book is published.

I am greatly indebted to my revered Prof. V. M. Mehta†, M. A., LL. B., and to my friends who prefer to remain unnamed, for their kindness in reading considerable parts of the MS. and making valuable suggestions.

The printing of the work involved considerable difficulty and I acknowledge with thanks the help I received from Messrs L. L. Mehta, Hormajshaw F. Coachbuilder, Gulabchand L. Shah and J. D. Dhruva.

I also thank the editors of the *Journal of the University of Bombay*, *Indian Culture*, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, *Prabuddha Bharata*, *Review of Philosophy* and *Religion*, and the *Proceedings* of *All India Oriental Conferences*, who have during these years published my Papers and have helped me in making known to scholars several of the views worked out and presented in details in this book.

Principal T. K. Shahani, M. A., has always taken keen interest in my work and has been very kind to me both in giving and getting me facilities for the preparation and publication of this book. I acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to him here.

I express my deepest obligations to H. H. the Maharaja Sir Krishnakumarsinhji of Bhavnagar who generously sanctioned a special grant for the publication of the present work, as His Highness did for my earlier publications also.

The author thankfully acknowledges his indebtedness to

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† It is very painful to me to mention that Prof. V. M. Mehta passed away just when the Preface was finally being seen through the Press.

the University of Bombay for the substantial financial help it has granted towards the cost of the publication of this book†.

I also thank the trustees of Seth Gordhandas Soonderdas Charities, Bombay for the help they have kindly given me for bringing out this work.

It now remains for me to crave the indulgence of sympathetic readers for errors of interpretation, exposition and expression, and of printing that might have escaped my attention.

I am sorry that owing to the increase in the volume of this book when revised, I could not include in it some Appendices which were ready and which deal with my interpretation of *Bra. Sū.* I and II*.

Parimala,
Waghawadi Road,
BHAVNAGAR,
7th May, 1943.

P. M. Modi.

† I gratefully acknowledge the fact that the Bombay University has already sanctioned another substantial grant for Part II of this book, which is now in the press.

* My Paper on the Scheme of Bra. Sū. I. 1-3 : A Rapprochement, published in the *Journal of the University of Bombay* (Vol. IV, Part III, 1935) deals with my interpretation of Bra. Sū. I.

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FOREWORD

Years ago, in my Second Volume of the History of Indian Philosophy, published in 1932, I said in my review of the Gītā as follows :—" God Himself is sometimes referred to as being *avyakta* (probably because He cannot be grasped by any of our senses), as an existence superior to the *avyakta* which is described as a part of His nature, and as a category from which all things have come into being. This *avyakta* which is identical with God is also called *akṣarà* or the Immortal......In IV. 24–25, where it is said that all sacrifices are to be made with the Brahman as the object and the sacrificial materials, sacrificial fire *etc.* are to be looked upon as being Brahman, the word " Brahman " is in all probability used in the sense of God. In Gītā V. 6, 10, 19 also the word " Brahman " is used in the sense of God or Īśvara; and in most other cases the word is used in the sense of God. But according to the Gītā the personal God as Īśvara is the supreme principle, and Brahman, in the sense of a qualityless, undifferentiated, ultimate principle as taught in the Upaniṣads, is a principle which, though great in itself and representing the ultimate essence of God, is nevertheless upheld by the personal God or Īśvara. Thus, though in Gītā VIII. 3 and X. 12 Brahman is referred to as the differenceless ultimate principle, yet in Gītā XIV. 27 it is said that God is the support of even this ultimate principle, Brahman " (pp. 473–474).

Dr. Modi in his dissertation, called Akṣara, for his Doctorate in the University of Kiel, published in 1932, developed a similar line of thought and tried to follow up the concept of Akṣara with *avyakta* as its synonym, in the Upaniṣads, in the Gītā, and also in other literatures. The point that he urges is not so much regarding a personal or impersonal Brahman but

the Brahman having a form and Brahman as without a form, that is, *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha*. We find also in Yāska the two concepts of the gods being *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha*. In the present work he tries to show that this problem existed also in the time when the Brahmasūtra was written and some of the Brahmasūtras appertain to this problem which has been wrongly interpreted by Śaṅkara as that of *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* Brahman.

I had the privilege of pointing out both in my *History* and my *Indian Idealism* that the proper understanding and the interpretation of the mental situation that prevailed in the Upaniṣadic days is still an enigma to us. It had offered considerable difficulties probably at that time also and that the Gītā and the Brahmasūtras are two distinct attempts on different lines to explore it. The study of the Brahmasūtras shows that many other attempts had preceded it but are now lost to us. There is also ample evidence to prove that the Brahmasūtras must have been explained by many other writers before Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara, the most masterful of all the commentators known to us, had so smothered them that apart from certain suggestions, very little can be deduced about the views of those commentators from Śaṅkara's own commentary. The commentator's who followed Śaṅkara mostly followed Śaṅkara's line of interpretation and differed only at particular points, where their own views were affected. Thus, a study of the commentaries of the great Ācāryas, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka, does not throw much light on the real meaning and purport of the Sūtras. It is also to be regretted that so far practically nothing has been done with regard to a critical study of the Brahmasūtras. Dr. Modi has done an inestimable service in attempting a critical study of at least a part of the Brahmasūtras. By a careful study of the Brahmasūtras he has practically succeeded in evolving a scheme, a sort of critical apparatus, which may be successfully applied to the Brahmasūtras, to make them yield their own meaning. It is, no doubt, true that without

Śaṅkara's commentary it might have been impossible for him to evolve that scheme but taking Śaṅkara's commentary into our consideration and applying Dr. Modi's scheme, it is easy to see how in many places Śaṅkara has, really, consciously or unconsciously, twisted the meaning of the Brahmasūtras to his own advantage.

Let us take for example Sūtra III. 2. 11 "*na sthānato'pi parasyobhayaliṅgam sarvatra hi*". Śaṅkara in interpreting this Sūtra says that this Adhikaraṇa is devoted to the interpretation of the nature of Brahman where the conditioned individual passes with the release of the conditions, on the ground of the Upaniṣadic texts. There are two types of texts, those attributing to Brahman qualities as *sarvakarmā etc.* (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 2) and those which declare it to be qualityless such as *asthūlam* (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8). Śaṅkara says that the opponent holds that since we have to be faithful to the Upaniṣads, Brahman must be qualified and unqualified. But this will be contradictory. The word *sthānataḥ* might mean as conditioned by earth *etc.*; but that is also impossible. For, the association of conditions cannot change the nature of a thing. A crystal by the mere shadow of a red object cannot lose its transparency. So, in whatever character Brahman may be described, it must be regarded as being nothing else than qualityless, *nirvikalpa* Brahman.

Dr. Modi takes the word '*sthāna*' to mean the three states, awaking, dream and dreamless. Dr. Modi here urges that the use of the word *api* suggests the opponent's view and the Upaniṣads teach two types of Brahman (1) one endowed with form: (*rūpavat*) and (2) the other formless (*arūpavat*). He also holds that the word *ubhayaliṅgam* means two types of Brahman *arūpavat* and *rūpavat* and not *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa.* According to him, therefore, the Sūtrakāra finds no conflict between the texts *sarvakarmā etc.* and *asthūlam etc.*; for the two texts refer to two types of Brahman *rūpavat*

and *arūpavat*. The sentence *sthānataḥ parasya ubhayaliṅgam* means that according to the relation of different states Brahman is *rūpavat* and *arūpavat*. In the *suṣupti* we have the *arūpavat* and in the *svapna* and *jāgrata* we have the *rūpavat*. In the fourth state or the *turîya* Brahman is neither *rūpavat* nor *arūpavat*. According to Dr. Modi, the Sūtrakāra denies the view that Brahman is *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* according to the states of waking and dream and dreamless sleep in which it appears. But the Sūtrakāra says that Brahman is *ubhayaliṅgam* *i. e.* *rūpavat* and *arūpavat*, in all the three states.

According to Śaṅkara the discussion is about *saviśeṣa* and *nirviśeṣa* Brahman and the reply is that Brahman is *nirviśeṣa* everywhere *i. e.* in all the Śrutis. Śaṅkara thinks that the expression *ubhayaliṅgaśrutyanugrahāt ubhayaliṅgam eva* is the opponent's view, whereas Dr. Modi takes it to be the conclusion (siddhānta) of the Sūtrakāra.

According to Dr. Modi's interpretation the Sūtra runs as follows :—*parasya ubhayaliṅgam na sthānataḥ api sarvatra hi* *i. e.* the characteristic description of Brahman as *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* is not in accordance with the mental states of the Para but everywhere *i. e.* (the description applies to the Para) in all the states.

According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra runs as follows :—*na sthānatopi parasya ubhayaliṅgam sarvatra hi.* Here the Sūtra cannot be interpreted without assuming the words " *Brahma nirvikalpam* ". He thus interprets the Sūtra by adding two words after the Sūtra from his own mind The Sūtra would then mean " Brahman cannot have two kinds of characteristics *saviśeṣa* and *nirviśeṣa* according to the limiting states (the earth *etc. sthāna*). But in all Upaniṣadic texts (*sarvatra*) it is regarded as *nirviśeṣa* or *nirvikalpa* only".

We, thus, see that Dr. Modi's interpretation is more faithful to the Sūtra. Many questions, however, can be raised here as

to whether Dr. Modi's interpretation is justifiable according to the context or not. To this, Dr. Modi gives in most cases very convincing proofs in support of his interpretation (Vide his interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 14 for his arguments in the case of the illustration cited above). The value of these, however, can only be adjudged when a scholar carefully compares Dr. Modi's interpretation as it appears in the book with Śaṅkara's interpretation and tries to come to an impartial and balanced judgement.

It must be said that Dr. Modi has learnt from Germany how to weld the critical apparatus to one's best advantage. He appears at the same time to be sympathetic and fair to Śaṅkara and does not seem to read his own philosophical creed into the Brahmasūtra.

He proceeds by re-arranging the text of the Sūtras and sometimes also the Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa into an order, which seems to yield a better meaning with the least assumption of other words. Śaṅkara's main defect seems to be the introduction of new words for his own advantage. Dr. Modi, however, follows the context alone as his guide and has strenuously abstained from the introduction of any word or idea not guaranteed by the context. He has, however, in certain places suggested new readings and tried to support them often quite successfully on critical, philological and contextual grounds.

The results of Dr. Modi's investigations may be classified in a twofold manner :—(1) doctrinal and (2) interpretational. He holds that the Sūtrakāra describes the two aspects of Brahmān as *puruṣavidha* and *apuruṣavidha* or *rūpavat* and *arūpavat* and believes that they are on an equal status. The *puruṣavidha* and the *apuruṣavidha* are both aspects of the Kāraṇa Brahman. The Sūtrakāra further discusses the three out of the six categories of Yāska, *pariṇāma*, *vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* of Brahman. The change of Brahman is such that the effect or *kṛti* is identical with Brahman and increment and decrement

of Brahman are due to his own relative self-concealment. He speaks of three kinds of meditations *viz.* (1) the meditation on the limits of the *puruṣa* or the parts of Brahman as in *ṣodaśakalāvidyā* and (2) the meditation on Brahman without thinking of his limits (*i. e.* contrary to *vaiśvānara ātman* and *ṣodaśakalāvidyā*). These two meditations lead to Mokṣa. The third type (3) is *kāmya*. Dr. Modi further discovers several śrauta and smārta Vedānta Schools which were the opponents of the writer of the Brahmasūtras. He also discovers that the Sūtrakāra discusses the meditation on the *Praṇava* as a symbol of Brahman.

I would not guarantee the exactitude of these results but I would only say that they are quite plausible and thought-provoking.

Dr. Modi holds that Bra. Sū. III. 3 deals with the method of meditation on Brahman and not with the *guṇopasaṁhāra* nor with the reconciliation of the different *vidyās* and *vijnānas*.

The most important feature of Dr. Modi's work is indeed the application of a critical method of study to the Sūtras. In this respect he has, undoubtedly, proceeded much further than previous interpreters of the Brahmasūtras, like Thibaut or Ghate. The Brahmasūtras do not offer the same readings always in the works of the different Ācāryas. But Dr. Modi, though he has generally accepted the readings as they are found in Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, has yet suggested modifications in accordance with the critical necessity of the context. He has also in many places differed from Śaṅkara as regards the allusions to the different Upaniṣadic texts, on which the meaning of the Sūtras depends. On many occasions he has successfully contested the claims of a Sūtra for being treated as a *hetu*-Sūtra and decided in favour of its being a *pratijnā*-Sūtra and *vice versa*, and in doing this he either regrouped the Sūtras of a particular Adhikaraṇa or ingeniously interpreted the particles *hi*, *tu*, *ca*, *etc.* and sometimes suggested different

readings in the Sūtras. But he has seldom introduced new words for the interpretation of a Sūtra as Śaṅkara so often does. Following the same line of enquiry he has also suggested exact *viṣayavākyas* of several Sūtras.

Though we may not always agree with all that Dr. Modi has said, yet he seems to have proved to our satisfaction that at least in many places Śaṅkara's interpretation is either doubtful or unacceptable. Śaṅkara seems to have been often interested in reading his own philosophy in the Sūtras and loyalty to the Sūtras does not seem to be his strong point.

Dr. Modi further holds that for his doctrine of a twofold Brahman Bādarāyaṇa is probably indebted to Yāska's conception of the *puruṣavidha* and the *apuruṣavidha* aspects of the Vedic deities or to other previous Vedānta writers who had already adopted a view about Brahman consistent with Yāska's conception of deities. That the idea of a personal Brahman and an impersonal one should have revealed itself clearly at some early stage of the development of Indian thought seems to be a very rational hypothesis.

By his careful and painstaking and thought-provoking researches Dr. Modi has done a great service to those who are engaged in tracing the development of Indian thought from the earliest times. It is precisely this period between the Brāhmaṇas and the Brahmasūtras the full history of which is now practically lost, that would require the most diligent application of critical study by which we may be able to weave a fairly correct picture of this obscure period. That Dr. Modi, instead of working in a stereotyped manner, in the beaten track, has showed his originality of approach to new types of thought that flourished before the Brahmasūtras and has thus given us a new picture of the Brahmasūtras is indeed a matter of great satisfaction.

But the book has been so elaborate that, I fear, he would have but few readers, who would have the patience to

follow him carefully. He has not also applied his critical apparatus to the whole of the Brahmasūtras but only to specific parts of it which he has selected for this purpose.

I recommend this elaborate piece of research particularly to those who are interested in a critical appraisal of the meaning and significance of the Brahmasūtras as they stand, unaffected by the opinions of any of the Ācāryas. Dr. Modi, is, thus, to be complimented upon for contributing something substantial and original towards our unravelling one of the most obscure parts of the history of the Indian thought.

Sanskrit College,
Calcutta.
18th September, 1941.

S. N. Dasgupta.

INTRODUCTION.

HEREWITH a fresh interpretation of the Brahmasūtra (III. 2. 11-IV) is offered to the student of this so-called third Prasthāna and to the student of the Indian Philosophy.

The reader must ever keep in mind the tentativeness of the interpretation proposed here. This is bound to be the characteristic of any modern interpretation of any text of the Scripture (Śruti). The author of the present work confesses that though the general and most important part of his interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 3 offered here is identical with the same offered in his doctorate thesis[1], some important points of details of the same are quite fresh here. It was discovered in the course of his fresh study that the exact meaning of some Sūtras of Bra. Sū. III. 3 was different from that proposed in his thesis. Similarly, while preparing the present work he had from time to time to make changes not only in the interpretation but also in the grouping of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas, when having once arrived at a decision about the same he discovered on a subsequent occasion that a new construction of a Sūtra or Sūtras in question was the proper one. It may be that on a further inquiry some fresh points may arise, the solution of which may necessitate changes even in the portion of the Brahmasūtra treated here. Let us, therefore, keep an open mind[2], while we study further.

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1. Akṣara: A forgotton chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy, Baroda, 1932.

2. It will be found that in the case of certain Sūtras the present author has found no satisfactory interpretation till now and that he has admitted his inability to come to a conclusion in such cases. More-

The reader must bear in mind here that it is only an accident that I begin the work with Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11. It must be made clear that I do not regard the portion of Bra. Su. I–III. 2. 10 as an interpolation or a later addition. In fact, I have discovered a very close connection between Bra. Sū. I. 1–3 and Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11, 37–39. I have found no reason to doubt the genuineness[3] of the remaining portion (Bra. Sū. I. 4, II, III. 1 and 2. 1–10).

As is very well known Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11 begins a crucial Adhikaraṇa, as it and the subsequent Sūtras contain what is called ' the discussion of Brahman ' (*tatpadārthavivecana*). While writing my doctorate thesis (in 1930) I happened to study particularly those Sūtras and prepared a small work on them, only a part of which was used for my thesis. Later on, I continued my study upto the end of the Brahmasūtra. This is why the present work begins from Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11 and ends with Bra. Sū. IV. 4.

I consulted some of my own professors as well as some others of established repute as to whether I should publish the portion of the interpretation of the Brahmasūtra, which I had prepared. Though some of them insisted that I should first write down my interpretation of the whole work, a majority of them approved of my idea to publish as much as was ready.

over, in spite of the great emphasis he has laid on certain tenets of the Sūtras which he thinks are as good as finally settled, he would be ready to consider any new interpretation coming from any source, because it is, though not impossible, very difficult to think of an interpretation of Sūtras as ultimate owing to the very aphoristic style of the Sūtras.

3. In an article in the Indian Historical Quarterly (1936) I have shown that Bra. Sū. II. 1 (Samṛtipāda) is very closely related to Bra. Sū. I. 4. These Pādas (Bra. Sū. I. 4 and II. 1) deal with the Opposition of what should be called the Smārta Vedanta and not with the Sāṁkhaya. The Sutrakāra's treatment of the Smārta Vedanta, however, applies to the Sāṁkhya *also* and this is the implied sense of *ca* in Bra. Sū. II. 2. 1.

I have, now, got with me most of Bra. Sū. I. 1–III. 2. 10 interpreted according to the method I have suggested in the present volume. I do not personally find that any Sūtra out of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11–IV will have to be interpreted differently than in the way done here, in view of Bra. Sū. I. 1–3. Sūtras III. 3. 11, 37–39 give an indication to the interpretation of Bra. Sū. I. 1–3. However, it is mainly due to the line of study I have followed that I publish the portion which I worked out and await another opportunity to publish other instalments of the interpretation of this great Prasthāna. The task of interpreting the whole of the Brahmasūtra at a single stretch is too big for a single person and perhaps there will be enough to be learnt from the criticism that the present work may stimulate.

An important matter for which I have to apologise to the reader, is that from among the commentaries I have selected only Śaṅkarācārya's commentary for particular study so far as the present work is concerned. I sincerely hope that no serious student will charge me with having an intention of insulting this great Ācārya or of finding fault with his *Bhāṣya*. Nor do I underrate the worth of the commentaries of other Ācāryas or refuse to receive any help they may give in interpreting this most difficult of the three or four Prasthānas. Here again, what has happened is that I have taken Śaṅkarācārya, with whose commentary I happen to be more familiar, as a type of the traditional interpreters, so far as the *method* of traditional interpretation is concerned. While examining Śaṅkarācārya's method of interpretation I have had innumerable occasions to criticise his *Bhāṣya*, but I thereby do not intend to offend him or his followers. All the same I beg to be pardoned if anybody feels offended with my criticism of Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhāṣya*[4].

4. " Any attempt at a more precise characterisation of the views of the Sūtras is bound to contain many rocks of offence and sources of the spiritual disturbances" – Sir S. Radhakrishnan, 'Indian Philosophy', Vol. II., P. 444. I hope, I do not become a source of such a disturbance.

My only justification for presenting this volume to the student of the Brahmasūtra lies in the method that I have adopted in its interpretation. The method is the modern method described as historico-critical-cum-philological method, which I personally believe to be the most reliable method and the greatest gift that India has received from the study of our Scriptures by western scholars. I believe, neither Deussen, nor Thibaut, nor Teliwala nor even Ghate who alone discusses the question of correct method of interpretation, has applied this method in its proper perspective to the Brahmasūtra. No doubt I have received valuable help from their works. Here I may state that I have made an effort to carry further the inquiry undertaken by these pioneers into the original sense of the Brahmasūtra, and I must leave it to those who are qualified to judge how far I have succeeded in it. I shall be satisfied if it is felt by the learned that the application of the modern method as is generally understood, and to the extent it was possible for me to follow, is a justification for writing a work like this[5].

In one chapter of Part II, I have examined the traditional method of interpretation as illustrated by Śaṅkarācārya and in another chapter I have shown what the modern critical method should be. Here I may mention one very important feature of this method. The Ācāryas start with the belief that *all* the Prasthānas teach *the same* doctrine. They try to discover this one doctrine in the Prasthānas and write commentaries on them with that in mind. Śaṅkarācārya seems to have got

5. *Vide* the Introduction to 'Studies in Vedantism' by K. C. Bhattacharya, Calcutta, 1909. He rightly complains against those scholars who dispose of important problems, *e. g.*, those of "Indian pessimism and fatalism by a sapient reference to the climatic and political condition of the country". But his attack on Thibaut seems to me to be unjustifiable.

Vide also my Introduction to Chap. I of Vol. II "The System of the Brahmasūtra".

his doctrine originally from Buddhism, Gauḍapāda, and some portion of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, and then interpreted *all* the Prasthānas in the light of that doctrine. Rāmānujācārya, according to the tradition, got a glimpse of his doctrine partly at least from the works of the Tamil Saints (Āḷwars) and Tamil Ācāryas and then discovered the same in the Prasthānas with the help of the commentary of the Vṛttikāra which he found in Kashmir. By an interpretation of the inspired works which the people at different times considered to be the canon of religion, each Ācārya achieved a wonderful success in infusing a new life and spirit into the religion and philosophy of his age, suitable not only to the religious necessity of his followers, but also to the political, social and above all the intellectual environments of his time. The Ācārya was not merely a critical interpretor; he was the religious guide too of his age; and he did his duty and achieved his goal thus. Unlike those Ācāryas, the modern student does not start with the idea of a *doctrinal uniformity of all the Prasthānas*, though he does believe that underlying all the Prasthānas (allotted to different periods) there is a historical unity in the gradual development of thought.[6] It is evident that he is no Maṭhādhipati, 'the Lord of a Sect', nor does he aspire to be one though he should try to bring home to his own people the truth that he discovers, by presenting it in simple, non-technical language. Such a modern student should, in my opinion, attempt to discover the original sense of the Brahmasūtra by proceeding in two different ways. The first way is that after a preliminary study of the commentaries on all the Prasthānas, which would enable him to understand the

6. *Vide* K. C. Bhattacarya's Introduction to his Studies in Vedantism, PP. VI–VIII for the distinction between the role of the philosophic systematiser and the critical or historical scholar. I fully agree with his idea of the latitude allowed to philosophic systematisation. However one may differ from the Ācāryas, he can never charge him with " intellectual dishonesty ".

traditional view[7], he should start with an intensive study of the Brahmasūtra text itself and refer to the Upaniṣads and the Gītā again and again to see whether the result of such an intensive study of the Brahmasūtra agrees with the doctrines of these Prasthānas. The second way is that having equipped himself with the study of the commentaries he should classify the Śrutis of the (twelve) Upaniṣads under the four heads corresponding to the four Adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtra, *viz.*, the Samanvaya, Avirodha, Sādhana and Phala Adhyāyas, and then see how these Śrutis come into discussion under the various Sūtras of each Adhyāya and try to find out how the Sūtrakāra interprets the corresponding Śruti, in the respective Adhyāya (and also Pāda, so far as possible). I have tried to study the Brahmasūtra according to the first way only. It still remains to examine this Prasthāna by the second method. Such an examination is bound to furnish us with invaluable evidence for the interpretation of the Sūtras[8].

Owing to the incompleteness of the work in the above and in many other respects, it has been utterly impossible to discuss in this book such questions as " which of the Ācāryas represents even approximately correctly the view of the Sūtrakāra ". Without knowing definitely the view of the

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7. This point has been amply emphasised by K. C. Bhattacarya in his 'Studies in Vedantism', Introduction, P. V. He says: "The Philosophical study should come first in the order of time; the historical study of an ancient system of philosophy, to be of any use at all, must be preceded by an earnest study of the philosophy, in the expositions traditionally accepted as authoritative." Such a sympathetic study means the study of the commentaries of the Ācāryas.

8. This second test will yield important results about such questions as the following :—(1) Whether by *darśayataḥ* and *darśayanti* the Sūtrakāra refers respectively to two and to several Śrutis only or to two and more Śrutis and Smṛtis also; (2) whether by *eke* he means *only one* Śākhā of one Veda or several Śākhās of the different Vedas, *etc., etc.*

Sūtrakāra himself, how could we compare those of the Ācāryas with the same ? The fact that several scholars have attempted to answer this question and have actually given various mutually contradictory answers shows that their very starting point is defective. The doctrine of the Sūtrakāra cannot be derived from an examination of some scattered remarks in the Sūtras or from a few technical words in the Sūtras. The comparison of the Sūtrakāra's view with the doctrine of Śaṅkarācārya which I have given in Chapter 8 of Part II is thus only tentative and should be received with caution.

I may now introduce the book to the reader. As is natural, I have divided the book into two Parts. The first Part contains an interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–IV. The second Part gives in twelve chapters an account of the System of the Sūtrakāra derived from this interpretation, and also gives some suggestions for the correction of the text and some rules for its correct interpretation.

In Part I, I have regrouped the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas and after giving my own translation of the Sūtras of each Adhikaraṇa I have given Notes. These Notes form the most important portion of the entire book. It is in these Notes that I give my reasons for not accepting Śaṅkarācārya's grouping of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas, for adopting a fresh one, for at times changing the reading in a Sūtra or Sūtras, for giving a certain sense to each word in a Sūtra, for rejecting Śaṅkarācārya's *viṣayavākya* and at times suggesting that there should be no *viṣayavākya* or should be a new *viṣayavākya*, for almost all things that a reader would like to know about the interpretation of the Sūtras given at the beginning of the Adhikaraṇa. It is, again, in these Notes that I give *full details* of my explanation of certain Śrutis, which I believe is in harmony with that of the Sūtrakāra, of the loss of tradition as regards Bra. Sū. III. 3, of what I believe to be the origin of the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman, etc., etc.

It is by dropping some of these arguments and these details that I have prepared the account in the twelve chapters of Part II. The first chapter of Part II in which I have summarised the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman and his method of meditation on Brahman, is based on my interpretation of Brahmasūtra III. 2 and III. 3, *i. e.*, the first two chapters of Part I. Sūtras III. 2. 11–41 discuss the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman and it is in Bra. Sū. III. 3 that the Sūtrakāra gives all pieces of information about the various meditations on Brahman which he collects from the various Upaniṣads. But for the sake of convenience I have not strictly observed the distinction and division between the two Pādas made by the author of the Sūtras. Chapter 2 discusses the comparative position of action and knowledge (*karma* and *jñāna*) in the attainment of Mokṣa, and the varieties of actions which a seeker (*mumukṣu*) may do as a help to knowledge directly or mediately; and thus it corresponds to Bra. Sū. III. 4, *i. e.*, Chapter 3 of Part I. Chapters 3–6 of Part II are summaries of the conclusions established in Chapters 4–7 of Part I, which deal with the interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 1–4.

From the *viṣayavākyas* of certain Sūtras which I claim to have discovered, it appears that the Sūtrakāra understood certain Śrutis of the chief Upaniṣads differently than Śaṅkarācārya, and this difference I have stated in Chapter 7 of Part II, after collecting the scattered remarks of the Sūtrakāra about the same from all the chapters of Part I. Chapter 8 presents a tentative comparison between the views of the Sūtrakāra and those of Śaṅkarācārya.

In Chapter 9 of Part II I have explained how Bra. Sū. III. 3 is in my opinion the most important part of the Brahmasūtra, as it contains certain critical Sūtras holding the key to Bra. Sū. I. 1–3.

Chapters 10 and 11 of Part II discuss the method of interpretation of the Brahmasūtra. In Chapter 10 I have examined

the traditional method as presented in Śaṅkarācārya's *Bhāṣya*, and pointed out how it is defective. I have also admitted that though some instances of defects given by me may be shown to be no defects at all, the general conclusion that the defects of the traditional method are to be classified under the particular heads stands. I may here add that the repeated reference to the same passage under different classes of defects was nacessary for me to illustrate what I think to be a mistaken way of interpretation. There is no intention, as there can be none, of disrespecting the Ācārya or his followers. In Chapter 11, I have made some practical suggestions which may be taken as rules for attempting an approximately correct interpretation of the Brahmasūtra, and which I have put into practice in Part I.

In Chapter 12, I have made an effort to reconstruct the readings of the Sūtras, and to regroup the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas so far as Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–IV is concerned. This reconstruction of the text is the most important part of the textual criticism, because without fixing the text no correct interpretation of the same is possible.

I may now briefly state the more important results which I have discovered for the first time in the course of my inquiry into the interpretation of the Brahmasūtra, and about which I feel I have achieved very great degree of certainty. These results are in five different directions:—(1) The links in the Sūtrakāra's System, (2) The importance of Bra. Sū. III. 3, (3) The reconstruction of the text of the Brahmasūtra, (4) The method of interpretation to be applied to the Brahmasūtra, and (5) the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of certain Śrutis.

1. The Links in the Sūtrakāra'a System.—(*a*) I have finally settled that the Sūtrakāra believes in two aspects of Brahman, the *puruṣavidha* (the *sākāra*) or the super-personal, and the *a–puruṣavidha* (the *nirākāra*) or the impersonal, not the *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* as in Śaṅkara's System. Both these

have attributes and are of *equal status*, as regards the attainment of Mokṣa. The Sūtrakāra refutes the views that the *puruṣavidha* is only a mental projection on the *apuruṣavidha* (the impersonal aspect, which is then the only aspect), and that the *puruṣavidha* is a concession to those who cannot understand the formless one, and also that the *puruṣavidha* is higher than the *apuruṣavidha*. (*b*) The Sūtrakāra also discusses the *pariṇāma*, *vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* of Brahman, the three out of the six states of an entity (*bhāva*) mentioned by Yāska. The *pariṇāma* of Brahman is such that the created world is also Brahman and consequently the *vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* of Brahman are due to the less or more self–concealment of Brahman in what are its effects or *pariṇāmas*. I have suggested that the Sūtrakāra adopts, or follows a Vedanta School which had already adopted a view about Brahman similar to Yāska's view about the two aspects of the deities of the Ṛgveda, which are both *puruṣavidha* and also *apuruṣavidha*. (*c*) One very important fact about the Sūtrakāra's discussion in favour of his System is that he refutes not only Sāṁkhya Pūrvapakṣas but also several other Pūrvapakṣas which can be classified under several *Śrauta* and *Smārta Vedanta Schools*. In Bra. Sū. III. 3, the Sūtrakāra refutes a Vedanta view that beyond the Unmanifest Brahman there is a Principle called Puruṣa; another Vedanta view that it is only the Unmanifest Brahman which is metaphorically to be thought of as Puruṣa; and a third Vedanta doctrine that the same principle is both the impersonal Unmanifest (Brahman) and also the Puruṣa at the same time. These Pūrvapakṣas of the Sūtrakāra throw a great deal of light on the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the Kaṭha and other Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā. Besides these, there are several other very important Pūrvapakṣas, one of which, for example, is that the meditation on the Puruṣa is taught in the Śruti because it is easy to be performed by the individual soul who is encased in a body.

Among the Sūtrakāra's doctrines of minor importance

discovered in this book I may briefly state the following:-
(1) The Prajāpatiloka is an aspect (the personal aspect) of the *Kāraṇa* or *Mukhya* Brahman ; it is not a *Kārya* of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra refutes the *lokāpatti doṣa* on the Prajāpatiloka. (2) The Sūtrakāra speaks of three kinds of meditations on Brahman. (*a*) Brahman thought of as not consisting of parts or limbs. (*b*) Brahman thought of as consisting of parts or limbs, *e. g.*, Brahman conceived as Puruṣa or Vaiśvānara. Both these meditations lead to Mokṣa. (*c*) Brahman thought of as the *nāma, etc.* The meditations of this third class are *Kāmya* or voluntary meditations on Brahman intended to achieve some aim of the meditator. (3) Not a few Sūtras discuss the meditation on Brahman as symbolised in the Praṇava, though none of the Ācāryas says that this meditation is discussed in the Brahmasūtra. (4) The Sūtrakāra explains Brahman and its meditations on the same lines as Jaimini explains Dharma and its performance. He says that because the line of explanation of the meditation on Brahman and of the performance of sacrifice is of the same nature, we have the *ekavākyatā*—unanimity—of the two Kāṇḍas of the Veda. (5) The knowledge of Brahman is *anuṣṭheya* and is laid down by a Vidhi, the result of which knowledge is an Apūrva, though unlike the performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma which guarantees the heaven in the very next birth, the practice of the means (knowledge and actions) of Mokṣa cannot guarantee Mokṣa in the very next birth. (6) Regarding the actions which directly help the knowledge of Brahman in achieving Mokṣa, the householder-*mumukṣu* has more duties to perform than *mumukṣus* belonging to other orders of life—a view given by Śaṅkara as a Pūrvapakṣa in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā. (7) In the time of adversity (*i. e.*, danger of losing life) an ascetic seeker may perform official (priestly) duties both of a primary and a secondary nature like those performed by Uṣasti Cākrāyaṇa. (8) The Sūtrakāra also allows a *mumukṣu* to perform his worldy duties in addition to those duties which directly help knowledge in achieving Mokṣa, in order

that 'whatever he has begun be not obstructed'. (9) Several religious good deeds including even those which the Śruti calls *kāmya karmans* are to be performed by a *mumukṣu* even after the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman till the fall of the body of the sage, because they help the knowledge *directly* in achieving Mokṣa, if they are performed by a sage with the idea of using them as a help to the knowledge. (10) The knowledge (of Brahman) and actions co-operate with each other in the achievement of Mokṣa, though, of course, the former is the principal of the two. (11) The *devayāna* is the Path of the Progressive Advance towards Mokṣa (not the Path of the Svarga). The *sampatti* ('union of the senses into the mind, that of that mind into the breath, that of that breath into the Light, and that of that Light into the Supreme Deity') takes place in the case of a seeker advancing on the Path. And that *sampatti plus utkrānti* (departure of these from the body) are necessary before a knower of Brahman attains his goal (non-separation with Brahman). (12) The Sūtrakāra does not want to add Devaloka, Indraloka, and Prajapatiloka to the list of worlds in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. (13) The discussion of *sa enān Brahma gamayati* (Chā. Upa. IV 15. 5) should proceed on the consideration of the conductor's ability or inability to go to Brahman himself, or on the consideration 'How far can the conductor himself go', and not on the question 'whether going to Brahman is logically possible or not'. (14) The meditators on the Praṇava as the Symbol of Brahman are conducted by the Sāmans (not by a Vaidyuta Ātivāhika) to Brahman (neu.) according to the Praṣna Upaniṣad. (15) The form of the liberated soul is free from the dealings of the world (*jagadvyāpāravarjam*), it is not subject to any change (*vikārāvarti*), and it is a permanent form (*tathā hi sthitim āha*). (16) One important fact which I have discovered is that the Sūtrakāra takes as authority for (the knowledge of) Brahman only the Vedāntas, *i. e.*, the Upaniṣads, and not the Saṁhitā, the Brāhmaṇa, the Āraṇyaka and the Khila (*e. g.*,

the Khilas of the Sāmaveda Rāṇāyanīya Śākha). He does not consider the attributes of Brahman mentioned in these non-Upaniṣadic Śrutis as worthy of discussion in his Brahmasūtra, though the attributes like *sambhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* (mentioned in the Rāṇāyanīya Khila of the Sāmaveda) are really the attributes of Brahman.

2. The Importance of Brahmasūtra III. 3:—A fact of supreme importance discovered during my study of Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–IV is that the most important portion of the entire Brahmasūtra is Pāda 3 of Adhyāya III. This Pāda reveals the Sūtrakāra's scheme of the division into three Pādas, *viz.*, Bra. Sū. I. 1, 2 and 3, of the Śrutis chosen by him for discussion in those Pādas. The principle underlying this division is discovered in three crucial Sūtras of Bra. Sū. III. 3, *viz.*, Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11, 38–39. From these Sūtras, we learn that (i) in Bra. Sū. I. 1 the Sūtrakāra discusses those Vedanta Śrutis which describe the formless (*arūpavat*) aspect of Brahman and which the Sūtrakāra would also interpret as such, (ii) that in Bra. Sū. I. 2 he discusses such Vedantas as profess to describe the formless aspect, but as apply such attributes to it as would be properly applicable to the aspect with the (human) form called the Puruṣa, and which, therefore, the Sūtrakāra interprets (in Bra. Sū. I. 2) as dealing with the Puruṣa aspect, and (iii) that Bra. Sū. I. 3 is devoted to the construction of those Vedanta Śrutis which profess to describe the Puruṣa aspect and which the Sūtrakāra also proposes to interpret (in Bra. Sū. I. 3) as dealing with the same aspect. I have given my reasons why I believe that the above scheme of the division of the Śrutis into three groups, each of which finds a place in one independent Pāda, is revealed in certain Sūtras of Bra. Sū. III. 3. I have also discussed the views of the Ācāryas on the basis of the division of the Śrutis into these three Pādas. Besides the revelation of this scheme, there is another stand-point which

makes Bra. Sū. III. 3 the most important part of the entire work. As interpreted by me the Sūtras of Bra. Sū. III. 3 proceed from Adhikaraṇa to Adhikaraṇa to present in a regular series the information about the various items of primary concern to the meditation on the *two* aspects of Brahman, the *puruṣavidha* and the *apuruṣavidha*, of the Sūtrakāra's System. Such a series of Sūtras is not to be found in any other Pāda of the Brahmasūtra. I have shown the importance of this Pāda by comparing the aims of the Adhikaraṇas one by one as interpreted by me, with the aims of the same as outlined in the *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. I think, the sequence of links of thoughts I have discovered is remarkably regular and, therefore, of great importance for the study of the work itself. It seems that the Ācāryas, even Śaṅkarācārya, had no unbroken tradition regarding the interpretation of the Sūtras in Bra. Sū. III. 3. I am at present unable to account for the loss of tradition but the fact that the tradition *was lost* is revealed by my discovery of the meaning of each of its Sūtras. It is this Pāda (Bra. Sū. III. 3) in the interpretation of which Śaṅkarācārya himself seems to realize that he is not quite sure about what he writes, as shown by me through his own statements in his *bhāṣya* on this Pāda. I have collected fourteen such statements to which I have proposed to add nineteen others from his *bhāṣya*. Also this Pāda contains six *tad uktam* Sūtras in the interpretation of which the Ācāryas seem to have erred. Not only was the tradition about the interpretation of this Pāda lost long before Śaṅkarācārya, but, as I have discovered, the very text of this Pāda had undergone mutilation even before him (*vide infra*). There are other portions of the Brahmasūtra which are also important, *e. g.*, Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–41 and II. 1. The former contains the *tatpadārthavivecana*. The latter is called ' Smṛti Pāda ' which in my opinion uses the word ' *smṛti* ' not in the sense of Sāṁkhya but in that of the Gītā and which, as I understand it, gives the Sūtrakāra's views on the various doctrines of the

Gītā which are not in harmony with those of the Upaniṣads honoured by the Sūtrakāra[1] himself. But the importance of this Smṛti Pāda is partly at least due to the place which the Gītā holds for us as a religious book. Thə Gītā, perhaps had not so much importance for the Sūtrakāra who seems to us to be ready to give up the Smṛti which contradicted the Śruti according to the rule laid down by Jaimini. In short, the value of Bra. Sū. III. 3 is immense and is derived from the help which that Pāda renders in understanding the Sūtrakāra's own System, his own work and, I must add, his views about several Śrutis of the Upaniṣads (*Vide* 5 *infra*).

3. The Reconstruction of the Text of the Brahmasūtra:—We have referred above to the mutilation of the text of Bra. Sū. III. 3. It should be noticed here that in the course of my study of Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–IV, I have been able to suggest certain text-readings which are not found in the possession of any of the Ācāryas who wrote a *bhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtra. I have ventured to suggest these because I think that an intensive internal study of these Sūtras would justify these inferences. The number of these is eight in all, and I request the reader to go through my arguments in favour of them given fully in Part I.

Besides these text corrections, I have regrouped the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas. It is very well known that each of the Ācāryas has an Adhikaraṇa Pāṭha of his own. In the course of my study I discovered certain rules which would negatively govern the establishing of an Adhikaraṇa, *e. g.*, (i) a Sūtra with *ca* would never begin a new Adhikaraṇa, (ii) so also a Sūtra with the statement of an argument only (*hetu*, either by the particle *hi* or by a form of the ablative) will never stand at the beginning of an Adhikaraṇa, and (iii) other

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1. Vide for a fuller discussion my article "Meaning of 'Smṛti' in the Brahmasūtra", Indian Historical Quartely, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1936.

rules which would possibly show the characterstics of the *first* and the *last* Sūtras of an Adhikaraṇa. All these I have given in Chapter XII. On the strength of these rules, I have offered a reconstructed Adhikaraṇa Pāṭha.

Thus, the correction of the readings of the text itself and the regrouping of the Sūtras into Adhikaraṇas are two features of the inquiry I have made as regards the text of the Brahmasūtra.

4. The Method of Interpretation to be applied to the Brahmasūtra :—Also, in the province of the *method* of interpretation the present work has brought to light certain new lines of appoach which, I believe, will stand any critical scrutiny.

My inquiry in this direction is two-fold : (1) a study of Śaṅkara's method of Interpretation, Śaṅkara being taken as a representative of the Ācāryas, and his *bhāṣya* as a type of the *bhāṣyas* of the Ācāryas, and (2) a study of the Sūtras themselves (without the help of any *bhāṣya* as far as possible).

I must admit that an Ācārya is more than a mere interpreter. It is in the capacity of an Ācārya that Śaṅkara sometimes, after having interpreted the Sūtrakāra in the proper way, *openly sets aside* the latter's interpretation of a Śruti and proposes a new one suitable to his own School.

I must admit this right of an Ācārya, because I would have accepted even the right of an Ācārya to write altogether a new Brahmasūtra, Bādarāyaṇa being only the first of such Ācāryas. The duties of an Ācārya require more rights than those accorded to an interpreter, and one more important privilege of that position is the right to formulate a System of Vedanta (or Saṁkhya or any other) Philosophy to suit the time and circumstances and the temperament of the people whom he, as an Ācārya, has to guide to the Path of Liberation. This privilege implies the right of interpreting the Scripture so as to enable him to base on it the System proposed by the Ācārya. This interpretation requires the ability to

harmonize mutually contradictory texts of the Scripture, in which the Scripture abounds. All the Ācāryas have wonderfully succeeded in this task, and Śaṅkara's success is perhaps the most brilliant one. I appreciate his explanation of the contradictions in the Śruti and the Smṛti and his System based upon it. I am, however, in the present book concerned with Śaṅkara's interpretation of only the Brahmasūtra, one of his authorities for his System; so, I take him here as an interpreter only, not as an Ācarya.

When I examine the method of Śaṅkara's interpretation, I must say, I find many difficulties in accepting his interpretation as correct. I have tried to study very minutely his *bhāṣya* and have *for the first time* ventured to offer a detailed criticism of his method, pointing out the defects underlying his interpretation. I have tried to establish several conclusions about his method, of which the following seem to me to be very important:—(1) No scheme about the threefold classification of topics, *viz.*, *parā vidyā*, *aparā vidyā*, and *avidyā*, is intended in the Sūtras by the Sūtrakāra. (2) Śaṅkara sometimes gives two opposite interpretations of the same Śruti or Smṛti. (3) Śaṅkara's *viṣayavākyas* in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 2 and 3 are mostly not correct in the sense that either no *viṣayavākya* or a different one is intended by the Sūtrakāra. (4) Śaṅkara's interpretation of each Sūtra in Bra. Sū. III. 2 and 3 involves too many *unwarranted additions* to each Sūtra. And (5) his *bhāṣya* contains Pūrvapakṣas which are wrong, or impossible if not altogether absurd when we look at the Śruti quoted or the sense of the Sūtra itself.

Studying the Sūtras independently of any *bhāṣya* as far as possible, I have felt that the traditional method of *seven indications* for deciding the sense of a text (*liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṇaye*) is defective so far as the Brahmasūtra (or any other similar Sūtra work) is concerned, because the Ācāryas and even the modern scholars who have mostly followed the same

method have come to divergent conclusions. I have, therefore, made *ten* practical suggestions which may be added to those made by Dr. Ghate. These suggestions, I believe, are made here for the first time on the grounds of a critical, comparative and philological study of the Sūtras. Of these, the following may be simply enumerated here as being more important:—(1) The expression '*tad uktam*' which occurs about eight times in the Brahmasūtra (six times in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–IV) refers only to some of the Sūtras in the Brahmasūtra, that precede the particular Sūtra with the expression (*tad uktam*), and not to other works like the Jaimini Sūtra, the Upaniṣads, the Gautama Dharma Sūtra, the Bhāgavata and other Purāṇas, as supposed by Śaṅkara and other Ācāryas. (2) The *bahuvrīhi* compounds, *ānandādayaḥ*, *satyādayaḥ*, *āyatanādayaḥ* (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11, 38–39) refer respectively to Bra. Sū. I. 1, 2 and 3, and suggest the scheme of three divisions of the *viṣayavākyas* discussed in those three Pādas. Similarly, all other *bahuvrīhi* compounds, *e. g.*, *śabdādayaḥ* (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 58), *etc.*, should be explained as referring to the Sūtras themselves and not to any other list of attributes or arguments mentioned either in the Upaniṣads or elsewhere (except a compound like *codanādi* in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 which refers to a well established rule in the Jai. Sū.). (3) On critical grounds I have further suggested quite new *viṣayavākyas* in the case of several Sūtras. Out of these, I am quite sure of the correctness of about *twenty viṣayavākyas* suggested by me for the first time. These striking cases I have enumerated in Chap. XI of Part II. If they are really correct, they would help a great deal in deciding the nature of the Sūtrakāra's System. (4) Three of my suggestions (Nos. 4, 5 and 8) are based upon a philological inquiry, such as a study of the words, synonyms and mutually contrary terms. Thus, I suggest that words like *pradhāna*, *puruṣa*, *sthāna*, *upasaṁhāra*, *etc.*, *etc.*, must be studied from all the Sūtras in which they occur. Studying synonyms, I find that *arūpavat* and *sūkṣma*,

pradhāna and *mukhya, etc.*, are synonyms. *Arūpa* in *arūpavat* finds a contrary term in '*rūpa*' in '*rūpopanyāsa*'. The study of these last two terms gives a very important piece of information about the exact nature of the two aspects of Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra. (5) Sūtras being elliptical by the very nature of their style require to be completed in sense by the addition of some words. I have tried to explain in each case *what additions can be made to each Sūtra adhering strictly to the context at the same time.* In several of these (undoubtedly at least in eight) cases a remarkably correct conclusion seems to me to have been arrived at. Attaching the same importance to the context, I have made a practical suggestion about the interpretation of the work, that words like *ataḥ, pūrva, tad, tadā, anyathā, etc., etc.*, must be interpreted in strict consonance with the context. I have proposed a fresh interpretation for several Sūtras, adopting this suggestion as a rule of critical interpretation, and I believe that there are not a few cases in which my explanation, given for the first time, will be acceptable to the reader.

(5) The Sūtrakāra's Interpretation of certain Śrutis:—One more direction in which my inquiry has led me to discover noteworthy results is the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of several Śrutis. The consideration of this question is more closely allied with the Sūtrakāra's System rather than with the interpretation of the Brahmasūtra itself. But so far as the Brahmasūtra deals with the Śrutis, I have to discuss the latter from the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra, if their meaning can be made out from the several Sūtras.

I have already noticed that by "Śruti" the Sūtrakāra, for his purpose, understands only the Vedāntas (not the Mantra and the other Śrutis).

(*a*) The most essential piece of information discovered on this point is that according to the Sūtrakāra the Udaniṣads describe the personal aspect of Brahman with the attributes

of the impersonal and *vice versa* (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37–42). It is on this fact that the Sūtrakāra bases his doctrine of two aspects *of absolutely equal status* and gives a complete *option of choice* to a *mumukṣu* to select either of the two, the immediate goal being the same. The Sūtrakāra, according to his own statements, as discovered and interpreted by me for the first time, says that the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 2 and explained by him as referring to the *sākāra* or *puruṣavidha* aspect may be optionally taken by a *mumukṣu* as dealing with the *nirākāra* or *apuruṣavidha* aspect, because they profess to describe the *nirākāra*, but do so with attributes some of which qualify the *sākāra*. Similarly, he holds that the Śrutis he has explained in Bra. Sū. I. 3 as dealing with the *sākāra* may be optionally taken by a *mumukṣu* as dealing with the *nirākāra* because they profess to deal with the *sākāra*, but do so with attributes some of which properly belong to the *nirākāra*. The Sūtrakāra has refuted several important Pūrvapakṣas raised against this theory of his interpretation of the Śrutis and against his doctrinal views based on the same. These Pūrvapakṣas and their refutations by the Sūtrakāra cannot be recounted here for want of space.

(*b*) I have shown that there are Sūtras in Bra. Sū. III. 3, which definitely mean that the *akṣara*–Śrutis which describe Brahman negatively (*neti neti* Śrutis) are ' not useful for meditation ' (*ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt*) on either aspect according to the Sūtrakāra (Bra. Su. III. 3. 14; also see III. 3. 33).

(*c*) According to a Pūrvapakṣa (of a Śrauta Vedanta System ?) there are several Śrutis, particularly Kaṭha Upaniṣad III. 10–11, which describe the Puruṣa or personal aspect as higher than the Avyakta or the impersonal aspect of Brahman.

(*d–e*) The Sūtrakāra refutes an opponent's view which is, as I have shown, based upon the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, that Brahman is really affected by the states of waking, dreaming and deep

sleep as also by the fourth state, and that *because Brahman is thus affected*, it is both *rūpavat* or *sākāra* and *arūpavat* or *nirākāra*. This view is opposed by the Sūtrakāra on the strength of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, says that Brahman is unaffected by all these states.

Another Pūrvapakṣa, raised on the strength of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, holds that Brahman undergoes *vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* because it is influenced by the three states and it is refuted by the Sūtrakāra by quoting the Chāndogya Upaniṣad to show that the *vṛddhi* and *hrāsa* of Brahman are due to the self-concealment of Brahman in its effects which are also Brahman.

(*f–g*) The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti which distinguishes the Prajāpatiloka from Brahman itself is, according to the Sūtrakāra, to be interpreted in the light of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and the Prajāpatiloka is the *sākāra* aspect of the *Kāraṇa* Brahman itself and *not a Kārya* of Brahman. Similarly, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Śruti, stating that the vital airs and the senses of the knower of Brahman *do not depart* when the latter attains to Brahman, is according to the Sūtrakāra to be interpreted in the light of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which, again, according to the Sūtrakāra, describes the depature (*utkrānti*) of the sage *along with* the senses, *etc.*, when the latter leaves the gross body for his journey to the *nirākāra* Brahman.

There are several other very important Śrutis or Vedāntas on the interpretation of which my study of the Brahmasūtra has, for the first time, thrown a flood of light, even a brief summary of which cannot be given here. Those Śrutis will be found in Parts I and II. In a few Sūtras I have not been able to discover the *viṣayavākyas*, though the sense of the Sūtras derived from the context assures me of very useful information regarding the interpretation of the Śrutis referred to. If one approaches the Brahmasūtra *from* the Śrutis, after dividing the latter into the four subjects according to the four

Adhyāyas of the Brahmasūtra, and if he tries to make out what interpretation the Sūtrakāra gives to these Śrutis, instead of going *from* the Sūtras *to* the Śrutis, I am sure, he would discover very valuable and fresh information.

There are several Smṛtis particularly from the Bhagavadgītā, which the Sūtrakāra understands and explains in his own way, or rejects if they openly contradict a clear statement of the Śruti (*e. g.*, the time-restriction for a Yogin to get Mokṣa in Bha. Gī. VIII; Cf. Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 21), just as he clearly rejects several Śrutis if the latter directly oppose such honoured Śruti-texts as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (*e. g.*, the *priyaśirastvādi* Śruti in Tai. Upa. II. 5), though generally he interprets the Śrutis (*e. g.*, of the so-called Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads) in the light of his interpretation of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. We have already seen above that very important texts like those of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad about the non-departure (absence of *utkrānti*) of the Brahmajnānin's subtle body, and about the Prajāpatiloka, have been interpreted by the Sūtrakāra in the light of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad.

I may sum up the merits of Bādarāyaṇa by repeating what I have said at the end of Chaptar I of Part II :—

Bādarāyaṇa's main work was that of constructing a Vedānta Darśana by presenting a system acceptable to the followers of **all** the Upaniṣads, *i. e.*, of the Upaniṣads of *all* the Śākhās of *all* the Vedas. His views seem to have been like those of a balanced thinker. He did not insist that the *entire* Veda taught only Dharma (the Sacrifice) or only Brahman. While Jaimini seems to have held that Dharma was the only Precept of the whole Veda, Bādarāyaṇa believed that Brahman only was the Usufruction (*phalam*) because Brahman is declared to be the *cause* of Dharma, the Inspirer and the Master of Dharma*. This belief seems to have inspired

* पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 41). *Vide* my interpretation in Part I.

Bādarāyaṇa to offer a thesis about Brahman as the sole goal of the Upaniṣads only. He carefully avoided a conflict with Jaimini's School by insisting that Brahman was to be known *only* from the Upaniṣads, and by rejecting the view that the Pūrvakāṇḍa was to be interpreted in the light of the Upaniṣads. Thus, his view stands high above the two extremes, one of Jaimini himself and the other of a staunch Vedāntin who is not less staunch than that staunch Karmakāṇḍin. Again, in interpreting the Upaniṣads he adopted the well established method of Jaimini and improved upon it where necessary, as when he says that even if in *one* Śākhā of *each* Veda the *saṁyoga, rūpa, codanā* and *ākhyā* of Brahman are the same, he would conclude that Brahman is the topic of *all* the Vedāntas. This shows that he was not a blind follower of the method of Jaimini. He used his own intelligence in applying that method to the Upaniṣads. The fact that Bādarāyaṇa rejects a Pūrvapakṣa, not accepting the Puruṣa as an aspect of Brahman, shows that in accepting the *arūpavat* conception of Brahman and in so far siding with the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads he was not blind to the special contribution of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, *viz.*, the superpersonal conception of Brahman. In so far as he rejects the Pūrvapakṣa, believing in the superiority of the Puruṣa over the Avyakta, and argues that the Upaniṣads 'deny a second reality', *he gives a death blow to the dualistic tendency* of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā, and saves the Vedānta Darśana once and for all from becoming another Sāṁkhya (or dualistic) School with *two* conscious Principles, one *nirākāra* and the other *sākāra*. Moreover he has tried to be logical as fas as possible since an appeal to the word of the Śruti is generally a *second* argument with him†. Only in the case of *an open conflict* between rational argument and the revealed Scripture, he has to say that " For

† *E. g.* Bra. Sū. III. 2. 39, III 4. 46, *etc.*

a believer in the Scripture, the express word of a text is the foundation of his belief and is more important than a rational argument ".‡ But when such circumstances do not arise, he is a free thinker and does not hesitate to reject such Śruti texts as appear inconsistent with his System, and accepts only such as are consistent with the same. Thus, he rejects the *priyaśirastvādi* Śruti, because it implies a difference of degrees in the Bliss within Brahman itself and the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad because the latter believes in the waking and other states as really affecting Brahman. Since he rejects even these Śrutis, it would be no wonder if he is found to reject, or to interpret in his own way, a Smṛti like the Gītā, whenever the latter is in conflict with his System drawn from the Śruti. Thus, he rejects the view of the Bhagavadgītā which holds that the knower of Brahman returns to this world if he dies during the southern course of the Sun (*dakṣiṇāyana*). He says that this rule applies only to the Yogin and that it is only a Smārta rule, not a Śrauta one. It is due to this boldness, on the part of the Sūtrakāra, of accepting literally a Śruti though it may be inconsistent with *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna,* and of rejecting a Śruti if it be contradictory to his own System of Vedanta, that while reading his work we are spared the intellectual jugglery of words which we often find in the commentaries of the Ācāryas who try to effect a compromise even when the three Prasthānas are in open conflict with one another. An example of this is supplied to us by Śaṅkara's effort to interpret Bha. Gī. VIII. 24-25 as referring to the conductor-deities though the verses clearly speak of the time-deities as the Sūtrakāra distinctly states. On the whole, the Sūtrakāra's system is based upon a bold and straightforward interpretation of the Scripture and he seems to have been a great saviour of the Vedānta School, who saved it, on the one hand, from being divided into so many sects and, on the other, from being plunged into a dualistic philosophy.

‡ *E. g.* Bra. Sū. II. 1. 27.

While I differ from Śaṅkarācarya and other Ācaryas regarding the interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's work and his doctrines, I must admit, as I have already done above, that my interpretation, exposition and expression cannot always be free from errors inspite of my efforts to avoid them. Though the conclusions drawn here are faithful to the original text within my own capacities, I cannot promise to stick to them under all circumstances, having myself arrived at them after revising them from time to time. Bearing in mind these facts I offer my interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's work, as a humble student and student only, and crave the indulgence of sympathetic readers (*ahetukasnehas*) in the following words of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the great saint and seeker after truth, uttered with reference to his commentary on the Gītā :—

वचो यद्गीताख्यं परमपुरुषस्यागमगिरां
रहस्यं तद्व्याख्यामनतिनिपुणः को वितनुताम् ।
अहं त्वेतद्बाल्यं यदिह कृतवानस्मि कथम-
प्यहेतुस्नेहानां तदपि कुतुकायैव महताम् ॥

(गूढार्थदीपिका on Bha. Gī. XVIII. 66).

A CRITIQUE OF THE BRAHMASŪTRA

PART I

Interpretation of the Brahmasūtra

CHAPTER I

SECTION I

Brahman unaffected by the Waking and other States. Two kinds of Śrutis describe Brahman in all its (four) States.

Sūtras III. 2. 11-19

(११) न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ।

(१२) भेदान्नेति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् ।

(१३) अपि चैवमेके ।

(१४) अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

(१५) प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात्* ।

(१६) आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

(१७) दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते ।

(१८) अत एव चोपमा सूर्यकादिवत् ।

(१९) अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् ।

* Saṅkara's predecessor begins a new Adhikaraṇa here.

TRANSLATION

THE two kinds of sentences cannot refer to (the Highest One) also from the stand-point of the states, because [both the kinds of sentences refer to It] in *all* [the states]. 11

If it be argued, " [The two kinds of sentences do] not [refer to the Highest One in all the states] because of the difference [of the states], " we reply, " No. [The difference of the states does not affect the Highest One] because with reference to every [state] there is a statement contrary to that [*i. e.* the difference of states affecting the Highest One]." 12

Moreover, so say the followers of a certain Branch. 13

[Both kinds of sentences refer to the Highest One] because It is formless only (*arūpavad eva*) in so far as that [*arūpavat* aspect] is the principal [aspect of Brahman]. 14

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" [Brahman is] like 'light' as well, because it should not be meaningless. 15

And the Śruti declares It to be *only* that [*i. e.* light]. 16

And the Śruti shows it and the Smṛti also mentions it. 17

And only on account of this [we find] the comparison [of Brahman] like the one with an aggregate of suns, *etc.*" 18

[Siddhānta]—" But Brahman has not the characteristics of things like the above (*i. e.* the sun, *etc.*), because of Its impossibility of being caught (*i. e.* reflected) as [the sun *etc.* are reflected] in water." 19

NOTES

Sūtra 11

1. स्थान—This Pāda (Bra. Sū. III. 2) seems to deal with the different states, जागरित, स्वप्न and सुषुप्त, of the individual soul and of the Supreme Being. The first Sūtra (संध्ये सृष्टिराह हि ।) refers to the Śruti " संध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानम् " (Br. Upa. IV. 3. 9). Therefore, स्थान in this Sūtra means the *states* of जागरित, स्वप्न and सुषुप्त. The word स्थान is similarly used in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (जागरितस्थानः, स्वप्नस्थानः, सुषुप्तस्थानः Mā. Upa. 3-5), and, as will be shown below, it is very likely that this Sūtra refers to that Upaniṣad. (See स्थान in Sūtra III. 2. 34 also.) If we interpret the word स्थान in this sense, we have not to suspect this discussion of the Supreme Self (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11-41) to be an interpolation because we can then say that Pāda II of Adhyāya III deals with the states of the individual soul *and those* of the Supreme Soul.[1]

2. अपि—The Sūtrakāra here implies the denial of the application of the two kinds of sentences to the Supreme Being *from some other stand-point* than that of the states of Brahman. अपि, therefore, refers to a पूर्वपक्ष which tried to explain the उभयलिङ्गs of the Supreme Being, by some way other than that of referring them to the states of Brahman. What this other method of explaining the उभयलिङ्गs was, can be guessed possibly from the expression उभयलिङ्गम्. Some opponents seem to have argued that there were two types of sentences describing Brahman, and therefore these *two* types referred to *two different Brahmans.* The अरूपवत् Brahman was different from the रूपवत् Brahman, and the अरूपवत् Śrutis and the रूपवत् Śrutis described these two different Brahmans. There is a

1. *Vide* Belvelkar, Shree Gopal Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta Philosophy, Page 145.

similar पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1–4, which seems to hold that the Vedantas teach not one, but two different Brahmans.[2] See also the पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31–37 which holds that there is *another* Brahman *beyond* the अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् and which the Sūtrakāra refutes by pointing to the अन्यप्रतिषेधश्रुतिs, *i. e.*, the Śrutis which deny the existence of a *second* Brahman (Sūtra III. 2. 36). So, अपि seems to imply the refutation of a पूर्वपक्ष believing that there were *two* Brahmans, one अरूपवत् and another रूपवत् and that the रूपवत् called also पुरुष was higher than the अरूपवत् called अव्यक्त. See also the पूर्वपक्ष and its refutation in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26–27.

For the arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष believing पुरुष to be higher than अव्यक्त, see our notes on Sūtra III. 2. 31.

3. उभयलिङ्गम्—Sūtra 14 makes mention of the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman implying at the same time its रूपवत् aspect. It signifies that अरूपवत् is the *principal* (प्रधान) and implies that रूपवत् is the subordinate aspect. Also Sūtra III. 2. 27 indicates that ब्रह्मन् being designated by *two* names is like अहि and कुण्डल. We, therefore, suggest that उभयलिङ्ग should mean sentences which describe Brahman as अरूपवत् and those which describe Brahman as रूपवत्.[3] The Sūtrakāra seems to speak of अरूपवत् and रूपवत् rather than निर्गुण and सगुण Brahman. Thus we have to distinguish between Śrutis which describe ब्रह्मन् as अरूपवत्, *e. g.*, like अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् (Br. Upa. III. 8. 8) and Śrutis which describe ब्रह्मन् as रूपवत् like अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः। वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4. Cf. the प्रादेशमात्र वैश्वानर आत्मन् in Chā. Upā. V. 12–18).

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2. Perhaps this पूर्वपक्ष can be traced to the Mahābhārata Aupaniṣada Schools. See P. M. Modi, Akṣara: A forgotten chapter in the history of Indian Philosophy, Chapter III.

3. *Vide* "The scheme of Bra. Su. I. 1–3. A Rapprochement," by P. M. Modi, Bombay University Journal, Vol. IV, Part III, Nov. 1935.

According to the Sūtrakāra अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् is not in conflict with सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 2), because both these types of Śrutis refer to both the aspects of Brahman the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत्.[4] Neither of the two aspects is निर्गुण "absolutely without attributes."

4. स्थानतः परस्य उभयलिङ्गम्—This seems to be a reference to a view like the one expressed in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, according to which the अरूपवत् sentences would be applicable to the चतुर्थस्थान Brahman and the रूपवत् ones to the जागरितस्थान, स्वप्नस्थान and सुषुप्तस्थान Brahman (Mā. Upa. 9-11). According to that Upaniṣad, the individual soul and the Supreme Soul have each of them *three* states जागरित, स्वप्न, and सुषुप्त, and corresponding to these three states the जीव is called विश्व, तैजस, and प्राज्ञ, while the Supreme Being is called विराट्, हिरण्यगर्भ and (अन्तर्यामी) ईश्वर. Beyond these three is a fourth state which is called तुरीय (but) which transends the above three states. In that state the जीव and ब्रह्मन् become identified. The उभयलिङ्गs of the Śrutis are to be explained as referring to Brahman in different states. The *rūpavat* Śrutis will refer to Brahman in the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states described in Māṇḍūkya Upa. 3-6 and the *arūpavat* Śrutis to Brahman in the fourth state described in Mā. Upa. 7.

It will be in agreement with this Pūrvapakṣa that in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 14 the Sūtrakāra points to the mention of the dreaming and deep sleep states in the *viṣayavākya* as an argument to prove that the Śruti in question deals with the Puruṣa or the sākāra aspect.

5. न–The Śutrakāra refutes the above view of explaining the two kinds of sentences as referring to Brahman in different states. As distinguished from this Pūrvapakṣa the Sūtrakāra's Siddhānta will be that Brahman is both sākāra and nirākāra in all the four states.

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4. Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37—व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत्।

6. सर्वत्र हि—He gives an argument why he rejects the view of स्थानत: परस्य उभयलिङ्गम्. He says that the उभयलिङ्गम् is applicable to Brahman in *all* the (four) *states.* "सर्वत्र" will according to the context mean सर्वेषु स्थानेषु.

7. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra discusses the question whether ब्रह्मन् is सविशेष or निर्विशेष, because there are both the सविशेष and निर्विशेष श्रुतिs. We have suggested above that the Sūtrakāra seems to distinguish between Śrutis referring to रूपवत् and अरूपवत् aspects of Brahman, both of which possess विशेषs or गुणs. Moreover, the Sūtrakāra seems here to discuss how *both* the Śrutis can refer to Brahman. He does not seem to favour Śaṅkara's view that one type of Śrutis is less important or less valid than the other. "उभयलिङ्ग श्रुत्यनुग्रहादुभयलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म" is not the पूर्वपक्ष as Śaṅkara says but it is the सिद्धान्त.

अपि indicates according to Śaṅkara the inclusion of "स्वतः एव". We have shown that *certain* Sūtras give a पूर्वपक्ष according to which there is another Brahman higher than the अव्यक्त (or अक्षर) ब्रह्मन्, *e. g.*, Bra. Sū. III 2. 31; so, it apperars to us that अपि refers to that पूर्वपक्ष in those Sūtras. Śaṅkara's पूर्वपक्ष is not supported by any पूर्वपक्ष Sūtras. Rather Śaṅkara's argument "न ह्येकं वस्तु स्वतः एव रूपादिविशेषोपेतं तद्विपरीतं चेत्यवधारयितुं शक्यं, विरोधात्।" is contradicted by the Sūtras themselves, *e. g.*, III. 2. 14, III. 2. 27 (उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहि कुण्डलवत्. See Śaṅkara's own Bhāṣya on it). The Sūtrakāra's arguments as to how Brahman itself is to be looked upon as अरूपवत् and रूपवत् are given in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37–52.

"स्थानतः" means according to Śaṅkara "पृथिव्याद्युपाधियोगात्." This interpretation of the word स्थान is responsible for the suspicion of several scholars as to the genuineness of the discussion of Brahman in this Pāda. We have shown above that "स्थानतः" means the जागरित, स्वप्न and सुषुप्त स्थानs, and that the Sūtra seems to refer to a view like the one given

in the Mā. Upa. Dr. Belvelkar also takes स्थान in the sense of states but the quotation given by him (Basū Mallik Lectures, P. 165-166) does not seem to substantiate the view.

According to Śaṅkara, the refutation of 'स्थानतोऽपि' leads to the necessity of "अन्यतरलिङ्गपरिग्रह" and to the inference "अतश्चान्यतरलिङ्ग परिग्रहेऽपि समस्त विशेषरहितं निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्." This inference is not even suggested in the Sūtra, because the Sūtrakāra seems to explain Brahman in such a way that *both* the types of sentences be applicable to Brahman at the same time, in the same state.

'सर्वत्र हि' is an argument not for rejecting the सविशेष ब्रह्मन् as Śaṅkara understands it, but for proving that "न स्थानतोऽपि परस्य उभयलिङ्गम्," as we have shown. "सर्वत्र" is explained by Śaṅkara as "ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु वाक्येषु" but from the context it seems to mean "सर्वेषु स्थानेषु" in all the four states.

And, lastly, in consistency with the context we should add "(सर्वेषु स्थानेषु) परस्य उभयलिङ्गम्" instead of "(ब्रह्मस्वरूप प्रतिपादन परेषु वाक्येषु 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्' इत्येवमादिषु) अपास्तसमस्तविशेषमेव ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते," as Śaṅkara adds, whereby Śaṅkara contradicts his own assertion (सन्ति उभयलिङ्गाः श्रुतयः ब्रह्मविषयाः) at the begining of his commentary on this very Sūtra.

Sūtra 12

8. "न, भेदात्" should mean "परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वेषु स्थानेषु न, स्थानानां भेदात् परस्य उभयलिङ्गम्." The स्थानs differ and, therefore, the twofold sentences can be applicable to Brahman as referring to the different states of Brahman. Thus, the Śrutis about the रूपवत् Brahman would be applicable to जागरितस्थान, स्वप्नस्थान and सुषुप्तस्थान Brahman, and those about the अरूपवत् Brahman to चतुर्थस्थान Brahman.

9. प्रत्येकम् would mean 'in each of these states' Cf. सर्वत्र in Sūtra 11 with प्रत्येकम् here.

अतद्वचनात् means because there is a statement in the Śruti to the contrary. Thus, प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् means 'because there is a statement in the Śrutis that Brahman does not differ in each of three or four states.' अतद्वचनात् should mean अभेदवचनात्. The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to Chā. Upa. VIII. 7-12. This is the famous dialogue between प्रजापति and इन्द्र whom विरोचन accompanies in the first stage only. The Sūtrakāra has proved in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14-21 that this passage deals with Brahman; Sūtra I. 3. 18 refers to Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. In this passage it is proved that ब्रह्मन् the पुरुष in the eye who is अपहतपाप्मन्, सत्यसंकल्प *etc.* is the same in the waking, dreaming and deep sleep states (Chā. Upa. VIII. 9, 10 and 11 respectively). In each of these states it is shown that the Supreme Being remains the same. Thus प्रत्येकम् (=प्रत्येकस्थानम्), अतद्वचनात् (= अभेदवचनात्) seems to refer to Chā. Upa. VIII. 7-11. Cf. also एष उ एवेषु सर्वेषु अन्तेषु परिहव्यायते (*in all the states*, अन्त = a state as in जागरितान्त, बुद्धान्त...). Also in Chā. Upa. VIII. 11. 3 Prajāpati tells Indra that Brahman is *the same* (नो एवान्यत्रैतस्मात्) when not in any of the three states *i. e.* when in the fourth state. Indra stays for five years more to get this knowledge. The same becomes mainfest in its own form when without a body (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 1-3).

10. Śaṅkara takes 'न' to mean the denial of *his* conclusion in Sūtra 11. *i. e.*, "न निर्विकल्पकमेकलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म." But on the strength of the context the Sūtrakāra is shown by us to have meant "परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वेषु स्थानेषु." So, this seems to have been denied by the पूर्वपक्ष by "न, भेदात्."

'भेदात्' is interpreted by Śaṅkara as "भिन्ना हि प्रतिविद्यं ब्रह्मणः आकाराः उपदिश्यन्ते।" and he refers भेदात् to the various विद्याs of the Upniṣads. भेदात्, according to the context, should refer to the difference in Brahman due to the difference of states, as shown above, and in that case the reference would be to the Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad passage mentioned in Note 1 above.

प्रत्येकम् is interpreted by Śaṅkara to mean "प्रत्युपाधिभेदम्"; this is cosistent with *his* explanation of स्थान in the preceding Sūtra but inconsistent with the general sense of the Pāda and the probable reference in this Sūtra to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, according to which प्रत्येकम् should refer to प्रतिस्थानम् "in each state." Śaṅkara rightly explains अतद्वचनात् as अभेदवचनात् but it should be the अभेद of Brahman in all the four states taken singly.

11. It should be noted that if the above interpretation of Sūtras 11 and 12 be correct, we have here an important piece of information as to how the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Chā. Upa. VIII. 7-12 were interpreted in the days of the Sūtrakāra. It seems that the four states described in the Māṇḍūkya and the Chā. Upa. were believed to be real, and not illusionary, but while the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad was taken to mean that Brahman really differed according as It was in the three states or in the fourth and therefore it may be said to refer to the doctrine of difference in Brahman in these states; the Chā. Upa. was interpreted to understand the states to be not at all affecting Brahman or, in other words, as asserting Brahman to be the same in all its (real) states, thus demonstrating the doctrine of the sameness of Brahman in all the states. And this *sameness* means *two-foldness.* The भेद asserted by the पूर्वपक्ष in Sūtra 12 was a reality (not appearance) and therefore the Chā. Upa. passage really differed from the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad in the doctrine about the states of Brahman.[5]

Sūtra 13

12. अपि चैवमेके–This seems to be a reference to a Śruti supporting the statement of Sūtra 11. The पूर्वपक्ष's argument "न भेदात्" in Sūtra 12 was refuted by the Sūtrakāra in प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् in the same Sūtra (12). Now, in Sūtra 13 he

5. As a result of this conclusion, the Gauḍapāda Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad do not seem to correctly represent the sense of the Upaniṣad.

supports his own position by referring to a Śruti which says that उभयलिङ्ग belongs to the Supreme Being *in all states* at all times. Thus, the Sūtrakāra refers to a Śruti which says that that same Brahman which is अरूपवत् is also simultaneously रूपवत्. The reference is probably to Śve. Upa. III. 16-20:—

सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम् ।
सर्वतः श्रुतिमल्लोके सर्वमावृत्य तिष्ठति ॥ १६ ॥
सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् ।
सर्वस्य प्रभुमीशानं सर्वस्य शरणं बृहत् ॥ १७ ॥

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अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः ।
स वेत्ति वेद्यं न च तस्यास्ति वेत्ता तमाहुरग्र्यं पुरुषं महान्तम् ॥ १९ ॥
अणोरणीयान्महतो महीयान् .... ॥ २० ॥

Thus, the same Brahman is both सर्वतः पाणिपाद and अपाणिपाद. In other words, Brahman is at the same time both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् without any reference to the different states.

13. Śaṅkara understands this Sūtra also as an answer to the पूर्वपक्ष "न, भेदात्" in Sūtra 12. But this seems to be impossible if we look to the method of the Sūtrakāra. First of all he makes a proposition, next he gives a पूर्वपक्ष and its refutation, and *then* he generally gives a reference to a Śruti in support of his proposition. Thus, we find, Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 contains the proposition, Sūtra III. 3. 2-3 give the पूर्वपक्ष and its refutation, and Sūtra III. 3. 4 gives the reference to the Śruti supporting the Sūtrakāra's proposition. In the present case Sūtra III. 2. 13 corresponds to Sūtra III. 3. 4 so far as the method is concerned. For this reason Sūtra 13 should be taken as referring to a text supporting the Sūtrakāra's statement in Sūtra 11.[6]

Śaṅkara gives a quotation from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and then adds "तथाऽन्येऽपि" "and so say the followers of another

6. Refer to Chapter IX of Part II.

Branch also". Generally the word 'एके' in the Brahmasūtra shows a reference to a Śruti the like of which is not found in any other Branch of the Veda (See एके in Sūtras III. 4. 42, एकेषाम् in IV. 1. 17, etc.). If this is the convention adopted by the Sūtrakāra for proceeding with his argumentation, if this be correct, then both the Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara are out of place here.

Sūtra 14

14. As this Sūtra contains हि and as it follows a reference (to a Śruti) made by the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 13), it would be likely that this Sūtra is intended to explain that Śruti. When a rational argument (Sūtra 14 refers to no Śruti but presents only an argument) follows an assertive statement in a Sūtra, that argument seems to have been used to substantiate the Sūtrakāra's view expressed in that statement. But when an argument follows a reference to a Śruti, the former seems to have been intended to explain primarily the latter, though ultimately it would also explain the main proposition of the Sūtrakāra also.

14*a*. The Śruti referred to under Sūtra 13 says that Brahman is simultaneously both अरूपवत् and रूपवत्. It is सर्वतः पाणिपादम् and अपाणिपादः *etc., etc.* In Sūtra 14 the Sūtrakāra says that this is possible because Brahman is *chiefly* अरूपवत् and *secondarily* रूपवत्. In other words, if Brahman were *both* रूपवत् and अरूपवत् in the literal sense, there would be a self-contradiction and then the Śruti in question would not be rationally explained. But such is not the case. Brahman is *only* अरूपवत्, because it is *chiefly* अरूपवत्. And this is the *interpretation* of the Śruti (Śve. Upa. III. 16–20). So on the strength of the Śruti one can say without being inconsistent that Brahman is *simultaneously* both अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, as the Sūtrakāra himself does in Sūtra 11.

14*b*. The Śruti (Śev. Upa. III. 16–20) declares Brahman to be both सर्वतः पाणिपाद and अपाणिपाद; and the Sūtrakāra has

stated that It is primarily अपाणिपाद. There was a Vedanta tradition in the days of the Sūtrakāra which was inclined to take this Śruti as declaring Brahman to be *primarily* रूपवत् (See Bra. Sū. III. 20. 31–36) and thereby probably asserting that Brahman is only " स्थानतः उभयलिङ्गम् " *i. e.*, different states of Brahman explain the रूपवत् and अरूपवत् sentences about Brahman, *viz.*, the रूपवत् sentences should describe Brahman in the जागरित, स्वप्न and सुषुप्तस्थानs, and the अरूपवत् ones in चतुर्थस्थान. This view is explained and refuted in Sūtras III. 2. 15–19.

15. अरूपवत्—This is a very important Sūtra for understanding the Sūtrakāra's conception of Brahman with the help of his own terminology. In Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23 (रूपोपन्यासाच्च), the Sūtrakāra argues that the topic of Mu. Upa. I. 1. 6. is पुरुष because of the presentation of His form in Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4. In this Sūtra (III. 2. 14) we are told that Brahman is अरूपवत् एव. Thus, a doubt would arise as to the Sūtrakāra's view regarding the रूपवत्ता or अरूपवत्ता of Brahman. That doubt is solved by the present Sūtra. Brahman, according to the Sūtrakāra, is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, but the अरूपवत् *aspect is the principal aspect and therefore Brahman can be said to be* अरूपवत् *only.* By using the expression " उभयलिङ्ग " (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11), the Sūtrakāra has admitted that Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत्.

15*a*. रूप—It is clear that according to the Sūtrakāra the Supreme Being is both अरूपवत् (Sūtra III. 3. 14) and रूपवत् (Sūtra 1. 2. 23—रूपोपन्यासाच्च ।). The रूप of Brahman which is meant in these expressions (अरूपवत्, रूपोपन्यास, *etc.*) is the रूप of पुरुष. We have shown elsewhere[7] that in Bra. Sū. I. 3 the Sūtrakāra's chief argument in deciding the subject of a Śruti (*i. e.*, deciding whether the Śruti in question deals with the अरूपवत् or रूपवत् aspect of Brahman) is that the Śruti mentions the word पुरुष. Thus, मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेश (Sūtra I. 3. 2) means पुरुषव्यपदेश in तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् (Muṇḍaka Upa. III. 2. 8.), ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेश (Sūtra I. 3. 13) is

7. *Vide* Appendix on Bra. Sū. I. 3.

पुरुषव्यपदेश in स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात् परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते (Pra. Upa. V. 5), शब्द (Sūtra I. 3. 24) refers to पुरुष in अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः (Kaṭha Upa. IV. 13-14). The रूपवत् aspect is referred to by पुरुषविद्या in पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 24; *vide* our interpretation). Again in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26 (शब्दादिभ्यः.........पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ।) the Sūtrakāra emphasizes the fact that the followers of one Branch of the Veda recite Brahman as पुरुष and, according to Śaṅkara, this very Sūtra was read by a predecessor of his as पुरुषविधमपि चैनमधीयते and it is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to स यो हैतमेवमग्निं वैश्वानरं पुरुषविधं पुरुषेऽन्तः प्रतिष्ठितं वेद (Śa. Brā. X. 6. 1. 11) where the reading पुरुषविध occurs, which justifies the text of the Sūtra known to Śaṅkara's predecessor. It is thus the रूप of पुरुष stated in अग्निर्मूर्धा चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः । वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4), which is meant by the Sūtrakāra (Sūtra I. 2. 23).

15*b*. In taking Brahman as possessed of these two aspects, अरूपवत् or अपुरुषविध and रूपवत् or पुरुषविध, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to adopt or to follow a once prevalent Vedanta tradition which had already adopted the same attitude regarding the nature or aspects of Brahman as was done by Yāska in respect of the nature or aspects of the देवताs of the Ṛgveda. He clearly gives two पूर्वपक्षs, *viz.*, one holding that the dieties are पुरुषविध and the other believing that they are अपुरुषविधः and then he gives his own view that they are possessed of both the traits (उभयविध).[8]

Our interpretation of the Sūtras and the conclusion about the Sūtrakāra's view regarding the nature of Brahman arrived

8. Cf. अथाकारचिन्तनं देवतानाम् । Nirukta VII. 6. 1.
पुरुषविधाः स्युरित्येकम् । „ VII. 6. 2.
अपुरुषविधाः स्युरित्यपरम् । „ VII. 7. 1.
अपि वोभयविधाः स्युः । „ VII. 7. 7.

at by us differ widely from the same propounded by Śaṅkara, his predecessors and his followers. It is very likely that a doubt may be raised against our view on the ground that it is not corroborated by any Vedantic tradition. We in reply submit that Yāska's view about the nature of dieties supplies the source of the Sūtrakāra's view about Brahman. Yāska also believed that it is one Atman only who is praised in various ways (in as many ways as there are dieties). In any case the Sūtrakāra's view and that of Yāska are strikingly similar and therefore deserve to be compared with each other for the historical development of the former's doctrine of the two aspects of Brahman. The introduction of the very word पुरुषविध (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26) suggests an inkling on the part of the Sūtrakāra from Yāska's view. Thus, this statement lends an authoritative support to the view expressed by us above.

16. तत्प्रधानत्वात्—The Sūtrakāra says that the अरूपवत् aspect is the principal aspect of Brahman so that we are justified in concluding that the रूपवत् aspect is the *subordinate* aspect of Brahman.

The word प्रधान in this expression throws light on the meaning of the same word (प्रधान) in Sūtra III. 3. 11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य). आनन्द and the attributes which subsequently follow in series refer to the principal aspect of Brahman, *i. e.*, to the अरूपवत् aspect. By प्रधान the Sūtrakāra means the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman[9]. See also the reading प्रधानवत् instead of प्रदानवत्, suggested by us in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43.

As regards the predominence of the अरूपवत् aspect over the रूपवत् aspect (' तत्प्रधानत्वात् ') Sūtra III. 3. 44 says that the प्रधान aspect of Brahman is " more powerful " (बलीयस्) because a majority of texts mentions that aspect (लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् तद्धि बलीयः—Sū. III. 3. 44).

9. *Vide* Note on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11

17. Śaṅkara interprets अरूपवदेव in the sense that Brahman is not रूपवत् *at all* (रूपाद्याकाररहितमेव ब्रह्मावधारयितव्यं, न रूपादिमत्।). He does this by explaining तत्प्रधानत्वात् as "अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम्" (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8)......इत्येवमादीनि वाक्यानि निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मतत्वप्रधानानि नार्थान्तरप्रधानानीत्येत्प्रतिष्ठापितं 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 4) इत्यत्र।. Thus, he takes "अस्थूलमनणु... ...इत्येवमादीनां वाक्यानाम्" (तत्प्रधानत्वात्) as understood. For this *addition* to the Sūtra there is no word in the Sūtra itself nor is there any indication for the reference to Bra. Sū. I. 1. 4. तत् in तत्प्रधानत्वात् should be taken as referring to अरूपवत् a word in the Sūtra itself rather than to निष्प्रपञ्चब्रह्मात्मतत्त्व. Moreover, Śaṅkara does not take into consideration the word उभयलिङ्गम् in Sūtra 11, which seems to us to suggest that the Sūtrakāra discusses the question of the application of the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् sentences to Brahman and that for that reason तत्प्रधानत्वात् would mean "because the अरूपवत् aspect is the principal one (and the रूपवत् is the subordinate)." It need hardly be said that Śaṅkara does not notice the question of the consistency of this Sūtra with Bra. Sū. I. 2. 23 (रूपोपन्यासाच्च) and III. 3. 11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य).

Sūtra 15

18. To us it appears that Sūtras 15-18 form a पूर्वपक्ष which is refuted by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 19. This is proved by तु in Sūtra III. 2. 19 and by the fact that in Sūtra II. 3. 46 Brahman is decided to be not like light. The expressions प्रकाशादिवत् and प्रकाशाश्रयवत् in Sūtras III. 2. 25 and 28 and the Sūtrakāra's remarks there also prove our suggestion that Sūtra III. 2. 25 is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र. In Sūtras 15-18 an attempt is made by a पूर्वपक्ष to establish that the Supreme Being is like light in addition to its being अरूपवत्. This पूर्वपक्षिन् seems to believe that Brahman is *equally* रूपवत् and अरूपवत् or that Brahman is primarily रूपवत् and only in a secondary sense अरूपवत्, if the argument 'प्रकाशादिवत्' has the meaning we understand it to convey. Thus, the पूर्वपक्षिन् would be one

who regarded पुरुष to be higher than अव्यक्त (See *infra* Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31). In Sūtra II. 3. 46 (प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः) it is said that ' the individual soul is like light *etc.*, but the Supreme Soul is not like that. ' This is the Siddhānta of the Sūtrakāra and it is established in Sūtra III. 2. 19 (अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् ।).

19. The पूर्वपक्षिन् seems to us to argue that if the Supreme Being were like ' light, ' just as the individual soul, then the three states of waking, dreaming and deep-sleep would affect the Supreme Being, as they do the जीव. This is how the Sūtras 15–19 belong to the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtras 11–14.

20. If Sūtra 15 begins a पूर्वपक्ष under the उभयलिङ्गाधिकरण, what reading is better, प्रकाशवद्वावैय्यर्थ्यात् (Bhāskara) or प्रकाशवच्चावैय्यर्थ्यात् (Śaṅkara) ?

21. अवैयर्थ्यात—If Brahman were declared to be principally *formless* (अरूपवत्) and if at the same time it was denied to be like light (*i. e.*, of the nature of light), It would be a *meaningless* principle. A principle which has no form can be understood to be an entity only when that principle is believed to be like light, otherwise it would be, to give a Sanskrit simile, like *vandhyāputra.* When Brahman is said to be अरूपवत् by the सिद्धान्तिन्, the पूर्वपक्षिन् asserts that, in that case, Brahman can be an entity only if It is admitted to be like light. The intention of the पूर्वपक्ष in offering this argument is to nullify the conclusion drawn by the सिद्धान्त by asserting that Brahman is " only " formless, *viz.*, that Brahman is unaffected by the states. When a principle is like light, its अरूपवत्त्व would be only partial or secondary since, as the logicians (तार्किक s) believe, light has a brilliant form (Cf. भास्वरं शुक्लं च तेजसि । तर्कसंग्रह 19.). Consequently the अरूपवत् Brahman would be भास्वरशुक्लरूपवत् and hence liable to change caused by states.

अवैयर्थ्यात् is a rational argument to prove the प्रकाशवत्त्व of Brahman, while Sūtras 16–17–18 give arguments based upon

the Scripture to prove the same. The Sūtrakāra's reply is that Brahman is like 'light' but not of the nature of light (न तथात्वम्–Sūtra 19), so that it remains अरूपवत् in its nature and therefore unaffected by the states.

22. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 15 begins a question about the interpretation of Śrutis which describe Brahman as possessed of आकार or रूप. "प्रकाशवत्" means according to him "यथा प्रकाशः सौरश्चान्द्रमसो वा वियद्व्याप्यावतिष्ठमानोऽङ्गुल्याद्युपाधिसंबन्धात्तेष्वृजुवक्रादिभावं प्रतिपद्यमानेषु तद्भावमिव प्रतिपद्यते। एवं (ब्रह्मापि पृथिव्याद्युपाधिसंबन्धात्तदाकारमिव प्रतिपद्यते तदालम्बनो ब्रह्मण आकारविशेषोपदेश उपासनार्थो न विरोध्यते।" This is Śaṅkara's explanation of the way in which the illustration of प्रकाश is to be applied to Brahman. "अवैयर्थ्यात्" "is interpreted by Śaṅkara as "एवमवैयर्थ्यमाकारवद्ब्रह्मविषयाणामपि वाक्यानां भविष्यति." Thus, according to Śaṅkara, अवैयर्थ्यात् refers to आकारवद्ब्रह्मवाक्यs, while the next Sūtra (16) refers to निर्विशेषब्रह्मवाक्यs. Śaṅkara, thus, tries to draw from this Sūtra the distinction between the उपास्य ब्रह्मन् and the ज्ञेय ब्रह्मन् in his School. But we believe that the word स्थान is used in the sense of a state and that प्रकाशवत्त्व is a पूर्वपक्ष सूत्र intended to nullify the सिद्धान्तिन्'s argument of अरूपवत्त्व of Brahman (because प्रकाश has a भास्वर शुक्लरूप). Moreover, in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 46 (प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः) Brahman is clearly denied to be प्रकाशादिवत् while according to Śaṅkara's interpretation Sūtra III. 2. 15 *asserts* Brahman to be प्रकाशवत् since he takes it to be a सिद्धान्तसूत्र. The interdependence of these Sūtras (II. 3. 46 and III. 2. 15) does not strike Śaṅkara because though he explains the simile in the same way in the same words in both the places, he makes a wide divergence regarding its application. In Sūtra II. 3. 46 it is applied to the individual soul, while in Sūtra III. 2. 15 to the Supreme Being. See also प्रकाशादिवत् and प्रकाशाश्रयवत् in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 25 and 28.

Sūtra 16

23. तन्मात्रम्—"And the Śruti declares Brahman to be only that" *i. e.* only light. In the preceding Sūtra it is stated by the

पूर्वपक्षिन् that the Supreme Being is like light, so it is likely that तन्मात्र in this Sūtra refers to a Śruti in which Brahman is said to be *only light*, e. g., अथाऽयमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव...। Br. Upa. IV. 4. 7), " The released soul is Brahman only *i. e.* light." This Śruti can be quoted to prove that Brahman is only light. Or, the Śruti in question may be Chā. Upa. III. 14. 2 in which Brahman is declared to be भारूप " of the form of brilliance." Cf. also परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते । in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 2.

24. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 14 deals with रूपाद्याकाररहित ब्रह्मवाक्यs, Sūtra 15 with आकारवद्ब्रह्मविषयवाक्यs, and again Sūtra 16 refers to निर्विशेष ब्रह्मवाक्यs. Moreover, तद् in तन्मात्र, according to Śaṅkara, stands for चैतन्य, not for प्रकाश which is mentioned in the preceding Sūtra. This is nothing but the violation of the context. Even Śaṅkara's interpretation of तद् as चैतन्य also suggests that he ought to have taken *all* these three Sūtras as dealing with the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन्.

Sūtra 17

25. In the preceding Sūtra the पूर्वपक्षिन् referred to a Śruti which described Brahman as only प्रकाश; now in this Sūtra (17) he says that the Śruti *shows* (by illustration) and the Smṛti states how Brahman is like light. (प्रकाशवत्--in Sūtra 15).

26. दर्शयति—The use of दर्शयति as distinguished from " स्मर्यते " in this Sūtra may show that the Sūtrakāra uses " दर्शयति " in the sense of " श्रुतिः दर्शयति ".

27. दर्शयति probably refers to such a Śruti as

" न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चन्द्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भान्ति कुतोऽयमग्निः ॥
तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वं तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति ॥ "
(Kaṭha Upa. V. 15; Śve. Upa. VI. 14; Mu. Upa. II. 2. 10).

स्मर्यते refers to

यदादित्यगतं तेजो जगद्भासयतेऽखिलम् ॥
यच्चन्द्रमसि यच्चाग्नौ तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम् ॥
(Bha. Gī. XV. 12)

Both these texts show that Brahman is like light in the sense that it shares the nature of light.

28. Śaṅkara does not associate दर्शयति and स्मर्यते with प्रकाशवत् in Sūtra 15, but he says that the Śruti and the Smṛti show how Brahman is निर्विशेष by describing Brahman by the method of elimination (नेति नेति).

Sūtra 18

29. ' अत एव ' means " because Brahman is like light." The comparison of Brahman with the Sun, *etc.* is *due to the fact* that Brahman is like light. The Sun, the Fire, *etc.*, are radiant objects, and Brahman being like light is compared with them.

30. सूर्यकादिवत्-The Śrutis which compare Brahman with the Sun and other radiant objects are referred to by this expression.

(1) सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः ।
एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः ॥
(Kaṭha Upa. V. 11)

(2) अग्निर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव ।
एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्च ॥
(Kaṭha Upa. V. 10)

(3) तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात्पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः ।
तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सौम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापियन्ति ॥
(Mu. Upa. II. 1. 1)

(4) दिवि सूर्यसहस्रस्य भवेद्युगपदुत्थिता ।
यदि भाः सदृशी सा स्याद्भासस्तस्य महात्मनः ॥
(Bha. Gī. XI. 12)

These texts are referred to under this Sūtra not to demonstrate the निर्लेपत्व, व्यापकत्व, *etc.*, of Brahman but only to show that Brahman is like light because it is compared with the Sun, the Fire, *etc.*

If ' सूर्यक ' in this Sūtra means ' a number of Suns ' (सूर्याणां समूहः), probably some text like Bha. Gī. XI. 12 has been referred to in the Sūtra. In this verse the light of Brahman is compared with that of a thousand Suns. This would also explain why क is added to सूर्य in the Sūtra, a point not considered by commentators.

31. Śaṅkara explains ' अत एव ' as ' यत एव चायमात्मा चैतन्यरूपो निर्विशेषः.........अत एव. ' Thus, he connects " अत एव " in this Sūtra with the Śruti he has quoted under Sūtra 16. And he says that the उपमा or comparison meant in the Sūtra is the one which aims at the peculiarity of Brahman due to उपाधि, (*i. e.*, not a real peculiarity). This is how he brings in the question of the illusoriness of the आकार of Brahman under this Sūtra.

32. The fact that Sūtra 18 refers to the comparison of Brahman with a number of Suns (सूर्यक) also shows that the पूर्वपक्षिन् here tries to prove that Brahman is like प्रकाश (Sūtra 15) and that तद् in Sūtra 16 refers to प्रकाश.

Sūtra 19

33. तु–This word shows that a पूर्वपक्ष has preceded and that in this Sūtra (19) that पूर्वपक्ष is refuted by the Sūtrakāra. To us it appears that this पूर्वपक्ष is given in Sūtras 15–18, as we have already stated above. The opponent tries to establish that the Supreme Being is *like light* and argues that then only the अरूपवत्ता of Brahman will have a meaning. In support of this he quotes the Śrutis and the Smṛtis which describe Brahman as light or compare it with light. The Sūtrakāra rejects this view in Sūtra 19.

34. न तथात्वम्—The Supreme Being has not " the characteristic of being so " *i. e.* It is not light by nature.

35. अम्बुवदग्रहणात्—This gives the reason why the Sūtrakāra does not accept the पूर्वपक्ष view that Brahman is by nature

like light. He says, Brahman is not like light because It cannot be reflected like light in water. Radiant objects like the Sun, the Moon, *etc.*, are reflected in water; but Brahman is not similarly reflected. Therefore, Brahman is not like light.[10]

This interpretation of Sūtra 19 corresponds to what the Sūtrakāra says elsewhere in the Sūtras regarding the प्रकाशत्व of Brahman. Thus, it agrees with Sūtra II. 3. 46 (प्रकाशादिवन् नैवं परः) and Sūtras III. 2. 28–30 which first say that Brahman has the nature of light (तेजस्त्व–III. 2. 28) and then refer to a denial of that view (III. 2. 30) which is probably a reference to the Sūtra under discussion (Sūtra III. 2. 19).

(36) For Śaṅkara's view on this Sūtra see Note (7) on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 20. According to him Sūtra 19 is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र and Sūtras 20–21 give the सिद्धान्त.

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(10) Perhaps the Sūtrakāra bases his argument of अम्बुवदग्रहण on the story of प्रजापति and इन्द्रविरोचनौ in Chā. Upa. VIII. 7–9.

SECTION II

Sūtras III. 2. 20-22

(२०) वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवम् ।

(२१) दर्शनाच्च ।

(२२) प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ।

TRANSLATION

[The Supreme Being] undergoes increment and decrement by becoming concealed. [This is] so, because of the propriety of [explaining] both [increment and decrement of Brahman by Its concealing Itself], 20

and because the Śruti shows it, 21

because [the Śruti] denies that the Supreme Being is " only so much as is referred to in the topic in hand (*prakṛta*) ", and then the Śruti says [that It is something] more. 22

NOTES

Sūtra 20

1. Regarding the Adhikaraṇa formed by Sūtras 20–22 see Note 12 under Sūtra 21 and Note 16 under Sūtra 22.

2. After discussing whether the different states affect the Jīva or not, the Sūtrakāra discusses the same question with regard to the Para. The nature of the individual Soul so far as its inborn characteristics are concerned (*i. e.* its ontology) does not form part of the *means* of absolution (**साधन**) and has been therefore relegated to that chapter in which the Śrutis about the creation of the world, *etc.* are discussed (Bra. Sū. II)[11]. That part of the knowledge of the Jīva, *viz.*, its eschatology, which properly comes within the province of **साधन**, is dealt with in Bra. Sū. III. 1 and III. 2. 1–10. The knowledge of Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11–41) and the details about the process of meditation on Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 3) are the most important part of the means of Mokṣa and therefore immediately follow the dicussion of the eschatology of the Jīva. In this connection it is worth noting that the statement of the knowledge of the Para begins with a discussion of the states of the Para because the discussion of the Jīva ends with that of his states. It is thus proper that *after* finishing the discussion of the states of the Para, the discussion of several other topics also connected with the states of the Para is taken up. And the first of these topics is about *two* out of the *six* states, *viz.*, **वृद्धि** and

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11. The fact that the Sūtrakāra relegates the discussion of the ontology of the Jīva to the अविरोधाध्याय instead of giving it a place in the साधनाध्याय shows that he did not look upon तत्त्वमसि, अहं ब्रह्मास्मि, सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म as the महावाक्यs " cardinal aphorisms "–a fact which detracts much of the importance attached to them by Śaṅkara.

अपक्षय (Yāska I. 1. 1.) so far as Brahman is subject to these (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 20–23). The purpose is to prove that वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman are not due to the three states.

3. वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वम्—This expression would seem to mean परिणामवत्त्वम् and refer to the परिणाम of the Para, the Supreme Being. In Bra. Sū. I. 4. 26 (आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्) the Sūtrakāra says that the परिणाम of Brahman is such that the effect (कृति or कार्य) is also Atman. The cause (कारण) is Atman and the effect (कार्य) is also Atman (तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत–Tai. Upa.)

But, the Sūtrakāra probably means *two* of the *six* states mentioned by Yāska, *viz.*, जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यति (निरुक्तनिघण्टु II. 2. 2). Śaṅkara in his Comm. on Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2 remarks अन्येषामपि भावविकाराणां त्रिष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थितिनाशानामिह ग्रहणम् । यास्कपरिपठितानां तु जायते, अस्ति इत्यादीनां ग्रहणे तेषां जगतः स्थितिकाले संभाव्यमानत्वान्मूलकारणादुत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशा जगतो न गृहीताः स्युरित्याशङ्क्येत । तन्माशङ्कीति योत्पत्तिर्ब्रह्मणः, तत्रैव स्थितिः प्रलयश्च, त एव गृह्यन्ते । Though Śaṅkara here says that these three states (परिणाम, वृद्धि, अपक्षय) are possible when *the world has come into existence and continues to exist,* it seems to us that the Sūtrakāra intends to consider them with respect to Brahman Itself.

In the case of worldly objects, *e. g.*, a jar, there is a production(जायते), then we talk of them as existing (अस्ति) then as " विपरिणमते " and subsequently in the case of worldly things we can explain how they increase and decrease (वर्धते and अपक्षीयते) because in their case we also predicate a birth and death (जायते and विनश्यति). But in the case of Brahman there is no birth and death and It is existence Itself so that we cannot demonstrate अस्ति as a state in Its case. The Sūtrakāra has said that the world is the परिणाम of Brahman and has explained that परिणाम by saying that the effect (*i. e.* the world) of Brahman is also Brahman Itself.[12] (आत्मकृतेः

12. The Sūtrakāra seems to use परिणाम in the sense in which it is used by Yāska.

परिणामात्—Bra. Sū. I. 4. 26). So he now explains only two states *viz.*, Its development and decay (वर्धते and अपक्षीयते) subsequent to Its changing Itself into the world (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2).

4. वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावात्—To take one example of वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman, each of the series of नाम, वाक्, मनः, संकल्प............upto प्राण in Chā. Upa. VII is declared to be Brahman and each succeeding member of the series is stated to be भूयः or "more" (further developed) than each preceding one. We may say that in this series the प्राण is "Brahman" (*i. e.*, transformation or modification of Brahman) in which Brahman is *least* concealed. (See Sūtra II. 1. 20 where we believe प्राण is given as an example which illustrates how Brahman and its effects are identical-अनन्य). Similarly, we may say that नाम in that series is a modification of Brahman in which Brahman is *most* concealed. Thus, Brahman undergoes वृद्धि (*e. g.* in Its transformation as प्राण) and ह्रास (*e. g.* in Its transformation as नाम) by becoming concealed (*i. e.*, latent, अन्तर्भाव).

The application of वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्व of Brahman to the series of नाम, *etc.*, is suggested to us by the विषयवाक्य of Sūtra 22. But we may also illustrate the same by considering आकाश, वायु, *etc.*, as effects of Brahman.

Accordingly, when आकाश, वायु, अग्नि, जल and पृथ्वी (*Cf.* Tai. Up. II. 1 and Chā. Upa. VI. 2) are created, we must say that each of these elements is "Brahman" (*i. e.*, a transformation of Brahman), and since each succeeding member in the series is grosser or more degenerate (Brahman becomes ह्रासभाक्) than each preceding one, we must say that in it Brahman becomes more and more concealed according to the Sūtrakāra.

So, when there is a series in which Brahman is more developed (वृद्धिभाक्) *e. g.*, in that of Chā. Upa. VII (नाम upto

प्राण), Brahman is less and less concealed and when there is a series in which Brahman is more degenerate (ह्रासभाक्) *e. g.*, in the series of Tai. Upa. II. 1 or Chā. Upa. VI. 2, we must say that Brahman is more and more concealed.

Thus, वृद्धि and ह्रास can be properly explained, says the Sūtrakāra, as due to Brahman becoming concealed (अन्तर्भाव).

In the case of अणुकारणवाद, वृद्धि would be due to conglomeration of अणुs and ह्रास to the division of the effect into its parts (*C. f.* कारणबहुत्वात्कारणमहत्त्वात्प्रचयविशेषाच्च महत् । Vaiśeṣika Sūtra VII. 1-9. See Sā. Bhāṣya on Sūtra II. 2. 11). The Sāṃkhyas say that when प्रधान develops into the world, there is growth (वृद्धि) and that growth is rather due to the प्रधान *revealing* itself more and more, and that when the world dissolves itself, the प्रधान conceals itself more and more and returns to the state of equipoise when none of its characteristics is manifest. The Sūtrakāra looks upon the states (of increment and decrement) following the change of Brahman, from a different stand-point and says that *both* are due to Brahman becoming concealed.

5. उभय in उभयसामञ्जस्य-उभय should refer to वृद्धि and ह्रास. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that *both* the वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman can be explained *properly* by the point of view that they take place by reason of Brahman becoming concealed (अन्तर्भाव). If some one says that Brahman becomes manifest or reveals some of its traits when It creates the world, the Sūtrakāra would say that this self-manifestation (आविर्भाव) is nothing but a comparatively lesser degree of concealment (अन्तर्भाव). This would be so particularly when we consider that Brahman by Itself is All (भूमन्-Chā. Upa. VII. 23-24). Whenever It *becomes* anything or undergoes a change and subsequently appears to be increasing or decreasing, it is nothing but अन्तर्भाव.

5*a*. उभय-To us the Sūtrakāra seems to use the word उभय because it is likely that a Vedantin would take ह्रास of

Brahman as due to Its becoming concealed but Its वृद्धि as due to Its becoming revealed, just as the followers of Sāṃkhya would do in the case of प्रधान changing itself into the world. and therefore the Sūtrakāra sounds a note of warning to a Vedantin by asking him to interpret *both* वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman as due to concealment, probably in the way in which we have explained these above, *viz.*, वृद्धि is a lesser degree of concealment and ह्रास a greater degree of concealment. It is not *one* (ह्रास) but both of these two (वृद्धि and ह्रास) which can be, in the case of ब्रह्मन्, explained as due to अन्तर्भाव.

Brahman is possessed of गुणs (*e. g.*, सत्, चित्, आनन्द), which are manifest when Brahman is in its original state *i. e.*, even before the creation takes place, unlike प्रधान in which no गुणs are manifest (except in the sense of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् being its constituents). Thus, in the case of ब्रह्मकारणवाद it is the concealment (of conciousness and bliss) which would make Brahman transformed into Its effects, while in the case of प्रधानकारणवाद the प्रधान would be transformed into जगत् only when its various गुणs not manifest in its अव्याकृतावस्था become manifest.

6. The word अन्तर्भावात् occurs also in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 53 (प्रदेशादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात्) where, it seems to us, we are told that the individual soul is *only* a likeness of the Supreme Being (*i. e.*, His likeness *minus* His powers) not because of the Śruti teaching (प्रदेश) him to be so (through the reflection of Brahman), *e. g.*, in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, but because of the concealment of Brahman.

Therefore, Brahman conceals Itself and thereby becomes *both* जीव and जगत्.

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13. See Bra. Sū. II. 1. 30, सर्वोपेता need not be changed to सर्वशक्तियुक्ता (See Śaṅkara) thus reducing the actual possession of powers to only latent powers; see II. 1. 37 also.

6*a*. In Sūtra III. 2. 5 (पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ) the Sūtrakāra has explained how the concealment [of the real form] is the cause of the bondage of the soul; therefore, it is likely that in this Sūtra (III. 2. 20) he explains how "concealment" is the cause of वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman.

7. It should be noted here that before Śaṅkara there was already a commentory on the Brahmasūtra which held that the conscious Brahman became the cause of the inanimate world by concealing Its attribute of consciousness. Śaṅkara mentions this view as the view of एकदेशिवेदान्तिन् in his commentory on Bra. Sū. II. 1. 4 and he partly accepts that view as an interpretation of विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं चाभवत् (Tai. Upa. II. 6. 1) under Sūtra II. 1. 6.

8. Śaṅkara takes Sūtra 19 as a पूर्वपक्ष against the conclusion established in Sūtra 18 as we have already stated under Note 36 of the preceding Adhikaraṇa. He interprets Sūtras 20–21 as a reply to that पूर्वपक्ष.

According to Śaṅkara's interpretation the opponent argues in Sūtra 19 that the illustration of the reflection of the Sun in the water does not apply to Brahman, because Brahman cannot be understood "like that" and he points out the dissimilarities in the illustration and the illustrated. In the former the Sun, *etc.*, have a material form *and the water is perceived* to be different from the Sun and is also possessed of a material form. But, Atman has no material form, nor are उपाधि s different from Atman. Thus, Śaṅkara overlooks the fact that in the Brahmasūtra the word तु is generally used for the purpose of the refutation of a पूर्वपक्ष, and that न तथात्वम् should mean न प्रकाशत्वम् in accordance with the context of the preceding Sūtras (15–18); he interprets अम्बु as जलसूर्य, while the Sūtra mentions only जल. अम्बुवद्ग्रहणात् means, according to Śaṅkara, अम्बु can be percieved while the Atman cannot be percieved "; but the non-perception of the उपाधिs as

different from Atman is not stated in the Sūtra itself. Moreover, Śaṅkara has already explained Sūtra II. 3. 50 (आभास एव च) as stating how the individual soul should be understood to be a reflection of पर आत्मन् like the reflection of the Sun in water (आभास एव चैष जीवः परमात्मनो जलसूर्यकादिवत्प्रतिपत्तव्यः). Therefore, it is not possible that a पूर्वपक्ष on the same subject and a सिद्धान्तिन्'s refutation of it would recur in Sūtras III. 2. 19-20.

9. Śaṅkara finds a *refutation* of the above पूर्वपक्ष in Sūtra 20. वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावात्—Śaṅkara says that the reflection of the Sun *being inside* the water, undergoes increment and decrement, but the Sun really undergoes no change. As we have shown, the पूर्वपक्ष of Sūtras 15-18 is refuted by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 19. Sūtra 20 has nothing to do with Sūtra 19. There is no mention of either of जल or सूर्य in Sūtra 20. The वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्व in Sūtra 20 should refer to the वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्व of Brahman, वृद्धि and ह्रास being *two* out of the *six* states mentioned by Yāska. अन्तर्भावात् should be explained here as in Sūtra II. 3. 53 *i. e.* as ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्भावात्. Śaṅkara says, " न तु परमार्थतः सूर्यस्य तथात्वमस्ति "; but in fact *the Sun* does not seem to change *illusorily* even, and the पूर्वपक्ष also would not be so foolish as to say so, because it is the *reflection* of the Sun which really changes. Śaṅkara takes उभय as referring to दृष्टान्त and दार्ष्टान्तिक, but in the Sūtra itself there is hardly any reference to any illustration; rather on the strength of strictly following the context, उभय should mean वृद्धि and ह्रास (of Brahman). The word अन्तर्भाव is explained by Śaṅkara as देहाद्युपाध्यन्तर्भाव. There is no mention of देहादि even in any of the preceding Sūtras. We have already given above the reasons for interpreting अन्तर्भाव as becoming concealed; see also *infra*.

Sūtra 21

10. This Sūtra gives a reference to a Śruti in which अन्तर्भाव of Brahman is mentioned in order to explain ब्रह्मणः वृद्धिह्रासभाक्त्वम्.

Such a Śruti seems to us to be तस्य ह वा एतस्यैवं पश्यत एवं मन्वानस्यैवं विजानतः आत्मतः प्राण आत्मत आशात्मतः स्मर आत्मत: आकाश आत्मतस्तेज आत्मत आप आत्मत आविर्भावतिरोभावात्मतोऽन्नमात्मतो बलमात्मतो विज्ञानमात्मतो ध्यानमात्मतश्चित्तमात्मतः संकल्प आत्मतो मन आत्मतो वागात्मतो नामात्मतो मन्त्रा आत्मत: कर्माण्यात्मत एवेदं सर्वमिति ॥ (Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 1).

The Sūtrakāra refers to "आत्मतः आविर्भावतिरोभावौ" from this passage. He considers *only* the तिरोभाव to be the cause of वृद्धि and ह्रास undergone by Brahman. Not rarely does the Sūtrakāra accept only a part of a Śruti as valid while rejecting at the same time the other portion. Thus he rejects प्रियशिरस्त्वादि while he accepts आनन्द as an attribute useful in the meditation on प्रधान or अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 12). He also rejects the Kaṭha Upaniṣad view that पुरुष is higher than अव्यक्त or अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31). He rejects the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad view of स्थानत: परस्योभयलिङ्गम् in favour of the Chā. Upa. view that Brahman is the same in all the states (III. 2. 11–18). So, the तिरोभाव mentioned in this Śruti is the self-concealment of Brahman which makes itself subject to development and decrease. "आत्मतः आविर्भावतिरोभावौ" is preceded by प्राण, आशा, स्मर, आकाश, तेजः, and आपः which are mentioned in Chā. Upa. VII. 15, 14, 13, 12, 11, and 10 respectively, and is followed by अन्न, बल, विज्ञान, ध्यान, चित्त, संकल्प, मनः, वाक्, नाम, (मन्त्र and कर्माणि) which are mentioned in Chā. Upa. VII. 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. Thus "आत्मतः आविर्भावतिरोभावौ" seems to have been placed almost mid-way between these topics in order to explain the creation of these effects of Brahman. The word अन्तर्भाव of Bra. Sū. III. 2. 20 and the sentence "ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः", (which is an expression almost verbally indentical with that in Chā. Upa. VII. 1–15) in Sūtra III. 2. 22 suggest that Sūtra III. 2. 21 refers to तिरोभाव in Chā. Upa. VII. 22. 1.

That the Sūtra contains the word अन्तर्भाव in place of the word तिरोभाव in the विषयवाक्य (Chā. Upa. VII. 22. 1) does

not detract from the value of our interpretation, because the Sūtrakāra not unfrequently uses in his Sūtras a synonym of the original word in the Śruti in question. Thus, he uses अम्बर for आकाश (Sūtra I. 3. 10) and चरण for पाद (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 24).

In the preceding Sūtra the वृद्धि of Brahman, (*e. g.*, in the प्राण form of Brahman) was also explained as अन्तर्भाव of Brahman. Thus, the Sūtrakāra has taken आविर्भाव (*e. g.* आविर्भाव of Brahman in प्राण) as the same as अन्तर्भाव in a different degree " because of the propriety of explaining *both* by Brahman becoming concealed. " Thus, this Sūtra may be interpreted, as we do, as referring to a Śruti in which both आविर्भाव and तिरोभाव are mentioned. The next Sūtra (22) is a clear evidence for the exactness of the विषयवाक्य of this Sūtra (21) suggested by us. It is, therefore. in complete harmony with the interpretation of अन्तर्भाव (as explaining वृद्धि also) in the preceding Sūtra (19) that this Sūtra (20) should refer to a Śruti with the expression " आविर्भावतिरोभावौ. "

11. According to Śaṅkara ' दर्शनात् ' refers to a Śruti in which the entrance (अन्तर्भाव) of परब्रह्मन् into the body, *etc.*, is mentioned. But it is not clear how अन्तर्भाव can be taken as equivalent to (देहादिषु उपाधिषु) अन्तरनुप्रवेश.

12. According to a predecessor of Śaṅkara quoted by him, Sūtras 11–14 form one Adhikaraṇa and Sūtras 15–21 from another. Śaṅkara says that he himself is responsible for making only *one* Adhikaraṇa of these two Adhikaraṇas. As there is च in Sūtra 15, there is no doubt that that Sūtra does not begin a new Adhikaraṇa. But Sūtra 20 seems to have no connection with Sūtra 19, as we have already shown. Therefore Sūtras 11–19 seem to have originally formed one Adhikaraṇa.

Śaṅkara's predecessor understood Sūtras 11–14 as discussing whether Brahman was एकाकार or अनेकाकारोपेत and Sūtras 15–21 whether Brahman was सद्रूप or बोधरूप or both. Śaṅkara

takes Sūtras 11–14 as establishing that Brahman is एकाकार and Sūtras 15–21 as explaining the आकारश्रुतिगति. Śaṅkara differs from his predecessor *only* so far as the interpretation of the सगुणब्रह्माकारश्रुतिs meant for उपासना is concerned; but as to the निर्गुणश्रुतिs and the सृष्टिश्रुतिs they are at one.

Thus, the predecessor of Śaṅkara also seems to have neither a correct tradition about the interpretation of स्थान in Sūtra 11 or of प्रकाश in Sūtra 15, nor a correct division of the Adhikaraṇas, if, as we suggest, Sūtras 20-22 form an independent Adhikaraṇa.

Sūtra 22

13. हि shows that this Sūtra gives as argument for the statement in the preceding Sūtra (21). Thus, Sūtra 22 is like Sūtra 14 which also explains the Śruti referred to in Sūtra 13.

14. प्रतिषेधति and ब्रवीति show that this Sūtra refers to a Śruti; and " ब्रवीति च भूय " at once reminds us of नाम्नो वाव भूयोऽस्तीति तन्मे भगवान् ब्रवीत्विति। and exactly similar passages which occur in Chā. Upa. VII. 1–15. So it is very likely that this Sūtra (22) refers to that Chā. Upa. text.

15. " प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति " seems to refer to such sentences as अस्ति भगवो नाम्नो भूय इति नाम्नो वाव भूयोस्तीति in each of the sections of Chā. Upa. VII. 1–15. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वम् means " ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतैतावत्त्वम् " *i. e.*, " the fact that Brahman is (only) so much (एतावत्) as is the topic in consideration (प्रकृत) and nothing more. " In each of these sections सनत्कुमार *denies that Brahman is only* नाम, *only* वाक्, *etc.*, in so far as his reply to नारद's question regarding there being any form of Brahman " more " (*i. e.* more developed) than the topic in discussion, is in the affirmative. Each of नाम, वाक्, मनः, *etc.* is said to be Brahman and is to be meditated upon as such.

16. Each of नाम, वाक्, *etc.* is said to be Brahman; each succeeding one is more developed than each preceding one.

Brahman is all these (which are effects of Brahman), and each preceding effect of Brahman is less developed than each succeeding one. This shows that Brahman *conceals* itself to a certain extent to become each of these. When the concealment is less, the form of Brahman is superior or higher, in other words, Brahman is वृद्ध more developed in it, and when more, the form resulting is inferior or lower, in other words, Brahman decreases in it. Thus, both वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman are dependent respectively upon less and more concealment of Brahman Itself. Therefore, this same series illustrates *both* the वृद्धि and ह्रास of Brahman. तेजः is superior to आपः (Chā. Upa. VII. 10-11), because in तेजः Brahman is less concealed than in आपः. According to the Sūtrakāra तेजः and आपः and every कार्य of Brahman are Brahman, as is stated in this Śruti (Chā. Upa. VII), and also in many other Śrutis. Brahman in the form of water "decreases more" than Brahman in the form of light, because in the former Brahman is more concealed than in the latter. The same rule is to be applied to the other forms of Brahman such as वायु, *etc.*, which are not mentioned in Chā. Upa. VII.

The concealment expressed in Chā. Upa. VII. 26 by the word तिरोभाव with reference to प्राण, *etc.*, upto नाम (मन्त्र and कर्माणि) is, according to the Sūtrakāra, illustrated and explained in Chā. Upa. VII. 1-15. This is how Sūtra 22 seems to us to explain Sūtra 21. The प्रतिषेध of "Brahman being only as much as नाम, *etc.*" and the statement of there being another principle identical with Brahman, which is "more" than the preceding one proves that Brahman assumes all these superior and inferior forms owing to different degrees of concealment. This is how the Sūtrakāra seems to interpret the Śruti.

15*a*. The Sūtrakāra gives Sūtra 22 in order to explain the आविर्भावतिरोभावश्रुति. Here the Sūtrakāra seems to interpret

from his own stand-point the Chā. Upa. text in order to show how Brahman is all things in the world.

16. Thus, the अन्तर्भाव of Sūtra 20 is supplied by a Śruti referred to in Sūtra 21 and that Śruti is explained by the statement of Sūtra 22. This shows that Sūtras 20–22 form an independent topic or Adhikaraṇa. This would prove that Sūtra 20 begins an Adhikaraṇa and is not related directly with Sūtra 19. 'तु' in Sūtra 19 and absence of च in Sūtra 20 also go to prove the commencement of a new Adhikaraṇa. The connection of the Śruti referred to in Sūtra 22 with that in Sūtra 21 shows that Sūtra 22 is a part of the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtra 21, and does not begin an Adhikaraṇa as is understood by Śaṅkara.

17. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra begins a new Adhikaraṇa, as noted above. He takes this Sūtra as referring to Bṛ. Upa. II. 6. 6, *viz.*, "अथातः आदेशो नेति नेति, न ह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत्परमस्मत्यथ नामधेयँ सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम्".

The Sūtra, says Śaṅkara, discusses the topic (विषय) of negation in नेति नेति. He says that नेति नेति negatives प्रकृतैतावत् *i. e.* the two रूपs, मूर्त and अमूर्त, mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. II. 6. 1–5 (प्रकृतं यदेतावदियत्तापरिच्छिन्नं मूर्तामूर्तलक्षणं ब्रह्मणो रूपं तदेव शब्दः प्रतिषेधति). Thus, Śaṅkara does not take into consideration 'त्वम्' in प्रकृतैतावत्त्वम् in the Sūtra. 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति' would mean that the Śruti negatives *the fact that* [Brahman] is only this much as is the subject in hand (and not more); this would ultimately mean that [Brahman] is more than this. By dropping the sense of "त्वम्" Śaṅkara has brought out quite a different sense from what it would have been otherwise. It comes to this that by 'त्वम्' the Sūtrakāra simultaneously accepts *both, viz.*, Brahman *is* the प्रकृत (the topic in hand) and also "more" than that; while Śaṅkara by dropping the sense of the termination 'त्वम्' asserts only the existence of that which is "more." Also "ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः" shows

that " प्रकृतैतावत्त्वप्रतिषेध " means the inclusion of " more " rather than the exclusion of the matter in hand (प्रकृत). There is no word in the Sūtra which would suggest a reference to the विषयवाक्य of Śaṅkara (Bṛ. Upa. II. 6. 6). Moreover, no question as to the topic of negation is likely to arise regarding that Śruti, because नेति is explained as " ' न हि एतस्मात् ' इति = नेति (अन्यत्परमस्ति) "; *i. e.* not indeed (other higher) than this (exists), therefore (इति), ' नेति '. Śaṅkara's interpretation in which he adds ' व्यतिरिक्तम् ' (न ह्येतस्माद्ब्रह्मणो व्यतिरिक्तमस्तीत्यतो नेतिनेतीत्युच्यते) and explains अन्यत् परम् as अप्रतिषिद्धम् न पुनः स्वयमेव नास्तीत्यर्थः, can hardly be accepted as a literal explanation of the Śruti in question. ' ततः ' in the Sūtra, means ' तस्मात् प्रतिषेधात् ' according to Śaṅkara; ततः भूयः means " after that negation. " And he refers ' ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ' to ' अन्यत्परमस्ति ' in Bṛ. Upa. II. 6. 6.

Śaṅkara explains the Śruti in a different way also, in which ' एतस्मात् ' in the Śruti refers to आदेशात् instead of to ब्रह्मणः. In this case ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः is to be taken as referring to नामधेय (अथनामधेयम्—सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम्).

Śaṅkara's conclusion from the argument in the Sūtra (*viz.*, तस्माद्ब्रह्मावसनोऽयं प्रतिषेधो नाभावावसान इत्यध्यवसामः) would show that the Sūtra ought to have been at the very beginning of the book, had it the meaning Śaṅkara sees in it.

SECTION III

Sūtras III. 2. 23-30

(२३) तदव्यक्तमाह हि ।

(२४) अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

(२५) प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ।

(२६) अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् ।

(२७) उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ।

(२८) प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ।

(२९) पूर्ववद्वा ।

(३०) प्रतिषेधाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

IT is the Unmanifest, because the Śruti says so; 23

and [it remains the Unmanifest] even when realized in ecstacy of the meditator according to Śruti and Smṛti; 24

and there is no differentiation [in Brahman] as in the case of light, *etc.*; and light [is realized] by repeated practice of the act [of seeing]; 25

[Pūrvapakṣa]—From this [Unmanifest] [the released soul goes to and unites] with the Infinite [*i. e.* Puruṣa], because there is indicatory sentence to that effect; 26

[Siddhānta]—But Brahman is like the serpent and also like its coil, because of the mention of both [the Unmanifest and the Infinite]; 27

or, it is [two-fold] like light and its source, because of Its characteristic of being light; 28

or, rather as in the former [illustration]; 29

and because of the negation [in Kaṭha Upa. VI. 9]. 30

NOTES

Sūtra 23

1. It seems to us that this Sūtra begins a new Adhikaraṇa. There is हि in Sūtra 22, which shows that it is to be connected with the preceding Sūtra. There is no च or any other adjunctive in Sūtra 23 to connect it with Sūtra 22. On the contrary, there is a proposition in it, *viz.*, तदव्यक्तम्, followed by an argument (आह हि); so it seems to begin a fresh Adhikaraṇa, like Sūtras III. 2. 1, III. 2. 31, III. 2. 38.

2. Brahman is the Unmanifest or Brahman is an unmanifest principle. Other principles in Vedānta are manifest; Brahman alone is unmanifest. The Smṛti like Bha. Gī. VIII. 18–21 mentions two अव्यक्तs, but the Sūtrakāra admits only one अव्यक्त, *viz.*, the पर अव्यक्त of Bha. Gī. VIII. 20, the lower अव्यक्त which is the principle called प्रकृति is identified by the Sūtrakāra with Brahman itself (*Vide* Sūtra I. 4. 23 ff.)

3. आह हि—Śruti mentions only one अव्यक्त *viz.*, the पर अव्यक्त of the Bha. Gī. Thus, the Kaṭha Upa. says :—

महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥
(Ka. Upa. III. 11)

And further on, the same Upaniṣad mentions the अव्यक्त as follows:—

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥
(Ka. Upa. III. 15)

This verse shows that the principle called अव्यक्त and said to be *higher than* महत् is Brahman. The Sūtrakāra seems to draw attention to the Kaṭha text by particulary saying " आह हि ".

4. Śaṅkara quotes several Śrutis, in none of which the word अव्यक्त occurs. The reason why he does not quote the Kaṭha Śruti in which the very word अव्यक्त occurs seems to us to be his explanation of Bra. Sū. I. 4. 1–7.

Sūtra 24

5. अपि च—Brahman is the Unmanifest, but some one may think that it may become manifest (व्यक्त) in the meditation of a seeker. But the Sūtrakāra says that even in the meditation when Brahman is realized, It is realised as the Unmanifest. It always remains the Unmanifest. So Brahman is the Unmanifest and remains the same also in the ecstacy or propitiation of a devotee.

6. संराधन—Instead of using the usual word आराधन the Sūtrakāra uses the word संराधन. Why ? (Also see *infra* Note 8.)

7. प्रत्यक्ष—The Śruti shows that even in meditation when Brahman is realised, it remains as the Unmanifest. The Sūtrakāra may be referring to a Śruti like Ka. Upa. IV. 1, which is quoted by Śaṅkara. 'The wise one sees the inner Self *with his eyes closed*'. The fact that Brahman is seen 'with eyes closed' proves that Brahman remains अव्यक्त even in the meditation. Brahman can not be seen or realised like manifest things.

8. अनुमान—This seems to be a reference to such a Smṛti text as follows :—

अव्यक्तं व्यक्तिमापन्नं मन्यन्ते मामबुद्धयः ।
परं भावमजानन्तो ममाव्ययमनुत्तमम् ॥ (Bha. Gī. VII. 24)

Verse 22 of Bha. Gī. VII which preceds this verse refers to propitiation (आराधन) of deities. So, verse 24 also should be taken as referring to आराधन and as saying that even in आराधन (*Cf.* संराधन of the Sūtra) the Lord remains अव्यक्त, but ignorant people take him to be व्यक्त.

In the eleventh Adhyāya of the Bhagavadgītā (verse 8), अर्जुन was shown by the Lord His own celestial form but before that he was given celestial eyes and was told that it was not possible to see the Lord with *his own* eyes. This also shows that Brahman is अव्यक्त 'not manifest' to the eye of the human being.

Thus, Brahman is अव्यक्त (Sūtra 23) and remains अव्यक्त even in propitiation or ecstacy when it is realised, according to Śruti and Smṛti.

9. Śaṅkara says that at the time of propitiation Brahman is seen by the devotee or the yogin. He takes "अपि" in the sense of "but" which is never the sense of अपि. The force of अपि seem to us to be that *by nature* Brahman is Unmanifest (Sūtra 23) *and also* in meditation It remains the same.

The next Sūtra also supports this view.

Sūtra 25

10. This Sūtra makes two statements, and it seems to us that the first statement is intended to explain how Brahman can be the unmanifest principle and the second how Brahman can remain अव्यक्त even in propitiation or meditation.

11. प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यम्—Brahman is without any difference in itself (अवैशेष्य) or without any internal difference (स्वगतभेद) just like light, *etc.* A thing which is व्यक्त has got some differentiation, *i. e.*, internal difference, whereby its parts can be distinguished and the object can be said to be manifest. Brahman is अव्यक्त (and impartite). This is the way in which the unmanifestness of Brahman is to be understood. In light there is no distinction; light is the same wherever it falls and it is not possible to distinguish parts or shape in light. Brahman is अव्यक्त in the sense in which light, *etc.*, are अव्यक्त.

11*a*. 'प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यम्'—is an explanation of Sūtra 23 while प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् explains Sūtra 24.

12. प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात्—This explains how Brahman remains अव्यक्त even in meditation. प्रकाश can be gazed at through repeated practice in the act of seeing it. Thus, when by long practice one is able to gaze at the Sun or Sun-light, it is visualised to be also *unmanifest* or without any distinction (वैशेष्य) in itself. Similarly Brahman is realized in propitiation. Brahman is a reality and, therefore, it is realized, but the realization does not make Brahman व्यक्त or manifest (visible to the physical eye).

13. आदि in प्रकाशादि seems to refer to such things in which there is no distinction (अवैशेष्य). Such things are perhaps नीहार, धूम, अर्क, *etc.* Perhaps the following verse from the Śve. Upa. may be useful here :—

नीहारधूमार्कानलानिलानां खद्योतविद्युत्स्फटिकशशिनाम् ।
एतानि रूपाणि पुरःसराणि ब्रह्मण्यभिव्यक्तिकराणि योगे ॥
(Śve. Upa. II. 11)

The word प्रकाश in the Sūtra may be taken to correspond to the word अनल in this verse. In Brahman there is no वैशेष्य, as there is none in नीहार, धूम, अर्क, अनल, अनिल, *etc.* Therefore, Brahman is अव्यक्त.

14. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 25 discusses whether the individual soul and the Supreme Soul are different because in Sūtra 24 they are referred to as the propitiator and the one to be propitiated in so far as propitiation or संराधन is mentioned in it. It would be very strange if such a question would be taken up here. The question of the identity of the soul with परमात्मन् is discussed in Bra. Sū II. 3. 28–32 and should be discussed properly in Bra. Sū. II. 3, because that Pāda discusses such questions as the जीव being an अंश of God, a likeness of God, *etc.* But Śaṅkara finds it discussed or hinted not in that Pāda at all but in other places in the Brahmasūtra, such as Sūtra II. 1. 22, III. 2. 27.

Śaṅkara takes आकाश, सवितृ, *etc.* by आदि and adds (यथा प्रकाशाकाशसवितृप्रभृतयः) ... ... सविशेषा इवावभासन्ते. There is no

justification in the Sūtra for this addition. कर्मणि is interpreted by him as अङ्गुलिकरकोदकप्रभृतिषु कर्मसु उपाधिभूतेषु. Thus he makes out a plural number out of the singular of कर्मन् and gives quite a novel sense to the word. To us it appears that कर्मन् means action corresponding to the action of संराधन mentioned in the preceding Sūtra. Instead of connecting कर्मणि and अभ्यासात्, Śaṅkara completes the sentence by adding सविशेषा इवावभासन्ते after कर्मणि; and he takes अभ्यासात् separately as meaning वेदान्तेष्वभ्यासेनासकृज्जीवप्राज्ञयोरभेदः प्रतिपाद्यते.

Sūtra 26

15. 'अतः' seems to refer to अव्यक्त, the topic of this Adhikaraṇa. And, as there is तु in the following Sūtra, this Sūtra seems to be a पूर्वपक्ष.

16. 'अतः अनन्तेन' seems to mean "from this अव्यक्त, *one is united* with the Infinite."

17. तथा हि लिङ्गम्—This is a reference to a Śruti in which अव्यक्त (referred to by अतः) and अनन्त are mentioned. The reference seems probably to have been made to

अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च।
यज्ज्ञात्वा मुच्यते जन्तुरमृतत्वं च गच्छति ॥

Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8.

अनन्त in the Sūtra stands for व्यापक in this verse. The Sūtrakāra often makes such changes (*Vide* Note 10 on Sūtra 21, PP. 30-31). In this verse it is stated that पुरुष who is omnipresent (व्यापक) is higher than अव्यक्त, and that by knowing him one gets immortality. So the opponent in Sūtra 26 seems to argue that from the Unmanifest (अतः) one reaches or unites with the अनन्त or व्यापक पुरुष according to this Śruti. Sūtra 26 uses अनन्त as a name and the word व्यपदेश in the next Sūtra (27) also shows that by अनन्त some name (पुरुष who is व्यापक) is meant in Sūtra 26. As will be clear from our interpretation

of Sūtras 27–30, the पूर्वपक्ष view of this Sūtra seems to have a threefold implication: (1) that from अव्यक्त there is a further progress to पुरुष, (2) that पुरुष has a form (a fact admitted by the Sūtrakāra) and, therefore, he is व्यक्त, and (3) that अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् is not अनन्त or व्यापक. The first and last implications are discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras III. 2. 31–36 and III. 2. 37, and the middle one in Sūtras III. 2. 27–30.

17*a*. For Śaṅkara's view on Sūtra 26 see *infra* Note 22.

Sūtra 27

18. तु shows that this is a सिद्धान्तसूत्र and the preceding Sūtra a पूर्वपक्ष.

19. उभयव्यपदेशात्—The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that Brahman itself its called अव्यक्त and also पुरुष (*lit.* व्यापक); both are the names given to the Supreme Being.

20. अहिकुण्डलवत्—Brahman is like अहि, the serpent, and like कुण्डल, the coil of a serpent. When we use the word अहि, we do not refer to any form or figure or posture of the serpent in particular, but when we use the word कुण्डल we refer to the coiled form of a serpent. Thus, though the two different names are used, the individual is one and the same.

The Sūtrakāra argues that as in the above example, अव्यक्त and पुरुष are two names of the same Brahman. The difference between the exact significance of the two names is like that between अहि and कुण्डल. Thus, the attainment of पुरुष is not different from that of अव्यक्त; either is the attainment of Brahman.

21. Sūtra 27 seems to have been referred to by Sūtra III. 3. 8.

22. 'अतः' in Sūtra 26 does not refer to अव्यक्त according to Śaṅkara who interprets it as "स्वाभाविकत्वादभेदस्य अविद्याकृतत्वाच्च भेदस्य." भेद and अभेद are not at all mentioned in the preceding Sūtras and therefore अतः cannot refer to them. Śaṅkara quotes a Śruti in which neither अव्यक्त (referred to

by अतः) nor अनन्त or its equivalent (*e. g.* व्यापक) is found. He also adds " जीवः एकतां गच्छति " after अनन्तेन, as we do owing to the instrumental singular form of अनन्तेन.

Śaṅkara does not take Sūtra 26 as a पूर्वपक्ष as is suggested by तु in Sūtra 27.

23. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra gives another view regarding the relation of the worshipped and the worshipper (संराध्यसंराधकभाव). Inspite of तु in this Sūtra Śaṅkara does not interpret this Sūtra as a refutation of any पूर्वपक्ष. ' उभय ' according to him refers to (1) the statement of भेद between परमात्मन् and जीव and (2) the statement of अभेद between the same. We have already stated that this topic is discussed in Sūtra III. 3. 28–32. Śaṅkara explains the example of अहिकुण्डल very briefly in the words " यथाहिरित्यभेदः कुण्डलाभोगप्रांशुत्वादीनीति तु भेद एवमिहापीति " (*Vide* Note 29 under Sūtra 29).

Sūtra 28

24. This Sūtra refutes in another way the पूर्वपक्ष that from अव्यक्त a meditator unites with the अनन्त or व्यापक *i. e.* पुरुष expressed in Sūtra 26.

25. The Sūtrakāra seems to say that अव्यक्त is like light and पुरुष is like the resort of light; thus, for example, the two are like the light of the Sun and the solar orb in which the light is centred. In Sūtra 25, the अव्यक्त is compared with light.

26. तेजस्त्वात्—" Because Brahman is of the nature of light ". The Chā. Upa. explains Brahman to be तेजः (Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 3–ब्रह्म एव तेज एव). There are other Śrutis which also show that Brahman is of the nature of light. (See the Śrutis and Smṛtis quoted under Sūtras 16–18). Thus, because Brahman is of the nature of light, we may say that अव्यक्त is light and पुरुष is a resort of light. Thus, the two are not different.

27. Śaṅkara explains प्रकाशाश्रयदृष्टान्त as यथा प्रकाशः सावित्रस्तदाश्रयश्च सविता नात्यन्तभिन्नावुभयोरपि तेजस्त्वाविशेषात्। अथ च भेदव्यपदेशभाजौ भवत एवमिहापि। (See Note 29 on Sūtra 29).

Sūtra 29

28. In Sūtra 29 the Sūtrakāra shows his preference for the analogy mentioned in Sūtra 27. The Supreme Being is like अहि and like कुण्डल because it is called अव्यक्त and पुरुष respectively, the one being अरूपवत् and the other रूपवत्. In Sūtra 28 the analogy of प्रकाश and its आश्रय was given on the ground that Brahman is of the nature of तेजस्; but the Sūtrakāra has already said that Brahman is not of the nature of तेजस् because it cannot be reflected like तेजस् in water (Sūtra 19 above). Brahman is described in Śruti and Smṛti to be light (Sūtra 16–17) and like light (Sūtra 18). For this reason the Sūtrakāra gives the illustration of प्रकाश and प्रकाशाश्रय, and, without rejecting it, preferes the illustration of अहि and कुण्डल. It would thus seem that Sūtra 28 presents the view of एकदेशिवेदान्तिन्.

29. Śaṅkara takes पूर्ववत् as a reference to Sūtra 25 (as interpreted by him). So, according to him, Sūtra 29 means that " the relation of संराध्य and संराधक is what it is stated to be in Sūtra 25. Śaṅkara explains here the application of the two illustrations in Sūtras 27–28. According to him, परमात्मन् corresponds to अहि and जीवात्मन् to कुण्डल which is a particular posture (संस्थानविशेष) of अहि; and in the second example परमात्मन् corresponds to प्रकाशाश्रय and जीव to एकदेश (of प्रकाश or of प्रकाशाश्रय ?). In either case the individual soul would be a *really* bound soul, and therefore his release by विद्या taught in the Scripture would be improper. All this is Śaṅkara's own criticism of the illustration given in Sūtras 27–28; the Sūtra (29) itself says nothing about them, nor does Śaṅkara quote any other Sūtra in favour of his criticism.

Sūtra 30

30. In Sūtra 26 (अतोऽनन्तेन तथाहि लिङ्गम् ।), the opponent tried to show that from the Unmanifest a liberated soul would unite with the Infinite *i. e.* with the पुरुष, on the strength of

Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8. In Sūtra 27, the Sūtrakāra says that Brahman is called both अव्यक्त and पुरुष and therefore it is like अहि and कुण्डल, so that अव्यक्त and पुरुष are not different and therefore a meditator does not go to and unite with the व्यापक पुरुष from the अव्यक्त. In Sūtra 28, he gave another example about the unity of Brahman whether it be called अव्यक्त or पुरुष. In Sūtra 29 he showed his preference for the example in Sūtra 27.

In Sūtra 30, the Sūtrakāra gives his reason for preferring the analogy in Sūtra 27 to that in Sūtra 28. प्रतिषेध in Sūtra 30 seems to us to be a reference to न तथात्वम् in Sūtra 19 (अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम्), which denies the तेजस्त्व (*i. e.* तेजः-स्वभावत्त्व) of Brahman. Thus, the analogy based upon तेजस्त्व of Brahman (Sūtra 28) is not the view favoured by the Sūtrakāra.

31. The word ' अनन्त ', used with reference to पुरुष and the distinction between the अव्यक्त and पुरुष which the पूर्वपक्षिन् tries to make out on the strength of that word in Kaṭha Upa. VI. 9 seem to be the ground for inserting Sūtra 37 because the omnipresence (सर्वगतत्व), which is not explained here (in Sūtras 27–30) has been explained in Sūtra 37 by refuting a पूर्वपक्ष similar to that in Sūtra 26. As अनेन in Sūtra 37 indicates, for the Sūtrakāra, it is more convenient to refute the supposed " limitedness " (असर्वगतत्व of अव्यक्त) after refuting the supposed परत्व of पुरुष as compared with अव्यक्त.

32. We have interpreted प्रतिषेध in the light of the context of Sūtras 19 and 28. Śaṅkara explains प्रतिषेधात् as अन्यप्रतिषेधात् and refers it to Bṛ. Upa. III. 7. 23, *etc.* To us it seems that here there is no question of अन्यप्रतिषेध which of course is mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 36. Here a प्रतिषेध as an argument for favouring the illustration of Sūtra 27 seems to have been meant by the Sūtrakāra and the reference seems to be to Sūtra 19.

SECTION IV

Sūtras III. 2. 31-36

(३१) परमतः सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः ।
(३२) सामान्यात्तु ।
(३३) बुद्ध्यर्थः पादवत् ।
(३४) स्थानविशेषात् ।
(३५) प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च ।
(३६) तथान्यप्रतिषेधात् ।

TRANSLATION

[Pūrvapakṣa]-There is (a higher) Brahman [or there is a higher aspect of Brahman] which is higher than this (Unmanifest), because of the mention of [the Unmanifest as] a bridge, that of its measure, that of the connection [of the individual soul with the Unmanifest] and that of the difference [between the Unmanifest and the higher one *viz.*, the Puruṣa]. 31

[Siddhānta]-But, because [the designation of a bridge is] common [to the Unmanifest and the Puruṣa]; 32

[the mention of its measure] is for the purpose of a notion [under which Brahman is meditated upon] like [the mention of] the quarters [for example, in the Puruṣasūkta]; 33

[the mention of the connection of the individual soul with the Unmanifest is] due to a particular state [of the individual soul]; 34

and [the mention of the difference of the Unmanifest and the Puruṣa is] due to the explicability [of the Unmanifest as the light, *etc.*, (*i. e. ahi*) [and that of the *Puruṣa* as the *prakāśāśraya, i. e. kuṇḍala,*]; 35

also because of the denial [by the Śruti] of [a principle] other [than Brahman]. 36

NOTES

Sūtra 31

1. An important Pūrvapakṣa is stated and refuted here in as many as seven Sūtras (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31-37). An opponent is here said to hold the view that the Supreme Being (पुरुष) is higher than (*param*) the Unmanifest dealt with in the preceding Sūtras. The arguments-four in number— of the opponent do not contain such arguments as 'the Unmanifest is the प्रकृति '. It is not likely that any of these arguments could have been put forth by a Sāṁkhya. The number of the arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष and those of the सिद्धान्त shows that the पूर्वपक्ष is not " an imaginary opposition presented by the Sūtrakāra to make his doctrine clear to the reader" (प्रतिपत्तिसौकर्यार्थम्). The argument of the Sūtrakāra that the Upaniṣads deny the existence of the *second* Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 36) shows that the opponent argues in favour of *two* final (conscious) principles, one of which is *higher than* the other (परमत:-in Sūtra 31).

2. अत:—refers to the अव्यक्त described in Sūtra 23-30. In our opinion this important point of context should not be overlooked (See other Sūtras where अत: occurs).

3. परम् –" [There is another principle which is] higher than this. " The पूर्वपक्षिन् does not argue that the other ultimate principle, the existence of which he is upholding is on an *equal* status with the Unmanifest, as could have been the argument of a Sāṁkhya. On the contrary he says that this principle is *higher than* the Unmanifest. ' पर ' does not seem to mean only " अन्य: " but it means another *higher*. *Cf.* अव्यक्तात्पुरुष: पर:. अव्यक्त is mentioned in Sūtras 23-30; and subsequently पर is mentioned in Sūtra 31. In Sūtra 37, the

Sūtrakāra gives an अतिदेश by which he applies the conclusion of Sūtras 31–36 to prove that the अव्यक्त in Bra. Sū. III 2. 23 is सर्वगत or omnipresent. This fact also seems to us to indicate that in परमतः (Sūtra 31), परं according to the Sūtrakāra means *higher than*, because Sūtra 37 implies that the अव्यक्त was thought of by the पूर्वपक्ष to be a *limited* principle.

3*a*. परम्—The पूर्वपक्ष means that "the Supreme Being is higher than this अव्यक्त." We have shown above that this पूर्वपक्ष implies a belief in two Supreme Realities, *viz.*, अव्यक्त and पुरुष. The पूर्वपक्ष has already agreed that the Supreme One is अव्यक्त in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23 and now he says that there is a Supreme One higher than this अव्यक्त. So, according to this पूर्वपक्ष, there are two Realities अव्यक्त and पुरुष, of which the latter is higher than the former. The पूर्वपक्ष may also mean that there is only one Reality which has two aspects अव्यक्त and पुरुष of which the latter is higher than the former. The former view is that of the Later Mahābhārata; the latter view is held by the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad Gītā.[14] The Sūtrakāra accepts neither of these views because according to him there is only one Reality which has two aspects of *equal status*. Thus, according to the Brahmasūtra अव्यक्त and पुरुष are two names or aspects of the same Brahman, neither being higher than the other.

4. सेतून्मानसंबन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः ।—As the पूर्वपक्ष argues that the Supreme Being is higher than this Unmanifest (अव्यक्त), it seems to us that all these four reasons (सेतुव्यपदेश, उन्मानव्यपदेश, संबन्धव्यपदेश and भेदव्यपदेश) are taken from a Śruti or Śrutis which allude to them with reference to the अव्यक्त. Such a text is only the Kaṭha Upaniṣad as we have stated in the notes on Sūtra III. 2. 23. This latter Sūtra (III. 2. 23) which mentions अव्यक्त seems to refer to that same text because we think that in all the Sūtras which give the expression "आह हि" we have a reference to a text in which the very word as is

14. *Vide* the author's Akṣara: A forgotten chapter

mentioned in the Sūtra in question occurs.[15] The following explanations of the four हेतुs given in Sūtra 31 would, we believe, be a further substantiative proof of the above suggestion of ours which we make only on the ground of the context of "अतः" in that Sūtra.

5. सेतुव्यपदेश—There are several Śrutis in which the word सेतु occurs with reference to Brahman (1) अथ य आत्मा स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषां लोकानामसंभेदाय नैतं सेतुमहोरात्रे तरतः ।......तस्माद्वा

15. This can be shown by a comparison of the Sūtras having the expression "आह हि" with their respective विषयवाक्यs. We give below a table of the same:—

सूत्राणि ।	विषयवाक्यश्रुतयः ।
(1) तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याह । II. 3. 10 (The preceding Sūtra, असंभवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः, refers to सत्).	'सदेव' इत्युपक्रम्य 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' इत्युपदेशात् ।
(2) संध्ये सृष्टिराह हि । III. 2. 1.	तस्य वा एतस्य...संध्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं...। बृ. उ. IV. 3. 9. न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान्रथयोगान्पथः सृजते ......॥ बृ. उ. IV. 3. 10.
(3) आह च तन्मात्रम् । III. 2. 16 (तत् refers to प्रकाश in the preceding Sūtra—प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् ।)	ब्रह्म एव तेज एव । बृ. उ. IV. 4. 7. See our Notes on Sūtra III. 2. 16. Why तेजः for प्रकाश ?
(4) तदव्यक्तमाह हि । III 1. 2. 3.	महतः परमव्यक्तम् । कठ. उ. III. 11.
(5) तानि परे तथा ह्याह ॥ IV. 4. 15 (तानि refers to तेज आदीनि भूतानि in Sūtra IV. 2. 5).	तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् । छा. उ. VI. 15. 2. See our Notes on Sūtra IV. 2. 15.
(6) अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् । IV. 4. 10 (अभावम् refers to the absence of body mentioned in Sūtra IV. 4. 13).	अथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव । बृ. उ. IV. 4. 7.
(7) विकारावर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह । IV. 4. 19.	Some Śruti describing the मुक्तरूप to be permanent is referred to.

एतं सेतुं तीर्त्वाऽपि नक्तमहरेवाभिनिष्पद्यते सकृद्विभातो ह्येवैष ब्रह्मलोकः ॥ (Chā. Upa. VIII. 4. 1–2). With regard to this Śruti it has been decided in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14–21 that दहर which is called आत्मन् and सेतुः विधृतिः in this Śruti is the Supreme Being. The opponent did not raise an objection there on the ground of the दहर being called सेतु. So it is not likely that the दहर श्रुति could be the पूर्वपक्ष text in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31. (2) यस्मिन्द्यौः पृथिवी चान्तरिक्षमोतं मनः सह प्राणैश्च सर्वैः ॥ तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानमन्या वाचो विमुञ्चथामृतस्यैष सेतुः ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5). This Śruti has been discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 1–7 and therefore would not be a पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31. (3) स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते......एष भूतपाल एष सेतुर्विधरण एषां लोकानामसंभेदाय...॥(Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22). It is not possible that this text could supply the पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31. (4) यः सेतुरीजानानामक्षरं ब्रह्म यत्परम् । अभयं तितीर्षतां पारं नाचिकेतँ शकेमहि ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. III. 2). Out of these Śrutis it is *particularly* the Kaṭha Śruti (III. 2) to which the पूर्वपक्ष in Sūtra 31 seems to refer, because in Kaṭha Upa. III. 11 the word अव्यक्त in the sense of ब्रह्मन् occurs and that अव्यक्त is here declared to be सेतु. अक्षर ब्रह्म (Kaṭha Upa. III. 2) is the same as अव्यक्त of the Sūtrakāra since अव्यक्त is the Supreme Being (See Note 3 on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23 ; also see *infra* Note 11 on भेदव्यपदेश). Therefore on the strength of Kaṭha Upa. III. 2 one may argue that in the Kaṭha Upa. the Unmanifest is declared to be a bridge (सेतु). The idea सेतु (bridge) implies that those who cross the bridge reach a destination *beyond* the bridge. Similarly the पूर्वपक्ष argues that *since* अव्यक्त *is declared to be a* सेतु, the supreme principle must be *beyond* the अव्यक्त, *i. e.* the पुरुष is beyond अव्यक्त. As stated in Sūtra III. 2. 26, it was a belief that from the अव्यक्त a seeker went to the पुरुष. This is also the purport of the argument that the Supreme Being is higher than the Unmanifest (Sūtra III. 2. 31). Thus, the पूर्वपक्ष of Sū. III. 2. 31 supports our interpretation of Sūtra III. 2. 26 which is a पूर्वपक्ष according to us. Now since a seeker was believed to progress from

अव्यक्त to पुरुष (that was *higher* than अव्यक्त), the पूर्वपक्ष used the text declaring अव्यक्त to be a सेतु to prove that the Supreme Being was *higher* than the अव्यक्त.

This argument was met with by the सिद्धान्तिन् saying that पुरुष is also declared equally to be a सेतु. In other words, सेतुव्यपदेश is *common* to both अव्यक्त and पुरुष both of which are aspects of Brahman (Cf. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 32).

6. The way of arguing adopted by Śaṅkara that the destination may be अनात्मन् cannot even remotely be drawn out from the Sūtra. Rather "परम्" in the Sūtra indicates that the one beyond this अव्यक्त Brahman (सेतु) is also Brahman or at least a *conscious* principle because the पूर्वपक्षिन् here is one who has accepted अव्यक्त as Brahman and then argues that the Supreme One is higher than this (Unmanifest).

7. उन्मानव्यपदेश—This should mean that the अव्यक्त is declared to be limited or measured. There are several Śrutis in which Brahman is declared to have a "measure" or to be limited.-(1) अथ यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति ॥ (Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 1); (2) अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्ये आत्मनि तिष्ठति । ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते एतद्वैतत् ॥ (Kaṭha. Upa. IV. 12-13); (3) य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति होवाचैतदमृतमेतदभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति ......(Chā. Upa. IV. 14. 1); (4) एष मे आत्मान्तर्हृदयेऽणीयान् व्रीहेर्वा यवाद्वा सर्षपाद्वा श्यामाकाद्वा श्यामाकतण्डुलाद्वा एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदये ज्यायान्पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षाज्ज्यायान्दिवो ज्यायानेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 3).

In these or other passages Brahman or Atman is declared to be of the size or measure of the heart, of a thumb, of an eye, *etc.* But it seems to us that out of all these Śrutis, it is the Kaṭha Śruti (IV. 12-13) only, to which the पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 21 is likely to refer, because only that Śruti mentions Brahman as अव्यक्त. Thus, उन्मानव्यपदेश seems to us to be a reference to the description of this अव्यक्त as "अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः

पुरुषः " (Kaṭha Upa. IV. 12 and 13). We have shown elsewhere (*Vide* our notes on आयतन in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39) that Bra. Sū. 1. 3 is devoted to the discussion of such Śrutis as contain the word पुरुष and are therefore taken by the Sūtrakāra as pertaining to the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman in his discussion of those Śrutis (in Bra. Sū. I. 3) but may be taken as mentioning the अरूपवत् or अव्यक्त aspect of ब्रह्मन् (as the Sūtrakāra says in Sūtra III. 3. 39). In fact the Sūtrakāra has discussed, in our opinion, in Bra. Sū. 1. 3 such विषयवाक्यs as the पूर्वपक्ष sought to interpret as dealing with अव्यक्त and has established by arguments (in Bra. Sū. I. 3) that they deal with पुरुष aspect, but has allowed (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39) their use in the meditation on the अव्यक्त aspect (See our Notes on that Sūtra). Thus, it seems to us that the opponent took अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुष to be different from व्यापक पुरुष (Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8 – Sūtra III. 2. 26) and argued that अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः was the अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन्. The Sūtrakāra took अव्यक्त to be an aspect *viz.*, the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman, but the opponent took अव्यक्त to be one Brahman and पुरुष to be another Brahman because he believed अव्यक्त to be *lower than* पुरुष (Sūtra III. 2. 31). In order to prove this belief the पूर्वपक्ष makes use of the fact that the अव्यक्त Śruti mentions अङ्गुष्ठमात्र पुरुष and also व्यापक पुरुष. The word उन्मान is etymologically connected with the word प्रमित in शब्दादेव प्रमितः (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 24) which discusses this very Kaṭha Śruti. This connection also may be taken as an indication in favour of our identification of the Śruti referred to by उन्मानव्यपदेश with Kaṭha Upa. IV. 12 and 13. Because अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् is declared to be limited, the Supreme Being is higher than that अव्यक्त, *i. e.*, पुरुष in Kaṭha Upa. III. 11 (or व्यापक पुरुष as in Kaṭha VI. 8) is higher than अव्यक्त as stated in Kaṭha Upa. III. 11.

The Sūtrakāra refutes this argument of the पूर्वपक्ष by saying that this उन्मानव्यपदेश is for the purpose of forming a notion about Brahman, just as the mention of पादs or quarters of the पुरुष (the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman).

8. Śaṅkara illustrates the पूर्वपक्ष by quoting a single Śruti in which Brahman is said to be चतुष्पाद्. This does not seem to us to be a happy quotation in as much as that very Śruti (of चतुष्पाद् ब्रह्मन्) is used by the Sūtrakāra in order to refute the objection of उन्मान (See Sūtra 33), by saying that the measure (चतुष्पाद्) is merely meant for the formation of a notion in meditation. According to Śaṅkara, the पूर्वपक्षिन् argues that because Brahman is ' measured, ' there should be *another* principle than that Brahman, just as the measurement of a particular thing in the world implies the existence of several other things as well. This does not seem to us to bring out exactly the point of the पूर्वपक्षिन्. Rather the latter means that because अव्यक्त accepted by the Sūtrakāra as ब्रह्मन् is said to be ' measured ' in the अव्यक्त Śruti, there should be another Brahman which is *without measure.*

9. संबन्धव्यपदेश—There are a number of Śrutis which say that the individual soul in bondage is associated with Brahman (1) सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति (Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 1), (2) शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तः (Bra. Upa. IV. 3. 21), (3) एवमेवेमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः अहरहर्गच्छन्त्य एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति...(Chā. Upa. VIII. 3. 2).

As the reply to this objection in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 34 (which we read as *only* स्थानविशेषात्) shows, this refers to the संबन्ध of the अव्यक्त and the individual soul. If so, it is likely that the Śruti to which this हेतु refers is the following:—

स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति ।
महान्तं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥

(Kaṭha. Upa. IV. 4).

As this Śruti is taken from the text of the अव्यक्त, the पूर्वपक्षिन् seems to argue that in this Śruti the अव्यक्त is declared to be that with which (येन) the individual soul sees or experiences both the state of dream and that of waking. Thus,

the soul is declared to be connected with the अव्यक्त (in these two states). Because there is already a connection between the अव्यक्त and the individual soul, the Supreme Being with which the soul seeks to be united (संपत्ति in Sūtra IV. 4. 1) in liberation is higher than this अव्यक्त. As it is not stated in Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4 that the connection between the Unmanifest and the individual soul to which it refers is that which takes place when the soul is in the deep sleep state and as the reply of the Sūtrakāra is an argument *explaining the connection* to be such a one, we believe that Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4 is just the proper Śruti to which संबन्धव्यपदेश in Sūtra III. 2. 31 refers. It is not likely, in any case, that a Śruti which *clearly mentions the connection* of Brahman and the individual soul in deep-sleep state would be referred to by संबन्धव्यपदेश by the पूर्वपक्ष, because that pointed reference itself would go against him rather than favour his conclusion.

10. Śaṅkara argues that as the soul is said to be connected with Branman in deep sleep, it follows that Brahman is 'limited' मित; and because Brahman is thus proved to be 'limited,' there must be another unlimited principle. Thus, Śaṅkara practically reduces the two arguments, उन्मान and संबन्ध, to only one, *viz.*, Brahman as taught by the Sūtrakāra is limited or measured.

11. भेदव्यपदेश – The opponent points out that the Śruti mentions the अव्यक्त and the higher one to be different. Could it be proved that the two are one and the same, the opponent would have to conclude that the two are only two aspects or designations of the same principle; but he does not think that this can be proved. The भेदव्यपदेश meant by the पूर्वपक्ष would be very probably the भेद of पर and अपर, the अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् mentioned by the Sūtrakāra (III 2. 23) being the latter, since the opponent holds that there is a पर ब्रह्मन् " higher " than that taught by the Sūtrakāra (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31).

The भेदव्यपदेश of the पूर्वपक्ष refers to the difference (भेद) between अव्यक्त and पुरुष mentioned in

महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न पर किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥

(Kaṭha Upa. III. 11).

The अव्यक्त of this series of principles is declared by the Sūtrakāra to be Brahman which he has discussed (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23). The same is described in the Kaṭha Upa. in a subsequent verse, *viz.*,

अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
अनाद्यन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥

(Kaṭha Upa. III. 15).

In this verse ' महत: परम् ' is described, so that this verse refers to the अव्यक्त of the above verse (Kaṭha Upa. III. 11); and " अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपम्......... " is applicable only to Brahman; therefore also अव्यक्त is Brahman. So, पुरुष in Ka. Upa. III. 11 is another Brahman higher than the अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन्. Similarly in Ka. Upa. VI. 8. In this Śruti पुरुष is declared to be पर and therefore अव्यक्त is lower or अपर. If the अव्यक्त is the परमं पदम्, पुरुष is विष्णु (Kaṭha. Upa. III. 9), the master to whom that पद belongs (Cf. Bha. Gī. VIII. 20–22). This भेदव्यपदेश was already mentioned by the पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26. The Sūtrakāra's reply given there was that because there are two designations (अव्यक्त and पुरुष), Brahman is like अहि and कुण्डल or प्रकाश and its आश्रय (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27–28; see also Bra. Sū. III. 2. 25 in which अव्यक्त is declared to be like प्रकाश). As the Sūtrakāra's reply (in Sūtra III. 2. 35 which we propose to read as प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च) refers to the simile of प्रकाश and the other (*e. g.*, अहि), we infer that it is the *difference* between अव्यक्त and पुरुष, both being argued by the पूर्वपक्ष to be Brahman, which is referred to by him in Sūtra III. 2. 31.

12. Śaṅkara explains भेदव्यपदेश by quoting Chā. Upa. I. 6–7. He says that that Śruti mentions two different ईश्वरs,

one who is आदित्याधार and another who is अक्ष्याधार. But the fact seems to be different, because by an अतिदेश which Śaṅkara himself quotes the Śruti itself identifies the two. So, in our opinion, the passage does not support the भेदव्यपदेश at all.

13. There are several other Śrutis in which the भेद between अव्यक्त and पुरुष which are respectively the अपर ब्रह्मन् and पर ब्रह्मन्, is mentioned:-

(*a*) तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात्पावकाद्विस्फुलिङ्गाः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः। तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापियन्ति ॥ १॥ दिव्योः ह्यमूर्त पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः। अप्रमाणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः ॥ २ ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 1–2). If अक्षर is interpreted in the first verse as Brahman, it cannot be taken in the second verse as अव्याकृत or माया without giving up the consistency of the context. So, पुरुष is here said to be higher than the अक्षर ब्रह्मन् which is the highest. अक्षर ब्रह्मन् is itself पर but पुरुष is परतः परः. So, there is a principle beyond the पर ब्रह्मन् discussed by the Sūtrakāra (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11 and 31).

(*b*) यं यं लोकं मनसा संविभाति विशुद्धसत्वः कामयते यांश्च कामान् ॥ तं तं लोकं जयते तांश्च कामांस्तस्मादत्मज्ञं ह्यर्चयेद्भूतिकामः॥ (Mu. Upa. III. 1. 10). स वेदैतत्परमं ब्रह्मं धाम यत्र विश्वं निहितं भाति शुभ्रम् ॥ उपासते पुरुषं ये ह्यकामास्ते शुक्रमेतदतिवर्तन्ति धीराः॥ (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 1). In this Śruti " स वेद " is to be connected with आत्मज्ञ. And एतत् शुक्रम् should be taken as a reference to परमं ब्रह्म. The word 'शुक्र' is used for Brahman in many Śrutis:-स पर्यगाच्छुक्रमकायमव्रणमस्नाविरंशुद्धमपापविद्धम् ॥ (Īśa. Upa. 8); तदेव शुक्रं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते ॥ तस्मिंल्लोकाः श्रिताः सर्वे तदु नात्येति कश्चन एतद्वैतत् ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. VI. 1); तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतं तं विद्याच्छुक्रममृतमिति ॥ (Ka. Upa VI. 17). So, 'एतत् शुक्रम्' in Mu. Upa. III. 2. 1 cannot be interpreted as 'नृबीजं'. It should be explained as referring to परम ब्रह्मन् in the first half of the verse. Thus, according to this verse, a meditator on पुरुष goes beyond परम ब्रह्मन्, and पुरुष is therefore higher than Brahman.

(*c*) स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते ॥ (Pra. Upa. V. 5). The same ब्रह्मलोक is further described in स सामभिर्यत्तत्कवयो वेदयन्ते ॥ तमोंकारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं चेति ॥ (Pra. Upa. V. 7). Thus, ब्रह्मलोक which is जीवघन is that "which the wise declare" (*Cf.* दुर्गं पथस्तत्कवयो वदन्ति Ka. Upa. III. 14). According to this Śruti of Pra. Upa. it seems that जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक is ब्रह्मन् and पुरुष is a principle higher than that ब्रह्मन्. If जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक is the हिरण्यगर्भलोक (as interpreted by Śaṅkara),[16] how can it be called 'ब्रह्मन्' at all? Much less can it be called "अपर ब्रह्मन्". "पुरुष" is परात्परः as in अक्षरात्परतः परः (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 2). In Pra. Upa. V. 2, this Brahman is actually called अपर ब्रह्मन् and पुरुष is called पर ब्रह्मन्.

In all these texts a principle *higher than the highest* Brahman is mentioned; and the two principles are distinguished as पर and परात्पर. The भेदव्यपदेश in these Śrutis would have to be explained on the same lines as that in Kaṭha Upa. III. 11.

14. If our suggestion (in Sūtra III. 2. 31) that it is the अव्यक्त text, *viz.*, the Kaṭha Upa. passage, which is referred to by all the arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31, be correct; we are here given to understand as to how that passage was generally understood in the days of the Sūtrakāra and how the Sūtrakāra himself interpreted it. The Kaṭha Upa. was believed to teach *two* Brahmans (*Cf.* तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात्— Sūtra III. 2. 36) one of which was considered to be higher than the other (the arguments of सेतुव्यपदेश *etc.*). Thus, अव्यक्त of Kaṭha Upa. III. 11 and VI. 8 is Brahman itself, as is also पुरुष. They were taken to be *different* from each other; the the Sūtrakāra explained them to be two aspects of the same principle like अहि and कुण्डल or प्रकाश and प्रकाशाश्रय. Compare the पूर्वपक्ष here with the Aupaniṣada School of Mahābhārata

16. *Vide* Śaṅkara's commentary on the Pra. Upa.

XII.[17] The Bhagavadgītā also makes the same distinction between अव्यक्त (or अक्षर) and पुरुष, *e. g.*, in Bha. Gī. VIII. 20-22.[18]

Sūtra 32

15. 'तु' indicates the Sūtrakāra's rejection of the पूर्वपक्ष in the preceding Sūtra. There is no principle higher than the Brahman called अव्यक्त (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23, Kaṭha Upa. III. 11, 15 and VI. 8).

16. सामान्यात्—The Sūtrakāra seems to us to mean that the सेतुव्यपदेश is common to both अव्यक्त and पुरुष and therefore the fact that in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad अव्यक्त is called सेतु cannot prove that there is a *higher* (aspect of) Brahman than the अव्यक्त, *viz.*, the पुरुष. In Kaṭha Upaniṣad III. 2 the अव्यक्त is called सेतु. We have already stated that the word सेतु is used for दहर in Chā. Upa. VIII. 4. 1-2 and for आत्मन् in Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5. In Bra. Sū. I. 3. 1-7 the subject of Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5 is explained to be पुरुष because it is called "मुक्तोपसृप्य" (a word coined specially for the purpose of a comprehensive significance conveying the two-fold purpose of a reference to the Śruti and a suggestion of a designation of पुरुष) or पुरुष (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 2); and in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14-21 the दहर has been explained as परमेश्वर. Thus, सेतुव्यपदेश being common to both cannot prove that one aspect of Brahman is higher than the other or that the पुरुष is higher than the अव्यक्त.

17. Śaṅkara gives a very simple explanation of the Sūtra, *viz.*, Atman is called सेतु not because after crossing the bridge of Atman we reach some other principle which is our destination, but because Atman is like a bridge inasmuch as like an ordinary bridge which determines the limitations of a particular place, Atman is the sustainer of the rules (boundaries)

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17. *Vide* the author's Akṣara: A forgotten chapter, PP. 35-48.
18. *Ibid*, P. 17 and P. 148-149.

of the world. This explanation is, in our opinion, hardly possible because we think that no पूर्वपक्ष which accepted अव्यक्त as निरस्तसमस्तप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्म as determined in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23-30, would be arguing that अव्यक्त is called सेतु in any other sense than that of "सेतुरिव सेतुः".

Besides explaining सामान्य as सेतुरिव सेतुः Śaṅkara gives several other arguments none of which are even implied in the Sūtra itself.

Sūtra 33

18. After "बुद्ध्यर्थः" we have to take उन्मानव्यपदेश as understood.

19. बुद्ध्यर्थः—The अव्यक्त is called अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः because in meditation the meditator has to form a notion (बुद्धिः) of अव्यक्त, as a पुरुष of the size of a thumb. In Sūtras I. 2. 7 and I. 3. 21 the Sūtrakāra says that the Supreme Being is said to be 'residing in the human heart' because It is to be meditated upon as such. Like "अर्भकौकस्त्व" the अङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्व is meant for use in meditation only. It does not prove that the अव्यक्त is *limited* and that there is a higher Reality or a higher aspect of the Reality.

20. पादवत्—In Bra. Sū. I. 1. 24 the impersonal aspect of Brahman called there ज्योतिः (Chā. Upa. III. 1. 37) is explained to be such because of the mention of its पाद्s (or चरणs) in which one पाद consists of all beings (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 26). The पूर्वपक्ष has raised no objection there that ज्योतिः should be the lower Brahman because it is "measured" by four पाद्s.[19] Elsewhere in Chā. Upa. IV. 4. 5-8, and III. 18 also the impersonal aspect of Brahman is said to be possessed of four quarters (पाद्s). Just as this cannot imply that Brahman is a *limited* entity, अङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्व does not mean that अव्यक्त is limited and that therefore पुरुष (who is above अव्यक्त) is an

19. *Cf.* चेतोऽर्पणनिगदात् in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 25.

unlimited or omnipresent principle higher than the अव्यक्त (*Cf.* सर्वगतत्व in Sūtra III. 2. 37 for the implication that the पूर्वपक्ष takes अव्यक्त to be ' limited ').

21. Śaṅkara says that the उन्मानबुद्धि is meant for मन्द and मध्यम students, but the Sūtrakāra does not seem to refer to such a view in the Sūtra. Rather, according to the Sūtrakāra *all* meditators have to meditate upon ब्रह्मन् as अङ्गुष्ठमात्र, *etc.* For explaining the उन्मान according to the पूर्वपक्ष Śaṅkara had already selected one Śruti describing चतुष्पाद् Brahman (पाद means a foot), so, for interpreting the Sūtrakāra's reply to that पूर्वपक्ष, Śaṅkara at first selects *another* Śruti about चतुष्पाद् Brahman and gives an alternative interpretation of पादवत् in which पाद means " a quarter," not a foot. But with the latter interpretation he could not rightly construe the expression ' बुद्ध्यर्थः,' so, he has to add "व्यवहारप्राचुर्याय" (and not for forming a notion).

Sūtras 34–35

22. To us it seems that only " स्थानविशेषात् " forms Sūtra 34; and प्राकाशादिवत् should be transferred to Sūtra 35. We make this suggestion, because by adopting it, we get, as will be shown below, a better and easier interpretation of these two Sūtras (34–35). Śaṅkara's statement that Sūtra 34 is a reply to both the remaining arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष (संबन्धव्यपदेश and भेदव्यपदेश), and his double explanation of that Sūtra supports our suggestion regarding the change of reading. च in Sūtra 35, which indicates that it is the answer to the last argument, also goes to corroborate our suggestion. Again, Śaṅkara takes Sūtra 35 (as read by him) also as an answer to the last two arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष. This also favours our proposed detached readings of Sūtras 34–35. Lastly, ' प्राकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च ' seems to be connected with Sūtra III. 2. 25–30 and therefore forms an answer to *one* argument only.

23. स्थानविशेषात्—In Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4 which the पूर्वपक्ष has quoted to show that the individual soul is associated with

the अव्यक्त, and therefore there should be a higher Reality or a higher aspect of Reality, *viz.*, पुरुष, there is no explanation of the association between the अव्यक्त and the individual soul. It was because of this very absence of explanation of the association and the consequent vagueness about the cause of the association, that the Pūrvapakṣa presented that verse as an argument.

The Sūtrakāra says that the association of the soul with the अव्यक्त mentioned in Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4 should be taken to be that which takes place when the soul is in the deep sleep state, in सुषुप्तस्थान. Because the soul unites with the अव्यक्त (or Brahman) in the state of dreamless sleep and does not undergo any other state (change), it is that he is able to go over once again to the states of dreaming and waking. This is the Sūtrakāra's explanation of Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4. Therefore, the verse (Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4) cannot be quoted, as the पूर्वपक्ष possibly did, to demonstrate the association or union of the soul with the अव्यक्त in dreaming and waking states. And because this cannot be proved, it cannot be argued that there is a higher (aspect of) Reality than the अव्यक्त with which the soul is already associated while in dreaming and waking states.

We have shown that in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11 the word स्थान has the sense of states like the states of waking, *etc.*

We believe that only Kaṭha Upa. IV. 4 could be the basis of the पूर्वपक्ष's argument in Sūtra III. 2. 31. The पूर्वपक्ष could have quoted no other श्रुति, not indeed a Śruti in which the connection of the individual soul with Brahman was clearly stated to be that taking place in dreamless sleep. If the latter were the case, the Sūtrakāra's explanation would be in vain, having been easily grasped by the पूर्वपक्ष.

24. प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च (which is our suggested reading for Sūtra 35)—The Sūtrakāra says that the भेदव्यपदेश can be explained (उपपत्तेः) like प्रकाश, *etc.* " प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेः " seems to be the same as is mentioned in Sūtras 27-29. There the

difference (भेद) of अव्यक्त and पुरुष was first explained as that between अहि and कुण्डल and then as प्रकाशाश्रय and प्रकाश. By knowing कुण्डल and प्रकाश, we know अहि and सूर्य who is प्रकाशाश्रय, though अहि and सूर्य remain unmanifest during the process of knowledge, envisaging their forms (coil and radiance). This has been explained in Sūtras 27–29.

So, the difference between अव्यक्त and पुरुष (भेदव्यपदेश) is like that between अहि and कुण्डल or प्रकाशाश्रय and प्रकाश. In short, it is not an essential difference. The अव्यक्त Brahman itself appears as पुरुष. The two are one in essence, just as कुण्डल and प्रकाश are identical with अहि and प्रकाशाश्रय.

By "आदि" we should take प्रकाशाश्रय, and also अहि and कुण्डल. The Sūtrakāra did not expound the similes here, because he had already done so in his preceding Sūtras (27–29).

25. The presence of च in Sūtra 35 shows that Sūtra 35 is an answer to the last argument of the opponent, because the Sūtrakāra is replying to those arguments *seriatim.*

26. Śaṅkara reads Sūtra 34 as स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत्. But we have shown that स्थानविशेषात् is an explanation for संबन्धव्यपदेश and प्रकाशादिवत् (उपपत्तेश्च) for भेदव्यपदेश and therefore स्थानविशेषात् should be read as Sūtra 34 and प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च as Sūtra 35.

Śaṅkara says that in Sūtra 34 (as read by him), the Sūtrakāra gives a reply to the last *two* arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष in Sūtra 31. This is inconsistent with the fact that the Sūtrakāra gives a reply to one argument only in each of Sūtras 32–33. Further, Śaṅkara interprets 'स्थानविशेषात्' *in two different ways,* one of which applies to the refutation of संबन्धव्यपदेश and the other to that of भेदव्यपदेश. (1) In the former case he explains स्थान as बुद्ध्याद्युपाधि and स्थानविशेषात् as बुद्ध्याद्युपाधिस्थान-विशेषयोगात्. According to Śaṅkara, the Sūtrakāra's reply to संबन्धव्यपदेश is that the संबन्ध is to be understood in a subordinate sense, *viz.,* it is true only so far as the उपाधि of the individual soul is concerned. The soul's connection (संबन्ध) with the

Supreme Being is nothing but the cessation of particular cognitions which arise on account of the soul's association with particular *limitations* in the form of बुद्धि, *etc.*, and this cessation results from the cessation of the limitation itself. Thus, the संबन्ध is not due to the fact that Brahman with which the soul comes into contact is 'limited' (परिमित). (2) The other interpretation of स्थानविशेष by which Śaṅkara refutes the opponent's argument of भेदव्यपदेश is that the भेदव्यपदेश (the Śruti teaching many ईश्वरs) is due only to the उपाधिभेद (different limitations), not due to different natures of ईश्वरs. To us it seems that all the complexity underlying Śaṅkara's explanation of स्थानविशेषात् is due to the fact that the original sense of स्थान (*viz.*, one of the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep) was forgotten in his days.

The illustration 'प्रकाशादिवत्' is explained by Śaṅkara (1) in relation to 'स्थानविशेषात्' and (2) as answering both the last objections of the पूर्वपक्ष.

According to him, प्रकाश or light (of the Sun or the Moon) is one and the same, but if we connect it with उपाधिs or adjuncts, there will appear diversity of light, and when these adjuncts are removed, the light in the adjunct will be said to be connected with or will recede into the Sun (or the Moon as the case may be); and, again, if the उपाधिs are different, we may talk of different lights. By आदि, Śaṅkara takes the ether of the eye of a needle (सूचीपाशाकाश).

In fact, 'स्थानविशेषात्' as interpreted by Śaṅkara does not make clear his meaning of संबन्ध, but rather according to his explanation स्थानविशेष leads to संबन्धाभाव, and the संबन्ध takes place when स्थानविशेष (*i. e.*, उपाधि) ceases to function.

27. Śaṅkara explains Sūtra 35 (उपपत्तेश्च as read by him) as a reply to the last two arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष. Thus, according to him, Sūtras 34-35 are each of them a reply to each of the last two arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष. Śaṅkara says

that the connection of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul can be explained only as due to the removal (?) of बुद्ध्यादि उपाधि (adjuncts in the form of बुद्धि, *etc.*); and that the भेदव्यपदेश can be explained only as due to उपाधिभेद (different adjuncts). In each case he explains the उपपत्ति as *referring to Śrutis.* In the case of संबन्धव्यपदेशपरिहार, he says that the Śruti teaching the merging of the soul into Brahman as the very self of the individual soul (स्वमपीतो भवति–Cha. Upa. VI. 8. 1) proves that this "connection" takes place on the cessation of उपाधिकृतस्वरूप. In the case of भेदव्यपदेशपरिहार, he quotes three Śrutis from Chā. Upa. III. 12 and says that the आकाश in all of them is said to be *different*, because the स्थानs of these आकाशs are *different.*

To us it appears that प्रकाशादिवदुपपत्तेश्च was the reading of Sūtra 35 and that it was the reply to भेदव्यपदेश only. 'प्रकाशादि' is the same argument as in Sūtra III. 2. 27–28. Moreover, if at all the single word "उपपत्तेः" was the reading of Sūtra 35, that उपपत्ति ought to have been explained only on the propriety of a more commonsense argument, and not with reference to what is said in Śrutis. The Sūtrakāra seems to make use of the argument 'उपपत्तेः' or 'उपपद्यते च' only when he does not refer to a Śruti, but when he gives an argument from our ordinary life. Compare उपपद्यते in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 36, and II. 3. 14, and उपपत्तेः in III. 1. 22, and III. 2. 38. A study of अनुपपत्तेः (*e. g.* in रचनानुपपत्तेः Bra. Sū. II. 2.) also adds strength to our interpretation of उपपत्ति.

Sūtra 36

28. After refuting the four arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष in the preceding four Sūtras, the Sūtrakāra adds one more argument of his own in his favour in this Sūtra.

There cannot be two Brahmans or even two aspects of Brahman in which one is *higher* than the other, because the Śruti denies that there is another principle. The Sūtrakāra

seems to have in his mind those Śrutis in which Atman or Brahman is said to be *only* one and in which *a second is denied*, *viz.*,

(*a*) आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्। (Ai. Upa. I. 1)
(*b*) सदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। (Chā. Upa. VI. 2. 1)
(*c*) ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीदेकमेव। (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 11)
(*d*) आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीदेक एव। (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 17)
(*e*) सलील एको द्रष्टा अद्वैतो भवति। (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 32)
(*f*) अनेजदेकं मनसो जवीयः । (Īśa. 4)
(*g*) एकस्तथा सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। (Ka. Upa. V. 9, 10, 11)
(*h*) एको वशी...एकं रूपं बहुधा यः करोति। (Ka. Upa. V. 12).

In some of these Śrutis Atman or Brahman is said to be one, in others one only, and in some a second one is denied.

There are some Śrutis in which 'अन्य' '*another principle*' *is denied*:—

(*a*) नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञातैष ते आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतोऽतोऽन्यदार्तम्...। (Bṛ. Upa. III. 7. 23)

(*b*) नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति मन्तृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञातृ......। (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 11)

(*c*) न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यद्विजानीयात् ॥ ३० ॥ यत्र नान्यदिव स्यात्तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येदन्योऽन्यज्जिघ्रेदन्योऽन्यद्रसयेदन्योऽन्यद्वदेदन्योऽन्यच्छृणुयादन्योऽन्यन्मन्वीतान्योऽन्यत्स्पृशेदन्योऽन्यद्विजानीयात्। (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 30-31).

In all these Śrutis a second principle is denied. The fundamental doctrine of Vedanta is that of *oneness* of Brahman. So, the Sūtrakāra argues that there can not be a principle higher than the अव्यक्त Brahman. Because there is none other than Brahman, there can be no other *higher* principle than Brahman. This seems to us to be the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra. In Bra. Sū. I. 3. 12, while discussing Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 7-8, he uses Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 11 (See (b) above)

and says that in this Śruti we have 'अन्यभावव्यावृत्ति' exclusion of any other existence.' So, it is likely that the Śrutis of the above type are in the Sūtrakāra's mind when he speaks of अन्यप्रतिषेध.

29. Śaṅkara, however, quotes several Śrutis which do not expressly deny the existence of a second principle. But the Śrutis quoted by him under Sūtra III. 2. 30 are those which deny the existence of a second principle.

30. We may now ask us once again: "Which particular School represented by the पूर्वपक्ष is stated in Sūtras III. 2. 31-36 ?

To us it appears that the followers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads as distinguished from those of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads were the opponents to whom the Sūtrakāra replies in these Sūtras. With these opponents the followers of the Bhagavadgītā and the Vedantins of the Māhabhārata Mokṣadharmaparvan might be associated. In these works the highest three principles in order are the unconscious Nature, the conscious Nature and the Puruṣa, as we have shown elsewhere.[20] They regarded the Akṣara Brahman of the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads in a two-fold capacity, (1) as an optional goal along with Puruṣa, and (2) as a power (प्रकृति) of the Puruṣa who was placed above Akṣara Brahman as the one to whom that power belonged. The Sūtrakāra tried to uphold the other view of taking Akṣara as the highest principle, making at the same time a compromise with the later view, which he did on the basis of Yāska's view or a Vedanta view which had already adopted Yāska's view about the अपुरुषविधत्व and पुरुषविधत्व of the देवताs of the Ṛgveda.

From the पूर्वपक्ष in some Sūtras of Bra. Sū. I and in Sūtra III. 2. 31 it appears that the followers of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads firmly took their stand on these Upaniṣads

20. *Vide* the author's Akṣara : A Forgotten Chapter in the history of Indian philosophy, Chapter III.

which the Sūtrakāra had accepted along with the Oldest Prose Upaniṣads as authoritative texts.

The Sūtrakāra discusses in Bra. Sū. I. 1–3 various passages from the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads and seems to decide that the topic of those passages is Puruṣa. In Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13 (ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः) it seems that the Sūtrakāra proves ब्रह्मलोक called जीवघन (Pra. Upa. V)[21] to be पुरुष and thus he repudiates the doctrine about पुरुष of that Branch of the Atharvaveda to which the Praśna Upaniṣad belonged, *viz.*, that पुरुष is above or higher than this जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक which is itself पर (एतस्मात् in the Śruti must refer to ब्रह्मलोक which is called जीवघन because it is a mass of life just as it is called प्रज्ञानघन a mass of consciousness). The Branch to which the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad belonged must have claimed that अक्षर ब्रह्मन् was lower than पुरुष (अक्षरात्परतः परः–Mu. Upa. II. 1. 2; उपासते पुरुषं ये ह्यकामास्ते शुक्रमेतदतिवर्तन्ति धीराः—Mu. Upa. III. 2. 1). The Sūtrakāra has replied to them in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 21–23, and in Bra. Sū. 1. 3. 1–7. The followers of the Kāṭhaka Branch of the Yajurveda also held that पुरुष was *higher* than अव्यक्त which was the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् (or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman). The Sūtrakāra admitted that the अव्यक्त is the अरूपवत् or सूक्ष्म aspect of Brahman (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 1–7) but did not agree that the पुरुष (or the पुरुष aspect of Brahman) was *higher than* the अव्यक्त (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31–36).

The arguments of the followers of the Kāṭhaka Branch were of course based upon the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. When the Sutrakāra made a statement that Brahman was predominantly अरूपवत् (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14) and that this अरूपवत् aspect was called अव्यक्त as in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad ('आह' in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 23 refers to a Śruti with the word अव्यक्त), the followers of the Kāṭhaka Branch found an opportunity to argue out their view that पुरुष was higher than the अव्यक्त. They had to base their arguments upon their own text, *viz.*, the Kaṭha

21. Or rather *akṣara* in Pra. Upa. IV. 10–11. *Vide* Appendix III.

Upaniṣad. The Sūtrakāra who wanted to build up a System of the Vedanta philosophy on the foundation of *all* the accepted Scriptures explained away the arguments of the Kāṭhaka Branch with the help of the other Upaniṣads also. Thus, when the Kāṭhakas argued that अव्यक्त was called a सेतु the Sūtrakāra replied that the designation of सेतु was common to both अव्यक्त and पुरुष; when the former argued that the अव्यक्त was अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः and that पुरुष who was declared to be व्यापक was higher than the अव्यक्त, the Sūtrakāra replied that the measure of the अव्यक्त was meant for helping the meditator to form a notion for the Unmanifest, just as the measure of four *pādas* of the व्यापक पुरुष Himself given in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (IV. 4., III. 8); when the Kāṭhakas pointed to their text in which the individual soul was declared to be connected with the अव्यक्त, the author of the Sūtras said that this connection must be interpreted as the one taking place when the individual soul was in the deep sleep state.

Lastly, when it was argued by the former that the Śruti mentioned the difference between the अव्यक्त and पुरुष (भेदव्यपदेश- the two were mantioned differently *i. e.*, under different names. *Cf.* उभयव्यपदेश in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26), the latter said that the difference can be explained without taking पुरुष to be higher than अव्यक्त, *viz.*, by taking them to be like कुण्डल and अहि or प्रकाशाश्रय and प्रकाश, which are illustrations of one and the same thing having two aspects which can be distinguished from each other without giving greater importance to either of the two and which prove that पुरुष is essentially अव्यक्त just as कुण्डल is essentially अहि, and प्रकाशाश्रय (*e. g.*, the Sun *i. e.*, the solar orb) is essentially प्रकाश. Also it should be noted here that when कुण्डल is perceived, the अहि as such is not perceived *i. e.*, the अहि (without a coil form) is अव्यक्त (invisible) during the preception of कुण्डल. Similarly, प्रकाशाश्रय (the disc) can be seen only when प्रकाश is अव्यक्त (impreceptible, the lunar disc in the day or the solar disc in the twilight). So, पुरुष when perceived, still remains अव्यक्त, *i. e.*, the अरूपवत्

aspect on which the पुरुष aspect is founded remains अव्यक्त when the पुरुष aspect is realised. But the पुरुष aspect is essentially the अव्यक्त aspect and therefore the result of the realization of the पुरुष aspect is the same as the result of the realization of the अव्यक्त aspect (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26–28).

Moreover, if the followers of the Kāṭhaka Branch argued that the अव्यक्त was the Brahman, they could not assert that there was पुरुष higher than the अव्यक्त because such an assertion would in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra mean that there were two Brahmans and would be contradictory to the Śrutis which exclude the possibility of a second principle other than the One Brahman. Even to say that Brahman had two aspects one of which was higher than the other (परम्—Bra. Sū. III. 2. 31) would amount to saying that there were two Brahmans.

By the above arguments the Sūtrakāra tried to establish that there was only One Brahman which was predominantly 'अरूपवत्', meaning thereby that It had also a रूपवत् aspect which however was *not to be understood as lower than the* अरूपवत् inasmuch as it was an aspect of the same Brahman and Brahman was Itself रूपवत् though principally अरूपवत्. Whatever *guṇas* belonged to the अरूपवत्, equally belonged to the रूपवत्, because both were aspects of the same Brahman and the meditation on either brought the same result, *viz.*, मुक्ति. This doctrine is explained in full details in Bra. Sū. III. 3, as we shall see in the next Chapter.

SECTION V

Sūtras III. 2. 37

(३७) अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।

TRANSLATION

BY this (the conclusion of the preceding Adhikaraṇa), the omnipresence of the Unmanifest [is proved] from the Śruti mentioning all-prevasion and other (arguments). 37

NOTES

Sūtra 37

1. Like other अतिदेश Sūtras (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 28, II. 1. 3, II. 1. 12, II. 3. 8), this Sūtra should form a separate Adhikaraṇa. The topic of this Adhikaraṇa is to prove that Brahman is omnipresent or all-prevading, while the topic of the preceding Adhikaraṇa was to prove that there was no other higher principle than Brahman called अव्यक्त.

2. अनेन—This is a reference to the conclusion of the preceding Adhikaraṇa. It is conclusively shown there that there is no other *higher* principle than Brahman. From the series given in such texts as Ka. Upa. III. 10-11 we learn that each succeeding one from among इन्द्रियs, अर्थs, मनः, बुद्धि, महान् आत्मा, अव्यक्त and पुरुष is higher than each preceding one; but in Sūtras 31–36 the Sūtrakāra has definitely determined that no other principle, not even पुरुष, is higher than अव्यक्त the Unmanifest Brahman. इन्द्रियs, अर्थs, *etc.*, are *limited* (are not विभु) in so far as there is a higher principle than each of them; but since there is no higher principle than अव्यक्त, it can be concluded that अव्यक्त is सर्वगत 'omnipresent'.

3. We may here remark that the Sūtrakāra's application of the conclusion established in Sūtras III. 2. 32–36 to prove that अव्यक्त is सर्वगत, also shows that 'पर' in Sūtra 31 is to be interpreted as 'higher' rather than as 'another'.

4. आयामशब्द—As Śaṅkara explains, the word 'आयाम' 'means' 'व्याप्ति' omnipresence, all-prevading nature. This is consistent with the word सर्वगत also.

5. अनेन...आयामशब्दादिभ्यः—Both these words are हेतुs. अनेन refers to the conclusion arrived at in Sūtras 31–36. As there is no च at the end of the Sūtra, अनेन and आयामशब्दादिभ्यः are not two different हेतुs or groups of हेतुs; but they both refer to the *same* arguments.

6. As आयाम means व्याप्ति, and as अनेन refers to the fact that पुरुष is not higher than अव्यक्त, we are inclined to think that the आयामशब्द "the word or Śruti for all-pervasiveness" is the word व्यापक in अव्यक्तात्तु परः पुरुषो व्यापकोऽलिङ्ग एव च" (Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8).

As Puruṣa is not higher than अव्यक्त (अनेन) and as पुरुष is called व्यापक (आयामशब्द), the conclusion is that अव्यक्त is व्यापक (अव्यक्तस्य सर्वगतत्वम्). This is the meaning of the Sūtra. पुरुष would have been व्यापक and अव्यक्त, अव्यापक, if अव्यक्त were lower than पुरुष. But अव्यक्त is not lower than पुरुष.

7. आदि in आयामशब्दादिभ्यमः—As the expression is आयामशब्दादिभ्यः and not आयामादिशब्देभ्यः we think that आदि does not refer to any other Śruti or Śrutis, but it stands for some rational arguments resulting from the conclusion that पुरुष is not higher than अव्यक्त ('अनेन' of the Sūtra).

These arguments may be of the following nature :-As सेतु is 'the bridge of those who are devoted to the Sacrifice' (यः सेतुरीजानानाम्), the designation सेतु given to the अव्यक्त shows that अव्यक्त must be व्यापक or सर्वगत. If it were limited (असर्वगत) it cannot be a bridge or 'Supporter,' as it were, of the sacificers. As the "अङ्गुष्ठमात्रपुरुष" which is an expression describing अव्यक्त, is said to be ईशानः भूतभव्यस्य, the अव्यक्त cannot be the ruler of all that has been and that is to be unless that अव्यकत is सर्वगत. The relation of the individual soul with the अव्यक्त is not possible if the अव्यक्त is not सर्वगत. As there is no essential difference (भेद) between पुरुष and अव्यक्त, the latter must be regarded as व्यापक if the former is व्यापक (as said in Kaṭha Upa. VI. 8). Lastly, as the Śruti denies the existence of any other principle but Brahman and as that Brahman is called अव्यक्त, the latter must be omnipresent.

8. Later on the Sūtrakāra uses this conclusion about the omnipresence of Brahman (III. 2. 37) as an argument *viz.*, that the Śruti (all Vedantas) teaches only *one* principle and not more than one *because* Brahman is सर्वगत or व्यापक (*Vide* Bra. Sū. III. 3. 9).

9. In Bra. Sū. III. 2. 26 the opponent argued that from the Unmanifest a meditator would be united with the Endless One (अनन्त). This shows that the Unmanifest was regarded by this opponent as having an end or limited. This point was left untouched in Sūtras 27–30. So, the refutation of that view seems to have been given in this Sūtra (37).

10. Śaṅkara gives several arguments based upon his conclusions in Sūtras 32–36. This he has done on the strength of अनेन. We have taken अनेन as referring not to the several conclusions which are in fact refutations of the four arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष; but we take अनेन as referring to the main conclusion that पुरुष is not higher than अव्यक्त. Besides, Śaṅkara does not take अनेन and आयामशब्दादिभ्यः as referring to the same argument or arguments, but he takes आयामशब्दादिभ्यः as a different group of arguments than that of अनेन. Thus, he interprets the Sūtra as if it were to be read as अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यश्च. This addition of च is clearly expressed by him in " सर्वगतत्वं च अस्य आयामशब्दादिभ्यो विज्ञायते." This is not consistent with the fact that there is no च in the Sūtra. His quotation of several Śruti and Smṛti texts gives the impression that he interprets आयामशब्दादिभ्यः as if it were आयामादिशब्देभ्यः *i. e.*, as if the Sūtrakāra referred to several texts by आयामशब्दादिभ्यः. We believe that the Sūtrakāra refers to only one text and by आदि he means several other arguments. Lastly, it may here be noted that none of the commentators tries to explain why the question of सर्वगतत्व of Brahman is discussed by the Sūtrakāra at such a late stage as in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 37, when no पूर्वपक्ष can be definitely ascertained to have advanced the arguments contained in Sūtra III. 3. 31. The omnipresence of Brahman is already taken as granted in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2 and on that assumption all the foregoing Sūtras were worked out. So the occassion of its discussion here in this context remained a conundrum.

SECTION VI

Sūtras III. 2. 38-39

(३८) फलमत उपपत्तेः ।

(३९) श्रुतत्वाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

THE fruit [*i. e..* of Mokṣa is to be had] from this [Brahman], because it is reasonable, 38

and because it is declared so in the Śruti. 39

NOTES

Sūtra 38

1. 'अतः', as in Sūtras 26 and 31, refers to the अव्यक्त discussed in the preceding Sūtras. As the (preceding) Sūtras (31–37) show, It is the Highest Principle of Vedanta.

2. फलम्—Thus, this is a reference to the फल *in the form of* मुक्ति. मुक्ति is called फल in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 52. It is out of place that the fruit of the actions of an individual soul be mentioned here, while the question whether he can do actions or not be discussed in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 33–40. The fruit of his worldly actions is perhaps discussed in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 41.

The nature of the फल meant *here* is discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 40–41.

3. उपपत्तेः—This seems to be a reference to अतः in this very Sūtra. अव्यक्त ब्रह्मन् meant here is the highest principle, therefore it is quite *proper* that the same Brahman should be the giver of the fruit in the form of liberation. Only the highest principle can give this fruit and none else. If there were a principle higher than अव्यक्त, the former can be the giver of the फल, but there is no such higher principle, as proved in Sūtras IV. 2. 31–36. पुरुष is not higher than the अव्यक्त.

4. Śaṅkara does not refer अतः to the transcendent Brahman mentioned in the preceding Sūtras, but to Īśvara of his system (तस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिक्यामीशित्रीशितव्यविभागावस्थायामयमन्यः स्वभावो वर्ण्यते।). Taking this Adhikaraṇa in the light of this view, he interprets फल as इष्टानिष्टव्यामिश्रलक्षणं कर्मफलम्. As we have already stated above, this is not a proper place in the Sūtras to discuss this question. This problem forms a part of the discussion in Bra. Sū. II. 3. The 'फल' meant here is men-

tioned in Sūtras III 2. 40–41 (See *infra*). 'उपपत्तेः' is explained by Śaṅkara as refuting the theory of अपूर्व proved by अर्थापत्ति, but in our opinion the 'उपपत्ति' should, from the evidence of the context, directly refer to the fact that the अव्यक्त Brahman is the highest principle.

Sūtra 39

5. श्रुतत्वात्—This seems to be a reierence to a Śruti in which the fruit in the form of मोक्ष is said to be solely dependent upon Brahman itself. Such texts seem to be the following :—

नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन ।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् ॥ ३ ॥
नायमात्मा बलहीनेन लभ्यो न च प्रमादात्तपसो वाप्यलिङ्गात् ।
एतैरुपायैर्यतते यस्तुविद्वांस्तस्यैष आत्मा विशते ब्रह्मधाम ॥ ४ ॥

(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 3–4, Kaṭha Upa. II. 22)

In Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17 the Sūtrakāra mentions the grace of God (हार्दानुग्रह) which a seeker gets through the power of विद्या and other means. That doctrine is consistent with Kaṭha Upa. II. 22. The grace of God is also mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 38.

6. Śaṅkara quotes a Śruti in which Īśvara, as he says, is said to be the giver of wealth (वसुदानः).

7. These two Sūtras (38–39) discuss the question of the giver of the fruit in the form of absolution. The word च in Sūtra 39 as usual shows that it is the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa. Moreover, according to the scheme of the Sūtrakāra the reference to a text of the Śruti (such as we have in Sūtra 39) is the last argument in an Adhikaraṇa except when a Sūtra explaining the Śruti follows the one referring to the Śruti.

SECTION VII

Sūtras III. 2. 40-41

(४०) धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव ।

(४१) पूर्वं तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ।

इति तृतीयाध्याये द्वितीयः पादः ॥

TRANSLATION

JAIMINI [says that the fruit is] Dharma (religious merit), because of this very reason (*viz.*, the support of the Śruti). 40

But, Bādarāyaṇa [holds] the former (*i. e.*, the Unmanifest Brahman) [to be the fruit], because [the former] is said to be the cause [of Dharma]. 41

NOTES

Sūtra 40

1. These two Sūtras seem to us to form an independent Adhikaraṇa, and to discuss the topic of the nature of the fruit mentioned in Sūtra 38.

2. ' अत एव ' seems to be a reference to a Śruti in which the ' religious merit ' (धर्म) is mentioned as to be given by the Supreme Being. Such a Śruti seems to be the following:— एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषते । एष उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं यमधोनिनीषते ॥ (Kau. Upa.) In this Śruti Brahman is said to give the fruit in the form of साधुकर्म ' religious merit. ' Jaimini, according to this Sūtra, held that it was the fruit in the form of religious merit, which would be given by Brahman.

3. Śaṅkara takes Sūtras 40–41 as forming part of the same Adhikaraṇa along with Sūtras 38–39. He construes the Sūtra (40) as जैमिनिस्त्वाचार्यो धर्मं फलस्य दातारं मन्यते । To us the evident significance of the Sūtra seems to be that Jaimini considered *dharma* to be the fruit (फल) given by Brahman. Śaṅkara takes अत एव as श्रुतेरुपपत्तेश्च. And as Śruti he quotes ' स्वर्गकामो यजेत '. But, as nothing is said in this Śruti about धर्म as फलस्य दातृ, he gives arguments to interpret that Śruti. And he finds that his argument is forestalled in Sūtra 38; he therefore gives additional arguments which are not given in the Sūtra. In fact Śaṅkara's interpretation of this Sūtra becomes superfluous after the conclusion established in Sūtras 38–39.

Sūtra 41

4. ' तु ' indicates a refutation of the view of Jaimini in Sūtra 40.

5. पूर्वम् refers to the Supreme Being discussed in the preceding Sūtras. Bādarāyaṇa thinks that Brahman is the fruit (फल) given by Brahman. This agrees with (1) यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यस्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनुं स्वाम् (Mu. Upa.), in which verse the Atman is declared to be that which is to be reached (लभ्यः), and (2) सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम् । (Kaṭha Upa. III. 9), where the अव्यक्त is said to be the Supreme Abode of विष्णु and the end of the " Journey " which in this Śruti represents symbolically " all human efforts for release from transmigration " (See Bra. Sū. I. 4. 1–7).

6. हेतुव्यपदेशात्—Brahman is said to be the cause of religious merit in the Śruti quoted under the preceding Sūtra; so, religious merit is a goal far inferior to Brahman; Brahman itself should be regarded as the fruit, rather than what Brahman is said to be the cause of. This seems to be the argument of Bādarāyaṇa. Śrutis like (1) यः सेतुरीजानानाम् (Kaṭha Upa. III. 2), (2) एको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान् (Kaṭha Upa. V. 13, for काम *cf.* स्वर्गकामः यजेत, *etc.*,) also show that the अव्यक्त Brahman is the cause of धर्म.

7. Śaṅkara takes " पूर्वम् " in the sense of Īśvara to be the *giver* of the fruit because he is the cause of religious merit according to the Śruti. It should be said that in the Śruti in question (Kau. Upa. *Vide sūpra*), there is no mention of फलस्य दातृ the giver of the fruit. This Śruti does not describe धर्म as a फल received from God by the individual soul *for any action performed* by him. It distinctly states that Brahman is the हेतु or cause of धर्म. ईश्वर is the cause of धर्म, therefore धर्म is a created thing. To argue that धर्म a created thing rather than the creator would be the bestower of the fruit, would be lessening the cogency of the argument. Śaṅkara saw this difficulty and explained फलहेतुत्व of Īśvara as being the creator of creatures in harmony with their own individual actions (तदेव चेश्वरस्य फलहेतुत्वं यत् स्वकर्मानुरूपाः प्रजाः सृजतीति ।). The Sūtrakāra, most probably, did not mean

this kind of फल at all, but he meant by फल the *summum bonum*, the ultimate goal, the absolution. Śaṅkara's interpretation of these Sūtras (40–41) makes Sūtras II. 1. 34–36, supererogatory. Moreover, the subject of these Sūtras as understood by Śaṅkara is foreign to the whole Pāda (III. 2) because he takes Sūtras 11–37 as dealing with पराविद्या, while he takes Sūtras 38–41 as dealing with व्यवहार (or अविद्या).

CHAPTER II

SECTION I

Sūtras III. 3. 1–4

(१) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् ।

(२) भेदान्नेति चेन्नैकस्यामपि ।

(३) स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च सववच्च तन्नियमः ।

(४) दर्शयति च ।

TRANSLATION

THE (certain) knowledge of Brahman [can be obtained] from all the Vedantas, because of the non-difference of the Injunction *etc.,* [in all the Vedantas]. 1

If it be argued [by the Opponent], " No, because of the difference of the Injunction *etc.,* [of one Vedanta from the same of another Vedanta] ", we reply, " No, even [if they be the same] in one Branch [of each Veda, we hold, the same Brahman is to be known from all the Vedantas], 2

and because *svādhyāya* being what it means (*i. e.,* nothing else but one's own text of religious study) a person has religious fitness for [the study of] that [text which is] in vogue [in his Branch]. And that rule is like the rule of the *sava* Sacrifices, 3

and the Śruti shows it. 4

NOTES

Sūtra 1

(1) सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम्- The topic of *all* the Vedantas is Brahman; lit., 'Brahman is one the knowledge of which is to be had from *all* the Vedantas.' All the Vedantas teach Brahman, and not only *some* of them teach it, because *all* the Vedantas have identical (lit., non-different) Injunction, *etc.* By the word 'Vedanta' the Sūtrakāra intends to exclude Samhita, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Khila. (See समाने in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5 and see Sūtras III. 3. 19–24.)

'सर्ववेदान्त प्रत्ययम्' is to be distinguished from शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55). Brahman is taught in (and may be studied from) all the Vedantas *i. e.*, from the Vedantas or Upaniṣads of all Brańches of all Vedas (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1), but the "अङ्गावबद्धाः (ब्रह्मोपासनाः)" are taught in and are to be studied from all the Branches of only one particular Veda. (See Notes on एकस्याम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 2 and शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55.)

2. चोदनादि—In Jai. Sū. II. 4. 6 the sameness of an act (कर्मन् *e. g.* अग्निहोत्र) is proved on the ground of non-distinction of संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या (एकं वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्या-विशेषात्-Jai. Sū. II. 4. 6). The same four proofs of identity of topic seem to have been meant here by चोदनादि. It is worth noting that in this Pāda and also elsewhere in the Brahmasūtra the method of argument regarding Brahman is the one established in the Jaiminisūtra regarding Karman (rites, see Note 4 below).

3. The first Sūtra (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1) seeks to establish the unity or identity of Brahman taught in all the Vedantas on the ground that संयोग, रूप, चोदना and आख्या about Brahman in all the Vedantas are indentical.

4. Śaṅkara says that the preceding Pāda deals with विज्ञेय ब्रह्मन्; and that this Pāda deals with सगुण or उपास्य ब्रह्मन्, the result of the meditation on which is at most क्रममुक्ति, and also with certain topics like the प्राण *etc.* But this distinction does not seem to us to have been made by the Sūtrakāra. In Bra. Sū. III. 2 the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् was discussed and it was also established that there is no other higher Brahman than that अरूपवत् which is the प्रधान aspect of Brahman. So, it is quite reasonable to think that Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 continues the same topic of अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन्.

In this Sūtra and in fact in this Pāda and in the Pāda which follows this, the Sūtrakāra has tried to explain his doctrine by the help of the rules of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Thus, we have here चोदनाद्यविशेषात्. According to Śaṅkara's School, the निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् cannot be a topic of Injunction (चोदना); so, in order to get rid of the difficulty, he says, this Pāda deals with the सगुण ब्रह्मन्, while the preceding Pāda with the विज्ञेय ब्रह्मन्. To us it seems that the Sūtrakāra does not make distinction between the विज्ञेय ब्रह्मन् and the उपास्य ब्रह्मन् as is done by Śaṅkara. According to the Sūtrakāra Brahman has two aspects the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् and each of the two has certain गुणs and is also without certain other गुणs, as will be shown by us in the course of this Pāda (Bra. Sū. III. 3). So, the Sūtrakāra, unlike Śaṅkara, does not find any difficulty in taking ब्रह्मन् to be a subject of Injunction. Śaṅkara also feels that his interpretation of Bra. Sū. I. 1. 4 is in conflict with Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1.

Moreover, Śaṅkara does not take 'ब्रह्म' as understood in "सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम्" He says: "किं प्रतिवेदान्तं विज्ञानभेद आहोस्विन्नेति।...तस्मात् सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययत्वं विज्ञानानाम्." And, from what follows, he does not appear to take 'सर्व' literally, because according to him the several विद्याs or विज्ञानानि which are discussed in this Pāda are each of them discussed not on the basis of *all* the Vedantas, but on that of only those Vedantas

in which the same विद्या is stated, the number of which is generally two, three or four only. To us, it appears that there is no reference to the several विद्याs like पञ्चाग्निविद्या, प्राणविद्या, शिरोव्रत, वैश्वानरविद्या (as a विद्या), शाण्डिल्यविद्या *etc.*, here; but only ब्रह्मन् and its meditations are discussed here and that ' सर्ववेदान्त ' is to be understood literally, because the problems of this Pāda are discussed on the basis of *all* the Upaniṣadic texts (*i. e.* Vedantas) of all the Branches of each Veda (See Note on एकस्याम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 2, and शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55).

Sūtra 2

5. भेदात् in Sūtra III. 3. 2—The opponent argues that one and the same Brahman is not taught in *all* the Vedantas, because चोदना and other proofs of identity of topic in *all* of them are ' not the same ' (भेदात्). To us it seems that as in the preceding Sūtra the Sūtrakāra asserted the identity (अविशेष) of चोदनादि as the argument, " भेदात् " in Sūtra 2 asserts that these चोदना, *etc.*, are different.

6. एकस्यामपि—The Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 1 assered that चोदना and others were the same in *all* the Vedantas and therefore the knowledge (प्रत्यय) of Brahman was to be had from *all* the Vedantas. The opponent in Sūtra 2 says that *all* the Vedantas do not teach Brahman (but some teach पुरुष also), because चोदना *etc.*, are not identical in *all* the Vedantas (भेदात्). To this the Sūtrakāra replies in " एकस्यामपि ".

" एकस्याम् " seems to us to refer to " शाखायाम् " as understood. We make this suggestion because in Sūtra III. 3. 55 we have " शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्. " It appears to us that Sūtras 1–54 deal with the meditation on Brahman not thought of as consisting of " parts " (अङ्गs), while Sūtras 55–59 deal with the meditation on Brahman thaught of as consisting of " parts " (अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः). In Sūtra 55 the Sūtrakāra seems to mention the difference between the meditation on

Brahman without parts and the same on Brahman with parts. He has proposed an उपसंहार in the case of the meditation on Brahman without parts in Sūtra III. 3. 5, but in Sūtra 55 he says that the meditations of Brahman based upon the अङ्गs of Brahman should not be collected, because they are taught in the Branches of each particular Veda (शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्).

From this it appears that the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra III. 3. 55) argues that the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः may be collected in the शाखाs of each Veda, so that the followers of one Veda should not practise such meditations of the शाखाs of another Veda.

To us it seems that Sūtras 1–2 which deal with the main उपासना or the meditation on Brahman itself should be considered from the standpoint of what is said in Sūtra 55 and the following regarding the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः.

In the case of निरङ्गाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः the Sūtrakāra says that Brahman is taught in *all* the Vedantas *i. e.*, in *all* the Upanisads of *all* the Vedas. Thus, he distinguishes the meditation on निरङ्ग Brahman from that on साङ्ग ब्रह्मन्. The thoughts of the latter belong to Branches of only each Veda; so all Branches of only each Veda should collect the thoughts on the अङ्गs of Brahman for themselves from *all* the Branches of each Veda. But in the meditation of Brahman *itself*, all Vedas *i. e.*, the followers of all the Branches of all the Vedas should collect the thoughts *etc.*, on Brahman.

Thus, अङ्गरहिताः ब्रह्मोपासनाः are taught in all the Vedas, while अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः belong to or are taught in all the Branches of each Veda only.

As a result of the above conclusion, the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 2) seems to reply the opponent's argument by saying that if चोदना *etc.*, are the same even in *one* Branch of each Veda, we shall conclude that all the Vedas teach the same Brahman.

The opponent argued that चोदना *etc.*, were not the same in all the Vedantas or Upaniṣads, so that Brahman only was not known from all the Vedantas; certain Vedantas taught पुरुष and not Brahman. In this case though चोदना and फलसंयोग (उपासीत and मोक्ष) may be the same in all the Vedantas, the रूप and समाख्या of the पुरुषवेदान्तs would be different from those of the प्रधानवेदान्तs (See Note on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27).

" एकस्यामपि "—The Sūtrakāra replies that if चोदना *etc.*, were the same even *in one Branch* of each Veda, he would assert that the knowledge of Brahman was given in *all* the Vedantas (because अरूपवत् or प्रधान and रूपवत् or पुरुष were only two aspects of the same Brahman).

Thus, the singular number (एकस्याम्) is to be contrasted with the plural number (शाखासु) in order to grasp the difference in the Sūtrakāra's view about the teaching of निरङ्ग ब्रह्मन् and that of Brahman with parts. प्रतिवेदम् should be taken as understood in Sūtra 2.

According to the Sūtrakāra's reply (एकस्यामपि) in Sūtra 2, the difference of चोदना *etc.*, between the various Vedantas does not matter, because even if they are the same in only *one* Branch of each of the Vedas, Brahman is known from *all* the Vedantas. So that the different चोदना, आख्या *etc.*, differ only in expression, not in *sense*. Thus, Brahman may have different names in different Branches.

7. भेदात् in Sūtra III. 3. 2 appears to us to be a contradiction of अविशेषात् in चोदनाद्यविशेषात् (Sūtra III. 3. 1) and should mean चोदनादिभेदात्. भेदात् would probably refer to the fact that in some Upaniṣads 'Brahman' is taught, in others 'Puruṣa' (आख्या भेद); in some the goal is said to be Brahman, in others Brahmaloka (फलभेद). Śaṅkara says that भेदात् means गुणभेदात्; but we find no reference to गुण in the Sūtra itself.

' एकस्याम् ' should mean ' एकस्यां शाखायाम् ' as the expression ' शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ' in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55 shows. Śaṅkara

explains एकस्याम् as एकस्यामपि विद्यायामेवंजातीयको गुणभेद उपपद्यते. This 'गुणभेदोपपत्ति' is neither stated nor implied in the Sūtra, though it may be consistent with Śaṅkara's illustration of पञ्चाग्निविद्या (Chā. Upa. V. 9).

A serious difficulty in accepting Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 2 is that he takes गुणोपसंहार as the topic of the Sūtra, though in this Sūtra the Sūtrakāra only discusses Brahman as the teaching of *all* Vedantas, and उपसंहार is first introduced only in Sū. III. 3. 5.

Sūtra 3

8. An objection may be raised against Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 as follows:—" If *all* the Vedantas teach the same Brahman, one must learn *all* the Vedantas; but this is not so, because one learns only the text of his own Branch (his own '*svādhyāya*).

The Sūtrakāra answers this objection by pointing out that '*svādhyāya*' is " what it means " (तथात्व), *i. e.*, by its very name it is meant to be studied by only him whose *svādhyāya* it is, and that one is considered religiously fit (अधिकृत) or one has the religious fitness *viz.*, the discharge of obligation to the practice of his family. Thus, it is only a religious formality that one is to study his own *svādhyāya*; it does not go against the fact that *all* the Vedantas teach (the same) Brahman. स्वाध्यायनियम does not conflict with taking the same Brahman as taught in *all* Vedantas, even if चोदना *etc.*, be identical in one Branch of every Veda. *Svādhyāya* is meant to be studied in one's own Branch (स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्व) and also one is entitled to repeat the text in vogue (समाचार) in one's Branch.

So, *svādhyāya* has its purpose fulfilled, when one studies and repeats the text of his Śākhā only. But so far as the knowledge of Brahman is considered, it may be gathered from *all* the Vedantas.

9. The नियम of *svādhyāya* is like that of सवs. The सवs are the only sacrifices restricted to the followers of only one

Veda (आथर्वणिकs), all other sacrifices being common to all the Vedas. Similarly *svādhyāya* is meant for only one Branch of a particular Veda. The knowledge of Brahman is meant for the followers of and may be gathered from all the Vedas.

10. V. L. सलिलवत् for सववत्. The idea seems to be similar to that in

यावानर्थ उदपाने सर्वतः संप्लुतोदके ।
तावान्सर्वेषु वेदेषु ब्राह्मणस्य विजानतः ॥ (Bha. Gī. II. 46).

When water is overflowing everywhere, it matters very little from what place one fetches water for himself. Similarly when Brahman is taught in *all* Vedantas, it matters little which Vedanta one adopts as his *svādhyāya* 'text of obligatory religious study.'

11. 'तथात्व' should mean 'स्वाध्यायत्व' and not "आथर्वणिके शिरोव्रतादीनां स्वाध्यायधर्मत्व" as Śaṅkara puts it. Śaṅkara separates स्वाध्यायस्य from तथात्वेन unnecessarily; he explains it by "स्वाध्यायस्य एव धर्मो न विद्यायाः" and thus makes one sentence out of one पद ('स्वाध्यायस्य') in the Sūtra. After 'समाचारे' (interpreted as वेदव्रतोपदेशपरे ग्रन्थे) Śaṅkara adds 'आथर्वणिका इदमपि वेदव्रतत्वेन व्याख्यातमिति समामनन्ति.' However, in his subsequent discussion it is clear that he also feels that this addition is not sufficient to serve his purpose. It is strange that "एतां ब्रह्मविद्याम्" in the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 10) should be interpreted as referring to the particular text-book instead of to the Lore about Brahman taught in that Upaniṣad. Moreover, Śaṅkara separates 'समाचारे' from 'अधिकारात्' and interprets 'अधिकारात्' as "अधिकृतविषयात्" and to it he adds "एतच्छब्दात् अध्ययनशब्दाच्च स्वोपनिषदध्ययन-धर्म एवैष इति निर्धार्यते." Thus, according to Śaṅkara each of the words 'स्वाध्यायस्य,' 'तथात्वेन' 'समाचारे' and 'अधिकारात्' is equivalent to an individual sentence, instead of the whole expression giving two हेतुs *viz.*, स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वेन and समाचारे अधिकारात्, as we have suggested. 'तन्नियम' in the Sūtra should

mean ' स्वाध्यायनियम ' and not ' शिरोव्रतरूपधर्मनियम ' as Śaṅkara interprets it. ' तद् ' must refer to some word in the Sūtra itself.

In fact the Sūtra (III. 3. 3) is an explanation of why there should be a rule about the *svādhyāya*, when *all* the Vedantas teach the same Brahman. The Sūtrakāra says that though *all* the Vedantas teach Brahman, one is not given the option of choosing any Vedanta text for *svādhyāya*, but everyone is obliged to study his own text (as *svādhyāya*). There is no reference to the शिरोव्रत of the आथर्वणिकs in the Sūtra at all.

Sūtra 4

10. दर्शयति—This is a reference to such texts as सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति (Kaṭha Upa. II. 15). The Śruti shows that only one Brahman is known from *all* the Vedantas.

We may raise a question: Can दर्शयति refer also to such Śrutis as " एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ? "

" दर्शयति " is used in the Brahmasūtras as distinct from " स्मर्यते, " because where the Sūtrakāra wants to refer to both श्रुति and स्मृति he gives such a Sūtra as " दर्शयति चाथो अपि स्मर्यते " (III. 2. 17). So, दर्शयति seems to be a reference to only Śruti.

13. Śaṅkara's भाष्य on Sūtra III. 3. 4 is in two parts, one quoting certain texts and another giving cross references to the same विद्या as found in *two* different Vedanta texts. The latter part, of course, is not given as an explanation of the Sūtra.

Śaṅkara's quotation proves that *all* and not some Vedantas, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra, teach the same Brahman. But from what follows (See Śaṅkara's comm. on Bra. Sū. III 3) we learn that Śaṅkara takes " सर्वे " as only those in which a particular विद्या or विज्ञान is given. Thus Śaṅkara modifies the sense of ' सर्व ' in both the Sūtra (III. 3. 1) and the Śruti referred to in Sū. III. 3. 4.

SECTION II

Collecting of Information, Attributes, Method of Meditation, Aspects, etc.

Sūtra III. 3. 5-9

(५) उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च ।

(६) अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

(७) न वा प्रकरणभेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् ।

(८) संज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि ।

(९) व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् ।

TRANSLATION

OWING to the identity of topic (Brahman) the Collecting together [of the attributes and other information relating to Brahman should be done from all the Vedantas], as in the case of those (rites) which are subsidiary to an Injunction; and [this Collecting is to be done] in the case of a similar [text]. 5

If it be argued, " It is otherwise [than the proposed Collecting], on the ground of the Śruti, " we reply, " No, because of non-difference" [of the topic, as stated above]. 6

Nor [is it otherwise] on the ground of the diversity of Context, just as the *parovarīyastva* [of the Udgītha, *etc.*, cannot be said to be different from the *parovarīyastva* of other things]. 7

If it be argued, " [It is otherwise] on the ground of the Designations [of Brahman, being different]," we reply that " We have already expressed [our view about] it; but, even then [the Collecting] remains." 8

And [our view about the Collecting is] the proper one, because [Brahman is spoken of as] all-pervading. 9

NOTES

Sūtra 5

1. In Sūtras III. 3. 1–4 the Sūtrakāra has proved that *all* the Vedantas teach (the same) Brahman; that, in other words, the subject of *all* the Vedantas is the same (अभिन्न). Now, he argues further. Because the same (Brahman) is the topic of all the Vedantas, a Collection of the thoughts and other information on Brahman mentioned in the various Vedantas should be made.

2. विधिशेषवत्—In the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, a rule is established that all the subsidiary rites pertaining to an Injunction should be collected from the various texts where they occur. The Sūtrakāra applies this rule in the case of the meditation on Brahman.

3. समाने—This word seems to state a condition under which the Collection should be made. It seems to us to be as follows:

The Sūtrakāra distinguishes between *two types of texts viz.*, the Vedantas and the other parts of the Śruti. The information about Brahman is to be collected together from all Vedanta texts, not from the other Śruti texts such as the Saṁhitās and Brāhmaṇas. Thus, ' समाने ' means in the case of a similar text *i. e.*, ' a Vedanta text. ' This meaning of ' समाने ' is suggested to us by the word ' समाने ' in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 19.

4. उपसंहार is a Collection and as Brahman is to be shown to be सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्यय, the Collection is to be made from *all* the Vedantas, not merely from two or more Vedantas; further, the Collection is not to be made mutually by two or more Branches dealing with the same विद्या, as Śaṅkara and other commentators say; but it is to be made by the followers of *all* the Branches of *all* the Vedas, as is implied in ' सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम् '.

(See Śaṅkara's meaning of उपसंहार in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 24. उपसंहार-दर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि and III. 4. 48 कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहार.)

5. Śaṅkara takes अर्थाभेदात् to mean " यः गुणानामेकत्रार्थो स एवान्यत्रापि ". It seems to us that अर्थाभेदात् is a reference to the conclusion established in the preceding Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras III. 3. 1–4. The same अर्थ is taught in all the Vedantas (अर्थाभेदात्), therefore a Collection of the (meditational) thoughts and other information on that अर्थ, *viz.*, Brahman, should be made. (See also the following Note.)

Sūtra 6

6. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 5 is to be directly connected with Sūtra 10, and Sūtras 6–8 form an independent Adhikaraṇa (See the last sentence of Śā. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5—अस्यैव तु प्रयोजनसूत्रस्य प्रपञ्चः सर्वाभेदादित्यारभ्य भविष्यति।). But, to us it seems that Sūtra 6 and the following three Sūtras are directly connected with Sūtra 5, all of them forming the same Adhikaraṇa.

7. अन्यथात्वम्—This is a पूर्वपक्ष view as regards the उपसंहार proposed by the Sūtrakāra in the preceding Sūtra. The opponent says that no Collection should be made (lit. " the fact is otherwise than that stated in Sūtra 5 "), because of the explicit word of the Śruti (शब्दात्). There are Śrutis which declare that one should know Brahman " thus " (एवम्) *i. e.*, as it is taught in one particular Branch of a Veda, *e. g.*, (1) एष उ एव वामनीरेष हि सर्वाणि वामानि नयति सर्वाणि वामानि नयति य एवं वेद—Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 3; (2) स वा एष आत्मा हृदि तस्यैतदेव निरुक्तं हृदयमिति तस्माद्धृदयमहरहर्वा एवंवित् स्वर्गं लोकमेति।—Chā. Upa. VIII. 3. 3 which refers to the दहरविद्या; (3) एवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वाऽऽत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति—Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23. The opponent argues: " In all these passages the Śruti insists upon the knowledge of Brahman *in the very way* in which it is taught in the particular Branch of a Veda. Therefore, no Collection from all the Vedantas is required to

be made for the knowledge of Brahman." (See Śā. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10.)

8. अविशेषात्—This seems to refer to the identity of the topic in the various Vedantas in which the knowledge of Brahman "in a particular way" (एवम्) is demanded from the aspirant. Brahman as taught in the Śrutis in which expressions like एवं वेद, एवंविद्, एवं विद्वान्, *etc.*, occur and in other Śrutis is the same (अविशेषात्); therefore such an expression cannot debar us from making the Collection of thoughts on Brahman. The अर्थ (topic) being the same, the शब्द does not matter.

9. Śaṅkara in his interpretation of this Sūtra takes it to be a discussion of the प्राणविद्या or उद्गीथविद्या passages from the Bṛ. Upa. and the Chā. Upa. (Bṛ. Upa. I. 3, and Chā. Upa. I. 2). But the Sūtra itself contains no indication of such a reference. If we look to the context, 'अन्यथात्वम्' should mean "otherwise" than the उपसंहार mentioned in the preceding Sūtra, as explained above. Again, Śaṅkara does not take अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति as the पूर्वपक्ष view, but according to him the whole Sūtra (III. 3. 6) is a पूर्वपक्ष. Moreover, in this case Śaṅkara's interpretation of the प्राणविद्या is quite different from that which he proposes as the aim of this Pāda in his interpretation of Sūtras III. 3. 1–4; *i. e.*, in this case the पूर्वपक्ष insists that both the Vedanta texts teach the *same* विद्या while the सिद्धान्त establishes that the two विद्याs are not identical. Lastly, Śaṅkara interprets अन्यथात्वम् as "न युक्तं विद्यैकत्वम्" inspite of there being no mention of विद्यैकत्व in the immediately preceding Sūtra and, again, he modifies the sense of अविशेष into बहुतर अविशेष.

Sūtra 7

10. "वा" here means "or". We think, in this Sūtra it is not used in the sense of "तु" as Śaṅkara understands it. And 'न वा प्रकरणभेदात्' would mean 'न वा प्रकरणभेदादन्यथात्वम्'.

Thus, it is not necessary to take Sūtra 6 as a पूर्वपक्ष, (because 'वा' does not mean "तु"). Instead of saying "प्रकरणभेदादिति चेन्न", the Sūtra simply says "न वा प्रकरणभेदात्".

11. प्रकरणभेदात्—This is one more argument of the पूर्वपक्ष for 'अन्यथात्वम्'. The पूर्वपक्ष argues that there can be no Collection (of attributes *etc.*, of Brahman) from all the Vedantas (सर्ववेदान्त-प्रत्ययम्—Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1.), because the प्रकरण or context of each of the Vedantas is different from that of the rest, though Brahman be taken as taught in *all* the Vedantas (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1).

12. परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्—Here the Sūtrakāra seems to give an illustration in which the sense (of a word) remains the same though the context varies; so that प्रकरणभेद does not cause विशेष.

परोवरीयस्त्व refers to Chā. Upa. I. 9 where परोवरीयस् is an adjective of उद्गीथ, लोकs, and of जीवन or life in this world; and it also refers to Chā. Upa. II. 7 where परोवरीयस् is an adjective of साम and of प्राण, वाक्, चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, मनस्, taken as a group. In all these different places of context, the word परोवरीयस् has the same sense, *viz.*, "that (series) in which each succeeding member is superior to each preceding one". By आदि in the Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra refers to some other words like परोवरीयस् which have the same sense in different places. All that the Sūtrakāra seems to say is that the variety of the प्रकरण or context does not necessarily lead to the variety of sense. According to the Sūtrakāra आनन्द and other attributes (or 'thoughts') of Brahman have the same sense even when they are collected from the various Vedantas, because they all are the attributes of Brahman which is the same in all the Vedantas. When परोवरीयस् which occurs in one context is also taken in another context, it has the same sense; similarly if we take आनन्द and other attributes from the various Vedantas and collect them for the purpose of meditation on Brahman, they will not change their sense.

13. According to Śaṅkara, this is a Siddhānta Sūtra and establishes that the विद्या or lore in Chā. Upa. I. 2 is not the same as that in Bṛ. Upa. I. 3 (विद्याभेद). But it must be pointed out that he explains प्रकरणभेदात् as प्रक्रमभेदात्. Several other reasons which Śaṅkara gives, are not referred to in the Sūtra. We have interpreted " वत् " in परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् as showing an illustration; Śaṅkara takes it as परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीथोपासनम् and supplies as understood यथा परमात्मदृष्ट्यध्याससाम्येऽपि (परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीथोपासनम्) अक्ष्यादित्यादिगत हिरण्यश्मश्रुत्वादिगुणविशिष्टोद्गीयोपासनाद् भिन्नम् ।. Here if he takes " वत् " (in परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्) in the sense of यथा, he interprets परोवरीयस्त्व as परोवरीयस्त्वगुणविशिष्टमुद्गीथोपासनम्. There is no word in the Sūtra to suggest these additions. Thus, Śaṅkara seems to interpret " वत् " in परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् both as showing an illustration and as meaning विशिष्ट. He does not seem to interpret आदि in the Sūtra. If the last line of Śā. Bhāṣya on Sū. III. 3. 7 gives the explanation of परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत्, it would appear that according to Śaṅkara the Sūtrakāra gives the example of two Vedanta texts of the same Upaniṣad in order to prove विद्याभेद in two Vedanta texts each of a different Upaniṣad.

Sūtra 8

14. संज्ञातश्चेत्—This seems to us to be the third argument of the पूर्वपक्ष for अन्यथात्वम्, the first two arguments being respectively शब्दात् (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 6) and प्रकरणभेदात् (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 7). The पूर्वपक्ष argues that उपसंहार should not be made because the names of Brahman (which is taught in all the Vedantas) differ. Owing to the various names of Brahman, we should not collect the thoughts on or attributes of Brahman from the Vedantas.

15. तदुक्तम्—The Sūtrakāra here seems to refer to a foregoing Sūtra in which he has mentioned the difference of the names of Brahman. Probably the reference is to be traced to Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27 which reads उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत्—" Brahman

is like the serpent and the coil of serpent because it is called both (उभयव्यपदेशः). " According to the Sūtrakāra Brahman is both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् or अव्यक्त and पुरुष; so it can have both the types of names.

16. अस्ति तु तदपि—" But even then the उपसंहार remains a fact ". The Sūtrakāra seems to say that the admission of various names of Brahman on his part, does not mean that thereby he admits the opponent's view that the difference of names bars the collection of the attributes of Brahman. In fact, the difference in names of Brahman is like that of the names अहि and कुण्डल the serpent and the coil; both are names of *one and the same object.* Therefore, even though the names of Brahman differ while (the same) Brahman is taught in the various Vedantas, a collection of its attributes *etc.*, should be made for the purpose of meditation on Brahman.

17. These three arguments of शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 6–8) seem to have been referred to by शब्दादि in नाना शब्दादिभेदात् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 58); and that Sūtra dealing with अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः seems to us to support our interpretation of the present Sūtras (III. 3. 5–9) dealing with ब्रह्मोपासनाः not based upon the अङ्गs of Brahman.

18. Śaṇkara does not connect संज्ञातः with अन्यथात्वम् as we do, but he interprets संज्ञातः as संज्ञैकत्वात्, and refers to the fact that उद्गीथविद्या is the one name of the lore in both the Upaniṣads in question. " तदुक्तम् " is, according to Śaṅkara, a reference to the preceding Sūtra; so that for the opponent's further argument of " संज्ञातः " the Sūtrakāra, in Śaṅkara's opinion, gives no new reply, but refers him to what he has said in the preceding Sūtra. Though he himself says that the same संज्ञा *viz.*, ' उद्गीथ ' occurs in both the Upaniṣads, he argues that संज्ञैकत्व is श्रुत्यक्षरबाह्य. " अस्ति तु तदपि " is explained by Śaṅkara as " अस्ति चैतत्संज्ञैकत्वं प्रसिद्धभेदेष्वपि " Thus, he explains तद् in the Sūtra as referring to ' संज्ञैकत्व ', which is his explanation of " संज्ञातः ". Elsewhere in the Sūtras *e. g.*, in Bra. Sū. III.

3. 44 ' तदपि ' means " even then. " It is not clear how Śaṅkara interpretes तु in the Sūtra, because once he takes तु with संज्ञैकत्व, and again he seems to interpret तु as च.

Sūtra 9

19. च shows the continuation of the same Adhikaraṇa and thus it gives one more argument in favour of the Sūtrakāra's view (about उपसंहार). Śaṅkara makes one independent Adhikaraṇa out of this Sūtra and takes च in the sense of तु without giving any reason why the Sūtrakāra should prefer to use च though he could have used तु itself (See *infra*).

20. As said above, here the Sūtrakāra seems to give one more argument for his view that a Collection of the attributes *etc.*, of Brahman should be made. He appears to say that because of the omnipresence of Brahman, it is quite proper that a Collection of its attributes be made. When a principle is omnipresent, it means that it is the only one principle in the world. There can not reasonably be two omnipresent principles. Brahman is an omnipresent principle, hence it is only *one* and the same; so the same Brahman is taught in all the Vedantas under different names. Therefore, it is proper that its attributes be collected for the purpose of meditation.

21. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra discusses ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1), particularly the meaning of the case in apposition of अक्षरम् and उद्गीथम् in this sentence. It is perhaps due to this supposed reference of this Sūtra to Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1 that Śaṅkara is led to interpret " च " of the Sūtra in the sense of तु intended to exclude ' पक्षत्रय ' about Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1. " व्याप्तेः " is explained by Śaṅkara by saying that the Syllable Om is सर्ववेदव्यापिन् and that व्याप्ति means सर्ववेदसाधारण्य instead of taking व्याप्ति in the general sense of सर्वसाधारण्य or सर्वव्यापित्व ' omnipresence '. He says that the

word उद्गीथ is put in as an adjective of "अक्षर" in the Śruti in question; otherwise, in absence of "उद्गीथम्" one may understand the सर्वव्यापि अक्षर ब्रह्मन् from the simple word "अक्षर". This does not seem to be a very happy argument, because when the Śruti starts with ओमित्येतदक्षरम्..............., whence is the possibility of forgetting that अक्षर here means a Syllable, particularly the Syllable Om? On a subsequent consideration Śaṅkara himself sees the difficulty in accepting his explanation of the presence of the word "उद्गीथ". समञ्जसम् in the Sūtra means 'उद्गीथमित्येतद्विशेषणमिति समञ्जसम्.'

Here it may be stated that to us there seems to be not the remotest suggestion in these Sūtras (III. 3. 6-9) of a reference to the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣad passages, as Śaṅkara and other commentators take it to be. The Sūtrakāra was probably not interested in discussing these विद्याs since the उपसंहार of attributes which he actually mentions is that of the attributes which he has collected in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3, as will be seen from our interpretation of आनन्दादयः (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11), सत्यादयः (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 38) and आयतनादयः (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39). Moreover, these विद्याs do not really form an essential part of ब्रह्मविद्या.

SECTION III

Difference of Two Aspects (Names) only.

Sūtra III. 3. 10

(१०) सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे ।

TRANSLATION

THESE two [designations or aspects of Brahman are to be understood as] distinct from each other [lit. elsewhere than the non-difference (*abheda*) established in all points *śabda, prakaraṇa etc.*]

NOTES

Sūtra 10

1. सर्वाभेदात्—This seems to refer to the identity or non-difference in respect of संयोग, फल चोदना, आख्या (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1), शब्द (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 6) and प्रकरण (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 7). In both the preceding Adhikaraṇas (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1–4, III. 3. 5–9), an attempt is made to prove the identity of several points with respect to Brahman. (See अविशेष in Sūtra 1, अभेद in Sūtra 5, and the refutation of भेद in Sūtra 2, अन्यथात्व in Sūtra 6 and प्रकरणभेद in Sūtra 7.)

There was only one point with regard to Brahman, in which the Sūtrakāra did not object to the difference proposed by the opponent, *viz.*, the names, संज्ञाs, of Brahman (Sūtra 8); and even there he said that there were only two names of Brahman just as a serpent is called अहि and कुण्डल, which (names) were not identical though Brahman is one and the same, and though the only same Brahman is taught in all the Vedāntas.

2. अन्यत्र seems to mean " भेदे " (lit. elsewhere than in अभेद).

3. इमे seems to refer to the two संज्ञाs or rather two types of names of Brahman admitted and mentioned by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra III. 3. 8 (and in Sū. III. 2. 27; see also Sūtra III. 3. 52).

4. Thus, looking to the context we are inclined to think that the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 10) says that there is identity in all respects regarding Brahman, except in the case of these two संज्ञाs. This would ultimately mean that the two aspects of Brahman, अरूपवत् and रूपवत्, should be understood as identical in so far as Brahman is one.

In the Sutras that follow (*i. e.*, in III. 3. 11–54), the Sūtrakāra explains how Brahman under these two different names is to be meditated upon. Sūtras III. 3. 11–54 would appear to support the interpretation of Sūtras III. 2. 11–41 and III. 3. 1–10 proposed by us.

5. Śaṅkara understands this Sūtra to refer to the passages about प्राणसंवाद in the Bṛ. Upa., the Chā. Upa., and the Kaṭha Upa., though the Sūtra contains no word indicative of such a reference. " इमे " in the Sūtra which should refer to some word in the preceding Sūtra or Sūtras is interpreted by Śaṅkara as referring to इमे वसिष्ठत्वादयो गुणाः in the प्राणसंवाद passages which he quotes. Thus, he takes " इमे " as mas. plu. instead of as fem. du. referring to the two संज्ञाs mentioned in Sū. III. 3. 8 and thereby to the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman, as done by us. " अन्यत्र " is construed by Śaṅkara, not as भेदात् अन्यत्र but as correlative of क्वचित् taken as understood by him. Lastly, सर्वाभेदात् as interpreted by us refers to all the अभेद or identity mentioned by the Sūtrakāra in the preceding two Adhikaraṇas, while according to Śaṅkara सर्वाभेदात् means " सर्वत्रैव हि तदेवैकं प्राणविज्ञानमभिन्नं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते " and the reason for this statement is given by Śaṅkara himself, *viz.*, प्राणसंवादादिसारूप्यात्. To us it seems that सर्वाभेदात् does not contain even the slightest reference to the प्राणसंवादs. The argument of the पूर्वपक्ष on which it based its view about the प्राणसंवाद passages, and the reply of the सिद्धान्त to that argument are neither of them mentioned in the Sūtra; only Śaṅkara is responsible for them.

SECTION IV

Attributes of the Pradhāna Aspect of Brahman.

Sūtras III. 3. 11-15

(११) आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ।

(१२) प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ।

(१३) इतरे त्वर्थसामान्यात् ।

(१४) आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् ।

(१५) आत्मशब्दाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

BLISS and the other (attributes) belong to the chief aspect [*i. e.* the formless aspect] of Brahman. 11

We cannot admit *priyaśirastva* and the other attributes, because increment and decrement of [*ānanda* as implied in the phrases *priyaśirastva etc.*, can be supposed to take place in Brahman] if there is a difference [in the degree of bliss within Brahman, but the latter is not the case]. 12

But we cannot admit [lit. There is no admission of] othere attributes [than *ānandādayaḥ* and *priyaśirāstva-dayāḥ*], because these have the sameness of sense, 13

because they have no utility for the purpose of meditation, 14

and because [the use of] the word " Atman " [as the subject of these attributes shows that they are common also to the Jīvātman]. 15

NOTES

Sūtra II

1. प्रधानस्य—This word is the same as in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14 (अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्). (See our Notes on that Sūtras.) The Sūtrakāra believes that Brahman has two aspects, *viz.*, the अरूपवत् which is the प्रधान or chief aspect and the रूपवत् which is the इतर (in Sūtra III. 3. 16) or गौण aspect. The Sūtrakāra also seems to believe that the अरूपवत् aspect has no form but it has गुणs or attributes. This is clear from several Sūtras (See Sūtras III. 3. 37–42). It is also clear from this Sūtra (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11).

In using the word प्रधान for the अरूपवत् aspect which the Sūtrakāra understands to be the chief aspect of Brahman, he seems to follow the terminology of the Jaiminisūtra.

2. आनन्दादयः—This must refer to a list of attributes, collected from various Vedantas, in which आनन्द is the first (आदि). Śaṅkara and other Ācāryas mention several attributes, but give no such list as is required by the nature of a बहुव्रीहि compound. Even in the Taitirīya Upaniṣad which is quoted in the commentary on this Sūtra and to which this Sūtra undoubtedly refers, there is no such list.

In our opinion "आनन्द" in this Sūtra is a reference to जन्माद्यस्य यतः (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2) which itself refers to आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते । आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति । आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । Tai. Upa. III. 6.

"आदि" in आनन्दादि refers to आनन्दमय (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 12), अन्तरादित्य (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 20), आकाश (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 22), प्राण (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 23), ज्योतिः (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 24), and प्राण (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 28).

Thus, आनन्दादयः seems to us to be a reference to all the attributes in the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 1. This

suggestion of ours would look more plausible if our interpretation of सत्यादयः (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 38 and आयातनादयः (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39) as referring to Bra. Sū. I. 2 and 1. 3 respectively be correct.

3. Thus, the Sūtra means that the attributes of Brahman mentioned in Bra. Sū. I. 1 beginning with *ānanda*, are those of the chief aspect or "the formless" aspect of Brahman.

4. As shown above the Sūtrakāra has collected in his book the attributes आनन्द *etc., for the meditation on the* अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman (*Cf.* also the argument आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 14). But according to Śaṅkara, the Sūtra means आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्माः सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्याः. To us it appears that the Sūtrakāra here makes no direct attempt to reconcile the various conflicting Śrutis even so far as the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman is concerned. According to him one is to study his own *svādhyāya*; but while meditating on Brahman he may collect the attributes of Brahman ("as many of them as possible "—See Sūtra III. 3. 31). Śaṅkara or any other Ācārya gives no explanation for the use of the word "प्रधान" in the sense of Brahman. Śaṅkara has used the word 'ब्रह्मन्' instead of 'ईश्वर' as an explanation of 'प्रधान.' From this it would appear that Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra to refer to the निर्गुण or पर ब्रह्मन् of his School. The same is indicated by his explanation of आदि in आनन्दादि as विज्ञानघनत्व, सर्वगतत्व, सर्वात्मत्व. If this inference regarding Śaṅkara's interpretation be correct, the question arises: 'How can the निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् have धर्मs or गुणs ?' According to the Sūtrakāra, there is no inconsistency because प्रधान is not निर्गुण, though it is अरूपवत्.

According to Śaṅkara the reason for "आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्माः सर्वे सर्वत्र प्रतिपत्तव्याः–is "सर्वाभेदादेव." The Sūtra neither mentions this reason nor does it contain any other expression like अत एव (*e. g.*, in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 18) or एतेन (*e. g.*, in Bra. Sū. I. 4. 28, II. 1. 3) which would justify such an "अतिदेश." In fact the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 11 only makes

a statement of his scheme in selecting the Śrutis for discussion in Bra. Sū. I. 1. He makes no attempt to reconcile any Śrutis here and therefore he is required to give no argument for आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य.

Sūtra 12

5. प्रियशिरस्त्वादि—This is undoubtedly a reference to Tai. Upa. II. 5, as is pointed out by the commentators. By "आदि" we must understand मोददक्षिणपक्षत्व, प्रमोदोत्तरपक्षत्व, *etc.*

6. अप्राप्ति—means non-admission or non-acceptance, rejection. This is the use of अप्राप्ति in Bra. Sū. II. 2. 18 (समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः), II. 2. 22 (प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात्), *etc.* The Sūtrakāra has, according to this Sūtra, rejected these attributes, though the Tai. Upa. mentions them as belonging to Brahman. This is consistent with the fact that he has not mentioned प्रियशिरस्त्वादि in Bra. Sū. I, where he has discussed the attributes of Brahman.

7. उपचयापचयौ—This is a reference to the words प्रिय, मोद, प्रमोद, आनन्द (and perhaps to ब्रह्मन् also in 'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा'). These words are such that each succeeding word indicates a greater degree of bliss than each preceding word. So, the increment and decrement (उपचयापचयौ) which the Sūtrakāra has in his mind are only with reference to the quality of आनन्द in the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन्, which (quality) is also mentioned in the preceding Sūtra. This explains also why प्रियशिरस्त्व is placed after आनन्दादयः. On mentioning आनन्द the Sūtrakāra was naturally reminded of other attributes like प्रियशिरस्त्व, मोददक्षिणपक्षत्व, *etc.*, which refer to the various degrees of the quality of bliss in Brahman.

8. उपचयापचयौ हि भेदे—This gives the reason why the Sūtrakāra rejected प्रियशिरस्त्वादि गुणs of Brahman. According to him आनन्द is an attribute of (the अरूपवत् or प्रधान) Brahman but he admits no such difference of degree (भेद) in the आनन्द

attribute of Brahman, as is expressed by the attributes like प्रियशिरस्त्वादि. The attribute, आनन्द in Brahman is the same; it does not undergo change, we may say, like the same attribute आनन्द in men. Thus, because the आनन्द in Brahman always remains the same and does not undergo change (भेद), the Sūtrakāra rejects such attributes as प्रियशिरस्त्वादि.

9. The fact that the Sūtrakāra rejects these attributes by giving an argument of the sameness or changelessness of the आनन्द of Brahman, proves indirectly that according to the Sūtrakāra the Tai. Upa. taught these as attributes of Brahman. Thus, Śaṅkara's doctrine that प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः are कोशधर्माः, not ब्रह्मधर्माः and also his interpretation of Bra. Sū. I. 1. 12 based on that doctrine, are both of them inconsistent with the view of the Sūtrakāra. In the light of Sūtra III. 3. 11–12 in our view Bra. Sū. I. 1. 12–19 teaches that आनन्द or आनन्दमय is an attribute of Brahman.

10. Śaṅkara interprets अप्राप्ति in the sense of (तैत्तिरीयकात्) अन्यत्र अप्राप्तिः. But the Sūtrakāra *totally* rejects प्रियशिरस्त्वादिs without making any condition as to their appropriateness in the Tai. Upa. The Sūtrakāra, moreover, refers उपचयापचयौ to आनन्द only, but Śaṅkara explains it as referring to Brahman itself and quotes 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्'. He also gives more reasons for अप्राप्ति than the one given by the Sūtrakāra. Again, Śaṅkara says that the Sūtrakāra's अप्राप्ति ("restriction") of प्रियशिरस्त्वादि should also be applied to other attributes like सत्यकाम, *etc.* This is inconsistent with Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1 and Bra. Sū. III. 3. 38 where, unlike the rejection and exclusion of प्रियशिरस्त्वादि from the lists of गुणs, the Sūtrakāra clearly mentions सत्यकाम as an attribute of Brahman. Finally, Śaṅkara's remarks regarding भेदे (उपचितापचितगुणत्वं हि सति भेदव्यवहारे सगुणे ब्रह्मण्युपपद्यते न निर्गुणे परस्मिन् ब्रह्मणि) go against the Sūtrakāra's view that the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman has also गुणs (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11, 37–42), just as the रूपवत् aspect. There is no निर्गुण Brahman according to the Sūtrakāra, nor सगुण Brahman after the fashion of Śaṅkara.

Sūtra 13

11. इतरे—The Sūtrakāra has mentioned आनन्दादयः in Sūtra 11 and प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः in Sūtra 12. Now, by इतरे he must be referring to a *third* group of attributes. Again, as अप्राप्तिः occurs in Sūtra 12, this third group seems to us to be a group of attributes which the Sūtrakāra has rejected *i. e.*, which he has not mentioned in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3. We mean that if we look to the contexts (Sūtra 12), इतरे should be a group of rejected attributes. As we shall show below, **अर्थसामान्यात्**, **आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्** and **आत्मशब्दाच्च** are reasons for the *rejection* of certain attributes. If this interpretation of ours be true, our explanation of इतरे would be more plausible. The degree of this plausibility will further increase if Sūtra 33 refers to अर्थसामान्यात् in this Sūtra, as we are going to suggest in our interpretation of Sūtra III. 3. 33.

It seems to us that इतरे refers to such attributes as are mentioned in एतद्वै तदक्षरं गार्गि ब्राह्मणा अभिवदन्त्य स्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घमलोहितमस्नेहमच्छायमतमोऽवाय्वनाकाशमसङ्गमरसमगन्धमचक्षुष्कमश्रोत्रमवागमनोऽतेजस्कमप्राणममुखममात्रमनन्तरमबाह्यं न तदश्नाति किंचन न तदश्नाति कश्चन (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8.).

12. **अर्थसामान्यात्**—According to the Sūtrakāra, these attributes have *the same aim;* therefore they have not been admitted (**अप्राप्त**) by him in his list of attributes of the **प्रधान** aspect of Brahman (Bra. Sū. I. 1). The Sūtrakāra does not feel the necessity of collecting them along with other attributes because they have the same sense ; while the other attributes, **आनन्द**, *etc.*, which he has collected, have each of them their own individual sense (See Note 14 below for **अर्थसामान्यात्**). The word **सामान्य** in Sūtra III. 3. 33 seems to refer to **अर्थसामान्य** in this Sūtra.

13. **तु** shows the rejection of a **पूर्वपक्ष** which insisted on collecting these attributes.

14. Śaṅkara does not take **इतरे** as referring to a group

other than both आनन्दादयः and प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः but he refers it to आनन्दादयः. To us the context appears to require that we should have a reference to *three* groups of attributes here, *viz.*, आनन्दादयः, प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः and इतरे, and that "अप्राप्तिः" is to be construed with इतरे also.

अर्थसामान्यात् seems to us to be a reference to the fact that all the negative attributes have the common meaning or purpose of denying any specific form of Brahman. Now, "प्रधान" being taken as अरूपवत् the Sūtrakāra did not feel it necessary to include these negative attributes in his list of attributes of Brahman. Śaṅkara, however, understands अर्थ-सामान्यात् to mean प्रतिपाद्यस्य ब्रह्मणो धर्मिणः एकत्वात्.

Sūtra 14

15. The group of इतरे गुणाः is not admitted also because they are of no use for the purpose of meditation on Brahman, since the प्रधान or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman is the object of meditation.

16. Śaṅkara takes Kaṭha Upa. III. 10–11 as the विषयवाक्य of this and the following Sūtras, and makes one independent Adhikaraṇa of these two Sūtras. It should be said that Sūtra 14 contains no indication of a reference to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Ka. Upa. III. 10–11); and the आत्मशब्द which is used as an argument in Sūtra 15 is found in the Kaṭha Upa. passage, as well as in many other Upaniṣadic passages, so it cannot be taken as a sure indication of a reference to the Kaṭha Upa. in these Sūtras. Moreover, as Śaṅkara notices in his bhāṣya on Sūtra 15, Kaṭha Upa. III. 10–11 has been fully discussed by the Sūtrakāra in seven Sūtras (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 1–7). Again, the doubt which, according to Śaṅkara, is meant to be solved by these two Sūtras, is whether each member of this series or only the पुरुष in the Kaṭha Upa. is intended to be established as पर. As Śaṅkara himself says (See the last sentence in his bhāṣya on Sūtra III. 3. 15) this doubt is solved

by Kaṭha Upa. III. 9; so, it appears to us, that the doubt was not raised by the Sūtrakāra at all. Thus, it seems that Sūtras 14 and 15 do not refer to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.

17. च in Sūtra 15 shows that अर्थसामान्यात्, आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्, and आत्मशब्दात् are all of them arguments for the rejection of इतरे and that आत्मशब्दात् is the last argument, thereby bringing the Adhikaraṇa to an end. Thus, this also goes against Śaṅkara's interpretation of Sūtras 14 and 15.

18. Śaṅkara divides Sūtra 14 into two parts by separating आध्यानाय and प्रयोजनाभावात्. We have seen that Sūtra 14 is one whole Sūtra and contains *one* argument for the exclusion of इतरे (गुणाः) from the Sūtrakāra's list of the attributes of Brahman. According to Śaṅkara आध्यानाय does not mean 'for meditation' but it means "for the right understanding" (पूर्वापरप्रवाहोक्तिः...आध्यानपूर्वकाय सम्यग्दर्शनाय). And "प्रयोजनाभावात्" means "न हीतरेषु परत्वेन प्रतिपन्नेषु किंचित्प्रयोजनं दृश्यते श्रूयते वा।".

Sūtra 15

19. आत्मशब्दात्—The *akṣara* passage quoted under Sūtra 13 runs further on as follows:—तद्वा एतदक्षरं गार्ग्यदृष्टं द्रष्टृश्रुतं श्रोत्रमतं मन्त्रविज्ञातं विज्ञातृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति श्रोतृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति मन्तृ नान्यदतोऽस्ति विज्ञातृ... । (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 11). In the section which precedes this passage we read एष ते आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतोऽदृष्टो द्रष्टाऽश्रुतः श्रोताऽमतो मन्ताऽविज्ञातो विज्ञाता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा नान्योऽतोऽस्ति श्रोतानान्योऽतोऽस्ति मन्ता नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञातैष ते आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतोऽतोऽन्यदार्तम्...। (Bṛ. Upa. III. 7. 23).

To us it seems, the Sūtrakāra points to the fact that the इतरे गुणाः *are also the* गुणs *of the individual soul* (आत्मन्) in so far as the words "एष ते आत्मा" occur with the same epithets (of "the unseen seer", "the unheard hearer", *etc.*) as are used for अक्षर. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that he has not collected these attributes of *akṣara* because they are asserted with reference to the individual soul also. The soul also possesses these qualities. Therefore the soul has not to acquire them by meditation, as in the case of other गुणs which

are solely the गुणs of the Supreme Being (See तद्भाव in Sūtra III. 3. 33) and which are yet to be acquired by the soul.

In another place the Sūtrakāra uses the same argument (आत्मशब्दात्) to show that " सत् " in Chā. Upa. VI. 2. 1 is not a material principle (गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात्...Bra. Sū. I. 1. 6).

20. Śaṅkara says that the पुरुष of Kaṭha Upa. III. 11 is called आत्मन् in Kaṭha Upa. III. 12 and therefore the इन्द्रियs, अर्थs, मनः, बुद्धिः, *etc.*, of Kaṭha Upa. III. 10–11 are suggestively declared to be अनात्मन् and thereby the पुरुष alone is shown to be " difficult to be known " and " comprehensible only to the sharp–talented. " Thus, Śaṅkara has to supply a great part of the argument in Sūtra 15 by additions foreign to the Sūtra. (Moreover, in Kaṭha Upa. III. 10 the word आत्मन् is used along with " महत् ".)

SECTION V

Identification of One's Own Self with Brahman (ātmagṛhīti) as Method of Meditation on Brahman.

Sūtras III. 3. 16-17

(१६) आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् ।

(१७) अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE method of meditation on the *arūpavat* or *avyakta* aspect of Brahman is that of] conceiving it as one's own self—just as (the method) in the case of the other (*i. e.*, the rūpvat or Puruṣa aspect of Brahman)—because of the subsequent passage of the Śruti. 16

If the opponent says [that the method of meditation is to conceive Brahman as one's ownself] because of the grammatical meaning [of the sentence], we reply, " It should be so because of the emphatic declaration [in the Śruti, describing the method of meditation] ". 17

NOTES

Sūtra 16

1. आत्मगृहीतिः—This seems to us to refer to the method of meditation on the *arūpavat* or *nirākāra* aspect of Brahman. Brahman is to be meditated upon as or understood to be the Self of the meditator. The method of meditation is that of अहंग्रह "self-identification with Brahman." The Sūtra refers to आत्मेत्येवोपासीत in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7.

2. उत्तरात्—This gives the reason for the आत्मगृहीति method. It refers to the sentences which *follow* Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7, *viz.*, ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् तदात्मानमेवावेदहं ब्रह्मास्मीति तस्मात्तत् सर्वमभवत् तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तदभवत्तथर्षीणां तथा मनुष्याणां, तद्धैतत् पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति तस्य ह न देवाश्चनाभूत्या ईशते आत्मा ह्येषां स भवत्यथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद, यथा पशुरेवं स देवानां...(Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10). आत्मेत्येवोपासीत in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7 is explained in this passage by "य एवं वेदाहं ब्रह्मास्मीति" and the importance of आत्मगृहीति is proved by saying अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद.

3. इतरवत्—In Sūtra 11, the Sūtrakāra has begun the description of the technique of the meditation on the प्रधान or अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman by saying that आनन्दादयः are the गुणs of the प्रधान (Sūtra 11 and that other गुणs are not to be taken in that meditation (Sūtras 12–15). In Sūtra 16 he states the method of that meditation with reference to the अरूपवत्. But at the same time he says that this method is *like the method used in the other case, i. e.*, used for the meditation on the other aspect *viz.*, the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman. इतर is प्रधानेतर "other than the *pradhāna* aspect of Brahman.

That this suggestion of ours regarding the meaning of इतर is correct can readily be seen from our interpretation of

Sūtra III. 3. 43 where this Sūtra (III. 3. 16) is very probably referred to. Also there are several other indications in this Pāda, which support our interpretation of इतर as प्रधानेतर, *e. g.*, इमे (in III. 3. 10), उभय (in III. 3. 28), पूर्वविकल्प (in III. 3. 45), *etc.*

4. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra discusses whether आत्मा in Ai. Upa. I. 1 means परमात्मा or something else like प्रजापति. The reason, given by Śaṅkara, for raising this question seems to us to be very weak. Again, आत्मा in Ai. Upa. I. 1, according to Śaṅkara, is explained by the Sūtrakāra as परमात्मा and Śaṅkara shows this by interpreting आत्मा in आत्मगृहीति (in the Sūtra) as परमात्मा. If this were really the case, why should the Sūtrakāra himself not have worded the Sūtra as परमात्मगृहीति instead of the expression " आत्मगृहीति " which is vague, as the word आत्मन् itself occurs in the so called doubtful passage (Ai. Upa. I. 1) ? Moreover, " इतरवत् " is interpreted by Śaṅkara as यथा इतरेषु सृष्टिश्रवणेषु......परमात्मनो ग्रहणम् . Śaṅkara and other Ācāryas seem to us to have missed the fact that Sūtra III. 3. 43 refers to इतरवत् in this Sūtra (III 3. 16). Lastly, उत्तरात् in the Sūtra, according to Śaṅkara refers to (अत्र परमात्मग्रहणानुगुणमेव विशेषणमप्युत्तरमुपलभ्यते) " स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजै इति " (Ai. Upa. I. 1) " स इमाँल्लोकानसृजत " (Ai. Upa. I. 2). Here, according to Śaṅkara, the ईक्षण which the पूर्वपक्ष argued to be a characteristic of the Jīvātman or any other आत्मन् but Brahman, is easily shown by the Sūtrakāra to be a characteristic of परमात्मन्.

Sūtra 17

5. अन्वयादिति चेत्—Regarding the method of meditation on Brahman we are told above by the Sūtrakāra that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the Self of the meditator (आत्मगृहीति). His opponent seems to say that " We come to this conclusion (regarding the method of meditation) on the ground of the

grammatical sense of the subsequent sentence. Thus, "अथ योऽन्यां देवतामुपास्तेऽन्योऽसावन्योऽहमस्मीति न स वेद" and "य एवं वेदाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति," taken together lead us to the conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the Self of the meditator.

6. स्यादवधारणवत्—The Sūtrakāra does not contradict the opponent, because instead of adding न after इति चेत्, as he usually does, he simply says "स्यादवधारणात्." By अवधारण, he seems to refer to एव in आत्मेत्येवोपासीत, "One should meditate on Brahman *as nothing else but* his own Self" (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7).

7. Śaṅkara takes अन्वयादिति चेत् in the sense of "अन्वयान्नेति चेत्". Thus, he adds "न" after अन्वयात्. He connects this न with परमात्मग्रहणम् taken as understood and thereby makes the Sūtra refer to his विषयवाक्य *viz.*, Ai. Upa. I. 1. We take "स्यात्" in the sense of आत्मगृहीतिः स्यात्; Śaṅkara interprets it as भवेदुपपन्नं परमात्मनो ग्रहणम्, thus also changing आत्मगृहीति to परमात्मगृहीति, in the preceding Sūtra. अवधारण he takes as प्रागुत्पत्तेरात्मैकत्वावधारणम्. Thus, he interprets अवधारण as referring to एव in his विषयवाक्य "आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत्किञ्चन मिषत्" (Ai. Upa. I. 1). In fact his explanation of अवधारण amounts to आत्मैकत्वावधारण instead of अवधारण pure and simple (as we have shown in आत्मेत्येवोपासीत).

It should be added that the श्रुतिवाक्यs in which certain words are to be interpreted as referring to or denoting परमात्मन् have been already discussed by the Sūtrakāra in the first Adhyāya, particularly in the first three Pādas of that Adhyāya. So, it seems to us improbable that the same point be discussed in this place in the Sūtras (III. 3. 16–17) once again. Moreover, almost everywhere in the Sūtras the word "आत्मन्" means the individual soul or the self. Lastly, the other argument that the Śruti in question teaches ब्रह्मात्मत्व of the world and not its उत्पत्ति and therefore in the Sūtra (III. 3. 16) आत्मगृहीति means परमात्मगृहीति comes from Śaṅkara himself and is not mentioned in the Sūtra at all.

Śaṅkara gives one more interpretation of these Sūtras (III. 3. 16–17), according to which they discuss a question whether Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3–4 and Chā. Upa. VI. 2–8 have the same sense or not. In other words, the question to be decided is whether each of these two passages refers to परमात्मन् or not. Now, the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra I. 3. 42 has already discussed Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 7; and it seems to us that the अतिदेश in Bra. Sū. I. 4. 28 applies to such Śrutis as Chā. Upa. VI. Thus *in a way* there was little possibility of any such doubt being raised as, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, is intended to be solved by these two Sūtras. Moreover, the Sūtras contain no direct reference to either of the two Śrutis mentioned by Śaṅkara.

In the second interpretation also Śaṅkara interprets अन्वयादिति चेत् as अन्वयातन्नेतिचेत् and अन्वय in his opinion does not mean the अन्वय of उपक्रम and उपसंहार, but only the अन्वय of the two passages. This does not seem to us to be the exact sense of the word अन्वय.

The word " अवधारण " in the Sūtra (III. 3. 17) is here interpreted by Śaṅkara in three different ways.

It may be added that there is no similarity between Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3–4 and Chā. Upa. VI, as there is, *e. g.*, between the पञ्चाग्निविद्या passages, or the प्राणविद्या passages of the various Upaniṣads. For this reason also the doubt regarding the तुल्यार्थत्व of Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3–4 and Chā. Upa. VI would not arise at all.

8. See our interpretations of Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 3 (आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च) and Bra. Sū. III. 3. 18–19, which also support our interpretation of Sūtras III. 3. 16–17.

SECTION VI

Apūrva as the Invisible Result (or Unique Merit) of Meditation. The Principle of Apūrva to be so understood in similar Śrutis, not in other Śrutis.

Sūtras III. 3. 18–24

(१८) कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् ।
(१९) समान एवं चाभेदात् ।
(२०) संबन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ।
(२१) न वा विशेषात् ।
(२२) दर्शयति च ।
(२३) संभृतिद्युव्याप्त्यपि चातः ।
(२४) पुरुषविद्यायामिव चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् ।

TRANSLATION

BECAUSE of the mention (in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10) of the result (of *atmagṛhīti* referred to in Sūtras III. 3. 16–17), there is the Apūrva or the Unique Merit (in Vedanta). 18

And so in every similar text (*i. e.* Vedanta), because of the identity [of the topic]. 19

[Pūrvapakṣa]–" It is so even in other texts (*i. e.*, in the dissimilar texts) because of the connection [beteween the similar and the dissimilar texts] ". 20

[Siddhānta]–" Rather not, because of the difference [between the two types of Śruti texts], 21

and the Śruti shows [that difference], 22

and also because of this [reason] *saṁbhṛti* and *dyuvyāpti* [are not to be included in the collection of attributes], 23

and because of the absence of the mention [in the dissimilar texts] of other [attributes] such as are mentioned in the Doctrine of the Puruṣa (*i. e.* the Science of the Form–Aspect of Brahman). 24

NOTES

Sūtra 18

1. The Sūtrakāra seems to discuss Brahman on the analogy of the explanation of Dharma given in the Jaimini-Sūtras. Thus, the identity of Brahman in all the Vedānta texts was established in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 on the analogy of the proof of the identity of Karman offered in Jai. Sū. II. 4. 6; the practice of स्वाध्याय was explained on the analogy of the "सव" sacrifices; the Collection of attributes and other information pertaining to the meditation on Brahman was compared with the collection of (गुणs or) rites subsidiary to an Injunction. In the same way, it seems to us that the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra (III. 3. 18) explains how there is an Apūrva also in the Vedanta School, just as there is an Apūrva in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā School. In both the Schools अपूर्व is a unique merit resulting from an act. Svarga is the अपूर्व resulting from ज्योतिष्टोम; so the Upaniṣad mentions " सर्वभवन " (तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवँ सूर्यश्चेति तदिदमप्येतर्हि य एवं वेदाऽहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति तस्य ह न देवाश्चनाभूत्या ईशाते आत्मा ह्येषाँ स भवति) as the result of the act of meditation on Brahman as one's own Self. Thus, कार्याख्यान refers to Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 and the Sūtrakāra seems to understand सर्वभवन as the अपूर्व the " unseen " result of the act of the उपासना of Brahman laid down in the Vedantas.

2. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra has nothing to do with the preceding Sūtra, because he understands this Sūtra as referring to आचमन and अपां वासः संकलपनम् mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. VI. 1. 14 and Chā. Upa. V. 2. 2. It must be admitted that this has no direct or indirect bearing on Brahman or Brahmajijñāsā the subject of the Brahmasūtra. It was not at all necessary for the Sūtrakāra to discuss the consistency of

these two Upaniṣadic passages. According to Śaṅkara कार्याख्यानात् means " न आचमनस्य विधेयत्वमुपपद्यते कार्याख्यानात् । प्राप्तमेव हीदं कार्यत्वेनाचमनं प्रायत्यार्थं स्मृतिप्रसिद्धमन्वाख्यायते". Thus, "कार्याख्यानात्" means in short " कार्यत्वेन प्राप्तस्य आचमनस्य अन्वाख्यानात् आचमनस्य विधेयत्वं न उपपद्यते ". There is no negation in the Sūtra, but Śaṅkara is ready to take a negation also as understood. Again, अपूर्वम् is interpreted by Śaṅkara as " अपां वासः संकलपनमेवापूर्वं विधीयते or प्राणस्यानग्नताकरणसंकल्पोऽनेन वाक्येनाचमनीयास्वप्सु प्राणविद्यासंबन्धित्वेनापूर्वं उपदिश्यते ". Thus, अपूर्वं is to be interpreted as being अपां वासः संकलपनरूपम् and " विधीयते " is to be added as " understood. " Thus, Śaṅkara does not take कार्याख्यानात् as the हेतु for the conclusion अपूर्वम्, as would be the natural procedure of interpreting the Sūtra; but he makes two independent sentences out of the two words in the Sūtra. This method of breaking up a Sūtra into two sentences does not seem to be satisfactory at least when it involves even the addition of a negation taken as understood. See also Notes below on च in the next Sūtra (III. 3. 19).

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman (*i. e.*, the *nirguṇa* Brahman of his School) cannot be an object of चोदना " Injunction." But the Sūtrakāra seems to differ from him (See Notes on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1). Śaṅkara makes use of his doctrine of *saguṇa* Brahman in order to explain the चोदना, *etc.*, mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1. Similarly, he does not think that the Sūtrakāra would refer to अपूर्वं arising from the meditation of Brahman. So, it naturally occurs to him to explain this Sūtra as referring to the अपूर्वं of अपां वासः संकलपनम्. Such seems to us to be the situation of Śaṅkara.

Sūtra 19

3. एवं च—Both these words seem to us to indicate that Sūtra 19 is closely connected with Sūtra 18. " एवं " refers to कार्याख्यानादपूर्वं and " च " connects the Śruti of कार्याख्यान with समान ' a similar text, ' as would seem probable from the following notes.

4. समाने —In Sūtra 5, the word समाने occurs and there it is said that उपसंहार should be made in the case of a similar text. Here "एवम्" shows that an अपूर्व should be taken as understood if there be the mention of the act of उपासना on Brahman in *a text similar* to the text referred to in the preceding Sūtra. This would mean that the Sūtrakāra takes Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 as referring to the अरूपवत् or प्रधान aspect of Brahman; while in Sūtra 19 he extends the rule of कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् (mentioned in Sūtra 18) to a similar text, *i. e.*, a text about Brahman (अरूपवत् as well as रूपवत्). Thus, the experience of every one who knows Brahman should be like that of Vāmadeva, when the goal is reached.

5. अभेदात्—The Sūtrakāra gives here the reason why the अपूर्व should be taken as understood in "a similar text." He says that the अपूर्व should be taken as implied in a similar text because the subject of the two similar texts is identical, *i. e.*, because the purpose or topic (अर्थ) of both the texts is the same (whether it be अरूपवत् or रूपवत् aspect of Brahman).

6. In our opinion there is a significant similarity of words and thought in Sūtra 5 and Sūtras 18–19 and therefore the method of the interpretation of both these passages should be the same. In Sūtra 5, उपसंहार was taught; in Sūtras 18–19 अपूर्व is taught. The हेतु of उपसंहार was अर्थाभेदात्, the हेतु of अपूर्व to be taken as implied in the "similar" text is also अभेदात् (*i. e.*, अर्थाभेदात्). The उपसंहार was to be made in the case of a समान text; the अपूर्व is to be taken as understood also in the case of a समान text. Thus, the phraseology of the two passages serves as a clear indication regarding their interpretation.

7. Śaṅkara begins a new Adhiakaraṇa with Sūtra 19. Thus, according to him Sūtra 19 forms an independent Adhikaraṇa. This, as shown above, is inconsistent with the sense of एवम् and च in the Sūtra. Also, we have indicated that a comparison of Sūtra 5 with Sūtras 18–19 proves that the last two Sūtras are closely connected.

8. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 19 solves a doubt regarding the एकवाक्यता (harmony) of a passage in अग्निरहस्य (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X) with another passage in Bṛ. Upa. (Bṛ. Upa. V. 6. 1), which occurs at the end of the same Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The Sūtra, it must be stated, contains no indication about a reference to these texts. "एवम्" which should refer to some statement in the *preceding* Sūtra, means according to Śaṅkara "यथा भिन्नासु शाखासु विद्यैकत्वं गुणोपसंहारश्च भवत्येवम्." "समाने" is interpreted by him as "एकस्यामपि शाखायाम्". If समान is to refer to शाखा, we should have समानायाम् (fem.) instead of समाने (mas). Moreover, समान seems to be used in contrast with अभेदात् and therefore समान should mean "similar", अभेद having the sense of "identical". अभेदात् is explained by Śaṅkara as "उपास्याभेदात्". He does not notice the similarity of phroseology between Sūtra III. 3. 5 and this Sūtra.

Sūtra 20

9. एवम् in this Sūtra, shows that this Sūtra is closely connected with the preceding Sūtra. एवम् in Sūtra 19 referred to the statement about the अपूर्व in Sūtra 18; so एवम् in Sūtra 20 should also refer to the same. Again, अन्यत्रापि of Sūtra 20 seems to be used in contrast with समाने in the preceding Sūtra (III. 3. 19); so that अन्यत्रापि would mean "असमानेऽपि" 'even in a dissimilar text'. Moreover, "संबन्धात्" in Sūtra 20 seems to have been replied to by "विशेषात्" in Sūtra 21 and this विशेषात् being equivalent to भेदात् seems to be contrasted with अभेदात् in Sūtra 19. Thus, Sūtra 20 seems to us to belong to the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtra 19. This will be clear also from the explanation of Sūtra 20 offered below.

10. This is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र, as is implied by the presence of वा in the next Sūtra.

11. अन्यत्रापि—The opponent argues that the अपूर्व should be taken as implied "even in other texts" (अन्यत्रापि) than a similar one. In the preceding Sūtra the Siddhāntin has said

that the अपूर्व should be taken as implied in a text similar to the one referred to in Sūtra 18, *i. e.*, in a Vedanta text or, in other words, in an Upaniṣad. Therefore अन्यत्र in Sūtra 20 would mean " in a non-Vedanta or non-Upaniṣadic text " *i. e.*, in a Mantra, Brāhmaṇa or Āraṇyaka text or a Khila of any Veda.

12. संबन्धात्—The opponent gives a reason why even in a dissimilar text like a Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka or a Khila an Apūrva should be taken as implied. He says that this should be done because " *of the connection* " of that text with the Vedanta or Upaniṣad literature. The Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka, and Khila are closely connected with the Upaniṣad literature; both belong to the same Veda; often an Upaniṣad forms the concluding part of a Brāhmaṇa or more properly Āraṇyaka; a Khila also *belongs to* the same Veda as an Upaniṣad, *e. g.*, the Rāṇāyanīya Khila is connected with the Sāmaveda to which the Chāndogya Upaniṣad belongs. The opponent seems to argue that even in a text which is different from an Upaniṣad or Vedanta text, the same अपूर्व should be taken as implied because the former type of text is closely *connected* with the latter.

13. Śaṅkara does not take this Sūtra as connected with the preceding Sūtra. According to him we have in the present Sūtra a reference to Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 1-4. The Sūtra, evidently, contains no suggestive word which would support Śaṅkara's विषयवाक्य. " अन्यत्रापि " is a very general statement of the विषयवाक्य. " एवम् " in Sūtra 19, according to Śaṅkara, means यथा भिन्नासु शाखासु विद्यैकत्वं गुणोपसंहारश्च भवत्येवमेकस्यामपि शाखायां भवितुमर्हति ", while he interprets " एवम् " in the present Sūtra as यथा शाण्डिल्यविद्यायां विभागेनापि अधीतायां गुणोपसंहार उक्त एवमन्यत्राप्येवंजातीयके विषये भवितुमर्हति । According to the interpretation suggested by us " एवम् " in Sūtras 19-20 has reference to अपूर्वम् in Sūtra 18. " संबन्धात् " according to Śaṅkara does not mean simple *connection* of " अन्यत्र " with " समाने " in Sūtra 19, but it is to be modified into " एकविद्याभिसंबन्धात् ".

Sūtra 21

14. वा here implies the refutation of the opponent's view expressed in the preceding Sūtra.

15. "न" — "The अपूर्व cannot be taken as implied in a dissimilar passage," though it is to be taken in a "similar passage".

16. विशेषात् — According to the Sūtrakāra all Vedantas teach (the same) Brahman (Bra. Sūtra. III. 3. 1) but other Śruti texts like the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Khilas, teach a different topic though they are closely connected with the Vedantas. The Sūtrakāra does not deny the "connection" (संबन्ध) mentioned by the opponent in Sūtra 20; but he says that while in a समान text or in a text *like* that of Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 referred to in Sūtra 18, the topic is the same, there is a "difference of topic" in a dissimilar text. In other words, there is a difference between the topic of the Vedantas and that of the other Śruti texts.

17. Śaṅkara takes "उभयोः उभयत्र प्राप्तिः" as understood in the Sūtra, and explains विशेषात् as उपासनस्थानविशेषोपनिबन्धात् (See Note 9 above). According to Śaṅkara's interpretation the पूर्वपक्ष argument (of Sūtra 20) is not refuted by the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 21). It is rather Śaṅkara who replies to it in his bhāṣya on Sūtra 21.

Sūtra 22

18. दर्शयति च — "And the Śruti shows" the विषेश or difference between the Vedantas and the other Śruti texts. The Sūtrakāra has refused to take अपूर्व like the one in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7, as understood in texts which are not Vedantas. Here he says that according to the Sruti itself, the topic of the dissimilar texts is different from that of the Vedanta texts. He seems to refer to Śrutis like Mu. Upa. I. 1. 4–5, Chā. Upa. VII. 4, Śve. Upa. V. 6, also Mu. Upa. II. 2. 3 and Bṛ. Upa. III. 9. 26. In Mu. Upa. I. 1. 4–5 we are told that "Vedas" teach

the अपराविद्या, but not the पराविद्या which is the अक्षरविद्या of the Upaniṣads. In Chā. Upa. VII. 1. 4 Nārada was told by Sanatkumāra that his knowledge of the *Vedas* was only " नाम ". From the Śve. Upa. we learn that Brahman is " hidden in the Upaniṣads which are the secret of the Vedas. " Mu. Upa. II. 2. 3 asks a man to hit the Akṣara Brahman by means of " the bow in the form of the great weapon *taught in the Upaniṣads.* " In Bṛ. Upa. III. 9. 26 Yājñavalkya asks Śākalya a question about the " Puruṣa taught in the Upaniṣad ". The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that these Śrutis show that the Upaniṣads or the Vedantas form a part of the Vedas by themselves, so that they teach a principle which is different from that taught by the other parts of the Veda. Therefore, he would not agree that the अपूर्व of Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 be taken as implied in any of the dissimilar texts of the Śruti.

19. By " दर्शयति " Śaṅkara refers to Chā. Upa. I. 7. 5. In the Sūtras " दर्शयति " generally means that the very point under discussion is illustrated by a Śruti. Here the point raised by Śaṅkara regarding Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 3 (about the two *upaniṣads* अहर् and अहम्) is not the thing mentioned in the Śruti quoted by Śaṅkara under this Sūtra; so, he says that the Śruti (Chā. Upa. I. 7. 5) gives an *indication* (लिङ्गदर्शन) as to how the point of doubt in Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 3–4 should be solved. Thus, दर्शयति is according to Śaṅkara the same as " लिङ्गं दर्शयति ". Again, the लिङ्ग is not clear in the Chā. Upa. Śruti; so Śaṅkara seems to explain it away. To us it seems that the Chā. Upa. (I. 7. 5) identifies the *puruṣas* in the eye and in the Sun with each other without making the distinction of the *upaniṣads* अहम् and अहर् and therefore it can not be quoted as an authority for explaining the Bṛ. Upa. passage. Śaṅkara himself seems to have felt this difficulty.

Sūtra 23

20. च or rather अपि च in the Sūtra shows that this Sūtra is a part of the preceding Adhikaraṇa.

21. संभृतिद्युव्याप्ती — Śaṅkara is right in referring these two attributes to a quotation from the Khila of the Rāṇāyaniya Recension of the Sāma Veda.††

The Sūtrakāra seems to say that also for the same reason (अतः) for which he does not agree to taking an अपूर्व (like the one in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10) as implied in a dissimilar text, he has not included संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति in the lists of the attributes collected by him in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3., (particularly in Bra. Sū. I. 1, where the Sūtrakāra has collected the attributes of the Avyakta, as distinguished from the Puruṣa aspect of Brahman; see the next Note below). संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति are attributes of Brahman but as they are mentioned in the literature other than the Vedanta or the Upaniṣads, he has not collected them in his lists of the attributes of Brahman. We do not find संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति in Br. Sū. I. 1-3; therefore we can see that he has not collected them, but has rejected them. The अपूर्व of the meditation on Brahman is given in Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 and is to be taken as implied in other Upaniṣads, but it is neither given expressly nor is it to be taken as understood in the *other* Śruti texts. This seems to us to be the sense of Sūtra 23. This is also consistent with the fact that in Bra. Sū. I only passages from Upaniṣads are considered (Bra. Sū. I. 4. 28) and in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1 the Sūtrakāra says that Brahman is to be known from all the Vedantas.

22. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra forms an independent Adhikaraṇa. Thus, he does not seem to take into consideration च or rather अपि च in this Sūtra. Though संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति clearly show that the Sūtra refers to the quotation from the Khila of the Rāṇāyaniya Recension of the Sāmaveda, the Sūtra contains no suggestion for a reference to the other quotations from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad given by Śaṅkara.

†† The present writer acknowledges with pleasure his indebtedness to Prof. M. Hiriyanna for drawing his attention to this undeniable fact.

" अतः " in the Sūtra is connected by Śaṅkara with his interpretation of विशेषात् in Sūtra 21 and therefore he takes it to mean आयतनविशेषयोगात् and locates these आयतनविशेषs in Chā. Upa. III. 14. 3, VIII. I. 1, *etc.* He finds that an opponent may object to the argument of these आयतनविशेषs on the ground that all these quotations from the Chā. Upa. do contain आधिदैविकी विभूतिs. Therefore, he has to give *another special reason* for not collecting संभृति and other attributes. Śaṅkara is, however, aware that this special reason is not given in the Sūtra.

Sūtra 24

23. च shows that this Sūtra is connected with the preceding Sūtra and that it forms part of the same Adhikaraṇa to which Sūtra 23 belongs. Moreover, as there is no च in the next Sūtra, we conclude that this Sūtra (24) is the last Sūtra of the Adhikaraṇa.

24. The Sūtrakāra has said in the preceding Sūtra that he has not collected संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति from the Khila of the Rāṇāyaniyas, in his lists of the attributes because there is a difference between the Upaniṣad literature and the other Śruti literature. According to the Śruti in question and also according to the Sūtrakāra, these (संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति) are attributes of the अरूपवत् or प्रधान aspect of Brahman, though he does not collect them because they are mentioned in the non-Vedanta Śruti literature.

Now, in Sūtra 24, he gives one more reason for his statement in Sūtra 21. He says that *other attributes* (than संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति which belong to the अरूपवत्), *such as are stated in the Puruṣa Vidyā of the Vedantas, are not stated in the non-Vedanta Śrauta literature, viz.*, the Saṁhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Khila. For this reason, he would not allow that the अपूर्व of Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10 be taken as understood in a dissimilar (*i. e.*, non-Vedanta) Śruti text also (न वा in Sūtra 21).

25. Incidentally it may be noticed here that the Sūtrakāra admits two Vidyās, the Pradhāna Vidyā or *a-rūpavad* (*i. e.*, *nirākāra*) Brahma Vidyā and the Puruṣa Vidyā or *rūpavad* (*i. e.*, *sākāra*) Brahma Vidyā as taught in the Vedantas or Upaniṣads. He also admits that occasionally in the non-Upaniṣadic Śrauta literature we come across passages in which the Pradhāna or the chief aspect of Brahman and its attributes are mentioned, but, he holds that the attributes which are mentioned in the Puruṣa Vidyā passages of the Upaniṣads are not found in the non-Upaniṣadic Śrauta literature.

For the distinction of these two Vidyās see Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26 (पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते) and III. 3. 47 (विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात्).

26. Śaṅkara takes Sūtra 24 as forming an independent Adhikaraṇa. According to him the Sūtra is intended to solve a doubt as to whether the attributes in the पुरुषविद्या of the Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa and the Paiṅgirahasyabrāhmaṇa are to be taken as implied in the *puruṣayajña* of the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad of the Taitīriyakas. Thus, Śaṅkara understands *puruṣa* in the expression Puruṣa Vidyā to mean a man, because in the texts referred to by Śaṅkara under this Sūtra *puruṣa* means a man and his life is supposed to be a *yajña*. This is quite contrary to the meaning of the word Puruṣa when the Sūtrakāra speaks of the Puruṣa Vidyā. In Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26 the Sūtrakāra says that "*vaiśvānara*" is also called Puruṣa in a certain Branch of the Veda (पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते Bra. Sū. I. 2. 26). In that Sūtra as well as in the present Sūtra (III. 3. 24) it can be proved that the word Puruṣa is used by the Sūtrakāra in the sense of the *rūpavad* aspect of Brahman. The Upaniṣads (*e. g.* Mu. Upa. II. 1. 3) also use the word *puruṣa* in the same sense; and the Sūtrakāra undoubtedly refers to such Upaniṣadic passages by the word *puruṣavidyā*. " इतरेषाम् " in the Sūtra seems to us to refer to attributes " other " than the attributes संभृति and द्युव्याप्ति mentioned in the preceding Sūtra which belong to the *arūpavad* Brahman, as we have explained above; but Śaṅkara takes

इतरेषाम् " to mean " of the Taitiriyakas who are *other* than the Tāṇḍins and the Paiṅgins (यथैकेषां शाखिनां ताण्डिनां पैङ्गिनां च पुरुषविद्यायामाम्नानं, नैवमितरेषां तैतिरीयाणामाम्नानमस्ति). But these Tāṇḍins and Paiṅgins are not mentioned in the preceding Sūtra, and therefore, we believe, " इतरेषाम् " cannot be explained as belonging to others than the Tāṇḍins and the Paiṅgins. The main conclusion " गुणाः न उपसंहर्तव्याः " is according to Śaṅkara to be taken as understood from the preceding Sūtra *i. e.*, from his interpretation of the preceding Sūtra. But to us it appears that this Sūtra is only a हेतु or an argument (abl. sing. of ' अनाम्नानात् ') and no statement; so it should be taken along with the preceding Sūtra. Moreover, " विद्या " cannot be applied to the *puruṣa* in the sense of man as Śaṅkara explains the word. We think, *vidyā* means *brahmavidyā*, as in Sūtra III. 3. 47. Lastly, as the passages referred to by Śaṅkara under this Sūtra do not pertain to Brahman even remotely, there is little likelihood of the Sūtrakāra discussing them in his book. As Śaṅkara himself, towards the end of his bhāṣya on the Sūtra, shows, there is very little similarity of thought between the two other passages on the one hand and that of the Nārāyaṇopaniṣad on the other and consequently nobody is likely to have raised a पूर्वपक्ष which, according to Śaṅkara, is answered by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra.

SECTION VII

Meditation on the Praṇava.

Sūtras III. 3. 25-27

(२५) वेधाद्यर्थभेदात् ।

(२६) हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् ।

(२७) सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्तथाह्यन्ये ।

TRANSLATION

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" Penetration, *etc.*, [are not to be (collected) because their topic is different. " 25

[Siddhānta]—" But, in the case of [Penetration, *etc.*,] not being found [stated in a text, they should be collected from another text, because the Penetration, *etc.*,] are subsidiary to the word for the reward " *upāyana* " (*viz.*, Mokṣa), just as *kuśa* grass, *āchanda* (a seat ?), a hymn, and an *upagāna* [a subsidiary song are subsidiary to a sacrifice]. This has been said, 26

[and] bacause there is nothing [else] to be crossed (*i. e.*, achieved by the one who resorts to the Praṇava) during his journey (to Brahman); because the followers of another Branch [than the Muṇḍaka] say so. 27

NOTES

Sūtra 25

1. "वेधादि" seems to us to refer to Mu. Upa. II. 2. 2–4, which runs as follows:—

यदर्चिमद्यदणुभ्योऽणु च यस्मिँल्लोका निहिता लोकिनश्च ।
तदेतदक्षरं ब्रह्म स प्राणस्तदु वाङ्मनः ॥
तदेतत्सत्यं तदमृतं तद्वेद्धव्यं सोम्य विद्धि ॥ २ ॥

धनुर्गृहीत्वौपनिषदं महास्त्रं शरं ह्युपासानिशितं संधयीत ।
आयम्य तद्भावगतेन चेतसा लक्ष्यं तदेवाक्षरं सोम्य विद्धि ॥ ३ ॥

प्रणवो धनुः शरो ह्यात्मा ब्रह्म तल्लक्ष्यमुच्यते ।
अप्रमत्तेन वेद्धव्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ ४ ॥

The Sūtrakāra has considered the method of meditation on Brahman in the preceding Sūtras. It was stated that the meditation should be practised by the method of आत्मगृहीति. But the Mu. Upa. (II. 2) says " ओमित्येवं ध्यायथ आत्मानम् " (Mu. Upa. II. 2. 6) and also mentions a method of *penetrating* (वेध) Brahman (which is described as) the aim, by means of the bow in the form of the Praṇava and the arrow in the form of the individual soul (the लक्ष्य, धनुः, and शर being metaphorically stated).

2. As तु in the next Sūtra shows, this Sūtra (25) is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र. This is also clear from the हेतु stated in this Sūtra, *viz.*, अर्थभेदात्. The Sūtrakāra has always stated emphatically that the object in all the Vedantas is the same (of अर्थाभेदात् in Sūtra III. 3. 5 which is also *referred* to in Sūtra 26 which is a reply to the present Sūtra).

3. अर्थभेदात्—An opponent seems to argue that वेधादि mentioned in Mu. Upa. II. 2 should not be collected in the

method of meditation on Brahman because they deal with another Brahman, a topic other than that with reference to which the Sūtrakāra has mentioned आत्मगृहीति as the method of meditation.

The frequent statement of a पूर्वपक्ष holding that the S'ruti or Vedantas did not teach one and the same Brahman but two or more such principles, throws light on the interpretation of the Earlier Metrical Upaniṣads (as Deussen calls them) and the Bhagavadgītā. It is not likely that the Opponent who opposed the views that all the Vedantas taught the same Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1–4) and also that a collection of attributes *etc.*, from all the Vedantas, should be made (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5–9), was any other than a Vedantin. Thus, in this Pāda we have evidence that in the days of the Sūtrakāra there was another school of Vedanta which believed that the Vedantas taught more than one final principle. Probably two *viz.*, अक्षर and पुरुष. The Sūtrakāra says that these are two names of the same principle (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 9 and 10).

4. After वेधादि we have to take as understood अप्राप्तम् " not to be collected " or अनुपसंहर्तव्यम्. This is clear from the fact that the argument in this Sūtra is अर्थभेदात् (*cf.* अर्थाभेदात् in Sūtra 5) and that the next Sūtra which is Siddhānta Sūtra seems to argue that वेधादि is to be collected.

5. S'aṅkara refers the Sūtra to a discussion regarding Mantras and rites which are mentioned in the Brāhmaṇas which precede certain Upniṣads of several Branches of the Vedas. The question, according to him, is whether these Mantras and rites are to be included (उपसंह्रियेन्) in the विद्याs of the Upniṣads or not. It seems to us to be impossible that the Sūtrakāra would discuss such a topic in his work or discuss texts other than the Upniṣads. But apart from this, only one quotation of S'aṅkara refers to प्रवेध, rather हृदयप्रवेध instead of वेध as does Mu. Upa. II. 2. 2–4 which we propose to take is the विषयवाक्य of the Sūtra. By आदि in the Sūtra we should

rather have a reference to बाण, शर and लक्ष्य because आदि is preceded by वेध and वेध would suggest bow, arrow, aim, *etc.* But Śaṅkara takes आदि to mean " other Mantras and rites ", because he interprets वेध to mean the वेध Mantra and the प्रवर्ग्य rite. अर्थभेदात् means, according to Śaṅkara हृदयं प्रविध्येत्येवंजातीयकानां हि मन्त्राणां येऽर्था हृदयवेधादयो भिन्ना अनभिसंबद्धास्त उपनिषदुदिताभिर्विद्याभिः। (न तेषां ताभिः संगन्तुं सामर्थ्यमस्ति ।). Thus, अर्थभेदात् is interpreted as " because the meanings of these Mantras are different or unconnected with the Lores of the Upniṣads "; so the " अर्थभेद " of this Sūtra has no association with the word अर्थ of the preceding Sūtra (*cf., e. g.,* अर्थाभेदात् in Sūtra III. 3. 5). In fact Śaṅkara makes the Opponent argue that on the ground of the proximity (सन्निधि) of the Brāhmaṇa texts with the Upniṣads the Mantra and the rites of the Brāhmaṇas should be included in or connected with the Lores of the Upaniṣads. But, as Śaṅkara himself admits, this is a very weak argument even for the पूर्वपक्ष to start its own view about the Mantras and the Lores.

Sūtra 26

6. तु—The word तु shows that the view (पूर्वपक्ष) in the preceding Sūtra is refuted by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra. The Sūtrakarā does not agree with the Opponent's view that the वेधादि should not be collected.

7. हानौ—According to the Sūtrakāra the वेधादि should be collected for the purpose of meditation on the Praṇava Brahman if they are missing (हानौ) in the text of one's own School. Thus, he admits प्रणवध्यान as an alternative way of meditation on Brahman along with आत्मगृहीति (Sūtra 16). This will be clear from Note (8) below.

8. उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्—This word seems to give the reason for " collecting in the case of missing (हानौ उपसंहारः)" and also to contain a reply to अर्थभेदात् the argument in the preceding Sūtra.

The word 'उपायन' means a reward. And in the present Sūtra उपायनशब्द may refer to the word लक्ष्य in Mu. Upa. II. 2. 4 or to the reward of the Jīva's absorption into Brahman stated in the fourth pāda of the same mantra. At the same time it may also refer to the reward of the meditation on the Praṇava in other Upaniṣads. In the former case, उपायनशब्दशेष means that the penetration, *etc.*, *should be collected* for the purpose of meditation on the Praṇava from all the Upaniṣads because the penetration, *etc.*, *are subsidiary to Brahman the goal*, the aim (लक्ष्य), the result.

'उपायनशब्द' may also be a reference to the word of the Reward *i. e.*, the Reward of the meditation on the Praṇava in Pra. Upa. V. 7. (तमोंकारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान् यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं चेति) and Kaṭha Upa. II. 17 (एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमेतदालम्बनं परम् । एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥). In these Śrutis the Reward is stated to be the attainment of Brahman Itself. (*Vide* Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7–16, for '*brahmaloka*' in the Śrutis).

उपायनशब्दशेत्व means that the Penitration, *etc.*, are subsidiary to the attainment of Brahman Itself which is the Reward; so all that is connected with the meditation on the Praṇava must be *collected* from all the different Upniṣads for the purpose of the meditation. Then only, Brahman will be attained.

Besides, उपायनशब्दशेषत्व is a reply to अर्थभेद in the preceding Sūtra. वेधादि is *subsidiary to the reward viz., Brahman*, and *so it can not be regarded as dealing with a topic other than Brahman* which is discussed in the preceding Sūtras. The Sūtrakāra thus refutes the argument 'अर्थभेदात्' (Sūtra 25). Because, वेधादि is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman, it should also be included in the process of meditation as an alternative way along with आत्मगृहीति.

9. कुशाछन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्—The collection of वेधादि for the purpose of meditation on Brahman from a Branch other than

one's own, is compared by the Sūtrakāra with the inclusion of the Kuśa grass, a seat (*āchanda ?*), a hymn, and a by-song (*upagāna*) from another text for the purpose of a sacrifice. It is because these latter are subsidiary to a विधि that they are collected from different texts; similarly because वेध, लक्ष्य, धनुः and शर are subsidiary to (the meditation on) Brahman, they are to be collected, or, in other words, the method of meditation on Brahman by resorting to Om is to be taken for the practice of meditation from all the Upniṣads.

10. तदुक्तम्—This seems to us to refer to Sūtra III. 3. 5. In that Sūtra the Sūtrakāra has given a general rule regarding उपसंहार or the collection of attributes, method of meditation, *etc.* In this Sūtra he states that a similar ' collection ' (उपसंहार) should be made in the case of वेधादि which is another method of meditation on Brahman. In Sūtra 5 the reason for the collection is stated to be अर्थाभेदात्; in the present Sūtra also the Sūtrakāra establishes अर्थाभेद in so far as he implicitly denies अर्थभेद (mentioned in the पूर्वपक्ष सूत्र) by the word तु and by giving the हेतु ' उपायनशब्दशेषत्व.' In Sūtra 5 he has given the example of विधिशेषs to which the example of कुशाछन्दस्तुत्युपगान in this Sūtra correspends. Thus, to us it appears that this Sūtra (26) refers to Sūtra 5 by the words ' It has been explained ' (तदुक्तम्).

11. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as forming an independent Adhikaraṇa and dealing with a question arising out of several Śrutis which mention the abandonment (हानि) of good and bad deeds of a knower of Brahman, or the assignment of these to those who are friendly or unfriendly to the knower of Brahman or which mention both of these options. Thus, according to Śaṅkara " हानौ " in the Sūtra does not mean " on the वेधादि being not mentioned or found missing " as suggested by us on the strength of the preceding Sūtra; but he takes it to mean " ब्रह्मज्ञानिनः सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः हानौ सत्याम्," thus changing the sense of हानौ, in a way not suggested by

the context at all. Moreover, we may point out that हानि or even the root 'हा' 'to abondon' does not occur in any one of the Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara as referred to by that word. 'तु' should mean the rejection of a पूर्वपक्ष, but Śaṅkara takes it in the sense of केवलायामपि (हानौ त्वेतस्यां केवलायामपि श्रूयमाणायाम्...). उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात् serves as a हेतु for हानौ उपसंहारः, as shown by us. Śaṅkara interprets that expression in such a way that 'उपायन' has to be construed twice (once as the assertion and again as the हेतु) though it is given only once in the Sūtra (हानौ तु...उपायनं, उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्). Śaṅkara refers 'उपायन' to 'उपयन्ति' in Kau. Upa. I. 4 and in one more Śruti. Thus, he explains उपायन as "ब्रह्मज्ञानिनः सुकृतदुष्कृतयोः विभागेन प्रियैरप्रियैः उपायनम् and he takes उपायनशब्दशेषत्व to mean "हानशब्दशेषः उपायनशब्दः समधिगतः कौषीतकिरहस्ये". And then he takes "तस्मादन्यत्र केवलहानशब्दश्रवणेऽप्युपायनानुवृत्तिः।" as understood. Moreover, Śaṅkara meets with another difficulty, because he refers उपायन to Kau. Upa. I. 4. The difficulty is as follows:— That Śruti says that "The dear relatives of the knower of Brahman get his religious merit, and those who are not dear to him get his demerit" (तस्य प्रियाः ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयन्त्यप्रिया दुष्कृतम्, and also another Śruti तस्य पुत्राः दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्तः पापकृत्याम्...). This doctrine is not consistent with commonsense and so a question may arise, "How is it that the Sūtrakāra asks us to add this irrational 'उपायन view' to passages where it is not mentioned?" Śaṅkara feels it necessary to give a reply to it and says that the Kau. Upa. text states only what is in fact a विद्यास्तुति. Then, one may ask, "Why does the Sūtrakāra include such a discussion in the गुणोपसंहार Pāda?" To this Śaṅkara says:—

उपायनशब्दशेषत्वादिति तु शब्दशब्दं समुच्चारयन् स्तुत्यर्थामेव हानावुपायनानुवृत्तिं सूचयति। गुणोपसंहारविवक्षायां ह्युपायनार्थस्यैव हानानुवृत्तिं ब्रूयात्। तस्माद्गुणोपसंहारविचारप्रसङ्गेन स्तुत्युपसंहारप्रदर्शनार्थमिदं सूत्रम्।. Thus, the result of taking उपायन as referring to उपयन्ति in Kau. Upa. I. 4 is that Śaṅkara is led to the position of making

this Sūtra an exception to the very purpose to which this Pāda is, according to him, devoted. The examples of कुश, आछन्द (कुशा and छन्दस् according to Śaṅkara), स्तुति and उपगान are not explained by Śaṅkara as those of materials to be taken from another text when any of them is missing in a particular text. But he says यथैतेषु कुशादिषु श्रुत्यन्तरगतविशेषान्वय एवं हानावप्युपायनान्वय इत्यर्थः। श्रुत्यन्तरगतं हि विशेषं श्रुत्यन्तरेऽनभ्युपगच्छतः सर्वत्रैव विकल्पः स्यात्। स चान्याय्यः सत्यां गतौ। तदुक्तं द्वादशलक्षण्याम्— 'अपि तु वाक्यशेषत्वादितरपर्युदासः स्यात्प्रतिषेधे विकल्पः स्यात्' इति। This last is Śaṅkara's explanation of तदुक्तम् in the Sūtra (26). To us it seems that तदुक्तम् in the Sūtra refers to Sūtra III. 3. 5 and we have tried to explain the Sūtra similarly. According to our interpretation तदुक्तम् wherever it occurs in the Brahmasūtra, seems to be a reference to what the Sūtrakāra himself has already said in the Sūtras which precede the particular Sūtra where तदुक्तम् occurs.

In the second explanation of this Sūtra which Śaṅkara himself offers, he admits that 'हानि' cannot be explained as विधूनन mentioned in his विषयवाक्यs, though he has taken a different view on this point in his first interpretation. In this second interpretation the विषयवाक्यs according to Śaṅkara are the same as in his first interpretation. 'हानौ' means हानौ एव एष विधूननशब्दो वर्तितुमर्हति। "उपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्" means नहि परपरिग्रहभूतयोः सुकृतदुष्कृतयोरप्रहीणयोः परैरुपायनं संभवति". The explanation of the remaining parts of the Sūtra is the same as in his first interpretation.

It should be pointed out that this Sūtra itself contains no reference to सुकृतदुष्कृत of the knower of Brahman, and that the explanation of this latter is given systematically by the Sūtrakāra himself in Bra. Sū. IV. I. 13–19, where almost all the Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara as referred to by this Sūtra have been fully discussed by the Sūtrakāra. Particular notice should be taken of the fact that Śaṅkara takes सुहृदःसाधुकृत्यां उपयन्ति

etc., as the विषयवाक्य of Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 17, though the fact does not seem to be the same (See our interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 17).

Sūtra 27

12. This Sūtra gives a हेतु (सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात्) and and refers to an authority for the same (तथा हि अन्ये). To us it seems that this हेतु is one more argument for "हानौ उपसंहारः" in the preceding Sūtra, so that this Sūtra forms part of the same Adhikaraṇa as does the previous Sūtra.

13. तथा ह्यन्ये—As the topic here is that of meditation on Brahman through the Syllable Om, "अन्ये" should refer to some Upaniṣad dealing with the same subject and particulary with the सांपराय (departure from this world or going to the life hereafter) of those who follow the path of प्रणवध्यान. Now, this method of meditation is mentioned in Kaṭha, Mu., Praśna, Māṇḍukya and other Upaniṣads. Out of these Upaniṣads, the Praśna Upaniṣad seems to discuss the question (सांपराये तर्तव्याभाव) referred to in the Sūtra, *viz.*, 'Whether the man practising the meditation of प्रणव has anything to cross (or to achieve, as Śaṅkara says) in his life hereafter or not. In Praśna Upaniṣad V. 7. we read ऋग्भिरेतं यजुर्भिरन्तरिक्षं स सामभिर्यत्तत्कवयो वेदयन्ते ॥ तमोंकारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं चेति ॥. By meditating on Brahman through the Syllable Om as one single Symbol without thinking of its constituent parts one reaches Brahman. Pra. Upa. V. 5. says that he who would meditate on the Para Puruṣa through this very Syllable *viz.*, Om as consisting of three parts, unites [on his leaving this world] with the light *viz.*, the Sun and, being free from sin just as a serpent is freed from its slough, he is carried on by the Sāmans to ब्रह्मलोक and he sees the पर पुरिशय पुरुष who is higher than this highest जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक (यः पुनरेतंत्रिमात्रेणोमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि सूर्ये संपन्नः ॥ यथा पादोरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यते एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात् परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते ॥ Pra. Upa. V. 5)

The Sūtrakāra holds that the knower of Brahman who has meditated on Brahman through the syllable Om has *not to achieve anything* after his departure from this world, but goes directly to Brahman (*Cf.* Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13–ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः ।).

14. Thus, "the absence of anything to be achieved" is a reason why the Sūtrakāra teaches an 'उपसंहार' of the details of the meditation of Praṇava. Meditation on Brahman (as identical with one's Self–आत्मगृहीति) does not leave anything further to be achieved in life after death; similarly meditation on Brahman as symbolised by Praṇava leaves nothing to be accomplished after the meditator's departure from the body (सांपराये) because he attains Brahman immediately. For this reason also it is that the Sūtrakāra asks us to collect (or collects himself) वेधादि from other texts where it is given.

In the above explanation of तर्तव्य in the Sūtra we have followed Śaṅkara who explains तर्तव्याभावात् as न किञ्चित्प्राप्तव्यमस्ति. (Can we explain तर्तव्य in its literal sense with reference to any other Śruti ?)

15. In the above interpretation, तर्तव्याभावात् is connected with सांपराये, thus सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् gives the हेतु. "तथाह्यन्ये" is interpreted to mean that there is nothing to be achieved in life after death by the meditator on प्रणव according to one Branch of the Veda; so that 'तथा ह्यन्ये' gives an authority for the हेतु. But Śaṅkara separates 'सांपराये' from 'तर्तव्याभावात्; 'सांपराये' means "सांपराये गमन एव देहादपसर्पणे इदं विद्यासामर्थ्यात्सुकृतदुष्कृतहानं भवति इति प्रतिजानीते ।" and then, Śaṅkara takes तर्तव्याभावात् as a हेतु for this प्रतिज्ञा. तर्तव्याभावात् means सुकृतदुष्कृताभ्यां प्राप्तव्यस्याभावात्. He gives no explanation why Kau. Upa. mentions सुकृतदुष्कृतहान later though it actually takes place earlier. Moreover, according to Śaṅkara, सांपराये तर्तव्याभावात् is a reply to a question regarding Kau. Upa. I. 4; while तथाह्यन्ये is a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 13. 1; thus according to Śaṅkara these two Śrutis are referred to by this Sūtra.

It should be noted that both the Śrutis which are understood by Śaṅkara as referred to by this Sūtra have been discussed, according to him, in the immediately preceding Adhikaraṇa, (since Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa with Sūtra 27). However, Śaṅkara discusses the question about *the time* of the destruction of सुकृत and दुष्कृत of a ज्ञानिन् in Bra. Sū. IV. I. 13–19 and therefore also it does not seem likely that he would discuss the same in this Sūtra (27). Moreover, Śaṅkara's interpretation of Sūtra 27 runs contrary to his own view. The पूर्वदुष्कृतविनाश (in the case of अनारब्धकार्य-दुष्कृतs) takes place on the very attainment of the knowledge of Brahman (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13) and not on his departure from the body, as he says under Sūtra 27; and according to Śaṅkara's interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 14, the अनारब्धकार्यपूर्व-सुकृतविनाश also takes place along with the दुष्कृत (though we do not agree with this interpretation. *Vide* our interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13–19).

SECTION VIII

Option regarding Choice of Aspect of Brahman.

Sūtras III. 3. 28-30

(२८) छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात् ।

(२९) गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः ।

(३०) उपपन्नस्तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेर्लोकवत् ।

TRANSLATION

ACCORDING to his wish [the meditator may choose either of the two aspects of Brahman] because both of them are not inconsistent [with each other]. 28

[Because] the liberation [which is mentioned in the Scripture on the attainment of either of the two] will have its meaning by both the ways [being accepted]; otherwise there will be an inconsistency [between the two]. 29

[The agreement of both these aspects of Brahman with the Scripture is] proper because we find (in the Scripture itself) a topic with such characteristics, just as it is seen in the world as well. 30

NOTES

Sūtra 28

1. In Sūtra 10, the Sūtrakāra says that the two *names* or *aspects* of Brahman are 'non-identical (अन्यत्र) while there is identity in all other respects'; and then he states that आनन्द and those that follow it are attributes of प्रधान the chief aspect of Brahman. After that he explained the method of meditation on Brahman (Sūtra 16–17). Now, the Sūtrakāra seems to say that any one of the two aspects of Brahman (प्रधान and पुरुष, अरूपवत् and रूपवत्) may be choosen by a meditator at his liking (छन्दतः), because both the aspects are mutually not inconsistent (उभयाविरोधात्).

2. 'उभय' refers to प्रधान and पुरुष, the two aspects of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra has throughout his work kept in view a difference between two aspects of Brahman. Compare Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10. इतरवत् in Sūtra III. 3. 16 refers to the पुरुष aspect, and thereby the meditation on both the aspects is dealt with in that Sūtra. In Sūtra III. 3. 23 the Sūtrakāra has expressed his opinion about the उपसंहार of the attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Śrauta texts other than Upaniṣads while in Sūtra III. 3. 24 he refers to the absence, in those texts, of the mention of the attributes of the Puruṣa described in the Upaniṣads. Also उभय in the next Sūtra (29) supports our view. Moreover, पूर्वविकल्पः in Sūtra III. 3. 45 as shown later on also refers to the विकल्प or option in this Sūtra (28).

3. उभयाविरोधात्—The Sūtrakāra seems to hold that Brahman has two aspects one of which is रूपवत् or पुरुष and the other अरूपवत् or प्रधान. It would seem that both these aspects are inconsistent with each other, being diametrically opposite in so far as one is *with form* while the other is *without form.* That which has form can never be consistent

with that which has no form. But the Sūtrakāra says that there is no inconsistency between the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. The reasons for this statement are given in Sūtra 29 and 30.

4. This Sūtra seems to state a new प्रतिज्ञा together with a हेतु, as we have shown above. We, therefore, propose to take it as the first Sūtra of a new Adhikaraṇa.

5. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra gives one more argument for the प्रतिज्ञा of Sūtra 27, *viz.*, सांपराये गमने एव देहादपसर्पणे इदं विद्यासामर्थ्यात्सुकृतदुष्कृतहानं भवतीति प्रतिजानीते (सूत्रकारः)।

In Śaṅkara's opinion the Sūtra answers a doubt that 'If the destruction of सुकृतदुष्कृत were admitted to take place *after* a portion of the journey on the देवयानमार्ग is finished, there would arise an impropriety of that destruction on account of the impossibility of making, according to one's desire, an effort (यमनियमविद्याभ्यासात्मकपुरुषप्रयत्न) for the attainment of that destruction due to the fall of the body before the journey is begun.' Thus, according to Śaṅkara, छन्दतः means "तस्मात् (*i. e.*, because of the above impropriety) पूर्वमेव साधकावस्थायां छन्दतोऽनुष्ठानं तस्य (= यमनियमविद्याभ्यासात्मकस्य सुकृतदुष्कृतक्षयहेतोः पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य) स्यात्।" and, in order to explain the connection of this Sūtra with the preceding one, he adds तत्पूर्वकं च सुकृतदुष्कृतहानमिति द्रष्टव्यम्। Thus, accoding to Śaṅkara's interpretation, *in fact* there is no option stated in the Sūtra, because the seeker *has got* to make a यमनियमविद्याभ्यासात्मकपुरुषप्रयत्न during the time that he is a seeker, since otherwise he is doomed to bondage. Then, Śaṅkara explains उभयाविरोधात् as एवं निमित्तनैमित्तिकयोः (= उभयोः of the Sūtra) उपपत्तिः (= अविरोध of the Sūtra). And, again, not being satisfied with the explanation he adds ताण्डिशाट्यायनिश्रुत्योश्च (= उभयोः of the Sūtra) संगतिः (= अविरोधः of the Sūtra) इति.

To us it seems that "उभय refers neither to (पुरुषप्रयत्न) निमित्तs and (सुकृतदुष्कृतक्षय) नैमित्तिक nor to ताण्डिन् and शाट्यायनिन्

श्रुति s but to the रूपवत् and अरूपवत् aspects of Brahman, which are distinguished *throughout* this Pāda (See Note 2 above).

Sūtra 29

6. 'उभयथा' in this Sūtra seems to us to refer to उभय in the preceding Sūtra and to be an argument for उभयाविरोधात् in the same Sūtra. We, therefore, take this Sūtra and the preceding one as parts of the same Adhikaraṇa.

7. गति—The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to the गति or मोक्ष (mentioned in the Scripture) of those who follow the अरूपवत् and also of those who follow the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman. Several passages of the Upaniṣads say that one attains absolution by knowing the अरूपवत् *e. g.*, अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं तथाऽरसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत्। अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥ (Kaṭha Upa. III. 15), and अस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते। (Chā. Upa. VIII. 3. 4). There are other sentences which teach that पुरुष is the highest goal; *e. g.*, पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः (Kaṭha Upa. III. II); तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् (Mū. Upa. III. 2. 8).

The word 'गति' is used by the Sūtrakāra in the sense of absolution or मोक्ष in other Sūtras also, *e. g.*, in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 16, I. 3. 15 (where Śaṅkara also explains it in that sense), *etc.*

8. गतेरर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा—The Sūtrakāra seems to say that the गति or the liberation mentioned in these Śrutis will "*have a meaning*" *i. e.*, they will be reasonably explained, only if a seeker can attain liberation in either of the two ways, by pursuing the अरूपवत् *or* the रूपवत्. The liberation will be real liberation if it can be achieved in either way; and, therefore, we must say that there is no inconsistency between the two aspects of Brahman. If the way of liberation were the knowledge of the अरूपवत् only, then a विरोध between the two aspects is sure to arise here.

9. अन्यथा विरोधः — Because मोक्ष is really achieved in either of the two ways, there is no conflict between the two aspects of Brahman. We should not imagine that because one aspect is *with form* and the other is *without form*, there is a conflict between the two. Rather there is no conflict because मोक्ष or realization of Brahman through the pursuit of the अरूपवत् is as true or real in its sense as the same through the pursuit of रूपवत् or पुरुष. If मोक्ष in its true sense were achieved by pursuing the अरूपवत् aspect only and not by pursuing the other alternative aspect, or if it were *vice versa*, there sould be a conflict between the two.

Meditation on Brahman results in real मोक्ष and that upon इन्द्रादिदेवs does not; therefore there is a conflict between the two. This conflict arises from the difference between the results of the two pursuits. The Sūtrakāra says that such is not the case with meditation on प्रधान and that on पुरुष; and therefore there is no inconsistency at all between the two aspects. If two things or aspects of a thing of a principle really give the same result, an option of selection may be given between the two, irrespective of the individual nature of the two aspects.

10. उभयथा — The particle उभयथा connects this Sūtra with the preceding Sūtra as shown in Note 6 above. Śaṅkara does not connect उभयथा in this Sūtra with उभय in the preceding Sūtra. He begins a new Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra.

गति — Śaṅkara takes this word in the sense of a path, *viz.*, "देवयानः पन्थाः". According to him the Sūtra answers the question whether the देवयान path begins immediately on the destruction of good and bad deeds of a man or not (whether there is an option). As to why such a question should at all arise, Śaṅkara quotes no Śruti suggesting such a doubt; but he gives a simile *viz.*, यथा तावद्धानावविशेषेणैवोपायनानुवृत्तिरुक्तैवं देवयानानुवृत्तिरपि भवितुमर्हतीत्यस्यां प्राप्तावाचक्ष्महे। To us it appears that there is no real ground for such a पूर्वपक्ष, not only because there is no

Śruti suggesting it, but also because the Sūtrakāra makes a definite statement that on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman sins and merits, as Śaṅkara says, do not touch the knower (Bra. Sū. IV 1. 13–19). Moreover, Śaṅkara's explanation of अर्थवत्त्वम् is hardly satisfactory because he interprets it by implication as also अनर्थवत्त्व by construing उभयथा in a very strange way (गतेः देवयानस्य पथोऽर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा विभागेन भवितुमर्हति क्वचिदर्थवती गतिः क्वचिन्नेति; नाविशेषेण). If गति is sometimes " न अर्थवती " how can we say that गति is अर्थवती both the ways " (उभयथा) " ? In fact he interprets गति in this Sūtra in two ways, *viz.*, देवयानः पन्थाः and " attainment " (as in साम्यमुपैति), and this seems to create a confusion. अन्यथा means according to him, ' If the गति be accepted without a specification '. And ' विरोध ' in the Sūtras is explained to be a विरोध between the देवयानमार्गप्रापणी गति and the attainment or गति mentioned in such a Śruti as पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति (Mu. Upa. III. 1. 3).

In fact, the question whether the use of the word ' गति ' in such sentences as mention the *attainment* of Brahman is justifiable or not is discussed in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7–14 (कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7). So the answer that गति is अनर्थिका in such sentences as पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति is not likely to have been stated by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra.

Sūtra 30

11. As Sūtra 29 is connected with Sūtra 28, in the way we have shown above, Sūtra 30 is necessarily to be taken as connected with Sūtra 28. ' उपपन्न ' is a masculine form and it does not seem possible that it is used to qualify गतेरर्थवत्त्वम् which is a neuter form (See Śaṅkara who says ' उपपन्नश्चायमुभयथाभावः क्वचिदर्थवती गतिः क्वचिन्नेति). " उभयाविरोधः (उपपन्नः) " seems to us to be the context of ' उपपन्नः ' in the Sūtra. Perhaps we can construe also in another way, *viz.*, अयं विकल्पः उपपन्नः । We make the suggestion because the expression

पूर्वविकल्पः in Sūtra III. 3. 45 appears to us to be a reference to the option given in Sūtra 28. However, we shall proceed by accepting the former construction (उभयाविरोधः उपपन्नः).

12. उपपन्नः—The mutual consistency of both the aspects of Brahman on the strength of which an option is given to the seeker is quite proper (उपपन्नः).

13. तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धेः — The Sūtrakāra gives a reason why the अविरोध mentioned in Sūtra 28 is proper. He says that there is no mutual विरोध between the two aspects of Brahman, because " we find in the Scripture (उपलब्धि) an object, *viz.*, Brahman which has that characteristic ". According to the Sūtrakāra the justification for the option he gives in Sūtra 28 is that we actually find that the Scriptures teach Brahman which has two aspects, by pursuing either of which we can realize it (तल्लक्षण - as described in Sūtra 29). The Sūtrakāra seems to grant that there is *an apparent inconsistency* between the two aspects of Brahman in so far as one has no form while the other has a form. But he says that since *we find in the Scriptural statements* Brahman which has two such apparently conflicting aspects each of which leads to liberation or its realization in its true sense, we have to admit that *there is no real inconsistency between the two aspects* and that therefore a seeker may be allowed to choose one of the two as he likes.

The Sūtrakāra's attitude here is similar to his attitude regarding the question whether Brahman which is impartite changes itself into the form of the world or not (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 26-27). There he asserts that Brahman is impartite and yet undergoes a change, remaining partly changeless and there is no inconsistency in this doctrine *because the Śruti mentions it.*

14. उपलब्धि — The Sūtrakāra seems to use this word in the sense of a statement *found in the Śruti.* It is explained similarly by Śaṅkara in Bra. Sū I. 3. 16, III. 1. 18 *etc. Cf.* also उपलभ्यते in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 16.

15. लोकवत्—The Sūtrakāra seems to have in his view an example like that of a village with two ways of approach to it, one from the *east* and the other from the *west*. Both of these roads, though opposite each other, are not really inconsistent, because a traveller may select any of the two at his desire and yet is sure to reach the village. Such is the case with the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman.

16. Śaṅkara has made an independent Adhikaraṇa out of Sūtras 29-30. Therefore, in order to explain the masculine form of उपपन्नः which cannot be grammatically construed with गतेः अर्थवत्त्वमुभयथा, he says उपपन्नश्चायमुभयथा भावः क्वचिदर्थवती गतिः क्वचिन्नेति. To us it appears that उपपन्नः means उभयाविरोधः (or छन्दतः विकल्पः) उपपन्नः (Sūtra 28). As a rule the words in a Sūtra should be construed with some words in that Sūtra or in the preceding Sūtras, rather than with a word taken as understood. तल्लक्षण अर्थ should according to Śaṅkara mean an object having the characteristic of sometimes real गति and sometimes गतिः understood metaphorically; but Śaṅkara could not construe it like that and therefore he says, " गतिकारणभूतो ह्यर्थः पर्यङ्कविद्यादिषु सगुणेषूपासनेषूपलयभ्ते । "... and then regarding an objecet having no real गति, he says, न हि सम्यग्दर्शने तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धिरस्ति. To us it seems that तल्लक्षणार्थोपलब्धि should mean the finding, in the Śruti, of an object having the *two-fold characteristic* mentioned in Sūtras 28-29. Śaṅkara explains लोकवच्च by taking *two* examples of ग्रामप्राप्ति and आरोग्यप्राप्ति.

Śaṅkara, however, realizes, that in fact, the question of the possibility or impossibility of *going* to Brahman is discussed in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7-14 (or rather 15), and therefore he adds भूयश्चैनं विभागं चतुर्थाध्याये निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः । There are several cases wherein according to Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtras, the treatment of his subject by the Sūtrakāra is shown to be overlapping But to us it does not seem to be so (See Chapter X of Vol. II,).

SECTION IX

Attributes necessary for Meditation.

Sūtras III. 3. 31–33

(३१) अनियमः सर्वासामविरोधः शब्दानुमानाभ्याम् ।

(३२) यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ।

(३३) अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् ।

TRANSLATION

NOWHERE [is] the rule [found for the employing] of *all* [the attributes belonging to either of the two aspects for the purpose of meditation]; [but] there is no inconsistency of them all with Śruti and Smṛti. 31

[The meditation on the attributes of Brahman] connected with official duties [at a sacrifice] should be continued (*avasthiti*) as long as the office lasts. 32

But the attributes of Akṣara are to be confined [to their respective Śrutis] on account of the sameness [of their purpose] and on account of [the soul] being [what] those [attributes imply], as in the case of *aupasada*; this has already been explained. 33

NOTES

Sūtra 31

1. The preceding Adhikaraṇa gives an option to a seeker to choose either of the अरूपवत् and रूपवत् aspects of Brahman. This Adhikaraṇa seems to us to discuss the question *how many* attributes (or 'thoughts') out of those mentioned by the Śruti and collected by the the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3 are to be used in the meditation on either of the two aspects.

2. सर्वासाम् seems to us to be connected with धियाम् taken as understood which is suggested by धियाम् in अक्षरधियाम् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 33.

3. अनियमः सर्वासाम्—There is no rule that *all* the attributes of अरूपवत् or रूपवत् aspect of Brahman should be used in the meditation on either. In other words, it is not necessary that a meditator should meditate on *all* the attributes of Brahman collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3 from the Śruti.

4. अविरोधः *i. e.* सर्वासां धियामविरोधः—If a meditator chooses to meditate on *all* the attributes of Brahman, there is no objection because *all* the attributes are consistent with Śruti and Smṛti, being themselves collected on the strength of their being mentioned in either of the two or both. The attributes on which a meditator is to meditate are those sanctioned by Śruti and Smṛti and therefore their use for meditation is also sanctioned by the Scripture; so they are collected in harmony with the Scripture. For this reason *all* the attributes or *as many as one would choose to use*, may be used in meditation.

5. शब्दानुमानाभ्याम—The words प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान have been used in the Sūtras in the sense of Śruti and Smṛti, *e. g.*,

Bra. Sū. I. 3. 28, III. 2. 24 *etc.* So, the word 'शब्द' in this Sūtra would mean प्रत्यक्ष or Śruti as the word अनुमान would mean Smṛti.

5*a*. This Sūtra gives an option about the number of attributes for meditation on Brahman *itself* while Sūtra III. 3. 57 seems to give an option about attributes to be used in the meditation on Brahman imagined as consisting of parts (अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः).

6. According to Śaṅkara the topic of this Sūtra is a question whether the गति mentioned in the Śruti in the case of certain सगुणविद्याs should be extended to other सगुणविद्याs in which no गति is mentioned. According to Śaṅkara सर्वासाम् in the Sūtra is not connected with धियाम् as is done by us by a hint from Sūtra 33, but he explains it as सर्वासामभ्युदय—प्राप्तिफलानां सगुणानां विद्यानाम्; he takes अनियमः (absence of rule) in the sense of 'अविशेषेण' and then adds 'एषा देवयानाख्या गतिर्भवितुमर्हति। Thus he explains अनियमः सर्वासाम् as 'सर्वासां सगुणानां विद्यानामविशेषेण एषा देवयानाख्या गतिर्भवितुमर्हति।

It seems to us that the question of गति is not at all discussed in this Pāda; it occurs in Sūtra IV. 3. 7–14. Śaṅkara knows this (*Cf.* भूयश्चैनं विभागं चतुर्थाध्याये निपुणतरमुपपादयिष्यामः—*Śā. Bhāṣya* on Bra. Sūtra III. 3. 30). गति is naturally a topic proper for discussion in the फलाध्याय. According to the context, सर्वासाम् should be connected with धियाम् instead of सगुणानां विद्यानाम्. Moreover अनियमः (absence of a rule) cannot literally mean अविशेषण 'without any distinction !

The sense of विरोध in अविरोध is modified by Śaṅkara by interpreting it as 'प्रकरणविरोध' and then he interprets "शब्दानुमानाभ्याम्" as हेतु for प्रकरणाविरोध. As शब्द or श्रुति he quotes Chā. Upa. V. 10. 1. and tries to interpret that Śruti as referring to *all* सगुणविद्याs instead of to पञ्चाग्निविद्या and श्रद्धा and तपः to which only that Śruti really refers or instead of referring to all (सगुण and निर्गुण) विद्याs as distinguished from

the religion of इष्टापूर्त and दत्त (See Bra. Sū. III. 1. 7, IV. 2. 17). As Smṛti or Anumāna Śaṅkara refers to Bhagavadgītā VIII. 26. But this Smṛti does not at all state that it refers to *all* the सगुणविद्याs; not only so but the Sūtrakāra himself regards this verse as a Smārta rule about the fate of the Yogins who know Brahman and to be in disagreement with the Chā. Upa. Śruti in question; so, according to Sūtra IV. 2. 21 Śaṅkara is not justified in holding that Chā. Upa. V. 10. 1 and Gītā VIII. 26 teach the same doctrine. Thus, neither the Śruti nor the Smṛti seems to justify Śaṅkara's interpretation of सर्वासाम् aa सर्वासां सगुणविद्यानाम्.

(6a). It should also be noticed here that Śaṅkara connects this Sūtra with Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 15 and says that the latter makes an exception to the general rule stated in this Sūtra. This connection also makes his interpretation of Sūtra III. 3. 31 doubtful.

Sūtra 32

7. As इतरेषाम् in Sūtra 24 above means इतरेषां गुणानाम्, it seems to us that आधिकारिकाणाम् in Sūtra 32, means आधिकारिकाणां गुणानाम्. Though the word धियाम् occurs in Sūtra 33 and seems to be referred to by सर्वासाम् in Sūtra 31, we may take गुणानाम् as understood with आधिकारिकाणाम् because गुण and धी are more or less used here as synonyms. If we are not willing to make such a concession about the terminology of the Sūtrakāra, we may adopt Rāmānuja's reading according to which Sūtra 32 preceds Sūtra 31. But it does not seem to us necessary to do so. *Cf.* इतरे in III. 3. 13 which is referred to not by a masculine word (*e. g.* गुणाः) but by धियाम् (Fem.) in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 33.

8. It seems to us that in Sūtras 31–33 the Sūtrakāra discusses three types of attributes; Sūtra 31 deals with attributes or thoughts which belong to Brahman and most of which have been collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I. 1–3.

There are other attributes or thoughts which belong to अक्षर the Immutable; these are dealt with in Sūtra 33. There is a third type of attributes or thoughts of Brahman which belong to the official duties or which are useful to officiating priests (आधिकारिकाणाम्). These seem to have been dealt with in Sūtra 32.

9. This Sūtra seems to tell us how long the attributes of Brahman which refer to कर्माङ्ग 'parts of the rites' should be meditated upon.

10. अधिकार in this Sūtra means the duties of the office (priestly or professional). In Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41 the Sūtrakāra tells us that one who has entered the stage of renunciation (संन्यास) should also not perform the official or professional duties (न च आधिकारिकमपि कर्म) because those duties do not concern him on account of the Smṛti about the possibility of his moral fall (if he performs them). Sūtra III. 4. 43 allows a man who is *outside* the stage of an ascetic, and who seeks Brahman and liberation, to do both his official and also "secondary" duties (बहिस्तूभयथाऽपि) on the strength of Smṛti and practice (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 43). In Bra. Sū. III. 4. 44-46 we have a discussion as to what official duties are allowed to a seeker of liberation. Thus, आधिकारिक duties were allowed to a गृहस्थ मुमुक्षु, and not to an ascetic.

11. आधिकारिकाणाम् — With this word we should take as understood some word of a masculine or neuter gender having the sense of 'धी' which is implied by सर्वासाम् in III. 3. 31 and which is mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 33. We believe we may take "either गुणानाम् or उपासनानाम्" as understood. The attributes of or the meditations on Brahman which pertain to the official duties are discussed here (*Cf.* the use of the word आधिकारिक in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41).

There are several meditations on Brahman, connected with the official duties of a Brāhmaṇa *i. e.* with the priestly

duties, discusssd in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 44-46. Examples of this kind of meditations or attributes of Brahman are (*a*) अथ य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते सैवर्क्तत्साम तदुक्थं तद्यजुस्तद्ब्रह्म तस्यैतस्य तदेव रूपं यदमुष्य रूपं यावमुष्य गेष्णौ तौ गेष्णौ यन्नाम तन्नाम। (Chā. Upa. I. 7. 5-9). (*b*) अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाच सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्त आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्त्याकाशो ह्येवैभ्यो ज्यायानाकाशः परायणम् ॥ १ ॥ स एष परोवरीयानुद्गीथः स एषोऽनन्तः परोवरीयो हास्य भवति परोवरीयसो ह लोकाञ्जयति य एतदेवं विद्वान्परोवरीयांसमुद्गीथमुपास्ते ॥ २ ॥ (Chā. Upa. I. 9. 1-2.); (*c*) अथ हैनं प्रस्तोतोपससाद प्रस्तोतर्या देवता प्रस्तावमन्वायत्ता तां चेदविद्वान्प्रस्तोष्यसि मूर्धा ते विपतिष्यतीति मा भगवानोवाच कतमा सा देवतेति ॥ ४ ॥ प्राण इति होवाच सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राणमेवाभिसंविशन्ति प्राणमभ्युज्जिहते सैषा देवता प्रस्तावमन्वायत्ता तां चेदविद्वान् प्रास्तोष्यो मूर्धा ते व्यपतिष्यत्तथोक्तस्य मयेति ॥ ५ ॥ (Chā. Upa. I. 11. 4-5) In Bra. Sū. 1. 2. 13, I. 1. 22, I. 1. 23, it has been decided that the above Śrutis mention Brahman under the names of अन्तरक्षिणि पुरुष, आकाश, and प्राण. But these Śrutis in their original place are connected with some rites or priestly duties, the official duties of a Brahman.

The present Sūtra (III. 3. 32) tells us how long these meditations on Brahman associated with priestly duties are to be kept on (आधिकारिकाणामवस्थितिः).

12. यावदधिकारम्—This gives us the limit of the period of continuing the ब्रह्मोपासनs or meditations on the attributes of Brahman connected with the priestly duties (अधिकार). A seeker of Brahman can perform his official duties as long as he has not renounced the world and may perform them even after renunciation if he is in the danger of losing life (See Bra. Sū. III. 4. 43, and 42). During this period of the parformance of official duties, the meditations on Brahman connected with them should be continued.

13. According to Saṅkara this Sūtra discusses the question " विदुषो वर्तमानदेहपातानन्तरं देहान्तरमुत्पद्यते न वा ".

It should be pointed out that this question has nothing to do with the so-called गुणोपसंहार which Śaṅkara believes to be the purpose of this Pāda. Moreover, this is not a proper place in the Brahmasūtras if at all the Sūtrakāra wanted to discuss that question. According to Śaṅkara, the देहपात of the knower of Brahman is described in Bra. Sū. IV. 1 and therefore the question of a further incarnation in the case of one who knows Brahman would at the earliest be discussed after Bra. Sū. IV. 1.†

"आधिकारिक" according to Śaṅkara means one who himself is ईश्वर (almost God-like) but is appointed by परमेश्वर to various offices; अवस्थिति means "सत्यपि सम्यग्दर्शने कैवल्यहेतौ अक्षीणकर्माणोऽवतिष्ठन्ते" "continuing to live with one's deeds unexhausted though they have attained right knowledge which is the means of absolution." 'यावदधिकारम्' means 'till the appointment lasts' (*Cf.* Bra. Sū. I. 3. 26–33). Śaṅkara also quotes several Śrutis and Smṛtis showing that *karmas* come to an end on the achievement of the knowledge of Brahman and that आरब्धकर्म comes to an end only after giving its fruit to the agent just as a discharged arrow stops only after its speed is exhausted. But the fact that the Sūtrakāra considers this same point in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13–19 shows that the topic of this Sūtra (32) is not what Śaṅkara thinks it to be.

Sūtra 33

14. तु — This word rejects a पूर्वपक्ष according to which

† Or rather the question of the invariable attainment of मुक्ति (as a consequence of ज्ञान which would put a stop to further incarnations) is discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 52 which seems to say that there is no rule about the attainment of the fruit in the form of liberation or the fruit of liberation (*viz.,* approach to Brahman and company of Brahman), because the Scripture definitely mentions (अवधृति) those who have reached the stage of the knowledge of Brahman. (See also Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1–2.)

'the thoughts' on अक्षर are also required to be included in the meditation on either of the two aspects of Brahman.

15. अक्षरधियाम्—Śaṅkara is right in quoting Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8. अक्षरधीs are the negative thoughts like अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वमदीर्घम् *etc.*, which describe the अक्षर and show that the Brahman is immutable.

16. 'अवरोध' means restraint, confinement, fence, barrier *etc.* The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that the thoughts on अक्षर are to be confined to where they are in the Śruti literature; they are not to be collected for the purpose of meditation. अवरोध is thus the opposite of उपसंहार in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5.

17. सामान्य and तद्भाव are two reasons why 'the thoughts on अक्षर' should not be collected or have not been collected by the Sūtrakāra in his work. The first reason is सामान्य, which seems to us to mean the common nature or common characteristic of the thoughts of the Immutable, *viz.*, the fact that all of these thoughts serve the same purpose of denying any phenomenal attribute of Brahman and consequently proving that Brahman is formless (निराकार, अरूपवत्). All these attributes have a common meaning or a common purpose (अर्थसामान्य — in Sūtra III. 3. 13). And, therefore, it is not necessary to collect them from the various texts. All the attributes that the Sūtrakāra has collected in Bra. Sū. I. 1–3 have each of them a *different meaning* and therefore they are useful. But such is not the case with the attributes of अक्षर.

18. तद्भाव — 'Being that.' This seems to mean that the individual soul itself is (immutable or) the same as अक्षर is described to be. The individual soul is already अस्थूल, अनणु, अह्रस्व *etc.* The purpose of meditation by the method of आत्मगृहीति is to transform the individual soul and make manifest in himself those गुणs of Brahman on which he meditates. As the individual soul *is* already अस्थूल, अनणु, अह्रस्व, *etc.*, (तद्भाव), there is no need of meditating on those गुणs. Thus,

the fact of the soul's being अनणु, अह्रस्व, अस्थूल, *etc.*, is the reason, why the Sūtrakāra does not favour उपसंहार or collection of the same attributes of अक्षर†

19. "औपसद" seems to be a minor sacrifice which includes some minor rites common to another major sacrifice; and though औपसद is required to be included in the major sacrifice, yet no such inclusion is carried out on the ground that the major sacrifice already includes those minor features. This, however, is a mere conjecture. But the example of औपसद seems to be interpreted by the Sūtrakāra as somewhat similar to that suggested by us.

20. तदुक्तम्—This phrase, wherever it occurs in the Brahmasūtra, is an important one, because on it depends the right interpretation of some of these Sūtras. To us it appears that तदुक्तम् in the present case is a reference to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 13–15. As we have already suggested above, सामान्यात् in Sūtra 33 corresponds to अर्थसामान्यात् in Sūtra III. 3. 13. तद्भाव "being the same" *seems* to be the summary of the arguments in Sūtra III. 3. 14–15 (compare the explanation of तद्भाव given above with the explanation of Sūtras 14–15 already given under those Sūtras). अवरोध corresponds to 'अप्राप्ति' taken as understood in Sūtra 13 on the strength of its occurence in Sūtra 12. इतरे in Sūtra 13 is interpreted as thoughts on अक्षर because आनन्दादयः which would mean the attributes collected in Bra. Sū. I. 1 and प्रियशिरस्त्वादयः are mentioned respectively in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11 and 12, so

† The interpretation of तद्भाव offered above is however tentative. It is a conjecture drawn from the argument आत्मशब्दात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 15. Perhaps 'तद्भाव' may refer to the fact that the meditator on the अरूपवत् aspect as well as the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman already understood the object of meditation as not having a physical रूप and therefore there is no necessity of meditating on either aspect as अस्थूल, अनणु, *etc.* This second suggestion is made in accordance with आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 14.). In this case 'तद्भावात्' means तस्य (उपास्यस्य) भावात् तद्भावात् (अस्थूलादिभावात्).

that only अस्थूलत्वादयः seem to remain to be mentioned in Sūtra III. 3. 13. Because of these identical and similar expressions and meanings in Sūtra 33 on the one hand and in Sūtras 13–15 on the other hand, it seems to us to be very probable that तदुक्तम् in Sūtra 33 refers to Sūtras 13–15. If this suggestion of ours be correct, we have in Sūtra 33 ample evidence for our interpretation of Sūtras 13–15.

21 Śaṅkara is right in saying that अक्षरधियाम् refers to such Śrutis as Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8. According to him, however, the question discussed in this Sūtra is whether all the thoughts on अक्षर are to be collected and *added to all the* अक्षर Śrutis or not. This does not seem to us to be the case; rather, the topic here is what attributes are to be collected for meditation on Brahman, and what are not.

This Sūtra seems to mention these latter, the former having been stated in Sūtras 31–32. अवरोध means obstruction, restraint, confinement, blockade, fence, blocking up where they occur. But Śaṅkara explains the word in the Sūtra as follows :– अक्षरविषयास्तु विशेषप्रतिषेधबुद्धयः सर्वाः सर्वत्रावरोद्धव्याः। Thus, by adding सर्वत्र he altogether changes the sense of अवरोध; and instead of 'obstruction' or 'restraint' the word comes to mean acceptance and admission *everywhere*. This way of adding words to such an extent that the original sense is altogether changed seems to us to be very dangerous. सामान्य which means a common characteristic is explained by Śaṅkara as समानो हि सर्वत्र विशेषनिराकरणरूपो ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनप्रकारः।. This is rather the very reason on account of which the Sūtrakāra *confines* these attributes to where they occur and thereby shows his unwillingness to collect them for meditation either on the अरूपवत् aspect (Sūtra 13–15) or on Brahman in general (Sūtra 33, *i.e.*, the रूपवत् aspect as well). It is the सामान्य of one 'thought' (अस्थूलम्) with other 'thoughts' (अनणु, अह्रस्व, *etc.*) which, it seems to us, is meant here. (*Cf.* अर्थसामान्य in Sūtra III. 3. 13). तद्भाव is interpreted by Śaṅkara as

" तदेव च सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्यं ब्रह्माभिन्नं प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । ". We think, by तद्भाव the Sūtrakāra refers to the fact that the soul is already अस्थूल *etc.*, like the Akṣara.

There is a mention of attributes in Sūtras 11–15, and again a statement of attributes occurs in these Sūtras (31–33). The purpose of Sūtras 11–15 is to state what attributes are to be taken in the meditation on the प्रधान aspect of Brahman; while Sūtras 31–33 aim at explaining *how many* attributes should be included in the meditation on both the aspects of Brahman (See Sūtras 28–30). But in so doing the Sūtrakāra also mentions (in Sūtras 32–33) which attributes are to be taken temporarily and which should be confined where they are. Sūtra 33 repeats briefly the statement of Sūtras 13–15, because that latter statement was made only for the meditation on the प्रधान; while it was not made for the रूपवत् aspect also. This latter incompleteness of statement has been removed by Sūtra 33. Thus, Śaṅkara's remarks that this repetation of the consideration of attributes is for the purpose of giving details only, are not correct (तथा च आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य इत्यत्र व्याख्यातम् । ...प्रपञ्चार्थश्च चिन्ताभेदः । तत्र विधिरूपाणि विशेषणानि चिन्तितानि इह प्रतिषेधरूपाणि इति विशेषः ।); because Sūtra 33 rather *briefly* refers to Sūtra 13–15. His remarks, however, are based upon his interpretation of both these groups of Sūtras (11–15, 33). To us they seem to support the explanations that we have offered for these Sūtras (31–33). Śaṅkara takes तदुक्तम् as referring to Jai. Sū. III. 3. 8. We have already stated above the reasons why तदुक्तम् in this Sūtra seems to us to refer to Sūtras 13–15 of this Pāda.

SECTION X

Inward Method of Meditation.

Sūtras III. 3. 34-36

(३४-३५) इयदामननादन्तरा " भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः " ।
(३६) अन्यथाऽभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशान्तरवत् ।

TRANSLATION

ON account of the Śruti's mention [of Brahman as being] ' of this much size ', [Brahman should be meditated upon] inwardly in one's own self, just as [is done] in the case of the group of elements. 34-35

If it be argued: " [Meditation is to be practised inwardly in one's self, because] otherwise there would be no explanation of the identity [of the meditator with the meditated], we reply " No ". [The inward meditation] is like [the one suggested] in another precept [about inward realization]. 36

NOTES

Sūtra 34–35

1. To us it seems that originally Sūtras 34 and 35 formed one single Sūtra, because, as we shall explain below, इयदामननात् (Sūtra 34 according to Śaṅkara's Pāṭha) gives the reason for ' अन्तरा ' in Sūtra 35, and does not therefore seem to us to be an independent argument or an independent Adhikaraṇa

2. इयदामननात् — This undoubtedly refers to a Śruti in which परमात्मन् is said to be ' of this much size ' *i. e.,* of a small size. So, probably, इयदामननात् refers to some Śruti like Kaṭha Upa. IV. 12–13 *viz.,*

अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति ।
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य न ततो विजगुप्सत एतद्वै तत् ॥ १२ ॥
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषो ज्योतिरिवाधूमकः ॥
ईशानो भूतभव्यस्य स एवाद्य स उ श्व एतद्वै तत् ॥ १३ ॥

In Bra. Sū. 1. 3. 24 (शब्दादेव प्रमितः), the Sūtrakāra has discussed this Śruti and has come to the conclusion that पुरुष mentioned here is परमात्मन्. Because परमात्मन् is said to be ' of a small size, ' and, as the same Śruti says, resides in the heart, He should be meditated upon in one's own self. " मध्ये आत्मनि " of the Śruti corresponds to " अन्तरा स्वात्मनः " of the Sūtra. This seems to us to be the argument of the Sūtrakāra in these Sūtras (34–35) for meditating upon the Supreme Being as present in one's own self. In Bra. Sū. I. 2. 7 and I. 3. 21 respectively पुरुष and प्रधान are said to be ' of the size of the heart ' because they are to be meditated upon as such, as being in the heart अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च । — Bra. Sū. I. 2. 7; अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् – Bra. Sū. I. 3. 21).

3. भूतग्रामवत् — The भूतग्रामs reside in the body. This is made very clear from the following verse:—

कर्षयन्तः शरीरस्थं भूतग्राममचेतसः ।
मां चैवान्तः शरीरस्थं तान्विद्ध्यासुरनिश्चयान् ॥ Bha. Gī. XVII. 6.

Thus, भूतग्राम means the number of small beings that reside in the human body. Similarly, the Supreme Being also resides in the body and is to be meditated upon in the body or within the self of the meditator. The point of comparison is not the meditation but only residence in the body. (*Cf.* also भूतानि यान्ति भूतेज्याः, which shows that भूतs were also worshipped MBh. XII. 236. 14-24 where the meditation on the Elements is mentioned.

4. Sūtra 34 has been taken as an independent Adhikaraṇa by Śaṅkara, but this expression (इयदामननात्) is only the statement of a हेतु and nothing is said therein regarding the conclusion. So, it is not likely that by itself it could form an Adhikaraṇa. As we have shown above, इयदामननात् can be well connected with Sūtra 35 as a हेतु, and, therefore, it seems to us that if इयदामननात् preceded अन्तराभूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः, इयदामननात् should not be an independent Sūtra, but should form part of Sūtra 35. If, however, इयदामननात् followed अन्तरा-भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः, इयदामननात् could be an independent Sūtra; in this case "अन्तरा भूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनः" would be Sūtra 34 and इयदामननात् would be Sūtra 35.

According to Śaṅkara, 'इयदामननात्' discusses a question whether Mu. Upa. III. 1. 1 and Kaṭha Upa. III. 1 teach the same विद्या or two different विद्याs. But, it should be pointed out that in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 11 and I. 3. 7 respectively the Sūtrakāra has discussed both these Śrutis (Ka. Upa. III. 1 and Mu. Upa. III. 1. 1), and in each case it is concluded that each verse mentions the Supreme Being and the individual soul. So, really, there is no reason why these two Śrutis be discussed once again. Śaṅkara himself is aware of this unnecessary repetition involved in his interpretation of this Sūtra ("गुहां प्रविष्टावात्मानौ हि"—ब्र. सू. १।२।२२ — इत्यत्र चैतत्प्रपञ्चितम्). So indirectly it had been proved in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 11 and I. 3. 7 that the same विद्या is taught in these verses. इयदामननात् does not

clearly refer to *two* Śrutis or to *two* souls; all that it can imply is that in the Śruti the Supreme Being is said to be of a small size. But Śaṅkara takes 'इयत्' in the sense of 'two' and explains the Sūtra as follows :- यत उभयोरप्यनयोर्मन्त्रयोरियत्तापरिच्छिन्नं द्वित्वोपेतं वेद्यरूपमभिन्नमामनन्ति ।"

5. According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 35 begins a new Adhikaraṇa and discusses the question whether Bṛ. Upa. III. 4. 1 and III. 5. 1 teach the same विद्या or different विद्याs. The reason for this doubt is stated by Śaṅkara to be "repetition" of the same statement. A glance at the two texts will show that both of them teach the same topic, which is repeated *verbatim* in both the passages; therefore there was no reason for such a doubt as is raised by Śaṅkara. It should be stated here that in this Sūtra Śaṅkara raises a पूर्वपक्ष because the same topic is repeated in the texts concerned, while in the preceding Sūtra he raises a doubt because different things are mentioned in the texts concerned (विशेषदर्शनात्). Thus, it would seem as if a doubt may be raised on any account, or that mere reproduction of the same words in different texts or mere difference in some texts should be taken as a sufficient ground for raising a doubt.

Moreover, not a single word in the Sūtra suggests a reference to the विषयवाक्यs of Śaṅkara. The words स्वात्मनः अन्तरा mean inside one's self or inside one's body; it does not mean 'सर्वान्तरः' and therefore it cannot be taken as a reference to 'सर्वान्तरः' in Śaṅkara's विषयवाक्य. Moreover, 'स्वात्मनः अन्तरा' should not be modified into "अन्तराम्नानविशेषात्स्वात्मनो विद्यैकत्वम्". There is no word in the Sūtra for आम्नान and अविशेष added by Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara gives two explanations for भूतग्रामवत् in the Sūtra (35). (1) एकस्य तु भूतग्रामवत् न एव सर्वान्तरत्वं स्यात्। यथा च पञ्चभूतसमूहे देहे पृथिव्या आपोऽन्तरा अद्भ्यस्तेजोऽन्तरमिति सत्यप्यापेक्षिकेऽन्तरत्वे नैव मुख्यं सर्वान्तरत्वं भवति तथेहापीत्यर्थः। We believe, the

additions to "भूतग्रामवत्" made in this explanation make Śaṅkara's interpretation appear too week to be accepted. Śaṅkara himself felt diffident about his first interpretation and therefore offered a second one. (2) In this second explanation Śaṅkara takes भूतग्रामवत् as referring to Śve. Upa. VI. 11 in which the compound words 'सर्वभूतेषु' and 'सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा' occur. The original sense in the Sūtra seems to be that भूतग्राम is inside one's own self; instead of this, Śaṅkara's explanation is that the Lord is *in* समस्तभूतग्रामs. Is भूतग्रामवत् a sufficient reference to Śve. Upa. VI. 11? And can we change भूतग्राम to समस्तभूतग्राम so easily?

Sūtra 30

6. "अभेद" in this Sūtra refers to the आत्मगृहीति method of meditation (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16, IV. 1. 3) in which the meditator identifies himself with Brahman on which he meditates. This interpretation is possible if ब्रह्मन् the object of meditation is inside the self as much as the soul of the meditator himself. If ब्रह्मन् the object of meditation be supposed to be in the Supreme Heaven (परमे व्योमन्) or in Nature anywhere but in the body, the आत्मगृहीति (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि) would not be possible because अहं is surely residing in one's own body (स्वात्मनः अन्तरा). Therefore, if Brahman also be in one's own body (स्वात्मनः अन्तरा), then only is there any possibility of achieving the identification underlying the meditation (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि). This seems to us to be sense of अभेद here.

7. अन्यथाऽभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्—A पूर्वपक्ष supposes that Brahman is to be meditated upon within one's self because otherwise the identification expressed in the आत्मगृहीति cannot become possible.

8. न—The Sūtrakāra rejects the पूर्वपक्ष's argument for meditation of Brahman within one's self. It is not for making possible the identification underlying अहंग्रहोपासना that Brahman is taught here to be meditated upon within one's self.

9. उपदेशान्तरवत् — The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to a statement in the Śruti according to which Brahman and the soul *are within an individual's body without being identical.* (उपदेशान्तर = भेदोपदेश).

There are Śrutis like Mu. Upa. III. 1. 1, Kaṭha Upa. III. 1, *etc.*

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते ।
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्त्यनश्नन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति ॥

(Mu. Upa. III. 1. 1 and Śve. Upa. IV. 6),

and

ऋतं पिबन्तौ सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे ।
छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पञ्चाग्नयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः ॥

(Kaṭha Upa. III. 1).

Brahman is to be meditated upon within one's self, not in order to achieve the identity of Brahman and the Jīva, but because the Śruti declares Brahman to be *with the soul within the latter's body.*

If we take उपदेशान्तर to mean *another teaching like* इयदाम्नान (Sūtra III. 3. 34–35), it may be a reference to

तिलेषु तैलं दधनीव सर्पिरापः स्रोतःस्वरणीषु चाग्निः ।
एवमात्मात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ सत्येनैनं तपसायोऽनुपश्यति ॥

(Śva. Upa. I. 15)

or, to

पराञ्चि खानि व्यतृणत्स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ् पश्यति नान्तरात्मन् ।
कश्चिद्धीरः प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदावृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्वमिच्छन् ॥

(Kaṭha Upa. IV. 1).

' प्रत्यगात्मन् ' the inner Atman is God residing in the heart.

10. If the above interpretation of Sūtra 36 be correct, it supports indirectly the explanation of Sūtra 16 suggested by us. The latter as well as Sūtras 34–35 deal with the method of meditation and so does also Sūtra 36.

10 *a*. Moreover, the fact that the Sūtrakāra rejects the argument leading to the identification of Brahman and the

Jīva, shows that the Sūtrakāra does not believe in the identity of the two. This is in complete agreement with the Sūtras in which the Sūtrakāra says that the soul and Brahman are not identical *e. g.*, Bra. Sū. I. 1. 17, I. 1. 21, I. 2. 22, I. 3. 5, *etc. etc.*, II. 1. 22.

11. Śaṅkara reads, 'भेदानुपपत्ति' in place of 'अभेदानुपपत्ति' which we have followed. Śaṅkara in accordance with his interpretation of Sūtra 35 explains भेद as आम्नानभेद and refers that आम्नानभेद to the different or double statement of the same in Bṛ. Upa. III. 4. 1 and III. 5. 1. अन्यथा should mean "if not within one's self" in accordance with the context of Sūtra 35, but Śaṅkara interprets it as "अनभ्युपगम्यमाने विद्याभेदे". उपदेशान्तर should mean उपदेश of अभेद because Śaṅkara reads 'भेदानुपपत्ति', or 'विद्याअभेद' if we adopt Śaṅkara's meaning of भेद. Śaṅkara, however, explains उपदेशान्तर as referring to Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 7. We need not say that there is no similarity between the repetition of the teaching of Chā. Upa. VI and the double statement occuring in Bṛ. Upa. III. 4 and 5. Inspite of this Śaṅkara takes Chā. Upa. VI to be the model wherewith to explain the repetition in Bṛ. Upa. III. 4–5.

SECTION XI

Interchange of Attributes of the two Aspects of Brahman in Śruti: No Objection to the Meditation on either of the two independently of the other.

Sūtras III. 3. 37-42

Note:— We propose to read Sūtras 37–42 as follows:—

(३७) व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् ।

(३८) सैव हि ।

(३९) सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ।

(४०) आदरादलोपः ।

(४१) उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ।

(४२) तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

TRANSLATION

THERE is an interchange [of attributes] because [the Śrutis] characterise in the same way [one aspect of Brahman] as they do the other [aspect], 37

because every one and the same [Śruti] does so. 38

Satya [*-saṅkalpa*] and other succeeding attributes [can] at the desire [of the meditator be used] in [the meditation on the *Avyakta* which is] the other [aspect of Brahman than the one to which, in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra as expressed in Bra. Sū. I. 2, they belong], and in [the meditation on] it [*i. e.*, " that other aspect " *viz.*, the *Avyakta* the meditator may at his desire use attributes] from [*dyubhvādy*] *āyatana* and the succeeding ones. 39

[Pūrvapakṣa -] " There should be no dropping [of the attributes of an aspect other than the one which one chooses to meditate upon] out of reverence [for the interchange found in the Śrutis]. "

[Siddhānta-] " When [such an attribute] presents itself [in a Śruti, it should not be dropped] on account of this (reverence) due to the statement of that (Śruti). 40–41

There is no rule for fixing those [attributes]. The result of this standpoint is that there is no objection [on the part of the Śruti] to [the taking of the *Avyakta* and the *Puruṣa* to be each of them] a separate aspect of Brahman. 42

NOTES

Sūtra 37

1. व्यतिहारः—The word means "interchange" and here it means the interchange of attributes (विशेषणs), as is suggested by the verb विशिंषन्ति in the Sūtra. The विशेष्यs are not to be interchanged but the विशेषणs can be interchanged because " the Śrutis use such विशेषणs for one aspect of Brahman as they do for the other. "

" व्यतिहार " is the statement of a conclusion, and " विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् " is a हेतु for it. The Sūtrakāra also gives an interchange of attributes of Brahman in Sūtras 38–39 *etc.* Therefore, व्यतिहार is an interchange of attributes.

2. विशिंषन्ति—The subject of this verb is श्रुतयः, just as the subject of दर्शयति which occurs so often in the Brahmasūtras is always श्रुतिः. Moreover, the feminine form ' सा ' in the next Sūtra makes it clear that the subject of विशिंषन्ति is श्रुतयः understood.

3. ' हि ' shows that व्यतिहारः is the conclusion and विशिंषन्ति इतरवत् is the premise.

4. इतरवत्—The Sūtrakāra holds that there are two forms of Brahman अरूपवत् and रूपवत् or प्रधान and पुरुष. Compare also इतरवत् in आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16). " विशिंषन्ति इतरवत् " means "The Śrutis distinguish प्रधान as they do पुरुष, and पुरुष as they do प्रधान." For this reason, the characteristics of each of the two can be interchanged with those of the other. The Sūtrakāra gives an example of how the Śrutis distinguish the one form of Brahman like the other, in the next Sūtra (सैव हि).

5. Śaṅkara makes one Adhikaraṇa of this Sūtra only. व्यतिहारः is in his view not a statement of the conclusion, but

he takes it as a reference to a text of the Aitareyins and another text of the Jābālas in both of which, he says, a व्यतिहार is given.

We have already said that व्यतिहार here is the statement of a conclusion and therefore it does not refer to any Śrutis. व्यतिहार is mentioned for the purpose of meditation and its illustrations in Sūtras 38–39 also go against taking व्यतिहार as referring to any particular Śrutis. Again, Śaṅkara explains व्यतिहार as " जीवेशयोर्मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावः ". This is not the exact meaning which the word व्यतिहार has in any standard lexicon. व्यतिहार is an interchange of equal things, interchange of विशेषणs only or विशेष्यs only. In the Sūtra, it is the interchange of विशेषणs, as is shown by us above. Lastly, it is not at all likely that the Sūtrakāra would try to discuss any revealed text other than an Upaniṣad or an Upaniṣad not accepted by him in the first Adhyāya of his work.

Instead of taking व्यतिहार as a simple statement (व्यतिहारः अस्ति) Śaṅkara completes " the gaps " in the Sūtra by saying " व्यतिहारोऽयमाध्यानायाम्नायते ". ' इतरवत् " is explained by Śaṅkara as यथेतरे गुणाः सर्वात्मत्वप्रभृतयः आध्यानाय आम्नायन्ते तद्वत्. Thus, Śaṅkara interprets इतरवत् as इतरे गुणाः इव. He adds " गुणाः ". If इतरवत् is to be taken with व्यतिहारः instead of with विशिंषन्ति, व्यतिहार should be a गुण like सर्वात्मत्वप्रभृतयः; but it seems to us that it is not a *guna*. विशिंषन्ति is interpreted by Śaṅkara as " तथा हि विशिंषन्ति समाम्नातारः उभयोच्चारणेन ' त्वमहमस्म्यहं च त्वमसि ' इति." We think that श्रुतयः is the subject of विशिंषन्ति.

Moreover, how would Śaṅkara explain the view established in his *bhāṣya* on this Sūtra in consistency with his interpretation of Sūtra IV. 1. 5 (ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात्) and his *bhāṣya* on the same ?

Sūtra 38

6. This Sūtra seems to us to be closely connected with the preceding Sūtra. ' हि ' in this Sūtra supports our view. In Sūtra 37 a general statement is given, *viz.*, " श्रुतयः विशिंषन्ति

इतरवत्"; in this Sūtra a particular example of that statement is given, *viz.*, "सैव हि विशिनष्टि इतरवत्." So this Sūtra is a continuation of the preceding Sūtra.

7. सैव हि—"विशिनष्टि इतरवत्" is to be taken as understood from the preceding Sūtra. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that *one and the same Śruti characterises one aspect of Brahman like the other*. He means that we may take any Śruti and we shall find the correctness of this assertion. Let us take the example of Chā. Upa. III. 14. 1–2. This Śruti begins with सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत......and then the attributes of this Brahman are given as मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसंकल्पः आकाशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः॥ The Sūtrakāra seems to think that in this Śruti the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् which is mentioned in the beginning is qualified as if it were the रूपवत् ब्रह्मन्, because मनोमय, सर्वकाम, *etc.*, are the विशेषणs of the पुरुष. Looking to the विषयवाक्यs of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya, which mention ब्रह्मन् as the cause of the creation, continuation and dissolution of the world, तज्जलान् is also a proof that this Śruti is intended to describe the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् †. Here the अरूपवत् ब्रह्मन् is qualified with adjectives which properly belong to the रूपवत् Brahman. This is true not only of one single Śruti, but many Śrutis do the same and therefore the Sūtrakāra says in Sūtra 37, "श्रुतयः विशिंषन्ति इतरवत्."

8. 'सत्यादयः' which is a part of this Sūtra according to the commentators seems to us to be originally a part of the next Sūtra (See Note 9 below).

Sūtra 39

9. "सत्यादयः" of the preceding Sūtra should in our opinion be taken in this Sūtra. Thus, the original Sūtra (39) should have been "सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः". Here we have

† See also Note (10) on Sūtra III. 3. 39.

introduced one more change also in the reading of Śaṅkara, *viz.*, कामादीतरत्र is changed to कामादितरत्र, thus substituting the long ई by a short one. Our reasons for detaching सत्यादयः from the preceding Sūtra and attaching it to this Sūtra are the meaning of सत्यादयः and the sense of Sūtra 39 as a whole. But, for the change of कामादीतरत्र to कामादितरत्र we are supported also by Madhva's reading according to which we have a short इ instead of a long one in this expression (कामादितरत्र).

10. सत्यादयः and आयतनादिभ्यः—In Sūtra 11 we have a group of attributes *viz.*, आनन्दादयः. Thus, we have here in Sūtras 11 and 39 three groups of attributes *viz.*, (1) one beginning with आनन्द, (2) a second beginning with सत्य and (3) a third group of attributes of which आयतन is the first. According to the requirement of the बहुव्रीहि compound, we want three lists of attributes in which आनन्द, सत्य and आयतन are respectively the *first*. None of the commentators gives any such lists.

To us it seems that here the Sūtrakāra refers to the lists of attributes in the first *three* Pādas of the first Adhyāya of his work. आनन्द is an attribute referred to in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2; that Sūtra undoubtedly refers to Tai. Upa. III. 6, *viz.*, आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्॥ आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते॥ आनन्देन जातानि जीवन्ति॥ आनन्दं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति॥ Similarly सत्य is the *first* attribute in Bra. Sū. I. 2. But in this case सत्य stands for सत्यसंकल्प which is given in the Śruti referred to in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1, *viz.*, सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत......॥ १॥ मनोमयः प्राणशरीरो भारूपः सत्यसंकल्पः आकशात्मा सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः॥ (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 1–2). In the same way आयतनादिभ्यः refers to a list in which आयतन is the first attribute of Brahman. This seems to be a reference to द्युभ्वाद्यायतन in the first Sūtra of the third Pāda of the first Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra.

The word " आनन्द " itself occurs in the Śruti referred to in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2; so the word आनन्द in Sūtra III. 3. 11 can

be easily identified with the same in the Śruti referred to in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2. But the identification of सत्य with सत्यसंकल्प and that of आयतन with द्युभ्वाद्यायतन may afford some scope for raising a difference of opinions. But, if we study how the Sūtrakāra refers to Śrutis or to the Sūtras, we come to a conclusion that he does make changes, even greater changes, than the change of सत्यसंकल्प to सत्य and द्युभ्वाद्यायतन to आयतन. Thus, चरण in Bra. Sū. I. 1. 24 (ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात्) refers to a Śruti in which the word " पाद " occurs, *viz.*, Chā. Upa. III. 12. 6; सर्वत्र in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1 refers to सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तः in Chā. Upa. III. 14. 2; अर्भकौकस्त्व in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 7 refers to एष मे आत्मान्तर्हृदये in Chā. Upa. III. 14. 3; व्योमवत् in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 7 refers to a Śruti in which the word " आकाश " occurs *viz.*, Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 1. All these examples of प्रतीकs used by the Sūtrakāra for making references to Śrutis show that he makes changes in the words occuring in the original passages. We believe the above examples of the way in which the Sūtrakāra makes references to other text are a sufficient ground to guarantee our suggestion to take सत्य and आयतन as abbreviations of सत्यसंकल्प and द्युभ्वाद्यायतन and therefore as references to the Śruti which is विषयवाक्य in Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1 and to Sūtra I. 3. 1 respectively. Since the purpose of the Sūtrakāra was to refer to the three lists of attributes in the three Pādas of the first Adhyāya, it is of minor importance that आनन्द and सत्य refer to the Śrutis which are the विषयवाक्यs of Bra. Sū. I. 1. and I. 2, while आयतन refers to the Sūtra (I. 3. 1) itself, or that सत्य or सत्यकाम is not the first in the attributes of Chā. Upa. III. 14. 2 (मनोमय being mentioned first in that Śruti).

आनन्द is an attribute, and सत्य or सत्यकाम is also an attribute; but आयतन is by itself no attribute; this inconsistency is removed by taking आयतन as द्युभ्वाद्यायतन which is an attribute. This is a more cogent reason also why आयतन should be understood to refer to द्युभ्वाद्यायतन.

If we accept the above suggestion regarding the inter-

pretation of the three groups of attributes, (1) आनन्दादयः, (2) सत्यादयः, and (3) आयतनादयः, we can easily make out the reference expressed by आदि in each compound. Thus, the first list consists of (1) आनन्द (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 2), (2) आनन्दमय (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 12), (3) अन्तर्...पुरुषः (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 20), (4) आकाश (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 22), (5) प्राण (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 23), (6) ज्योतिः (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 24) and (7) प्राण (Bra. Sū. I. 1. 28). The second list is made up of (1) मनोमयः (सत्यसंकल्पः) *etc.*, (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1), (2) अत्ता (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 9), (3) गुहां प्रविष्टः (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 11), (4) अन्तरः (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 13), (5) अन्तर्यामिन् (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 18), (6) अदृश्यत्वादिगुणक (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 21) and (7) वैश्वानरः (Bra. Sū. I. 2. 24). The third list consists of (1) द्युभ्वाद्यायतन (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 1), (2) भूमन् (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 8), (3) अम्बरान्तधृति (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 10), (4) ईक्षतिकर्म (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13), (5) दहर (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14), (6) अङ्गुष्ठमात्र (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 24), (7) कम्पन (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 39), (8) ज्योतिः (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 40), (9) आकाशः (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 41), (10) विज्ञानमय (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 42), and पतिः (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 43).

11. सत्यादयः कामादितरत्र—" सत्यसंकल्प and those attributes that follow it may be, at the desire of the meditator, used for meditation on an aspect other than that aspect of Brahman for which they have been mentioned by the Sūtrakāra. " कामात् is छन्दतः (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28). On account of the व्यतिहार or interchange of attributes (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37) the Sūtrakāra gives an option to the meditator. The Sūtrakāra has argued in Bra. Sū. I. 2 that the विषयवाक्यs collected in that Pāda describe the पुरुष aspect of Brahman. Now he says that सत्यादयः may be optionally used in the meditation on the other, *i. e.*, on the प्रधान aspect of Brahman. This option is quite consistent with the nature of the विषयवाक्यs of that Pāda. All the विषयवाक्यs contain words which express the अरूपवत् Brahman, but on account of certain विशेषणs of that विषय the Sūtrakāra argues that the subject of those वाक्यs is पुरुष. Let us take

an example in addition to that of सत्यसंकल्प given above under Sūtra 38. Thus, Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6 mentions the अरूपवत्, but the Śruti characterises that aspect as it does the रूपवत् or पुरुष and therefore the Sūtrakāra gives arguments from that Śruti to show that that passage teaches the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman. This is true also about other Śrutis discussed in that Pāda (See our Notes on Bra. Sū. I. 2 in the Appendix).

The above option (सत्यादयः कामाद् इतरत्र) lends support to Śaṅkara's view because it explains why it is that Śaṅkara takes Śrutis like Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6 as referring to निर्गुण ब्रह्मन् in his commentary on that Upaniṣad, while he interprets the same as dealing with पुरुष or सगुण ब्रह्मन् is his commentary on the Brahmasūtra.

11. तत्र च आयतनादिभ्यः—" And in the meditation on it (*i. e.*, on the अरूपवत्) may be used at the desire of the meditator attributes from आयतन, *etc.* " This means the विषयवाक्यs of Bra. Sū. I. 3 deal with the रूपवत् according to the Sūtrakāra, but here he gives an option to use those attributes in the meditation on the अरूपवत्. This shows that the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3 characterise पुरुष as they do प्रधान.

If we study the विषयवाक्यs of Bra. Sū. I. 3, we find that they expressly mention पुरुष and describe Him with words applicable to the अरूपवत्. The Sūtrakāra who lays emphasis on the express word in these Śrutis makes a two-fold attempt at explaining the topic of these Śrutis; in Bra. Sū. I. 3 he says that these Śrutis describe the पुरुष because actually the word पुरुष is mentioned in them, while in Bra. Sū. III. 3 39 he makes it clear that since these Śrutis describe the पुरुष with adjectives and terms applicable to the अरूपवत्, he allows an option to use these attributes in the meditation on the अरूपवत्.

To give an example from Bra. Sū. I. 3, Mu. Upa. II. 2. 5 is the विषयवाक्य of the first Adhikaraṇa. That विषयवाक्य uses the word आत्मन् which the Sūtrakāra seems to take as a

word *belonging to* पुरुष; moreover, as the Sūtrakāra himself says, the द्युभ्वाद्यायतन is called पुरुष or मुक्तोपसृप्य (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 2). Now, this पुरुष or आत्मन् is said to be द्युभ्वाद्यायतन 'that which is the abode of the sky, the earth, *etc.*' This द्युभ्वाद्यायतन is according to the Sūtrakāra an attribute of the प्रधान. Again, this पुरुष is said to be आनन्दरूप (Mu. Upa. II. 2. 7) which is in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra an attribute of the प्रधान. Mu. Upa. II. 2. 8 also describes this पुरुष in the terms of प्रधान. Thus, Mu. Upa. II. 2 describes पुरुष in the terms of प्रधान. The same seems to be true also of other Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3.

12. Why does the Sūtrakāra use आयतनादिभ्यः instead of आयतनादयः ? Is it for a metrical reason ? Or, does it mean that only some of the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I 3 describe पुरुष in the terms of प्रधान and therefore only some of those Śrutis should be taken in the meditation on the अरूपवत्, while other Śrutis describe पुरुष in the terms of पुरुष (only) and these should not, therefore, be taken in the meditation on the अरूपवत्, but they should be used only on the meditation on पुरुष ?

13. If the above interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11 and III. 3. 37–39 be correct, we have here the *key to the interpretation* of Bra. Sū. I. 1–3. According to Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11 the Sūtrakāra has devoted the first Pāda of Bra. Sū. I to the collction of the attributes of only the अरूपवत् (निराकार) or प्रधान aspect of Brahman. In Bra. Sū. I. 2 he has dealt with those Śrutis which describe the प्रधान or अरूपवत् with the adjectives applicable to only the रूपवत्, and which he has himself taken as teaching the रूपवत् aspect. This is the implied sense of व्यतिहारो विशिंषन्ति हीतरवत् and सत्यादयः कामाद् इतरत्र (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 37–39). And lastly, Bra. Sū. I. 3 discusses those Śrutis which describe the पुरुष with the terms applicable to the प्रधान, and about which the Sūtrakāra himself *argues* there that they deal with पुरुष (तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः — Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39).

14. According to Śaṅkara's reading there is one indepenment

Adhikaraṇa of Sūtra 38 (सैव हि सत्यादयः). He takes this Sūtra as referring to a question arising out of Bṛ. Upa. V. 4–5, *viz.*, whether the सत्यविद्या of Bṛ. Upa. V. 4 and that of Bṛ. Upa. V. 5 are one and the same. As can be seen by reading the text of Bṛ. Upa. V. 4–5 there is no reason to raise such a doubt at all, because it is clearly stated that सत्य in Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 2 is the same as the सत्य in Bṛ. Upa. V. 4 and V. 1, *viz.*, तद्यत्तत्सत्यमसौ स आदित्यः। Therefore, it appears to us that Bṛ. Upa. V. 4–5 does not require any discussion and is not, therefore, likley to have been discussed in the Brahmasūtra. Śaṅkara seems to take सत्य in सत्यादयः as referring to Bṛ. Upa. V. 4–5. सत्यादयः refers to a list of attributes in which सत्य is the *first* attribute, but there is no such list in this passage from the Bṛ. Upa. In Bṛ. Upa. V. 4 there are three attributes (महद्यक्षं, प्रथमजं वेद् सत्यम्) of which सत्य is the last one. Thus, it is not likely that सत्यादयः refers to Bṛ. Upa. V. 4–5.

Śaṅkara takes सैव as एका एव and adds ' इयं विद्या '. To us it appears that सैव means " सैव श्रुतिः विशिनष्टि इतरवत् " as we have explained above. " विशिनष्टि, " which is here implied, joins this Sūtra with the preceding Sūtra. There is no evidence in the Sūtra to take इयं विद्या as understood. Having taken सैव in the sense of एकैवेयं सत्यविद्या, Śaṅkara finds that the हेतु for this conclusion is not given in the Sūtra, so he takes " प्रकृताकर्षणात् " as understood. In our opinion it was very easy to see the प्रकृताकर्षण and therefore the Sūtrakāra does not discuss the Bṛ. Upa. passage at all.

" सत्यादयः " in the Sūtra is explained by Śaṅkara as " सत्यादयो गुणा एकस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे उपसंहर्तव्याः". As we have shown above, there is no list of सत्यादयो गुणाः in this Bṛ. Upa. Śruti.

Śaṅkara quotes an interpretation of this Sūtra given by some of his predecessors. That interpretation also shows that the correct tradition was lost long before Śaṅkara.

As regards Śaṅkara's own interpretation of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 38 it may be added that in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 20–22 the same Bṛ. Upa. Śruti (V. 5) is also discussed by the Sūtrakāra according to Śaṅkara's interpretation of those Sūtras. Now, there in the very beginning he tatkes it for granted that the सत्य in V. 2 is none else but the सत्य ब्रह्मन् mentioned in V. 1. Looking to this position of Śaṅkara regarding Bṛ. Upa. V. 5, it would also seem impossible that any doubt about Bṛ. Upa. V. 5 be raised or discussed at all in the Brahmasūtra.

15. Śaṅkara interprets Sūtra 39 as intended to solve a question whether Chā. Upa. VIII. 1 and Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4 teach the same विद्या. Out of these two Śrutis Chā. Upa. VIII. 1 is already discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14–17, and the other Śruti (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4) along with Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3 is discussed under Sūtra I. 3. 42 in accordance with the interpretation of Śaṅkara. Thus, as both the Śrutis were already discussed and proved as dealing with परमात्मन्, it does not seem necessary to us that any doubt regarding the identity of their teaching required to be solved later on in this Sūtra.

Śaṅkara takes कामादीतरत्र to be the reading, which, as we have shown above, should have been originally कामाद् इतरत्र. But Śaṅkara takes कामादि (separated from कामादीतरत्र) to refer to सत्यकाम in Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 5. His argument for interpreting कामादि as सत्यकामादि is as follows:- "कामादीति । सत्यकामादीत्यर्थः । यथा देवदत्तो दत्तः सत्यभामा भामेति । " This argument seems to us to have no parallel in the Brahmasūtra. Moreover, as Śaṅkara himself further on notices, he requires here सत्यकामत्वादि and not सत्यकामादि. In our opinion, we rather require सत्यकामत्वादयः, not कामादि, because सत्यकामत्वादयः would be a symmetrical expression along with सत्यादयः and आयतनादिभ्यः. But even सत्यकामत्वादयः cannot refer to Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 5 because the list of attributes in that Śruti begins with "अपहतपाप्मा" and therefore "अपहतपाप्मत्वादयः" (a list of

attributes in which अपहतपाप्मत्व is the first) should have been the compound–word, if a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 5 were intended by the Sūtrakāra. But as no such expression is given in the Sūtra, we believe it is not possible to take the Sūtra as referring to Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 5 at all.

Śaṅkara takes इतरत्र as referring to the Bṛ. Upa. passage. But to us this इतरत्र seems to signify the way in which इतरवत् is used by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 37 (and also in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16).

'तत्र' means, according to Śaṅkara, यच्च वाजसनेयके (= तत्र) वशित्वाद्युपलभ्यते तदपीतरत्र छान्दोग्ये "एष आत्माऽपहतपाप्मा" (छा. उ. ८।१।५) इत्यत्र संबध्यते।" We must say that one cannot add so many words before and after तत्र in order to make out the sense of तत्र, and one cannot take इतरत्र *twice* as Śaṅkara, has done.

Lastly, Śaṅkara's interpretation of आयतनादिभ्यः is hardly satisfactory. We have interpreted "तत्र च आयतनादिभ्यः" as "and to It should be applied attributes from those beginning with आयतन *i. e.*, द्युभ्वाद्यायतन". Śaṅkara takes तत्र and आयतनादिभ्यः separately, thus making one sentence out of तत्र and making "आयतनादिभ्यः" the statement of हेतुs. Again, आयतनादिभ्यः is, according to him, to be taken as आयतनादि-सामान्यात्. How can one make additions so easily ? *The word* 'आयतन' *occurs in neither of the two Śrutis.* So, Śaṅkara says that the statement of हृदय as the आयतन is the same in both the Śrutis. As to what other attributes are common Śaṅkara says "समानश्च वेद्यः ईश्वरः"; but even this ईश्वर is not mentioned in any of the two Upaniṣadic passages. Finally, after taking all this trouble to establish विद्यैकत्व between Chā. Upa. VIII. 1 and Bṛ. Upa IV. 4. 22 Śaṅkara lands himself into a quandary because he realizes that according to his own interpretation the Chā. Upa. passage (VIII. 1) teaches सगुण ब्रह्मन् while the Bṛ. Upa. passage (IV. 4. 22) teaches the निर्गुण ब्रह्मन्. So he

has to explain why the Sūtrakāra, as interpreted by him, teaches that the विद्या is the same in the two passages. Śaṅkara's reply is: – गुणवतस्तु ब्रह्मण एकत्वाद् विभूतिप्रदर्शनायायं गुणोपसंहारः सूत्रितो, नोपासनायेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।. This can hardly be accepted as a satisfactory explanation for the labour which Śaṅkara supposes the Sūtrakāra to have taken in this Sūtra. Such an explanation only shows that there is no गुणोपसंहार in this Sūtra in the sense in which Śaṅkara understands it.

It may be added that in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. I. 3. 42 Śaṅkara quotes Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 (discussed above) in support of his argument and comes to the conclusion that Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 7 teaches परमेश्वर or सगुण ब्रह्मन्.

Sūtra 40

16. This is a पूर्वपक्ष सूत्र according to Śaṅkara and others and it seems to be so. But while these Ācāryas begin a new Adhikaraṇa with this Sūtra, to us it appears that this and the next two Sūtras are closely connected with Sūtras 37–39, and therefore they should be taken as part of the Adhikaraṇa begun with Sūtra 37.

17. In Sūtra 37 the Sūtrakāra states that there is a व्यतिहार ' interchange ' of the विशेषणs of प्रधान and पुरुष and supports the same by giving arguments and illustrations in Bra. Sū. 38–39.

Now, what is to be done for the practical purpose of meditation in view of the fact that there is an ' interchange ' in the Śrutis ? The पूर्वपक्ष seems to say that *out of respect for the Śruti, the attributes* of an aspect other than the one on which a man meditates *should not be dropped*, (*i. e.*, these attributes variously scattered in different Śrutis should be also gathered and should be made the subject of meditation as one has to do in the case of those attributes which belong to that aspect on which he meditates). This would be tantamount to gathering and meditating upon the attributes of प्रधान as much as the attributes of पुरुष when one meditates on पुरुष.

Similarly, though one may be meditating on **प्रधान,** he *should not drop* gathering and meditating upon the attributes of **पुरुष,** *because he respects the Śruti* and the Śruti teaches **व्यतिहार** of the **विशेषणs** of the two aspects of Brahman. In other words, the distinction between the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 2 and I. 3 which the Sūtrakāra has kept up, should be given up, because there is the interchange of the attributes of **प्रधान** and **पुरुष** in the Śruti.

Sūtra 41

18. The above procedure would involve the gathering of the attributes of *both* aspects in the meditation on either of the two aspects of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean in Sūtra 41 that this kind of procedure of meditation is not the one to be followed as a result of the **व्यतिहार** found in the Śrutis. All that one should do is *not to drop* only those attributes *which present themselves* in the Śruti or Śrutis of the aspect on which he meditates. Thus, if one wishes to meditate on **पुरुष,** he should resort to the **पुरुषश्रुतिs** (*viz.,* those discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3) and select as many of them as he would like (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31) and from them he should collect the attributes of **पुरुष,** and *if in doing so he finds an attribute or attributes* of **प्रधान,** he should not drop them from his meditation on **पुरुष.** Thus, one should not drop an attribute (of the other aspect) when that attribute (of the other aspect) *presents itself* in the Śruti of that aspect on which he wishes to meditate. One should not drop attributes of other aspect than the one on which he has chosen to meditate, *only if those attributes occur* in the Śrutis he is using for the purpose of meditation.

19. **अतस्तद्वचनात्**— This is done " out of this " (*i. e.,* out of respect) " due to the word of that (Śruti)." ' **अतः** ' refers to **आदरात्** in the preceding Sūtra and **तद्वचनात्** seems to give reason for the respect. The respect is due to the fact that

the Śruti mentions those attributes expressly. The Śruti which professes to teach पुरुष *mentions* some attributes of प्रधान also; so, one who meditates on पुरुष honours those few attributes of प्रधान also and does not drop them though they do not belong to पुरुष the object of his meditation. As a result, there shall aways be in meditation a majority of those attributes which belong to the object of one's meditation.

Sūtra 40 argues that the attributes of other aspect than the one on which a man meditates should not be dropped, but should be gathered and meditated upon along with those belonging to the aspect of one's meditation. Sūtra 41 states that only those attributes which present themselves in the Śrutis of one's aspect of meditation should not be dropped.

20. In place of Śaṅkara's reading of Sūtra 41 (उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात्), Madhva has उपस्थितेस्तद्वचनात्. This seems to us to be a better reading than that of Śaṅkara, firstly because 'उपस्थिते' of Śaṅkara would mean 'उपस्थिते सति तस्य गुणस्य अलोपः'; thus, the locative absolute construction is not correct because the noun in the construction is again referred to by तस्य in the sentence;† and secondly because अतः meaning आदरात् (or व्यतिहारात्) in Sūtra 41 seems to be redundant because its purpose is served by तद्वचनात् unless we can assign any other meaning to अतः or तद्वचनात्. So, on the whole Madhva's Pāṭha is here also more correct than Śaṅkara's, as it is in the case of Sūtra III. 3. 39.

21. Śaṅkara takes Sūtras 40-41 as making an independent Adhikaraṇa. According to him Sūtra 40 gives the पूर्वपक्ष and Sūtra 41 gives the सिद्धान्त. We have also follwed him in accepting this division of पूर्वपक्ष and सिद्धान्त (though there is no clear indication about पूर्वपक्ष or सिद्धान्त in the Sūtras).

According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 40 refers to Chā. Upa. V. 19. 1–V. 24. 5 and discusses whether one should drop प्राणाग्निहोत्र

† *Cf.* Pāṇini's Śikṣa.

when one drops his dinner. There is *no word* in this Sūtra or the following, which would justify a reference to Chā. Upa. V. 19–24. And, moreover, the topic falls outside the scope of ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा and, therefore, it is not likely that the Sūtrakāra would at all discuss it in his work. Just as he would not care for considering the question of आचमनीयासु अप्सु परिधानदृष्टिः (Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 18), so he would care very little for discussing प्राणाग्निहोत्र in his inquiry for Brahman.

अलोपः—Śaṅkara says, ' प्राणाग्निहोत्र *should not be dropped*, even if one drops his dinner. ' आदरात—Śaṅkara refers this आदर to a जाबालश्रुति in which respect is shown indirectly for प्राणाग्निहोत्र. Thus, आदरात् would mean, " Because the जाबालश्रुति indirectly shows respect for प्राणाग्निहोत्र. " So, the sense of the entire Sūtra is that even if one drops his dinner, he should perform प्राणाग्निहोत्र even by means of water or any other materials suitable to his intention to drop a dinner of rice *etc.*, (भक्त). This is the पूर्वपक्ष view on प्राणाग्निहोत्र.

22. Sūtra 41 gives the सिद्धान्त. According to Śaṅkara, उपस्थिते means उपस्थिते भोजने; अतः means तस्मादेव भोजनद्रव्यात् प्रथमोपनिपतितात्; and we have to take as understood प्राणाग्निहोत्रं निर्वर्तयितव्यम् ". ' तद्वचनात् ' refers to Chā. Upa. V. 19. 1 *viz.*, तद्यद्भक्तं प्रथममागच्छेत्तद् धोमीयम् ". Thus, अतः in Sūtra 41 does not refer to any *word in Sūtra 40;* and we have to take उपस्थिते as referring to आगच्छेत् in the Śruti in question. And अलोपः and उपस्थिते do not refer to the one and the same thing as shown in the interpretation offered by us (उपस्थिते गुणे तस्य गुणस्य अलोपः), but we have " उपस्थिते भोजने प्राणाग्निहोत्रस्य अलोपः".

The refutation of the main argument of the पूर्वपक्ष *viz.*, आदरात् referring to a जाबालश्रुति is not given by the Sūtrakāra in the सिद्धान्तसूत्र but it is inserted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on that Sūtra (41).

Sūtra 42

23. This Sūtra seems to us to be connected with the

Adhikaraṇa formed by the five preceding Sūtras. तद् in तन्निर्धारणानियमः refers to what is said in the preceding Sūtras.

24. The Sūtrakāra seems to say that 'there is no rule for fixing it' *i. e.*, there is no rule by which we can decide which attributes belong to प्रधान and which to पुरुष. It is impossible to decide the attributes of प्रधान and पुरुष. The Śrutis distinguish प्रधान as if it were पुरुष and *vice versa*; now, the Sūtrakāra seems to say, there is no rule by which we can with certainty make out the attributes of प्रधान and those of पुरुष. 'तद्' means 'that' about which अलोप was taught in the preceding two Sūtras (40 and 41).

It is *certain* that the Śrutis teach प्रधान and पुरुष two aspects of Brahman. The Śruti itself uses two "names" (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10) and, therefore, there is no doubt regarding this part of the Śruti's teaching (Cf. Bra. Sūtra III. 2. 27, III. 3. 8). But, then, the Śrutis characterise प्रधान and पुरुष with the attributes of पुरुष and प्रधान respectively; so, it is not possible to decide exactly which are the attributes of प्रधान and पुरुष.

25. In place of Śaṅkara's reading "पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः" we suggest पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः It is very likely that Sūtra 50 refers to a Sūtra which preceds it and mentions प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्व; this is possible, if we have पृथग्धी instead of पृथग्घि, as the traditional Pāṭha reads. Mistakes of घ् having been written in place of ध् or प् for य् and *vice verse* are not uncommon in the various recensions of works like the Buddhacarita of Aśvaghoṣa. So, we venture to suggest that the original reading in Sūtra 42 was पृथग्धी instead of पृथग्घि as preserved by the tradition. The word 'धी' is used in this sence by the Sūtrakāra also, *e. g.*, in Bra. Sū. III. 3. (अक्षरधियां तु अवरोधः).

26. The Sūtrakāra has taken the standpoint that there is no rule to fix the attributes of प्रधान and पुरुष, though we know with certainty that the Śruti teaches प्रधान and पुरुष as

two distinct aspects of Brahman. Now, he declares the result of this standpoint (तद्दृष्टेः फलम्).

27. The result of this standpoint is that there is no objection (अप्रतिबन्धः) from the side of the Śruti to taking प्रधान and पुरुष as two separate "thoughts" on Brahman. As the attributes, of प्रधान and पुरुष can be interchanged, because there is a similar interchange of these attributes in the Śrutis themselves, some doctrinaires may conclude that प्रधान and पुरुष are identical and not two separate aspects of Brahman (See Bra. Sū. III. 3. 45–50). The Sūtrakāra says that these two are not identical because the two are taught to be separate by the Śruti which mentions two separate names of Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27; III. 3. 8). And, it has been shown that प्रधानश्रुतिs distinguish प्रधान like पुरुष and पुरुषश्रुतिs distinguish पुरुष like प्रधान. As a result we have to admit that प्रधान and पुरुष are two separate thoughts of the same Brahman, though in a प्रधानश्रुति there may be some attributes of पुरुष characterising प्रधान, and *vice versa*. Thus, the absence of any rule to fix exactly the attributes of प्रधान and पुरुष does not imply that the two should be taken as identical or as only one and the same aspect of Brahman, but rather the व्यतिहार itself shows that प्रधान and पुरुष are two separate thoughts on Brahman. व्यतिहार itself is possible if there are *two* aspects; in case there were only one aspect of Brahman, there would have been no possibility at all of any व्यतिहार. Each of the whole series of whatever attributes are there would have been equally the attribute of the same aspect of the same Brahman. But the व्यतिहार proves that पुरुष and प्रधान are separate thoughts or aspects of Brahman. So, the result of तन्निर्धारणानियमः is that the Scripture has no objection against taking the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् to be separate aspects or thoughts of the same Brahman. This seems to us to be the sense of "तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम्."

28. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as an independent Adhi-

karaṇa dealing with the question whether कर्माङ्गव्यपाश्रयणानि विज्ञानानि like the one in Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1 are नित्य or whether they are अनित्य.

'तन्निर्धारणानियमः' means according to Śaṅkara "यान्येतान्युद्गीथादिकर्मगुणयाथात्म्यनिर्धारणानि (रसतम आप्तिः समृद्धिर्मुख्यप्राण आदित्य इत्येवमादीनि) नैतानि नित्यवत् कर्मसु नियम्येरन्. Thus, Śaṅkara *does not take* तद् as connected with the preceding Sūtra; निर्धारण which has the simple sense of 'fixing' or 'deciding' is interpreted by him as 'उद्गीथादिकर्मगुणयाथात्म्यनिर्धारणानि' and अनियमः is explained as न (एतानि नित्यवत्) कर्मसु नियम्येरन्. How can we take निर्धारण *in the plural number* and modify its sense so as to make it mean कर्मगुणयाथात्म्यनिर्धारणानि, without any contextual reference in the Sūtras to रसतमः, आप्तिः, समृद्धिः, *etc., etc.* ? 'अनियमः' is also vastly changed in its sense by the additions of नित्यवत् and कर्मसु.

We have correlated "फलम्" with "तद्दृष्टेः" Śaṅkara takes तद्दृष्टेः as a हेतु for तन्निर्धारणानियमः and explains it as तथाह्यनियतत्वमेवंजातीयकानां दर्शयति श्रुतिः, and quotes 'तेनोभौ कुरुतो यश्चैतदेवं वेद यश्च न वेद' (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10).

It should be noted here that in fact the above question is discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 18. So, the same cannot be the topic in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 42.

As Śaṅkara reads पृथग् हि अप्रतिबन्धः फलम् and as he has taken तद्दृष्टेः separate from फलम्, he explains पृथग् हि अप्रतिबन्धः फलम् as follows :—

"अप्रतिबन्धः फलम्" is explained by Śaṅkara as अपि चैवंजातीयकस्य कर्मव्यपाश्रयस्य विज्ञानस्य पृथगेव कर्मणः फलमुपलभ्यते कर्मफलसिद्धयप्रतिबन्धः तत्समृद्धिः अतिशयविशेषः कश्चित् and quotes यदेवविद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति । (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10).

Here Śaṅkara interprets फलं as विज्ञानस्य फलम् and पृथक् as कर्मणः पृथक्. "The fruit of विज्ञान is separate from the कर्म" ('पृथग् हि फलम्' in the Sūtra). And what is that फल ?

Śaṅkara says, अप्रतिबन्ध is the फल and explains अप्रतिबन्धः as कर्मासिद्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः. By सिद्धि Śaṅkara seems to mean समृद्धि because he has explained कर्मफलसिद्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः as तत्समृद्धिः and अतिशयविशेषः. Thus, Śaṅkara has to make several additions and modifications in the simple meanings of पृथक्, अप्रतिबन्ध and फल, because in his days the tradition about the reference to the preceding Sūtras by तद् in the Sūtra (III. 3. 42) was lost and also because he had here a wrong reading " पृथक् हि " instead of पृथग्धी. पृथक् of the Sūtra is taken by Śaṅkara as referring to नाना in " नाना तु विद्या चाविद्या च यदेव विद्यया करोति... वीर्यवत्तरं भवति । (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10). He says, तत्र नाना त्विति विद्वदविद्वत्प्रयोगयोः पृथकरणात् वीर्यवत्तरमिति च तरत्प्रत्ययप्रयोगाद्विद्याविहीनमपि कर्म वीर्यवदिति गम्यते. Here Śaṅkara seems to give a slightly different sense to the word पृथक् than the one given by him already. According to this explanation पृथक् is to be interpreted as विद्वदविद्वत्प्रयोगयोः पृथकरणात्.

SECTION XII

Sūtras III. 3. 43-54

(४३) प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम् ।

(४४) लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः ।

(४५) प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत् ।

(४६) अतिदेशाच्च ।

(४७) विद्यैव तु निर्धारणात् ।

(४८) दर्शनाच्च ।

(४९) श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः ।

(५०) अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

(५१) न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापत्तिः ।

(५२) परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः ।

(५३) एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ।

(५४) व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावभावित्वान्न तूपलब्धिवत् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE Puruṣa is to be meditated upon as the Self of the meditator,] exactly as is done, in the case of the Pradhāna. This has been already referred to. 43

That [*pradhāna* aspect of Brahman] is indeed more predominant [than the *puruṣa* aspect] because it is mentioned in a majority of texts. Even then, the option already stated [in Sūtras III. 3. 28–30, stands]. 44

[Pūrvapakṣa]–On account of the context, the meditation on the Puruṣa may be considered as an activity of projection on the Pradhāna, of the *Puruṣa* idea, like a mentation, 45

and on account of the *atideśa* [*i. e.* saying that the Puruṣa is the same as the Akṣara]. 46

[Siddhānta]–But [the meditation on the Puruṣa is] nothing else but prescience (Vidyā), because of the definite statement, 47

and because the Śruti shows it. 48

And there is no irreconciliability because of the greater authenticity of Śruti *etc.* [than that of Perception and Inference.]. 49

And [the Puruṣa] is seen [in Śruti] to possess the separateness of a different aspect [than the *pradhāna* aspect] on the ground of *anubandha* (peculiar usage of words), *etc.* This has been already referred to. 50

Despite the common characteristic [of enjoyment of desired objects both in the world of the Puruṣa and in the worlds of the deities], [the meditation on the Puruṣa can]

not [be regarded as a *Kriyā* an act like a mental projection], because we find in the Śruti [that the Puruṣa is Vidyā, not a *Kriyā*]; [and for the same reason] there cannot arise the contingency of the Puruṣa being considered a *loka* ' a world ' [like the worlds of the gods], as in the case of the Mṛtyu [-loka]. 51

And [the Puruṣa has got] a common terminology with the Supreme One; but the peculiar use of words [for either aspect] should be based upon the frequency [of usage]. 52

Some [hold that the meditation on the Puruṣa is taught] because the individual soul is in the body [and as such he can better comprehend the *puruṣa* aspect than the *avyakta* aspect. 53

[Siddhānta]-[The soul is] separate [from the body] because of [the soul] being absent when that [body] is present [*i. e.,* the existence of a soul does not depend upon its encasement in a body; it has independent separate existence of its own]. But, it is not as it is found stated in the Scripture (*i. e.,* the existence of the soul dose not depend upon its embodiment). 54

NOTES

Sūtra 43

1. The traditional reading प्रदानवत् should have been originally प्रधानवत्, because it seems to us that तदुक्तम् in this Sūtra refers to इतरवत् in आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16), and because no satisfactory interpretation has been put forth for the word प्रदान by any commentator.

2. In Sūtra 42, the Sūtrakāra has established that the Scripture has no objection to taking the पुरुष as a thought or aspect of Brahman separate from प्रधान the अरूपवत् aspect of Brahman. In this Sūtra, he proceeds to explain to us how the पुरुष aspect should be meditated upon. According to him the पुरुष aspect should be meditated upon exactly in the way in which the प्रधान aspect is meditated upon (प्रधानवदेव).

3. तदुक्तम्—In Sūtra III. 3. 16, (आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् ।) the Sūtrakāra has stated that " the Pradhāna aspect of Brahman is to be meditated upon as being taken to be the self of the meditator *just as the other aspect* (*i. e.*, the पुरुष aspect), on account of the subsequent sentence. " Thus, by putting इतरवत् (" just as the other " or the पुरुष aspect), the Sūtrakāra has already said that the पुरुष is also to be meditated upon as the self of the meditator. तदुक्तम् in this Sūtra (43) seems to us to be a reference to इतरवत् in that Sūtra (16).

4. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra discusses whether वायु and प्राण in Bṛ. Upa. I. 5. 21 and in Chā. Upa. IV. 3. 1 are to be approached (*i. e.*, meditated upon) as separate or identical.

It must be said that not one of the words of the Sūtra gives any indication for referring to Bṛ. Upa. I. 5. 21 or Chā. Upa. IV. 3. 1.

Śaṅkara takes the whole conclusion or the rejoinder to the doubt of the पूर्वपक्ष as implied, *viz.*, पृथगेव वायुप्राणावुपगन्तव्याविति । कस्मात् । पृथगुपदेशात् । The Sūtra contains no word to justify this conclusion.

'प्रदानवत्' which is Śaṅkara's reading is explained by him to mean यथा......देवतापृथक्त्वात्प्रदानपृथक्त्वं भवति । एवम्....Śaṅkara then refers प्रदान to a ritual in त्रिपुरोडाशिनी इष्टि, but there also the word प्रदान itself is not mentioned in any Śruti.

'तदुक्तम्' is taken by Śaṅkara as referring to संकर्षकाण्ड of Jai. Sū. *viz.*, to the Sūtra "नाना वा देवता पृथग्ज्ञानात्" इति ।. Thus, according to Śaṅkara, तदुक्तम् does not refer to प्रदान or any thing about प्रदान; but it refers to पृथक्त्व which Śaṅkara takes as understood in the Sūtra.

Sūtra 44

1. 'तद्' in this Sūtra refers to प्रधान in the preceding Sūtra (43). Therefore, 'तद्' means the अरूपवत् Brahman.

2. तद्धि बलीयः—The अरूपवत् aspect is "more powerful" or more authentic than the रूपवत् aspect, or प्रधान is more authentic than the पुरुष.

3. लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्—This gives the हेतु why the अरूपवत् aspect is "more powerful". It is more authentic because it has a majority of the Śruti texts in its favour. The Śrutis dealing with the अरूपवत् Brahman are far more in number than those dealing with the रूपवत्. To any reader of the Upaniṣads used by the Sūtrakāra this is self-evident and need not be borne out by counting the number of Śrutis dealing with the प्रधान and the पुरुष aspects.

4. तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः—We suggest the transference of "पूर्वविकल्पः" from Sūtra 45 to Sūtra 44. In our opinion the last word तदपि in Sūtra 44 keeps it inconclusive, and this incompletion is removed if we can transfer पूर्वविकल्पः from the following Sūtra to this Sūtra (44). The transference of पूर्वविकल्प to

Sūtra 44 does not create a break in the sense of Sūtra 45, but rather facilitates the interpretation of that Sūtra, thus showing that the word (पूर्वविकल्पः) originally belonged to the preceding Sūtra (44). This will be evident from the following interpretation of these Sūtras.

5. ' पूर्वविकल्पः ' seems to us to refer to the option given in " छन्दतः उभयाविरोधात् " in Sūtra 28. There an option is given by the Sūtrakāra to a seeker to choose for meditation any one of the two aspects of Brahman according to his desire.

6. तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः—In Sūtra 44 the Sūtrakāra says that the प्रधान is more authentic than the पुरुष because the प्रधान is dealt with in a majority of *Vedantas*. This would raise a question whether the पुरुष who is less authentic can be at all an object of उपासना in the same sense and with the same result as the उपासना of the प्रधान. If not, the option given in Sūtra 28 falls to the ground, and should be now withdrawn by the Sūtrakāra. That which is less powerful should give a result of less value than that which is more powerful.

In reply to such a doubt the Sūtrakāra says " तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः ". " Even then, the option already stated in Sūtra 28 holds good. " In Sūtra 45 and those which follow it the Sūtrakāra gives the reasons why he sticks to the विकल्प he has already given.

One of the main reasons is that though fewer Śrutis deal with the पुरुष than those dealing with the प्रधान, the fact that the Śruri teaches the पुरुष is itself sufficient for the Sūtrakāra to stick to the पूर्वविकल्प. The greater authenticity or बलीयस्त्व of प्रधान lies in its being mentioned in more Śrutis than those mentioning the पुरुष. This would not mar the authenticity of the meditation on the पुरुष, because as being part of the Scripture all Śrutis are equally important, and so the पुरुषश्रुतिs are as important as the प्रधानश्रुतिs.

7. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra deals with a question

arising out of the सांपादिक अग्निs mentioned in the अग्निरहस्य ब्राह्मण of the वाजसनेयिन्s belonging to the Yajurveda, *viz.*, whether these मनश्चित: and other fires are subsidiary to the rite or are independent thereof being of the nature of pure विद्या.

It is apparent that not a single word in the Sūtra suggests a reference to the long quotation from अग्निरहस्य ब्राह्मण given by Śaṅkara. Moreover, the word मनोमयान् in the quotation (अग्नीनर्कान्मनोमयान्) seems to us to be a clear evidence that these fires are not क्रियानुप्रवेशिन:; but they are केवलविद्यात्मका:. There is no valid reason for any doubt arising out of that text. Moreover, the topic has nothing to do with ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, the inquiry of the Sūtrakāra.

Śaṅkara takes ' लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् ' as " स्वातन्त्र्यं तावत् [एतेषां मनश्चिदादीनामग्नीनाम्] लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्. Thus, he takes ' लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् ' as giving one sentence and तद्धि बलीय: as another sentence. But we have shown above that लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् is the हेतु why प्रधान is " more powerful " (तद्धि बलीय:). Having separated " लिङ्ग-भूयस्त्वात् " from तद्धि बलीय:, Śaṅkara has to take स्वातन्त्र्यं [तावद् एतेषां अग्नीनाम्] as understood.

Śaṅkara interprets लिङ्गभूयस्त्व as the fact that there are many indicatory words in the अग्निरहस्य ब्राह्मण showing that the fires in question are विद्यात्मक and not क्रियात्मक. This kind of लिङ्गभूयस्त्व would rather prove that there is no reason for a doubt regarding the nature of the fires. In our opinion लिङ्गभूयस्त्व means that a majority of texts describes the प्रधान while fewer texts deal with the पुरुष. Śaṅkara does not quote *any sentence* from अग्निरहस्य, stating that the fires are क्रियात्मक; his reason for their being doubted to be क्रियात्मक is that they are in a context dealing with rites (प्रकरणात् क्रियानुप्रवेशे प्राप्ते). लिङ्गभूयस्त्व requires that there are at least a few sentences describing the fires as क्रियात्मक; but such is not the case at all.

We have already noticed above that Śaṅkara separates " तद्धि बलीय:, from " लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात् ". So, he interprets " तद्धि

बलीयः " independently, by saying " तद्धि लिङ्गं प्रकरणाद् बलीयः ". Thus, Śaṅkara does not take ' तद् ' as referring to प्रधान in the preceding Sūtra, but he explains it as referring to लिङ्ग in लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्, and बलीयः does not mean "more powerful than [that which is other than प्रधान *viz.*,] the पुरुष," but according to Śaṅkara, it is प्रकरणाद् बलीयः; so, Śaṅkara interprets तद्धि बलीयः as meaning, " That लिङ्ग is more powerful than प्रकरण ". This word प्रकरण is suggested to Śaṅkara by the word लिङ्ग which itself seems to us to have been misunderstood by Śaṅkara.

' तदपि ' in the Sūtra is interpreted by Śaṅkara as " तदपि उक्तं पूर्वस्मिन् काण्डे". He seems to take उक्तम् as understood from the preceding Sūtra. But to us it appears that तदपि does not mean " even that ", but it means " even then ", as it does in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 8. Moreover, how can we take उक्तम् as understood in Sūtra 44 ? In the preceding Sūtra we have तदुक्तम् which refers to the Brahmasūtra itself, as we have shown; so, even तदुक्तम् in that Sūtra does not help us to take उक्तम् understood in this Sūtra.

Sūtra 45

8. We have transferred पूर्वविकल्पः from this Sūtra to the preceding Sūtra. So, according to our opinion Sūtra 45 reads as follows :—प्रकरणात्स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत्.

9. As तु in Sūtra 47 shows, Sūtras 45 and 46 give two objections to the statement in Sūtra 44. Śaṅkara also understands these two Sūtras (45, 46) similarly. Thus, in our view Sūtras 45-46 contain objections against the पूर्वविकल्प upheld in Sūtra 44.

10. In Sūtra 44 the Sūtrakāra says that प्रधान is mentioned in more texts than पुरुष and is, therefore, " more powerful. " This may be interpreted by an opponent to mean that पुरुष is no independent aspect of Brahman. Expecting this objection, the Sūtrakāra further says that " Even then,

the option he has already stated in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28 stands as it is. To this the objector says that on account of the context (प्रकरणात्) the meditation on अव्यक्त as पुरुष would be an act like a mental projection.

11. प्रकरणात् — To us it appears that प्रकरणात् in this Sūtra, अतिदेशात् in Sūtra 46, निर्धारणात् in Sūtra 47 and दर्शनात् in Sūtra 48 all of them refer to various sentences of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad.

"प्रकरणात्" refers to the fact that Mu. Upa. I. 1 starts to teach अक्षर. So, Mu. Upa. as a whole should be taken as a dissertation on अक्षर. The context shows that the mention of पुरुष in the Upaniṣad (*e. g.*, Mu. Upa. II. 1. 2, III. 1. 2, III. 3. 1) is not the chief teaching of the Upaniṣad, it being a dissertation on अक्षर. The mention of अक्षर in Mu. Upa. II. 1. 1 and in Mu. Upa. II. 2. 2 would be a proof to show that पुरुष mentioned in a passage (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 2) intervening these two passages is meant to be a क्रिया an act like the mental acts in sacrifices. In other words, अक्षर is to be thought of mentally as पुरुष, this being one of the ways of meditating on अक्षर. This would mean that पुरुष is not an independent aspect of Brahman, but it is an aspect of अक्षर or the अरूपवत् Brahman. The अरूपवत् Brahman should be taken as the only aspect of Brahman because a majority of texts mention it.

Thus, the पूर्वपक्ष says that the meditation on पुरुष is an act (क्रिया, but not विद्या) like a mental act, on account of the context.

Sūtra 46

12. अतिदेशात् — This is another हेतु for the पूर्वपक्ष, *viz.*, "स्यात्क्रिया मानसवत्". The first हेतु was प्रकरणात्. अतिदेशात् is the second हेतु. The पूर्वपक्ष wishes to prove that the meditation on पुरुष is a क्रिया, not ब्रह्मविद्या; and this is proved by अतिदेश. To us it appears that this Sūtra (46) refers to "येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्" (Mu. Upa. I. 2. 13).

This is an अतिदेश of the अक्षर mentioned in Mu. Upa. I. 1. 5–6. By अतिदेश, the पुरुष is said to be अक्षर itself, in "अक्षरं पुरुषं वेद", "he knew अक्षर to be पुरुष." So, पुरुष is not different from अक्षर. Therefore, the meditation on पुरुष is only a क्रिया, a mental act performed on अक्षर. Therefore, the पूर्वविकल्प of the Sūtrakāra does not stand because it is against the context (प्रकरण) and against the अतिदेश.

13. Śaṅkara reads पूर्वविकल्पः as a part of Sūtra 45 and takes "पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात्" as one sentence and explains it as "पूर्वस्य क्रियामयस्याग्नेः प्रकरणात्तद्विषय एवायं विकल्पविशेषोपदेशः स्यान्न स्वतन्त्रः". Thus, he explains प्रकरणात् as पूर्वस्य प्रकरणात् and पूर्वविकल्पः as पूर्वविषयः अयं विकल्पः. He explains पूर्व as क्रियामय अग्नि. How can we explain पूर्वविकल्पः as पूर्वविषयः अयं विकल्पः? In fact, there is no विकल्प in the text quoted by Śaṅkara. In that अग्निरहस्यब्राह्मण, there is no mention of क्रियामय अग्नि *preceding* this मनोमय अग्नि; Śaṅkara does not quote any such passage. Can there be a precedence of क्रियामय अग्नि over मनोमय अग्नि as suggested by Śaṅkara's interpretation of पूर्व as क्रियामय अग्नि? Moreover, we do not see any way by which the विकल्प or विकल्पविशेषोपदेश of a thing be interpreted to mean that the thing about which a विकल्प is given is not an independent thing. Rather the विकल्प proves that the things about which an option is mentioned are independent of each other.

Śaṅkara takes प्रकरणात् with पूर्वविकल्पः, not with स्यात्क्रिया. As already stated, Śaṅkara makes a vast difference in the sense of प्रकरणात् by adding to it 'क्रियामयस्य अग्नेः प्रकरणात्'. Moreover, this interpretation of प्रकरणात् is in conflict with Śaṅkara's explanation of बलीयः (= प्रकरणात् लिङ्गं बलीयः); and in order to solve the inconsistency, Śaṅkara himself gives some arguments. None of these, however, are given by the Sūtrakāra in the Sūtra (45). This shows that Śaṅkara's explanations of बलीयः and प्रकरणात् are neither of them in accordance with the Sūtrakāra's own view.

Śaṅkara takes प्रकरणात् with पूर्वविकल्पः and again with

स्यात्क्रिया. So, he explains स्यात्क्रिया as " तस्मात्सांपादिका अप्येतेऽग्नयः प्रकरणात् क्रियानुप्रवेशिनः एव स्युः. Thus, he explains स्यात् as स्युः.

मानसवत् is explained as the mental acts of ग्रहण, आसादन, हवन, आहरण, उपह्वान and भक्षण.

14 Śaṅkara explains अतिदेश by quoting a text in which " each of 36000 fires is said to be as big as the actual ritual fire ".

It should be stated that the अतिदेश mentioned here is as regards the size of each सांपादिक fire and the ritual fire; and, therefore, it seems to us that the पूर्वपक्ष would not quote this sentence to prove that the सांपादिक fires are also the ritual fires. सामान्य is there between the two, as Śaṅkara says; but it is the सामान्य of size, and not of क्रिया. It is rather likely that the पूर्वपक्ष quotes such a text as mentioned two things or principles in which there is a real सामान्य of essence and which are by an अतिदेश really identified wholly with each other. We believe, it is so because the Sūtrakāra does not deny the अतिदेश stated by the opponent. *It is Śaṅkara who seeks to find out in the Sūtras a refutation of the* अतिदेश; so he says that आदि in अनुबन्धादिभ्यः (Sūtra 50) is meant to refute the अतिदेश argument of the पूर्वपक्ष. But it seems to us that the Sūtrakāra does not leave it to his commentators to give the refutation of the valid arguments of his opponents. The same should be said regarding Śaṅkara's attempt to find a refutation of पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात् in Sūtra 45, (which he thinks to be a पूर्वपक्ष argument) also included in आदि of Sūtra 50.

Sūtra 47

15. " तु " in the Sūtra (47) shows that the Sūtrakāra rejects the पूर्वपक्ष given in Sūtras 45–46.

16. विद्यैव — The पूर्वपक्ष argued that on account of प्रकरण (Sūtra 45) and अतिदेश (Sūtra 46), the meditation on पुरुष was an act like the mental acts in sacrifices; thus, the पूर्वपक्ष

denied that the meditation on पुरुष was विद्या or ब्रह्मविद्या at all. As already explained above, according to the पूर्वपक्ष the meditation on पुरुष was an act of meditation on अक्षर as पुरुष on account of अक्षर or प्रधान being "more powerful" than पुरुष. To this the Sūtrakāra replies in Sūtras 47 and 48. To 'स्यात् क्रिया' he replies "विद्यैव". The meditation on पुरुष is not a mental act performed on प्रधान, but it is विद्या itself (विद्या एव). It is ब्रह्मविद्या itself.

17. निर्धारणात् — This is one reason why the meditation on पुरुष as identical with one's Self is really विद्या. The Sūtrakāra refers to a Śruti in which the meditation on पुरुष is definitely said to be विद्या. To us it seems that the Sūtrakāra *without rejecting* the प्रकरण and अतिदेश *arguments of the* पूर्वपक्षिन् points out to the latter that the very Śruti which mentions the अतिदेश also determines that the meditation on पुरुष is ब्रह्मविद्या. In Mu. Upa. I. 2. 13 we read येनाक्षरं पुरुषं वेद सत्यं प्रोवाच तां तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्याम्. Here the knowledge of the पुरुष or अक्षर as पुरुष is said to be ब्रह्मविद्या.

The meditation on अक्षर or the अरूपवत् aspect as आनन्द, आनन्दमय, आकाश, प्राण, ज्योतिः is a क्रिया. By performing that क्रिया one knows ब्रह्मविद्या. But the meditation on अरूपवत् or अक्षर as पुरुष as the पूर्वपक्षिन् thinks the teaching of Mu. Upa. I. 2. 13 to be, is not here said to (only) a क्रिया, but it is definitely said to be विद्या. The अतिदेशवाक्य itself says that the knowledge of अक्षर or ब्रह्मन् as पुरुष is ब्रह्मविद्या. "That is ब्रह्मविद्या, by which one knows अक्षर to be पुरुष, or अक्षर as पुरुष". अक्षर here means ब्रह्मन् and therefore the knowledge of अक्षर as पुरुष is ब्रह्मविद्या. It is the real ब्रह्मविद्या (तत्त्वतो ब्रह्मविद्या).

18. Śaṅkara interprets this Sūtra (47) to mean that the मनश्चिदादयोऽग्नयः are विद्यात्मकाः; he wanted a plural number and as विद्या in the Sūtra is singular, he changes it to विद्यात्मकाः.

By निर्धारणात् he refers to "ते हैते विद्याचित एव" and "विद्यया हैवैत एवंविदश्चिता भवन्ति." Both of these passages occur in the अग्निरहस्य ब्राह्मण.

Sūtra 48

19. This Sūtra gives one more reason why the meditation on the पुरुष aspect of Brahman is विद्या or ब्रह्मविद्या. दर्शनात् always implies a reference to a Śruti and here it refers most probably to a Śruti in which the meditation on पुरुष or पुरुषप्राप्ति is said to be विद्या, such as Mu. Upa. III. 2. 10 in which the teaching of पुरुष mentioned in Mu. Upa. III. 2. 8 is said to be ब्रह्मविद्या. दर्शनाच्च is an argument to prove that the knowledge or realization of पुरुष is ब्रह्मविद्या.

20. According to Śaṅkara, दर्शनात् proves that the मनश्चिदादयोऽग्नयः are स्वतन्त्र, not a part of क्रिया; and by दर्शनात् no new argument is intended by the Sūtrakāra, but he simply refers once again to what he himself has said under Sūtra III. 3. 44 in this very connection. To us it seems that just as the च in Sūtra 46 sums up the two arguments of पूर्वपक्ष (प्रकरणात् and अतिदेशात्), similarly the च in Sūtra 48 sums up the two arguments of the Siddhāntin (निर्धारणात् and दर्शनात्) to prove that the knowledge of पुरुष is also विद्या. The fact that Śaṅkara refers by दर्शनात् to the Sūtrakāra's own words in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 44 shows the weakness of his interpretation. दर्शनात् in the Sūtras always refers to a Śruti statement.

Sūtra 49

21. In Sūtras 47–48 the Sūtrakāra has established that the meditation on पुरुष is also ब्रह्मविद्या. He seems to give some more reasons leading to the same conclusion in Sūtra 49 and those that follow it.

It is claimed by the Sūtrakāra that both प्रधान and पुरुष are ब्रह्मविद्या. Now, प्रधान is अरूपवत् and पुरुष is रूपवत्. How can such mutually contradictory forms belong to one and the same principle *viz.*, Brahman ? And, since प्रधान or अरूपवत् is proved to be " more powerful " (Sūtra 43), the रूपवत् aspect though taught by the Śruti to be ब्रह्मविद्या as proved by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras 47–48, should be regarded as contradicted

by the अरूपवत् aspect. The रूपवत् is in disagreement with the अरूपवत् which is " more powerful ". Therefore, the अरूपवत् should be kept up and the रूपवत् being contradictory with the अरूपवत् should be rejected (बाधः).

22. To this the Sūtrakāra replies that though fewer Śrutis and Smṛtis describe पुरुष, पुरुष is valid and is not contradicted by प्रधान, because the few texts which describe पुरुष are the texts of श्रुति and स्मृति which are more cogent proofs than प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान. It is according to प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान that the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् aspects seem to be mutually contradictory and therefore the रूपवत् would be inconsistent with Brahman. But श्रुति and स्मृति are far more authentic as revelatory than प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान of the world. So, there is no contradiction in taking पुरुष or रूपवत् aspect to be an aspect of Brahman which is itself अरूपवत्.

23. By आदि we take स्मृति because श्रुति is mentioned expressly. If we take श्रुति and स्मृति to be the grounds of the Sūtrakāra on which he asserts that there is no contradiction in holding रूपवत् पुरुष to be an aspect of Brahman, just as प्रधान the अरूपवत् one, we find that the Sūtrakāra justifies his position here exactly in the way in which he does so often in the Sūtras. Thus, he also elsewhere in the Bra. Sū. meets an opponent's argument based upon Perception and Inference by having recourse to the word of Śruti (कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयत्वशब्दकोपो वा—II. 1. 26 is refuted by श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्—II. 1. 27).

24; Śaṅkara takes श्रुति to refer to श्रुति in श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षात् (जै. सू. ३।३।१३) and by श्रुत्यादि he refers to only श्रुति, लिङ्ग and वाक्य and not to *all* the six topics mentioned in the Sūtra of Jaimini. He could not refer to प्रकरण *etc.*, because he had stated under Sūtras 44-45, that प्रकरणात् लिङ्गं बलीयः. Otherwise, if श्रुत्यादि were to refer to Jai. Sū. III. 3. 13, it should refer to *all* the six topics of proof mentioned in that Sūtra. In this latter case श्रुत्यादि would be

" more powerful " than प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान as we have above proposed to interpret these words.

Śaṅkara interprets श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वात् as " श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यानि प्रकरणात् बलीयांसि " and adds that in the श्रुति under discussion श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यानि prove that मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are स्वतन्त्र, not connected with क्रिया.

Then, he explains श्रुति, लिङ्ग and वाक्य from the Śruti passage. These texts pressed into service are the same as have been quoted as the सिद्धान्तिन्'s arguments under Sūtra 47. And the argument that लिङ्ग is " stronger " than प्रकरण was Śaṅkara's interpretation of तद्धि बलीयः in Sūtra 44. So, we are justified in saying that at least partly Śaṅkara repeats the same interpretation in the case of Sūtras 44, 47 and 49 (and also Sūtra 48, see above Note 20). The Sūtra style does not justify the attribution of the reiteration of the same arguments in different expressions to the Sūtrakāra.

न बाधः means according to Śaṅkara, स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षो न बाधितव्यः.

Sūtra 50

25. दृष्टः implies पुरुषः. Therefore, the Sūtra refers to पुरुष. " पुरुषः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टः ". " पुरुष has been found to possess (वत् to be interpreted as a possessive termination) the separateness or differentiation (from प्रधान) of being another thought (on Brahman) than the प्रधान which is the predominant thought on Brahman ". प्रधान or अरूपवत् is the salient feature of Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14). As पुरुष is रूपवत्, He is another (subsidiary) thought on Brahman. पुरुष differs from प्रधान because both of them are different प्रज्ञाs or thoughts on Brahman.

पुरुष is not a thought on प्रधान, but both of them are different thoughts on Brahman itself. Therefore, both of them are विद्याs.

26. The Sūtrakāra says that the पुरुष is *seen* (in the preceding portion of the Brahmasūtras) to be प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववान् on

account of अनुबन्ध and other grounds (अनुबन्धादिभ्यः). The well-known अनुबन्धचतुष्टय of वेदान्त are विषय, प्रयोजन, अधिकारिन् and संबन्ध. But this idea of अनुबन्धचतुष्टय is later than the Sūtrakāra. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean by अनुबन्ध the application of names or words as names to either of the two aspects of Brahman (See Bra. Sū. III. 3. 52).

" दृष्टः " in the Sūtra probably refers to what has been noticed in the following statements in Bra. Sū. III. 3 :—

(*a*) The difference of संज्ञाs of Brahman was emphasised in Sūtra 8, where it was accepted by the Sūtrakāra that there were different संज्ञाs of Brahman, but that the difference did not bar the उपसंहार proposed by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 5. The difference between the two names of Brahman was like that between the two names of a serpent *viz.*, अहि and कुण्डल (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27). This shows that पुरुष is a different thought on Brahman, just as प्रधान.

(*b*) In Sūtra 10, the Sūtrakāra admitted that everything was identical, but the two names (इमे द्वे संज्ञे) were different. So, they were two aspects or thoughts of the same Brahman, which could not be identified in any case.

(*c*) In Sūtra 16 and in Sūtra 43, it is stated that the meditation on प्रधान and पुरुष is to be performed by conceiving both of them as the Self of the meditator. Thus, the method of meditation on both is the same. This shows that पुरुष is a different aspect of Brahman like प्रधान.

(*d*) In Sūtra 18 the Sūtrakāra states that the *result* of the meditation on प्रधान is mentioned in the Śruti laying down the process of meditation (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 10) and, therefore, it is the अपूर्व resulting from the act of meditation. In Sūtra 19 he says that the same अपूर्व is to be taken as understood in a similar text *i. e.*, in the Vedāntas of पुरुष, because both प्रधान and पुरुष being the aspects of the same Brahman

were not different. This shows that the result of the पुरुषविद्या was the same as that of the प्रधानविद्या.

(*e*) In Sūtras 28–30, the Sūtrakāra says that a seeker may meditate on any of the two aspects of Brahman, प्रधान and पुरुष, because both are not opposed to each other and that गति or मोक्ष would be achieved by following either of the two (Sūtra 29). This also shows that the Puruṣa is a different though not contradictory aspect of Brahman, the other aspect being the अरूपवत् or अव्यक्त aspect.

(*f*) Sūtras 34, 35, 36 state that the meditation on प्रधान and पुरुष is to be carried out in the human heart. This also places पुरुष on an equal status as प्रधान.

(*g*) In Sūtras 37–42, the Sūtrakāra said that there was an interchange of the attributes or the thoughts of प्रधान and पुरुष because the Śrutis themselves characterised प्रधान like पुरुष and *vice versa*; thus, an option of attributes was also given (Sūtras 38–39). Such an option would only mean that पुरुष is प्रज्ञान्तर "another aspect" and so far different from the अव्यक्त aspect of Brahman.

Thus, on the grounds of (अनुबन्ध) the application of words (*a* and *b*), the method of meditation (*c*), the result of meditation (*d*), the attainment of liberation (*e*) and the interchange of attributes occuring in the Śruti (*g*), the Sūtrakāra has shown that पुरुष is different from प्रधान just as one aspect of a principle is different from another aspect of the same. The two are different thoughts on the same principle *viz.*, Brahman (प्रज्ञान्तरपृथकत्व).

27. तदुक्तम्—This refers to a statement in which पुरुष is said to be a different thought on Brahman from प्रधान (प्रज्ञान्तर-पृथक्त्ववत् = "one having the difference of another thought"). It seems to us, as we have already suggested, that the reference is to पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः which must have been the original reading in place of पृथग्घ्यप्रतिबन्धः in Sūtra 42. In that Sūtra we have

been told that it is not possible to state definitely what the attiributes of each of प्रधान and पुरुष are; and that the result of this standpoint is that there is no objection from the Śruti to taking पुरुष as a different thought (धी in place of हि) from प्रधान. This amounts to the acceptance of पुरुष as an aspect of Brahman separate from प्रधान. Therefore, तदुक्तम् in Sūtra 50 is a reference to what is stated in Sūtra 42.

The identity of the statement in Sūtras 42 and 50, if correct, also justifies our suggestion to change पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः in Sūtra 42 to पृथग्ध्यप्रतिबन्धः.

28. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra gives one more argument for the *independence* of मनश्चिदाद्यः अग्नयः by rejecting the प्रकरण. "अनुबन्ध" means according to Śaṅkara the fact that the Śruti connects (अनुबध्नाति) various parts of activity (क्रियावयवान्) with the functions of the mind *etc.*, and this connection (अनुबन्ध) results in संपत्; therefore, the क्रियावयवs are not physical but only mental.

By आदि in अनुबन्धादि Śaṅkara refers to what the Sūtrakāra would have said against the पूर्वपक्ष's arguments of प्रकरण and अतिदेश (Sūtras III. 3. 45-46). To us it appears that without saying that these two arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष are wrong, the Sūtrakāra gives independent arguments to prove that his case is correct. (See Sūtras 47, 48 which serve in a way as refutations of Sūtras 45-46. See Note 14 *supra*).

Śaṅkara takes प्रज्ञा as विद्या or विज्ञान, and प्रज्ञान्तराणि as the शाण्डिल्य and other विद्याs, which are प्रज्ञाs or विद्याs other than मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः. "पृथक्" means independent of कर्मन्s and of other विद्याs. He takes वत् in the sense of यथा. Thus प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत् means, according to Śaṅkara, "just as शाण्डिल्य and other विद्याs are different from कर्मन्s and other विद्याs" [so मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are different from क्रिया *i. e.*, they are विज्ञानs]. So, according to Śaṅkara प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत् would mean "like the independence of शाण्डिल्य and other विद्याs."

Śaṅkara could not construe पृथक्त्व satisfactorily with his explanation of प्रज्ञा and प्रज्ञान्तर; so, he seems to take पृथक्त्व as "पृथक् भवन्ति".

Having taken वत् in the sense of यथा (and not as a possessive termination as we have done) Śaṅkara separates प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत् and दृष्टः. He could not connect दृष्टः (sing., form) with मनिश्चदादयः अग्नयः (plu. form), so, he takes "अवेष्टेः उत्कर्षः" as the विशेष्य of दृष्टः in the Sūtra. In our opinion दृष्टः by its singular number and masculine gender refers to पुरुष who is another thought on Brahman in the Sūtras. And we have to connect प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववत् with दृष्टः. Lastly, तदुक्तम् is, according to Śaṅkara, a reference to Jai. Sū. XI. 4. 7.

Sūtra 51

29. This Sūtra like Sūtras 47–50 appears to us to be an argument to prove that पुरुष is विद्या, not a क्रिया.

The पूर्वपक्ष (in Sūtras 45–46) tries to establish that the meditation on पुरुष is a क्रिया an act like a mental act and gives two हेतुs for this *viz.*, (1) प्रकरणात् and (2) अतिदेशात्. The Sūtrakāra seems to think that the पूर्वपक्ष might also give one more हेतु *viz.*, (1) सामान्यात्, to prove its conclusion, and, therefore, he says "न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेः".

From the word "लोकापत्ति" in this Sūtra, we can get an idea of the सामान्य meant by the Sūtrakāra. The Śrutis say that one who knows Brahman enjoys all objects of desires in company of Brahman. सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता। (Tai. Upa. II. 1). तं तं लोकं जयते तांश्च कामांस्तस्मादात्मज्ञं ह्यर्चयेद् भूतिकामः (Mu. Upa. III. 10). स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा *etc. etc.* (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3). The Sūtrakāra himself mentions this सामान्य or साम्य in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 21 (भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गात्). A similar enjoyment of desired objects in the worlds of मनुष्यगन्धर्वs, देवगन्धर्वs, पितृs, आजानजदेवs, कर्मदेवs, देवs, इन्द्र, बृहस्पति, प्रजापति or other worlds is also taught in the Scriptures (*e. g.* Tai. Upa. II. 8. See also

Chā. Upa. VII. 4–12) as a result of action, physical or mental, as in Chā. Upa. VII. 4–12. The opponent may argue that on account of this सामान्य 'common characteristic of enjoyment of desired objects', the meditation on पुरुष is a क्रिया like a mental projection, on the अरूपवत् Brahman (स्यात् क्रिया मानसवत् ।-Sūtra 45).

30. अपि — The पूर्वपक्ष has already given two arguments प्रकरणात् and अतिदेशात्. The Sūtrakāra now says that the पूर्वपक्ष may give a third argument *also viz.*, that of सामान्य.

31. न — The Sūtrakāra says that even on the ground of the common characteristic the meditation on पुरुष cannot be a क्रिया, a mental act.

32. उपलब्धेः — The Sūtrakāra gives the reason why the meditation on पुरुष is विद्या (विद्यैव तु Sūtra 47). "Because *we find in the Śruti* that पुरुष is विद्या". He has already shown that in the Śruti the knowledge of पुरुष is definitely said to be विद्या (Sūtras 47–48). Just as he does not deny the other two हेतुs (प्रकरणात्, अतिदेशात्) of the पूर्वपक्ष, so also he does not deny the third हेतु *viz.*, the सामान्य. The सामान्य or the common characteristic is a fact; yet पुरुष is विद्या *i. e.* ब्रह्मविद्या because we find that the Śruti says so. उपलब्धि in the Sūtra seems to mean "what we find in the Śruti" (*Cf.* उपलभ्यते in Bra. Sū. II. 1. 36, also उपलब्धि in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 54).

33. मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः — The Sūtrakāra has above denied that the meditation on पुरुष was a क्रिया; now he denies that पुरुष is a लोक like the various लोकs or worlds of gods, पितृs, गन्धर्वs. The पूर्वपक्ष's argument and the reply of the Siddhāntin are the same in लोकापत्तिदोषनिवारण as in क्रियापत्तिदोषनिवारण and therefore we get a Sūtra like Sūtra 51.

It may be argued by the पूर्वपक्ष that पुरुष or the attainment of पुरुष is like that of a world because in both the cases, there is a common characteristic *viz.*, enjoyment of desired objects. Thus, the पुरुष is liable to the fault of being a world (लोकापत्ति) on account of the सामान्य.

The Sūtrakāra's reply is that the पुरुष is not a *loka* because the knowledge of पुरुष is found in the Śruti to be the knowledge of Brahman (ब्रह्मविद्या – Sūtra 47, Mu. Upa. I. 2. 13); so पुरुष is Brahman, not a world. The Sūtrakāra does not deny the सामान्य, but he denies that पुरुष is a लोक.

34. मृत्युवत् — The interpretation of this word is somewhat difficult. But this much is certain that the Sūtrakāra here asserts that Brahman or rather Puruṣa is not a *loka*, just as it is not Death though there is सामान्य between Puruṣa and a लोक and also between पुरुष and मृत्यु. The fact that Puruṣa is not मृत्यु inspite of a common characteristic between the two is given as an illustration to prove that पुरुष is not a लोक though there is सामान्य between the two. If this be the way in which the example of Death (मृत्युवत्) should be explained, then it is likely that the Sūtrakāra here refers to Kaṭha Upa. I. 2. *viz.* यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चोभे भवत ओदनः । मृत्युर्यस्योपसेचनं क इत्था वेद यत्र सः ॥ In Br. Sū. I. 2. 9 (अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्) it is proved that this great Eater is the Supreme Being. Brahman is an Eater like Death, both of them devour the world, अदन is the common characteristic of the two; but even on account of this सामान्य, Brahman does not become Mṛtyu (Death). Similarly, though those who attain पुरुष enjoy objects of desire just as those who attain certain worlds, पुरुष does not in the least become a लोक on the ground of a common characteristic with a लोक.

35. Śaṅkara has refuted the two arguments of प्रकरणात् and अतिदेशात् (Sūtras 45–46) by interpreting आदि in अनुबन्धादि (Sūtra 50) in his own way. It is very strange that the Sūtrakāra would not refute the arguments of the पूर्वपक्ष stated in Sūtras 45–46 immediately after they have been given *e. g.*, in Sūtras 47–49; and even in Sūtra 50 there is no distinct refutation of the arguments of the opponent. The पूर्वपक्ष's illustration of मानसवत् (the fact that ग्रहण, आसादन, हवन, आहरण, उपह्वान and भक्षण of सोम are mental acts and are

yet क्रियाशेष) which occurs in Sūtra 45 is according to Śaṅkara refuted in Sūtra 51.

" सामान्य " is thus, according to Śaṅkara, मानसग्रहसामान्य " the fact that मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः and the action of ग्रहण, आसादन *etc.*, of सोम are *both* mental ", मानसग्रह is common to both; so, " न सामान्यात् अपि " means " Even on account of the common characteristic of being mental (and not physical), मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः cannot be क्रियाशेष."

" उपलब्धेः" means, according to Śaṅkara, " पूर्वोक्तेभ्यः श्रुत्यादिहेतुभ्यः केवलपुरुषार्थत्वोपलब्धेः". Śaṅkara thus refers by उपलब्धि to the arguments given in Sūtra 44, 47–50. The important argument of the Siddhāntin against the पूर्वपक्ष's argument of सामान्य is according to Śaṅkara that there is वैषम्य also, and this is not given in Sūtra 51 but it is given in his bhāṣya by Śaṅkara.

मृत्युवत् — Śaṅkara takes this as a reference to Bṛ. Upa. III. 2. 10 where अग्नि is said to be मृत्यु and to another passage where आदित्यपुरुष is said to be मृत्यु; and he says that though the word मृत्यु is commonly applied to अग्नि and आदित्यपुरुष, the two are not the same. It should be said that this illustration does not form an exact illustration for explaining even Śaṅkara's दार्ष्टान्तिक (the point to be illustrated). According to Śaṅkara, the पूर्वपक्ष argued that मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are मानस and are yet क्रियाशेष, just as ग्रहण, आसादन, हवन, आहरण *etc.*, of सोम on the tenth day of the दशरात्र Sacrifice which are मानस are yet क्रियाशेष. मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः and ग्रहणादि क्रियाs are मानस and are yet क्रियाशेष. They are not called " मानस ". Only the मनश्चितः अग्नयः are called मनोमय, but the पूर्वपक्ष has not argued its case (in Sūtra 45) on the ground of their being called मानस. The सामान्य is a common characteristic, not a common designation, even as explained by Śaṅkara in the beginning of Sūtra 51. Thus it seems to us that the illustration of मृत्युवत् is not correctly explained even so far as Śaṅkara's own explaination of Sūtras 45 and 51 are concerned.

Moreover, from the expression "मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः" it would appear that only *one* illustration is meant here by the Sūtrakāra. But Śaṅkara separates मृत्युवत् and लोकापत्ति and makes out two illustrations. For this reason also Śaṅkara's interpretation of मृत्युवत् is not correct. To us it seems that मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः should be interpreted either as यथा सामान्यात् पुरुषस्य न मृत्य्वापत्तिः तथा सामान्यात् पुरुषस्य न लोकापत्तिः। or यथा सामान्यात् मृत्योः न लोकापत्तिः तथा सामान्यात् पुरुषस्य न लोकापत्तिः। The former seems to be meant in the Sūtra (51).

लोकापत्तिः – Śaṅkara, as said above, does not construe 'मृत्युवन्न हि लोकापत्तिः' as one expression, but he takes लोकापत्ति as a different illustration from मृत्युवत् which is also an illustration, both illustrations having been meant to contradict the पूर्वपक्ष's illustration of ग्रहणादिमानसक्रियाs. So, Śaṅkara takes लोकापत्ति as referring to Chā. Upa. V. 4. 1 and interprets लोकापत्ति as यथा च न......लोकस्य अग्निभावापत्तिः तद्वत्. To us लोकापत्ति seems to be the दोष of some principle or topic in question which would be liable to be interpreted as a लोक 'a world'. And in the Sūtra it seems to us that पुरुष was liable to be interpreted as a लोक on account of भोगसामान्य, but the Sūtrakāra denies this लोकापत्ति and thereby proves that पुरुष is ब्रह्मविद्या, not a क्रिया like a mental act.

Sūtra 52

36. ताद्विध्ये — Two types of similarity. ताद्विध्ये is the reading in the Nirnayasagar Edition of Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya (1915), and if we read the bhāṣya we find that Śaṅkara mentions two ताद्विध्यs (one which precedes and the other which follows). For this reason we propose to adopt the reading ताद्विध्ये. Other editions of Śaṅkara's bhāṣya and other bhāṣyas mention the reading ताद्विध्यम्.

37. परेण च (पुरुषस्य) शब्दस्य ताद्विध्ये — The Puruṣa has two types of words common with the प्रधान or पर the chief aspect of Brahman. Thus, Brahman, Puruṣa, Ātman, Akṣara, Avyakta, *etc.*, are all of them terms the Puruṣa has in common with

the Pradhāna. These words are of two types, those applicable to the अरूपवत् aspect, *viz.*, Akṣara, Avyakta, Brahman, *etc.*, and those applicable to the रूपवत् aspect, *viz.*, Ātman, Puruṣa, *etc.* This seems to us to be the sense of परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्ये.

If the reading ताद्विध्यम् is followed, the sentence would have the following sense: "पुरुष has a common terminology with प्रधान or the principal aspect."

38. भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः—The same terms are applied to both प्रधान and पुरुष, but the particular association (अनुबन्ध) of a term with either प्रधान or पुरुष depends upon the frequency (भूयस्त्व) of the use of that term for either in the Upaniṣads.

39. By the above argument the Sūtrakāra seems to support his view that the meditation on the पुरुष is a ब्रह्मविद्या, not a क्रिया and therefore the option of choice given in Sūtra 28 stands as before (Sūtra 44-45 तदपि पूर्वविकल्पः).

40. Śaṅkara interprets this Sūtra as an argument for proving that मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are not connected with क्रिया but are विद्या.

"परेण" means, according to Śaṅkara what *follows* the text in which मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are mentioned; and he also quotes the text which precedes the text of मनश्चितः अग्नयः (परस्तात्). 'परेण' is thus interpreted as परस्तात् referring to a subsequent *text.* To us it seems that "परेण" means परेण ब्रह्मणा, *i. e.*, प्रधानेन. The Sūtrakāra often uses the word पर in this sense, *e. g.*, Bra. Sū. III. 2. 5, 11, 31; IV. 3.10,12; *etc.*, *etc.*

'ताद्विध्य' means केवलविद्याविधित्वम्; and शब्दस्य is not connected by Śaṅkara with ताद्विध्यम् but with 'प्रयोजनं लक्ष्यते,' taken as understood. Thus, ताद्विध्य meaning केवलविद्याविधित्व is indicated by the subsequent sentence to be the aim of the word or the text; and, therefore, says Śaṅkara, मनश्चिदादयःअग्नयः are विद्या and not शुद्धकर्माङ्गविधि. He gives a quotation for परस्तात् 'a subsequent text'. In our opinion 'शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यम्' should be taken as a

single expression having the sense of "the sameness of terminology or words" *i. e.*, a common terminology.

So, according to Śaṅkara, the Sūtrakāra argues that sentences which precede and also those which follow the text of मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः associate these fires with विद्या or विद्याफल and therefore these fires which are mentioned between these texts should be also associated with विद्या, and not with कर्मन्.

भूयस्त्वात् means, according to Śaṅkara, "Because a *majority* of the parts of the fire are of the nature of संपादयितव्य 'to be effected by meditation'"; and अनुबन्ध is interpreted as "अग्निना अनुबध्यते विद्या (न कर्माङ्गत्वात्)." "Because a majority of the parts of these मनश्चिदादयः अग्नयः are संपादयितव्य in the विद्या, the विद्या is associated with अग्नि, but not because these fires are कर्माङ्गs". Is a commentator reliable in his work when he adds so many words to a Sūtra in order to draw out from it a sense consistent with what he thinks to be the purpose of the Sūtra ?

Sūtra 53

41. Sūtras 53–54 are very important. Śaṅkara says that these have been used by Śabarasvāmin and Upavarṣa (इत एव चाकृष्याचार्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणलक्षणे वर्णितम् । अत एव च भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः ।).

42. According to Śaṅkara, in the preceding Adhikaraṇa the मनश्चित् and other fires have been described as meant for man (पुरुषार्थ), so, now the Sūtrakāra tells us who that man is. And, the discussion about the existence of the soul as distinguished from the body taken up during the consideration of the meditations of the nature of injunction aims at showing that the entire Scripture is "subsidiary" to that soul. Again, the existence of the soul distinct from the body is supported by arguments in order to prove his 'fitness' (अधिकार) for bondage and liberation. Lastly, in the begining of the first Pāda of the first Adhyāya the Commentator (*i. e.*, Śaṅkara)

has stated that the soul is distinct from the body (See the आध्यासभाष्य), but there was no Sūtra given by the Sūtrakāra there, so, here he gives an express Sūtra.

Such are the arguments given by Śaṅkara to explain the relevancy of these two Sūtras in the context in which they occur (III. 3. 53–54).

To us it does not appear that Sūtra 53 gives such a view as the Lokāyatikas or Materialists are said to have held. Rather, it seems to us that the पूर्वपक्ष itself does admit that the soul is spiritual and can exist and did exist once as distinct from the body. This sense is evident from the very wording of the Sūtra (आत्मनः शरीरे भावात् ।). So, we do not think that Sūtra 54 refutes any materialistic view of Ātman. Moreover, the topic of the individual soul is dealt with in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 17–53, and the eternal nature (नित्यत्व) of the soul is stated in the very first Sūtra of that group, since without establishing the नित्यत्व of the soul at the very start no discussion of the soul can serve any useful purpose. Again, the soul is said to be in the heart (II. 3. 24). Moreover, it has been already stated twice that the soul has come into contact with the body (अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसंबन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत्–Bra. Sū. II. 3. 48 and देहयोगाद्वा सोपि–III. 2. 6). So, it does not seem to us to be necessary that the Sūtrakāra would be required to refute the materialistic view of the soul here in the present context.

43. To us it seems that these two Sūtras form part of the preceding Adhikaraṇa and that they discuss a view about the " पूर्वविकल्पः " " the option of meditating on पुरुष or the रूपवत् aspect of Brahman," mentioned in Sūtras 44–45 and 46–52.

44. Some hold that the option of meditation on पुरुष is given in the Śruti because the individual soul is in the body. Who these ' some ' are, the present author must admit, he is not able to point out from the Upaniṣads ; but this पूर्वपक्ष seems

to be a view like the one mentioned in the following verses of the Bhagavadgītā :—

ये त्वक्षरमनिर्देश्यमव्यक्तमुपासते ।
सर्वत्रगमचिन्त्यं च कूटस्थमचलं ध्रुवम् ॥ ३ ॥
सनियम्येन्द्रियग्रामं सर्वत्र समबुद्धयः ।
ते प्राप्नुवन्ति मामेव सर्वभूतहिते रताः ॥ ४ ॥
क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम् ।
अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भि रवाप्यते ॥ ५ ॥

Bha. Gī. XII. 3–5.

In these verses the meditation on the पुरुष as distinguished from that on the अक्षर is supported by saying that the *soul having a body* can attain the goal of the Unmanifest with great difficulty. A contrast between देहवद्भिः and अव्यक्ता गतिः is suggested in the verse. It seems that some Vedantins (स्मार्त Vedantins ?) defended the meditation on Brahman as पुरुष by saying that the soul is in the body and, therefore, he can more easily understand and realize the अरूपवत् form of Brahman through the रूपवत्.

With this view about the option of meditation on पुरुष the Sūtrakāra does not agree, as will be clear from the next Sūtra.

45. It should be marked that in this Sūtra the body and the soul are not at all said to be ' identical, so that there is no soul but the body'; but rather admitting that the two are distinct from each other, it is only emphasized that the soul is *in the body*.

Sūtra 54

46. व्यतिरेक means that the soul exists without a body or in separation from a body. He is not *always in the body*.

47. तद्भावाभावित्वात्—The soul exists distinct or separate from the body (व्यतिरेकः) because it does not exist (अभावित्व) when the body exists (तद्भाव). It is not possible to argue

that the soul exists (always) when the body exists, because that is not a matter of our experience. For this reason, the Sūtrakāra gives the other argument in order to show that the soul exists separate from the body.

48. By establishing that the soul does exist independently of the body, the Sūtrakāra refutes the पूर्वपक्ष that the पुरुष aspect of Brahman is taught in the Scripture *because the soul being in the body* cannot easily realize the unmanifest goal.

49. न तूपलब्धिवत् — The Śrutis describe the soul as देहिन्, शरीरिन् *etc.*, which means that the soul always exists in a body. Thus, we find in the Scripture (उपलब्धि) that the individual soul is never without a body till he gets liberation (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 2). The Sūtrakāra says that the soul is not always in a body (till he gets liberation) as is *found* stated in the Śruti. There are many occasions during transmigration when the soul is free from the body, though he is permanently free from the gross body only when he gets liberation.

' उपलब्धि ' in other Sūtras means what *we find stated* in the Śruti. So, it must have the same sense here also. Śaṅkara takes उपलब्धि in the sense of perception, *i. e.*, the perception of the elements and the objects made of elements and he explains न तूपलब्धिवत् as यथैवास्या भूतभौतिकविषयाया उपलब्धेर्भावोऽभ्युपगम्यते एवं व्यतिरेकोऽप्यस्यास्तेभ्योऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। उपलब्धिस्वरूप एव च न आत्मेत्यात्मनो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वम्. Thus, he seems to make out two more arguments for the distinction of the Atman from the body from न तूपलब्धिवत्. We think, ' उपलब्धि ' means what we *find stated* in the Śruti.

50. Śaṅkara takes this and the preceding Sūtra to prove that the soul is not identical with the body. We believe that the very words of Sūtra 53 are sufficient to show that the देहात्मवाद is not the topic here. " The Ātman is *in* the body " already means that the soul is not identical with the body, though it is in the body. Sūtra 54 gives the argument

that the soul is absent when the body is present, so, this Sūtra also tries to show that the soul is not invariably in the body (व्यतिरेकः). We find that in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 48 (अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसंबंधाज्ज्योतिरादिवत्) and III. 2. 6 (देहयोगाद्वा सोपि) the soul is already admitted to be *not identical* with the body. To these two Sūtras we may add Bra. Sū. III. 1. 1. (तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् ।). These Sūtras make the topic of Sūtra III. 3. 53–54 rather superfluous if we have to adopt the interpretation of Śaṅkara.

Moreover, 'आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्' is only a हेतु or an argument and the purpose of the argument is, it seems to us, to show why the पूर्वविकल्प about the meditation on पुरुष (Sūtras III. 3. 28, 44, 45) is given in the Śruti.

SECTION XIII

Meditation on Brahman, based upon its Parts.

Sūtras III. 3. 55-56

(५५) अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

(५६) मन्त्रादिवद्वाऽविरोधः ।

TRANSLATION

[PŪRVAPAKṢA-] But the meditation fixed on the limbs [or parts of the Supreme One] are not [to be collected for the purpose of meditation] because [they should, properly speaking, be collected] in *all* Branches of *each* particular Veda [only]. 55

[Siddhānta]—Rather, there would be no objection [on the part of the Śruti, to collecting them] as in the case of the Mantras, *etc.*, [of one Veda taken into another Veda]. 56

NOTES

Sūtra 55

1. The meditation or meditations on the अङ्गिन् *i. e.*, the principal one *viz.*, the Para, have been the topic of the preceding Sūtras (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11–54). Now the Sūtrakāra discusses the meditations on the अङ्गs or limbs or parts of Brahman. After ' अङ्गावबद्धाः ' we may add ' धियः ' from such Sūtras as Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31 in which it is implied and Bra. Sū. III. 3. 33 in which it is expressed. The meditations on the अङ्गिन् or the Supreme One form one type of meditations; those on the parts or अङ्गs of Brahman form a second group of meditations.

2. After ' न ' we may add ' उपसंहर्तव्याः ' from Sūtra 5. The latter taught that a collection of thoughts or meditations on the अङ्गिन् or Brahman should be made from *all* the Branches of *all* the Vedas (*i. e.*, from all the accepted Upaniṣads). Here (in Sūtra 55) we are told that no collection is to be made in the case of the meditations on the parts of Brahman. We can also take समुच्चीयेरन् as understood (in Sūtra 55) from Sūtra 60.

3. The meditation on Brahman is taught in *all* the Branches of *all* the Vedas; so the meditations or thoughts on Brahman proper are to be collected from *all* the Upaniṣads as has been done in Bra. Sū. I. 1–3. But the meditations on parts of Brahman are meant for (all) the Branches of each particular Veda only, and so the thoughts on the parts of Brahman are not to be collected from all the Branches of all the Vedas, but they should, properly speaking, be collected by the followers of the Branches of one particular Veda only. To explain the same, the meditation on Brahman as Vaiśvānara is a meditation on Brahman; and the meditation

on Brahman (under some thought or other) is taught in all the Branches of all the Vedas; therefore, the meditation on Brahman as Vaiśvānara is to be collected by the followers of all the Vedas. But the meditations on the parts of Vaiśvānara are taught only in the Chā. Upa. *i. e.*, only in one Śākhā of the Sāmaveda. So, these are not to be collected by the followers of the *other* Vedas. They should, however, be collected by the followers of the other Branches of the Sāmaveda. This seems to be the sense of "शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्". The काण्व and माध्यन्दिन Branches of the Yajurveda should mutually collect the meditations on the अङ्गs of Brahman from each other, but the followers of the other Vedas need not collect the अङ्गोपासनाs from them.

The following is a list of all the Eleven Upaniṣads referred to in the Brahmasūtra together with the names of the Śākhās and the Veda:—

1.	Īśopaniṣad Vājasaneyiśākhā	Śukla Yajurveda	(4)
2.	Kenopaniṣad Talavakāraśakhā	Sāmaveda	(2)
3.	Kaṭhopaniṣad	Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda	
4.	Praśnopaniṣad	Atharvaveda	(3)
5.	Muṇḍakopaniṣad	Atharvaveda	
6.	Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad	Atharvaveda	
7.	Taittirīyopaniṣad	Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda	
8.	Aitareyopaniṣad	Ṛgveda	(2)
9.	Chāndogyopaniṣad	Sāmaveda	
10.	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad	Śukla Yajurveda.	
11.	Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇopaniṣad	Ṛgveda.	

(See Winternitz; Vol. I, PP. 235-237.) Winternitz adds Śve. Upa. (Yajurveda), Mahā Narāyaṇa Upa. (Yajurveda) and Maitrāyaṇi Upa. (Yajurveda) to these eleven and says that at any rate only these fourteen may be regarded as useful for the history of the ancient Indian Philosophy (preceding the Buddhistic Period).

4. Should we interpret 'शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्' to mean 'because the अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः *differ* even in the Śākhās of each Veda'? If so, what about those in the काण्व and माध्यन्दिन Śākhās of the Yajurveda? When the अङ्गोपासनाs are regarded as भिन्नाः even in all the Śākhās of a Veda, there is very little propriety in collecting them from one Veda into another Veda.

5. A note on the meditations on Brahman in the Upaniṣads would not be out of place here.

It appears to us that the meditations on Brahman taught in the Upaniṣads can be in a general way divided into four classes :—

(*a*) Meditations on some parts of the Saṁhitā as Brahman.

Such meditations are like those given in

(I) Chā. Upa.I. 7. 5-9, अथ य एषोऽन्तरक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते सैवर्क्तत्साम तदुक्थं तद्यजुस्तद्ब्रह्म तस्यैतस्य तदेवरूपं यदमुष्य रूपम्......";

(II) Chā. Upa. I. 9. 1-2; and

(III) Chā. Upa. I. 11. 5.

In these Upaniṣads Brahman is identified with any or all of the Vedas, with the उद्गीथ (Chā. Upa. I. 9. 1-2), the deity of the प्रस्ताव (Chā. Upa. I. 11. 5). From Bra. Sū. I. 1. 22-23, we learn that Brahman is mentioned in these Śrutis. But it is here associated with the priestly duties. For the seeker of Brahman, It is to be meditated upon as associated with the priestly functions only so long as the seeker does not give up his priestly duties (See Bra. Sū. III. 3. 32, III. 4. 41-46). At a later stage when the seeker renounces the world, he is to give up meditating on Brahman as connected with priestly duties. These meditations are called आधिकारिक meditations in Br. Sū. III. 3. 32.

(*b*) There are several meditations in which several objects are to be meditated upon as Brahman and the result is only

the achievement of some object of desire. These are called काम्य उपासनाs (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 60). Such उपासनाs are like those given in :—

(I) Chā. Upa. III. 12, where the meditation of 'अन्तर्हृदये आकाशः' as Brahman is said to give पूर्णमप्रवर्तिनीं श्रियम् ।

(II) Chā. Upa. III. 18, where मनस् and आकाश are said to be meditated upon as Brahman and the result is the attainment of fame, reputation and Brahmanical lustre.

(III) Chā. Upa. III. 19, where the Sun is declared to be meditated upon as Brahman and the result is that the meditator would hear " good sounds " (स य एतमेवं विद्वानादित्यं ब्रह्मेत्युपास्तेऽभ्याशो ह यदेनं साधवो घोषा आ च गच्छेयुरुप च निम्रेडेरन्निम्रेडेरन् ।).

(IV) Chā. Upa. IV. 5–8 may be called a काम्य meditation so far as the meditation on each पाद alone is concerned.

(V) Chā. Upa. VII. 1–14. Here a series of fourteen items, नाम्, वाक्, *etc.*, *etc.*, is given and in each case a particular 'fruit' is said to be achieved by meditating on each of नामन्, वाक्, *etc.*, as Brahman. Only the meditation on the highest item *viz.*, भूमन् brings absolution (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 8), because that भूमन् is Brahman itself.

(VI) Bṛ. Upa. IV. 1. 2–7, in which वाक्, प्राण, चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, मनः, हृदय are taught to be meditated upon as Brahman and the result is that the particular object of meditation would never leave the meditator, all elements would run to him, he would become a god and go unto the gods.

All these are काम्य उपासनाs of Brahman and those who seek the respective 'fruits' may perform them taking either each singly or some of them combined, according to his desires (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 60).

(*c*) There is a third type of meditations in which Brahman is said to be identical not with one particular object, but with a number of objects, so that *all* of them together make up

the knowledge of Brahman, while each of them by itself is only a part of Brahman.

(I) The best example of this perhaps is the meditation on Brahman as Vaiśvānara Atman (Chā. Upa. V. 12-18). The sky (द्यु), the Sun, the Wind, the Ether, the Water, the Earth, are said to be all of them jointly making Ātmā Vaivśānara or Brahman, but singly each of them makes only one part of Brahman, *viz.*, the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेह), the bladder (वस्ती), the feet respectively. Thus, here we have an exmaple of the उपासना or meditation on Brahman based upon its parts. To think of Brahman as Vaiśvānara Ātman is a meditation on Brahman itself; but to think of Brahman as consisting of so many parts is an अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना.

(II) Similarly, Chā. Upa. IV. 5-8 teaches that Brahman has four पादs and each पाद has four कलाs; thus, Brahman consists of sixteen parts *viz.*, 1-4 the four quarters; 5-8 पृथ्वी, अन्तरिक्ष, द्यौः, समुद्र; 9-12 अग्नि, सूर्य, चन्द्र, विद्युत्; 13-16 प्राण, चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, मनः. The meditation on Brahman as consisting of these sixteen parts makes a man know or realize Brahman (*Cf.* ब्रह्मविदिव वै सोम्य भासि ।-Chā. Upa. IV. 9. 2). In this meditation, the पादs are given names (प्रकाशवान्, अनन्तवान्, ज्योतिष्मान्, आयतनवान्), but they or the कलाs are not said to be *particular* parts in the Supreme Being, as is the case with the parts of the Vaiśvānara Atman. This seems to be the difference between the two उपासनाs; but each of them is undoubtedly an अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना.

(III) The उपकोशलविद्या is also an उपासना of Brahman as consisting of so many parts (Chā. Upa. IV. 10-14).

(IV) Similarly, Bṛ. Upa. IV. 1. 2-7 gives another अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना.

The Sūtrakāra seems to say that these अङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः should not be collected by the followers of all the Vedas,

because they are meant for all the Śākhās of each Veda (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55); or rather, there would be no violation of the Śruti even if they be collected in the other Veda than the one in which they are found, because several मन्त्रs are found common in several Vedas. They must have originally been the property of one Veda, but later on have been taken by the followers of the other Vedas. It is not necessary that all the parts should be taken in an अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना, but the more the better (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 57). These meditations are each of them independent of the other; so the parts of Ātman Vaiśvānara should not be mixed with the parts of षोडशकला ब्रह्मविद्या or उपकोशलविद्या or any other similar विद्या (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 58). An option is given regarding the selection from these उपासनाs on the ground that the fruit of each of them is the same (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 59).

(*d*) The last and the most important type of ब्रह्मोपासनाs is that meditation on Brahman, in which Brahman is associated with some idea, quality or qualities, attributes. Examples of this type are those collected by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. I. 1-3. Thus, Brahman is to be meditated upon as that from which this world appears, in which it continues, and into which it returns (all Adhikaraṇas of Bra. Sū. I. 1). Or, Brahman may be meditated upon as described in Chā. Upa. III. 14 (सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म......), Chā. Upa. IV. 15 (अक्षिणि पुरुषः......), Chā. Upa. VII. 23. 1 (भूमा), Chā. Upa. VIII. 1-4 (दहर), Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 (परं ज्योतिः), Chā. Upa. VIII. 14 (आकाश), Bṛ. Upa. III. 7 (अन्तर्यामिन्), Bṛ. Upa. III. 8 (अक्षर upholding all the objects ending with the Ether). All these *upāsanās* are direct उपासनाs of Brahman. Brahman meditated upon as वैश्वानर आत्मन् will also belong to such a form of meditation.

The fruit of these and the meditations on Brahman as consisting of parts (अङ्गावबद्धा उपासनाः) is the realization of Brahman or liberation. Brahman may be thought of as possessing as many of these attributes as possible (Bra. Sū. III. 3.

31). Similarly पुरुष may be meditated upon (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28, 44–54). This is the main or principal form of meditation and seems to us to be the topic of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11–54.

There are serveral meditations mentioned in the Upaniṣads, which are concerned only with rites and not at all with Brahman, *e. g.*, the meditation of उद्गीथ as the Syllable Om (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 7, I. 1. 8, I. 2. 14), the meditation of उद्गीथ as the Sun (Chā. Upa. I. 3. 1, *etc.*,); so also the meditations mentioned in Chā. Upa. II. 1–22, Chā. Upa. IV. 17. These are in no way meditations on Brahman and, therefore, they do not seem to have been considered by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III. 3, which is devoted to the meditations on Brahman.

6. According to Śaṅkara Sūtras 53–54 make an incidental topic (प्रासङ्गिकी कथा), but to us it appears to be a पूर्वपक्ष against the पुरुष aspect of the Para and a reply to it, taught in Sūtras III. 3. 44–54.

Sūtra 55, he says, is a continuation of ' the topic in hand. ' To us it appears that the preceding Sūtras 11–54 dealt with the meditations on the अङ्गिन् or Brahman itself, while Sūtra 55 begins the treatment of the meditations on the अङ्गs of Brahman.

Śaṅkara takes अङ्ग in the sense of कर्माङ्ग and explains कर्माङ्गावबद्धाः उपासनाः as उपासनाs like those in Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1, II. 1. 1 *etc.* We have proposed to take the expression अङ्गावबद्धाः (प्रत्ययाः) as referring to the अङ्गs or parts of Brahman. The उपासनाs on Brahman referring to कर्माङ्गs are probably dealt with in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 32 (यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् । See also Bra. Sū. III. 4. 41, 43).

So, according to Śaṅkara the doubt to be solved by this Adhikaraṇa is whether the thoughts referring to कर्माङ्गs like उद्गीथ mentioned in the various Śākhās of each Veda are to be kept where they occur or are to be collected in the कर्माङ्गs of all the Śākhās of all the Vedas. This doubt arises from the fact that owing to the difference of accents (स्वरादिभेद), *etc.*

the कर्माङ्गs *viz.*, उद्गीथ *etc.*, may be considered to be different in each Branch.

According to Śaṅkara, 'तु न' rejects a पूर्वपक्ष that these अङ्गावबद्धाः प्रत्ययाः should be restricted only to the Śākhā in which they occur. Śaṅkara takes 'प्रतिवेदम्' with 'तु न' and says नैते प्रतिवेदं स्वशाखास्वेव व्यवतिष्ठेरन्। अपि तु सर्वशाखासु अनुवर्तेरन्. Thus, he makes a sentence out of 'प्रतिवेदम्' and another out of 'शाखासु'. He leaves out 'हि' and then himself supplies an argument for the conclusion drawn from his interpretation of the Sūtra, *viz.*, उद्गीथादिश्रुत्यविशेषात्.

To us it seems that 'अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न' is a statement rejecting a conclusion likely to be drawn from the method of the meditations on अङ्गिन् or Brahman, as taught in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5–9 and 11–54 *viz.*, that of उपसंहार from all the Branches of all the Vedas. And the reason for this rejection seems to be given in 'शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम्' 'because they are taught differently in all the Śākhās of each Veda.' It does not seem to us to be the correct method to separate शाखासु and प्रतिवेदम् so as to make two sentences, to drop 'हि', and then to add an argument *viz.*, उद्गीथादिश्रुत्यविशेषात्.

Sūtra 56

7. 'वा' seems to give an option regarding the statement in the preceding Sūtra. The meditations on the अङ्गs of Brahman *may* be collected or may not be collected even from the Branch of another Veda; and yet there would be no violation of the Śruti, just as there is no such violation when the मन्त्रs or hymns of one Veda are collected into the Saṁhitā of another Veda. The Sūtrakāra here refers to the मन्त्रs which occur in more than one Veda. On the ground of such मन्त्रs, he says that the अङ्गोपासनाs of Brahman though found only in one Branch or more Branches of one particular Veda only, may be collected in another Veda, *i. e.*, in a Branch or Branches of another Veda.

8. 'वा' shows that the position of the Sūtrakāra here is *different* from the one he has taken up in the preceding Sūtra. But Śaṅkara seems to give it a different significance when he interprets it in a way which would amount to saying that Sūtra 56 gives one additional argument for the conclusion established in Sūtra 55.

To us it seems that in Sūtra 55 the standpoint of the Sūtrakāra was that there would be a विरोध an objection from the Śruti or a violation of the Śruti, if उपसंहार is resorted to in the अङ्गोपासनाs of Brahman, and, therefore, he said 'अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न'. Now, in this Sūtra he tells us that there would be no violation of the Śruti, just as there is no violation in taking a hymn from one Veda into another.

By आदि Śaṅkara refers to कर्मन्s and गुणs.

SECTION XIV

Sūtra III. 3. 57

(५७) भूम्नः क्रतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति ।

TRANSLATION

THE meditation on a greater number of parts of Brahman is better [than that on a smaller number] as in the case of a Kratu; so shows the Śruti. 57

NOTES

Sūtra 57

1. This Sūtra seems to us to answer a question as to how many parts of an अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना should be taken in that meditation. Thus, the meditation on Vaiśvānara Atman or Brahman is based upon six or eleven parts (See Chā. Upa. V. 18. 2). If a question be asked as to how many of them should be taken in the meditation, the Sūtrakāra says, " As many as possible because the meditation on a greater number of parts is better like a Kratu ".

2. क्रतुवत् :—क्रतु seems to be a bigger saerifice than यज्ञ, consisting of more rites than the latter (Vide Note 3 *infra*).

3. तथाहि दर्शयति :—This seems to be a reference to such texts as Chā. Upa. V. 18. 2.

In Chā. Upa. V. 12, the meditation on द्यौः as आत्मा वैश्वानरः is censured and declared to be dangerous, and it is said that द्यौः is the head of आत्मा वैश्वानरः. From this it would follow that the meditation of द्यौः as आत्मा वैश्वानरः is wrong, but the same as the head of आत्मा वैश्वानरः is the proper one, so that one may meditate on आत्मा वैश्वानरः as one whose head is द्यौः and the result of the meditation would be liberation. Similarly, the meditation on आदित्य as आत्मा वैश्वानरः is wrong, but the meditation on Brahman as one whose eye is the Sun is correct and gives liberation (Chā. Upa. V. 12–13). This would mean that each meditation as corrected by अश्वपति would be the proper meditation of आत्मा वैश्वानरः. As a result, each correct meditation would give the fruit of the meditation on आत्मा वैश्वानरः, so, the meditation on a number of parts would only be 'better' in the sense in which a क्रतु is better than a

यज्ञ (?). The chief result is the same whether one meditates on one part or on many parts as forming parts of आत्मा वैश्वानरः. Thus, it is not necessary to include in the meditation *all* the अङ्गs mentioned in the chapter; a few or even one would do. This seems to be the sense of the errors and corrections in Chā. Upa. V. 12–17.

Now 'तथाहि दर्शयति' seems to us to be a reference to Chā. Upa. V. 18. In Chā. Upa. V. 18. 1 we are told that वैश्वानर आत्मा is to be meditated upon as consisting of the parts mentioned above (एवं प्रादेशमात्रं अभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते...); this would mean that वैश्वानर आत्मा is to be meditated upon as consisting of six parts. But in Chā. Upa. V. 18. 2 eleven parts are mentioned. From this the Sūtrakāra seems to us to draw a conclusion that the Śruti here shows that a greater number of parts when taken into the meditation make the meditation better than or superior to the meditation in which a fewer number of parts are included in the sense in which a क्रतु is superior to a यज्ञ, or a क्रतु with a greater number of potsherds is superior to a क्रतु with a fewer number of potsherds (See Rāmānuja's explanation of क्रतु). The result is the same, and therefore a choice regarding the number of अङ्गs is given. This choice is shown by the difference in the number of अङ्गs of वैश्वानर आत्मा in Chā. Upa. V. 18. 1 and V. 18. 2.

4. According to Śaṅkara the Sūtra refers to the वैश्वानरात्मोपासन only. We hold that it refers to *any* ब्रह्मोपासना based upon parts of Brahman like that of वैश्वानर आत्मा, and answers a doubt regarding it like a similar doubt about the meditation of Brahman without parts, solved in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31.

According te Śaṅkara the Sūtra says that one cannot meditate on one part of वैश्वानर, but only on *all* parts of it, *i. e.*, on Vaiśvānara Atman consisting of all the parts mentioned in the Śruti. Thus, he takes भूमन् in the sense of 'all' or 'the whole' (समस्त). But this is not the proper sense of the word.

भूमन् is " a large number, " " many ", and so, here it should mean 'a large number of अङ्गs', because अङ्गs are mentioned in Sūtra 55. Moreover, he takes ज्यायस्त्व as प्राधान्य which he interprets as the only possible or proper way of meditation. But this is also incorrect. ज्यायस् means better or superior; so that a meditation on आत्मा वैश्वानरः as consisting of a fewer parts is *good* and does give the fruit in question, *viz.*, liberation, but a meditation on a greater number of अङ्गs is better. The example of क्रतु can be interpreted only in our favour, because in a क्रतु an option of potsherds is given as the option of parts in the present case. As to तथाहि दर्शयति, Śaṅkara says that the व्यस्तोपासन is censured in मूर्धा ते व्यपतिष्यद्यन्मां नागमिष्यः । (Chā. Upa. V. 12. 2); to us it seems that the Śruti censures the meditation of द्यौः, *etc.* as the whole of वैश्वानर आत्मा, and it does not censure, but rather lays down, the meditation of द्यौः, *etc.*, as the head, *etc.*, of वैश्वानर आत्मा as we have already explained. Śaṅkara states the view of a predecessor of his and that view seems to support us. To us also the Sūtrakāra seems to sanction व्यस्तोपासन as corrected by अश्वपति.

SECTION XV

Sūtra III. 3. 58

(५४) नाना शब्दादिभेदात् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE meditations on Brahman as consisting of several parts are each of them] different [from one another], because of the difference of the word and others [*i. e.,* the context and the name]. 58

NOTES

Sūtra 58

1. With 'नाना' we have to connect "अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः" so, 'नाना' means that the meditations on Brahman resting upon the parts or अङ्गs of Brahman are each of them different or independent of the others.

The Sūtrakara has told us (in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5) that the same Brahman is taught to be meditated upon in all the ब्रह्मोपासनाs of the Upaniṣads and thus the aim of all these is the same (अर्थाभेद) and, therefore, a collection of the thoughts on Brahman from all the recognised Upaniṣads should be made (उपसंहारः). In the present Sūtra (III. 3. 58), he seems to reject this view so far as the अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासनाs are concerned. This is clear from the meaning of शब्दादिभेदात् (See below).

2. शब्दादिभेदात् —In the case of the meditations on Brahman itself (*i. e.*, not consisting of several अङ्गs), the Sūtrakāra had rejected the view that those meditations differed from each other on account of शब्द (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 6), प्रकरण (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 7) and संज्ञा (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 8). But in the case of अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः he seems to argue that these meditations are different from one another because the शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा of each are different from those of others. Thus, the problem of the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः is here discussed from the same stand point from which the निरङ्गाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः were discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5–8. शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा in this case should be taken to be referring to those of the अङ्गs, because here the ब्रह्मोपासनाs based upon अङ्गs are the topic.

3. Śaṅkara connects this Sūtra with Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1–2 (See his closing remarks: स्थिते चैतस्मिन्नधिकरणे सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययमित्यादि द्रष्टव्यम् । See Thibaut, Volume 2, P. 279).

SECTION XVI

Sūtra III. 3. 59

(५९) विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ।

TRANSLATION

[In meditations on Brahman consisting of parts,] an option of choice is given, because the fruit of each of these meditations is the same. 59

NOTES

Sūtra 59

(1) In the case of the meditation on Brahman not regarded as consisting of parts an option was given in the form of a selection from either of the two forms of the Supreme One, *viz.*, the अरूपवत् and the रूपवत् (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28–30, 44–54). Here in the case of the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः, the Sūtrakāra gives an option of choice of any *one* out of all such meditations because the fruit of all such उपासनाs is the same, *viz.*, liberation. In the षोडशकलब्रह्मविद्या, Satyakāma Jābāla is said to be a knower of Brahman (Chā. Upa. IV. 9. 2), so, also उपकोसल in what is called उपकोसलविद्या (Chā. Upa. IV. 14. 2). The same fruit, we may say, accrues from the knowledge Vaiśvānara Atman (Chā. Upa. V. 18. 1).

(2) Śaṅkara does not take this Sūtra as dealing with अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः; he understands the विकल्प 'option' in the Sūtra as given by the Sūtrakāra with reference to all the ब्रह्मविद्याs in the various Upaniṣads. To us it appears that the question of the collection (समुच्चय) of the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः is discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55–56 so far as the collection of those विद्याs from one Veda into another is concerned and in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 58 as regards the question of the collection of the अङ्गs of different अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः; while the problem of the number of the अङ्गs of one अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना to be collected in a meditation is dealt with in Sūtra III. 3. 57. Further we think that Sūtra 59 is meant to reject an inference that since the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः are different or independent (Sūtra 58), they may be giving different fruits and therefore they should be resorted to only by those who seek the respective fruits or results. The Sūtrakāra says that the result of all अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः is the same, *viz.*, the knowledge of Brahman or liberation and, therefore, an option of

choice of one from among the various meditations is given by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra.

The option also, which the Sūtrakāra allows in the case of ब्रह्मोपासनाs not based upon the parts of Brahman seems to us to have been given in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 28, 44–54 and this option is as regards the रूपवत् and अरूपवत् aspects of the Para, and the collection (समुच्चय) in all such ब्रह्मोपासनाs is also discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5–9.

We think that Śaṅkara's interpretation of this Sūtra (एकेन चोपासनेन साक्षात्कृत उपास्ये विषय ईश्वरादौ द्वितीयमनर्थकम्। अपि चासम्भवः साक्षात्करणस्य समुच्चयपक्षे चित्तविक्षेपहेतुत्वात्।) is directly contradictory to the conclusion drawn from Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5.

SECTION XVII

Sūtras III. 3. 60

(६०) काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्न वा पूर्वहेत्वभावात् ।

TRANSLATION

BUT the meditations on Brahman performed for some desired object may or may not be collected according to the desire of the meditator, because of the absence of the foregoing reason.

NOTES

Sūtra 60

1. In the case of the meditations on Brahman not based upon the parts of Brahman, a collection (उपसंहार) was prescribed by the Sūtrakāra because all of them though occurring in different Vedas had a common topic, *viz.*, Brahman, and because the objections based upon शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा did not hold good. In the case of अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः, such a collection was denied because those objections held good in their case, but an option was given because the fruit of all such meditations was in fact not different. Now, in the case of काम्या उपासनाs on Brahman, the Sūtrakāra seems to believe that शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा make their topics different but their fruits also are different; so he allows an option regarding collection. One may collect only those काम्या ब्रह्मोपासनाs, the fruits of which he desires to gain.

2. काम्याः (ब्रह्मोपासनाः) — We have already explained which ब्रह्मोपासनाs are काम्या or performed for a particular object (See Note 5 on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55). It will be noticed that the so-called प्रतीकोपासनाs are included in these काम्या उपासनाs on Brahman, because here Śaṅkara explains Chā. Upa. VII. 1. 5 as a काम्या उपासना on Brahman.

3. " पूर्वहेत्वभावात् " seems to be a reference to अर्थभेद in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5 and to अविशिष्टफल in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 59. In ब्रह्मोपासनाs not founded on parts of Brahman a समुच्चय was compulsory because they all taught the same Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5); while in ब्रह्मोपासनाs based on parts of Brahman the fruit was the same but the शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा were different in each case, so only a विकल्प and no समुच्चय was possible. But in काम्या उपासनाs on Brahman, the teaching of the topics are different and the fruits also are different. Therefore, an

option regarding *both* is given. To explain the point further, the topics of meditation in "नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत," "वाचं ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत" *etc.*, (Chā. Upa. VII. 1. 5, 2. 2) "आदित्यं ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते" (Chā. Upa. III. 19. 4) are different in each case, though all of them are meditated upon as the same. Thus, the अर्थ is not the same because शब्द, प्रकरण and संज्ञा are different. The fruits also of all these meditations (यावन्नाम्नो गतं तत्रास्य यथाकामचारो भवति । Chā. Upa. VII. 1. 5; यावद्वाचो गतं तत्रास्य यथाकामचारो भवति । Chā. Upa. VII. 2. 2; एनं साधवो घोषा आ च गच्छेयुरुप च निम्रेडेरन्निम्रेडेरन् ।—Chā. Upa. III. 19. 4) are different in each case. And these meditations are काम्या as distinguished from those on Brahman without parts or with parts, which are all meant for achieving liberation through meditation on Brahman itself. Therefore, an option of choice in the selection of topics of meditation is given in the काम्या उपासनाs on Brahman.

4. Regarding the काम्या उपासनाs on Brahman it may be added that the meditation on the heaven (द्यौः), the Sun, the Wind, the Ether, the Water, the Earth as Brahman are all of them काम्या उपासनाs, but the meditations on the same as the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेह), the bladder (बस्ति) and the feet of Brahman are not काम्या, but they would all lead to the same fruit, *viz.*, liberation.

5. The word 'काम्य' used here shows that the उपासनाs, अङ्गावबद्धा or not, mentioned in the foregoing Sūtras (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 1-54) are not काम्य, but aimed at achieving liberation.

6. Śaṅkara takes काम्याः as काम्याः विद्याः and gives the same illustrations as we have given, *viz.*, स यो नाम ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते........।. पूर्वहेत्वभावात् is explained by him as referring only to अविशिष्ट-फलत्वात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 59, but we think, it refers *also* to अर्थभेदात् in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5.

SECTION XVIII

Sūtras III. 3. 61-66

(६१) अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः ।

(६२) शिष्टेश्च ।

(६३) समाहारात् ।

(६४) गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च ।

(६५) न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः ।

(६६) दर्शनाच्च ।

इति तृतीयाध्यायस्य तृतीयः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

THE conceiving of the parts of Brahman in meditation should be in accordance with the respective objects seeking substratum, 61

because of the teaching, 62

[and] because of the collection, 63

and because of the Śruti stating the commonness of qualities (between parts and objects seeking substratum). 64

Rather not, because of the absence of a Śruti about the co-existence [of the two, *viz.*, the part and the object seeking substratum], 65

and because the Śruti shows it. 66

NOTES

Sūtra 61

1. In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55–60 the Sūtrakāra has discussed the question of the समुच्चय and विकल्प of the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः and of the काम्या ब्रह्मोपासनाः. Now, he seems to state the method of the meditations of the former type. In the case of the ब्रह्मोपासनाs without the parts of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra stated the method to be that of आत्मगृहीति (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16). The अङ्गs in this Sūtra are the same as the अङ्गs in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55. The अङ्गs are the अङ्गs of Brahman in अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना; *e. g.*, the heaven (द्यौः), the Sun, the Wind, the Ether, the Water and the Earth, are the अङ्गs of the अङ्गावबद्धा ब्रह्मोपासना, *viz.*, that of आत्मा वैश्वानरः.

2. The आश्रयs or items seeking substratum are in the case of the same अङ्गावबद्धा वैश्वनरब्रह्मोपासना the following; the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेह), the bladder (बस्ति), and the feet.

3. भाव means the conception, imagination, fancy or supposition used in meditation. Thus, in the chief ब्रह्मोपासना not based upon parts of Brahman, Brahman is conceived to be or imagined to be the Self of the meditator. Similarly, in the अङ्गावबद्धा वैश्वानररूपब्रह्मोपासना the heaven, the Sun, *etc.*, are conceived to be the head, the eye, *etc.*, of Brahman in the process of meditation. The former make the series of अङ्गs or आश्रितs and the latter that of आश्रयs. The अङ्गs are to be conceived as the आश्रयs.

4. Śaṅkara does not take अङ्गs to be those of Brahman, but he interprets अङ्गs as कर्माङ्गs, *e. g.*, the उद्गीथ, *etc.*

Sūtra 62

5. शिष्टेः — This seems to be a reference to such Śrutis as " मूर्धा त्वेष आत्मन इति होवाच, मूर्धा ते व्यपतिष्यद्यन्मां नागमिष्य इति । " (Chā. Upa. V. 12. 2), चक्षुष्ट्वेतदात्मनः........(Chā. Upa. V. 13. 2),

प्राणस्त्वेष आत्मनः.........(Chā. Upa. V. 14. 2); संदेहस्त्वेष आत्मनः... ......(Chā. Upa. V. 15. 2), बस्तिस्त्वेष आत्मनः.........(Chā. Upa. V. 16. 2), पादौ त्वेतावात्मनः.........(Chā. Upa. V. 17. 2). In these and similar passages of other अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः the respective pupils are told by their respective teachers that they were mistaken in imagining the object of meditation to be Brahman itself while really it was a part of Brahman. This teaching requires that in the अङ्गs the meditator should have the thought of the आश्रय and not of the entire Brahman.

Sūtra 63

6. 'समाहार' seems to refer to Chā. Upa. V. 18. 2 (तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य मूर्धैव सुतेजाश्चक्षुर्विश्वरूपः, प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मात्मा, संदेहो बहुलो, बस्तिरेव रयिः, पृथिव्येव पादावुर एव वेदिर्लोमानि बर्हिर्हृदयं गार्हपत्यो, मनोऽन्वाहार्यपचन आस्यमाहवनीयः) in which all the अङ्गs (named सुतेजाः, विश्वरूपः, *etc.,*) along with the आश्रयs (मूर्धा, चक्षुः, *etc.,*) have been collected together. This collective statement is according to the Sūtrakāra intended to mean that in the respective parts the respective आश्रयs are to be imagined at the time of meditation.

Sūtra 64

7. गुणसाधारण्यश्रुति — This seems to be a reference to such अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः as are mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 1. 2-7 where वाक्, प्राण, चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, मनः and हृदय which are declared to be only one part (एकपाद) of Brahman and are taught to be meditated upon as प्रज्ञा, प्रिय, सत्य, अनन्त, आनन्द and स्थिति which are thus the corresponding आश्रयs to be imagined in वाक्, प्राण, चक्षुः, श्रोत्र, मनः and हृदय. Moreover, in each case, we have an explanation as to how both the अङ्ग and आश्रय possess a common attribute, *viz.,* प्रज्ञता, प्रियता, सत्यता, अनन्तता, आनन्दता and स्थितता.

'गुणसाधारण्य' means the attribute common to the अङ्ग and आश्रय. This गुणसाधारण्यश्रुति also proves that the अङ्गs should be imagined to be the आश्रयs in the respective order.

Sūtra 65

8. न वा — This Sūtra seems to show a disapproval of the

conclusion in the preceding Sūtras; so that the preceding Sūtras should be regarded as पूर्वपक्षसूत्रs. 'न वा' means that the अङ्गs should not be imagined as the आश्रयs.

9. तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः — There is no Śruti about the coexistence of the अङ्ग and आश्रय. In the case of निरङ्गाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः Brahman was taught to be looked upon as the Self of the meditator and the Para was taught the residing *in the heart* and to be meditated upon as present there (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 34-35). Such Śrutis as गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे परार्धे (Kaṭha Upa. III. 3. 1) clearly show that the Para who is to be object to be meditated upon and the individual soul who is the आश्रय according to the method of आत्मगृहीति (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16) reside together. This kind of Śruti in the case of the heaven and the head, the Sun and the eye, *etc., etc.,* does not exist at all. Therefore, the Sūtrakāra rejects the view "अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः" (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 61).

Sūtra 66

10. दर्शनात् — The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to a Śruti in which in the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः the parts of Brahman are not said to be meditated upon as the respective आश्रयs. Such Śrutis would be Chā. Upa. IV. 5-9 (the षोडशकलब्रह्मविद्या), Chā. Upa. IV. 10-14 (the उपकोसलविद्या). In these विद्याs which are अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मविद्याः, there is no attribution of the आश्रयs to the parts of Brahman and so all the reasons (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 62-64) do not hold good regarding such अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मविद्याः.

Thus, according to the Sūtrakāra (Sūtras 65-66) in the case of अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मविद्याः the various अङ्गs or parts are to be meditated upon as parts of ब्रह्मन् without attributing to them the आश्रयभाव. Perhaps this is the sense of यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानं आत्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्मस्वन्नमत्ति । (Chā. Upā. V. 18. 1).

The omnipresent वैश्वानर आत्मन् is to be meditated upon as measured by parts or consisting of parts. Similarly, in other अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः Brahman is to be meditated upon as consisting of so many parts.

CHAPTER III

SECTION I

Achievement of Mokṣa through the knowledge of Brahman. Superiority of that Knowledge to Karman.

Sūtras III. 4. 1–17

(१) पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दादिति बादरायणः ।
(२) शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादो यथाऽन्येष्विति जैमिनिः ।
(३) आचारदर्शनात् ।
(४) तच्छ्रुतेः ।
(५) समन्वारम्भणात् ।
(६) तद्वतो विधानात् ।
(७) नियमाच्च ।
(८) अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ।
(९) तुल्यं तु दर्शनम् ।
(१०) असार्वत्रिकी ।
(११) विभागः शतवत् ।
(१२) अध्ययनमात्रवतः ।
(१३) नाविशेषात् ।
(१४) स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा ।
(१५) कामकारेण चैके ।
(१६) उपमर्दं च ।
(१७) ऊर्ध्वरेतःसु च शब्दे हि ।

TRANSLATION

" FROM this [knowledge of Brahman] the aim of human life [is achieved] because of the Word ", so holds Bādarāyaṇa. 1·

" The name of 'the aim of human life' is applied [to the goal of the Lore of the Upaniṣads] because that knowledge is subsidiary [to the sacrifice] as is the case with other knowledges or other पुरुषार्थs ", so says Jaimini, 2

" because we find the practice [of rites among the knowers of Brahman], 3

" because of a Śruti about it [*i. e.*, subordination of the knowledge to action], 4

" because of [a new body] being begun [by the Lore and the Action], 5

" because of the Injunction of actions in the case of him who possesses that [Lore], 6

" and because of the rule." 7

But, because of the teaching [about the Knowledge] as superior [to the Action] Bādarāyaṇa has such a view [as expressed in Sūtra 1 above], because we find it in the Śruti, 8

but [the practice] is found equally [in favour of the Lore], 9

[the Śruti] does not apply to all [Lores], 10

there is a separate function [of Action from that of Knowledge] as in the case of a hundred [arteries in Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6], 11

[the Injunction is] in the case of him who has merely committed the Scripture to memory, 12

[there is] no [rule] because of the absence of definiteness [about the nature of the agent or actions], 13

[the Śruti in question is] either for praise of actions or is an approval of actions, 14

and some hold that [all actions may be done] voluntarily [by a knower of Brahman], 15

and [they mention] the destruction [of actions], 16

and because in the case of celebates [the religious fitness is] for the Word. 17

NOTES

Sūtra 1

1. अतः — As Sūtras 4 and 5 clearly show, 'अतः' means 'from the Lore of the Upaniṣads'. The knowledge of Atman is called विद्या in the last Sūtras of the preceding Pāda also (*Vide* Sūtra III. 1. 47), the whole of which discusses the nature of the knowledge of Brahman.

2. शब्दात् — This is a reference to such texts as the following :— (1) विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते । (Īśa. Upa. 11).
(2) आत्मना विन्दते वीर्यं विद्यया विन्दतेऽमृतम् । (Kena Upa. 12).
(3) तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति नान्यः पन्थाः विद्यतेऽनाय । Śve. Upa. III. 8 and VI. 15).
(4) निचाय्य तं मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते । (Kaṭha Upa. III. 15).

3. 'पुरुषार्थ' means 'release' मोक्ष "freedom from death," the last of the four aims of human life.

4. According to Śaṅkara the discussion in this Sūtra is as regards the question whether the knowledge of Brahman achieves its aim *by itself* or is subsidiary to action. Bādarāyaṇa's view is the former. But the Sūtrakāra though not admitting that आत्मज्ञान is subsidiary to कर्मन्, does not say that आत्मज्ञान *alone* achieves Mokṣa; rather he seems to be inclined to make certain types of actions subsidiary to आत्मज्ञान (See Sūtras III. 4. 32-33) but co-operating with it in the achievement of Mokṣa. It is strange that Śaṅkara does not quote तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति……..., on which he lays great emphasis elsewhere.

Sūtra 2

5. शेषत्वात् — Jaimini holds that the knowledge of Brahman is subsidiary to Action (or karman) and, therefore, the name of पुरुषार्थ is given to the Lore of Upaniṣads, *i.e.* the application of this name is not to be understood in its literal sense.

6. यथाऽन्येषु — This should be a reference to the case of such other knowledges or means like तपस्, ब्रह्मचर्य, सत्य, *etc.*, than the knowledge of Brahman, in which the fruit is declared to be मोक्ष and which are subsidiary to actions. Śaṅkara explains अन्येषु as referring to द्रव्य, संस्कार and कर्मन्.

Or this may refer to the other three पुरुषार्थs also, which are subsidiary to मोक्ष and are therefore called पुरुषार्थs.

7. Śaṅkara takes शेषत्व as the dependence of the individual soul upon action as being the agent (कर्तृत्वेनात्मनः कर्मशेषत्वात् ।). As 'knowledge of Brahman' or विद्या seems to have been referred to by अतः in Sūtra 1 and as Sūtras 4, 5 and 6 mention the combination of विद्या and कर्म, it seems to us that शेषत्व means here the dependence of the knowledge of Brahman on *karman* or the dependence of the other three पुरुषार्थs on the fourth पुरुषार्थ *viz.*, मोक्ष. Śaṅkara himself says under Sūtra 4 that the विद्या is dependent on कर्म. Regarding the Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara see Note (5) above.

Sūtra 3

8. आचारदर्शनात् — This refers to such Śruti texts as mention the practice, to do sacrifices, of those who possessed the knowledge of Brahman. Śaṅkara rightly refers to the story of Janaka who, though a knower of Brahman, performed sacrifices and all other actions.

Sūtra 4

9. 'श्रुतेः' is evidently a reference to the word विद्या in यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवति । (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10).

Sūtra 5

10. The word समन्वारम्भण at once suggests the reference to तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते । (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2) as Śaṅkara points out.

Sūtra 6

11. तद्वतो विधानात्—This refers to a Śruti in which one

who *has studied the Scripture* is asked to perform the sacrifices, *e. g.*, the one quoted by Śaṅkara. See Sūtra III. 4. 47.

Sūtra 7

12. नियम—A Śruti like Īśa. Upa. 2 which makes it a rule that actions must be performed, is referred to by this Sūtra.

Sūtra 8

13. 'तु' refutes the view of Jaimini in Sūtras 2-7 and एवम् reasserts the view of Bādarāyaṇa stated in Sūtra 1.

14. अधिकोपदेशात्—Bādarāyaṇa holds that the aim of human life is achieved from the knowledge of Brahman, because that knowledge is taught to be superior to the knowledge of action. This may refer to Chā. Upa. VII. 4. 1, Mu. Upa. I. 2. 2, *etc.*, and also to Bha. Gī. IV. 33. In Mu. Upa. I. 1, the four Vedas and their auxiliary sciences are said to be अपरा विद्या and that by which अक्षर ब्रह्मन् is obtained is called परा विद्या. In Mu. Upa. I. 2. 7-10 we read:—

प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म ।
एतच्छ्रेयो येऽभिनन्दन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापियन्ति ॥ I. 2. 7

अविद्यायां बहुधा वर्तमाना वयं कृतार्था इत्यभिमन्यन्ति बालाः ।
यत्कर्मिणो न प्रवेदयन्ति रागात्तेनातुराः क्षीणलोकाश्च्यवन्ते ॥ I. 2. 8

इष्टापूर्तं मन्यमाना वरिष्ठं नान्यच्छ्रेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः ।
नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोकं हीनतरं वा विशन्ति ॥ I. 2. 9

तपःश्रद्धे ये ह्युपवसन्त्यरण्ये शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्षचर्यां चरन्तः ।
सूर्यद्वारेण ते विरजाः प्रयान्ति यत्रामृतः स पुरुषो ह्यव्ययात्मा ॥ I. 2. 10

परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन ।
तद्विज्ञानार्थं स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम् ॥ I. 2. 11

In the Bhagavadgītā also we find similar statements:-

(1) न हि ज्ञानेन सदृशं पवित्रमिह विद्यते । (Bha. Gī. IV. 38)

(2) सर्वं कर्माखिलं पार्थ ज्ञाने परिसमाप्यते । (Bha. Gī. IV. 33)

15. तद्दर्शनात् — This refers to those Śrutis in which मोक्ष is said to be had from ज्ञान, some of which have been quoted under Sūtra 1.

16. अधिकोपदेशात् and तद्दर्शनात् jointly form one argument. Because मोक्ष is said to be had from ज्ञान of Brahman and because that ज्ञान is said to be superior to कर्मन्, Bādarāyaṇa concludes that मोक्ष can be had from the ज्ञान of Brahman which is not dependent on कर्मन्; the ज्ञान is not subsidiary to कर्मन् but it is superior to कर्मन्. It should be noticed that Bādarāyaṇa does not give those various reasons against कर्मन् as a means to Mokṣa, which Śaṅkara so often gives in his works.

17. Śaṅkara interprets अधिकोपदेश as the fact that परमात्मन् who is superior to the individual soul is taught in the Scripture as the one to be known. And to this interpretation of अधिकोपदेश, he adds that the knowledge of that परमात्मन् is not the inspirer of actions, but it is the destroyer of actions. According to Śaṅkara 'तद्दर्शनात्' refers to such Śrutis as teach परमात्मन् who is superior to the individual soul. Thus, according to him, अधिकोपदेशात् and तद्दर्शनात् refer to the same texts.

Sūtra 9

18. तु shows that the refutation of the हेतु given in Sūtras 3-7 is begun here.

19. तुल्यं दर्शनम् — Just as we find in the Śruti the knowers of Brahman performing actions, so also we find the knowers of Brahman renouncing actions. See above "विद्वांसो भैक्ष्यचर्यां चरन्तः" in Mu. Upa. I. 2. 10, also Bṛ. Upa. III. 5. 1 which is quoted by Śaṅkara. Thus, practice (आचार) does not help in deciding the dependence of knowledge on action.

Sūtra 10

20. असार्वत्रिकी — This is a refutation of Sūtra 4. The Śruti referred to in Sūtra 4 does not apply to all विद्याs; it does not apply to ब्रह्मविद्या. It applies only to विद्याs concerned

with various rites. See Bra. Sū. IV. I. 18 and Śā. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 3. 42.

Sūtra 11

21. विभागः—This is an answer to Sūtra 5. The Sūtrakāra says that विद्या and कर्मन् begin the bodies of *different* persons; विद्या helps the knower of Brahman (See विद्यासामर्थ्यात् in Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17), and कर्मन् helps those who perform the rites and sacrifices. Thus, there should be a separation of कर्म from विद्या.

According to Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17, विद्यागति is separated from कर्मगति in the interpretation of तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारेभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2), the Śruti which is quoted as an argument of Jaimini in Sūtra 5.

22. शतवत् seems to us to be the separation of 100 arteries from the one artery mentioned together in " there are one hundred and one arteries in the heart " *etc.*, in Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6. The विभाग of these arteries is made in that Śruti itself. It is said there that of these hundred and one arteries the one goes upwards towards the head, he who goes up thereby attains immortality; the other arteries are meant for various transmigrations in all directions (Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6). Just as the hundred arteries are here separated from the hundred and one mentioned together in the first quarter of the verse, similarly कर्मन् is separated from विद्याकर्मणी in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2. This is the view of the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 11. According to him विद्या is dealt with in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2 and कर्मन् in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3-5.

Though ' शतवत् ' does not contain a reference to शतनाडीs, we make this suggestion because in the case of शतनाडीs कर्मन् is separated from विद्या, as in the case of विद्याकर्मणी समन्वातरेभेते. Both the Śrutis (Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6 and Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2) in question make a joint statement (the one regarding the number of नाडीs, the other regarding विद्याकर्मणी) and then make a division or separate statement regarding the same. The one

separates hundred नाडीs out of one hundred and one (Sūtra 11), the other separates कर्म from विद्याकर्मणी.

23. Śaṅkara first explains the word विभाग in the Sūtra as if the word विद्या in the Śruti meant ब्रह्मविद्या, as was done above. But afterwards he adds that न चेदं समन्वारम्भवचनं मुमुक्षुविषयम् ।. Thereby he means that the विद्या in the Śruti (तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते ।) is not ब्रह्मविद्या. But this conclusion is against the Sūtrakāra's own. Not only does it contradict the Sūtrakāra so far as this Sūtra (11) is concerned, but also as regards other Sūtras, *e. g.*, Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17, which, as shown above, is consistent with the Sūtra in question. According to the Sūtrakāra " the brightening of the top of the heart " mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2 (हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते) is a sure mark of विद्या and the man being a knower of Brahman, as he says in Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17. " इति तु कामयमानः ", according to the Sūtrakāra, refers to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 3–6, while Śaṅkara applies it to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 1–6. Śaṅkara's conclusion (एवं सत्यविभागेनापीदं समन्वारम्भवचनमवकल्पते ।) actually makes the Sūtrakāra's position in Sūtra 11 totally weak.

Śaṅkara takes शतवत् to mean " यथा शतमाभ्यां दीयतामित्युक्ते विभज्य दीयते पञ्चाशदेकस्मै पञ्चाशदपरस्मै तद्वत् । ".

Sūtra 12

24. The Sūtrakāra replies to the argument in Sūtra 6. He says that such Śrutis refer to those who have only committed the text to memory. This Sūtra is referred to in Sūtra III. 4. 47.

Sūtra 13

25. The Sūtrakāra says that the Śruti in question does not make a rule that the knower of Brahman should invariably perform all actions, because the Śruti does not mention definitely who is asked to do actions invariably, and what actions are to be done by him. The Śruti defines neither the agent nor the actions.

Sūtra 14

26. स्तुतये and अनुमति seem to be two different conclusions. The Īśa. Śruti (2) is for praise of actions so that it shows that actions are more praiseworthy than renunciations of actions; therefore, one (even a knower of Brahman) should do them rather than renounce them. This is the position of the Bhagavadgītā also. This does not prove that the knowledge of Brahman is subsidiary to actions.

27. अनुमति—Or, the Śruti is an approval of actions if a knower of Brahman performs them. The Scripture has no objection to his doing the actions.

28 Śaṅkara interprets स्तुति as विद्यास्तुति. As the Śruti does not mention विद्या but emphasises actions, it is likely that it praises actions as compared with renunciation of actions. Moreover, Śaṅkara takes 'स्तुतयेऽनुमतिः' *i. e.*, the Śruti is an approval of actions in order *to praise the* विद्या. Is this praise real or not? The approval can be real only if the praise of the विद्या be real.

Sūtra 15

29. This is also a reply to the opponent's argument in Sūtra 2.

30. एके seems to be a reference to *a Śruti* according to which actions for a knower of Brahman are not compulsory, but voluntary. *Cf.* Mu. Upa. III. 1. 4 which mentions the knower of Brahman as क्रियावान् and again III. 2. 6 in which the knowers of Brahman are described as संन्यासिन्s or those who have renounced all actions.

To give an option of choice between a life of actions and that of renunciation of actions and to prefer the former (as said in Sūtra 14 – स्तुतये 'praise of actions') is the view of the Bhagavadgītā also. So, एके may refer to Bh. Gī. See एके in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 53, which also seems to refer to the Gītā.

If the above-mentioned Śruti (Mu. Upa. III. 1. 4) which

does not deny the Path of Renunciation and yet prefers that of Action (आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः ।), as is the case with the Bhagvadgīgtā (III. 1–8, V. 1–2), is referred to by this Sūtra, we must note that this Śruti in so far as it implies an option of choice between संन्यास and कर्मयोग shows that ब्रह्मज्ञान or ब्रह्मविद्या cannot be subsidiary to actions; otherwise the option of renunciation of actions cannot be given to the knower of Brahman.

Sūtra 16

31. उपमर्दं च—This refers to a Śruti in which the destruction of actions is said to result on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Mu. Upa. II. 2. 8 says " क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे । " So on the realization of the Supreme Principle [all] actions are destroyed. For this reason also the knowledge of Brahman cannot be subsidiary to actions.

32. Śaṅkara takes उपमर्दं as स्वरूपोपमर्दं and instead of taking कर्मणामुपमर्दः he takes कर्माधिकारहेतोः क्रियाकारकफललक्षणस्य समस्तस्य प्रपञ्चस्य स्वरूपोपमर्दः and he also adds that this प्रपञ्च is अविद्याकृत. But, as the context shows, the destruction of only the actions is meant in the Sūtra. And from that it seems to be argued that the knowledge of Brahman cannot be subsidiary to the actions which it destroys.

Sūtra 17

33. ऊर्ध्वरेतसः — This means the students, the hermits and the ascetics. In the case of these three orders of life, the duty lies in reciting the text, but not in doing the actions or rites. The celibates are entitled to the text, not to the act. So, when they gain the realization of Brahman, the latter cannot be subsiduary to action.

34. Śaṅkara does not take शब्दे in the sense of शब्दे न तु कर्मणि; he rather explains शब्दे in the sense of श्रूयते and adds " विद्या ". By this way, perhaps, he intends to bring out the sense that only the ascetics are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. But, ऊर्ध्वरेतस् would include also students; and for the meaning of शब्दे as न तु कर्मणि see Bra. Sū. I. 3. 27–28.

SECTION II

Knowledge of Brahman, not a simple reflection, but something to be performed, or rather an Injunction. The unanimity of sense of the knowledge of Brahman and Dharma.

Sūtras III. 4. 18–26

(१८) परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदना चापवदति हि ।

(१९) अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणः साम्यश्रुतेः ।

(२०) विधिर्वा धारणवत् ।

(२१) स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।

(२२) भावशब्दाच्च ।

(२३) पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।

(२४) तथा चैकवाक्यतोपबन्धात् ।

(२५) अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ।

(२६) सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् ।

TRANSLATION

JAIMINI holds the knowledge of Brahman to be a thought; and [he says] 'It is not of the form of an Injunction, because the Scripture denies all actions [as a help to the realization of Brahman]. 18

Bādarāyaṇa holds that [the knowledge of or meditation on Brahman is something] to be performed because of the Śruti mentioning the likeness [of nature of the knowledge of Brahman and nature of the action], 19

or, rather, that there is an Injunction [for the knowledge of Brahman], like that of committing the text to memory. 20

If the opponent argues that, " It is only the glorification due to its being received [in the sacrifice] ", we reply, " No, because of its having been not stated in what has preceded [or because of its characteristic of being quite new], 21

and because of the Word of the existence [of Brahman such as is described in the Śruti]." 22

If it be argued, " They are meant for the पारिप्लव rite ", we reply, " No, because [the Upniṣadic stories] have been distinguished [in such Śrutis as Kaṭha Upa. III. 16–17 from the पारिप्लव stories]; 23

and because we construe the unanimity in meaning [of the two parts of Scripture] in that way; 24

and for this very reason there is no need of fire, fuel, *etc.*, [in the knowledge of Brahman]; 25

and all requirements [for the knowledge of Brahman] due to the Śruti mentioning the Sacrifice, *etc.*, are like that of the horse. 26

NOTES

Sūtra 18

1. Having established in the preceding Adhikaraṇa that the knowledge of Brahman is not subsidiary to actions or rites, the Sūtrakāra now seems to proceed to prove that the knowledge of Brahman is not a simple 'reflection' or 'thought' but it is an object to be performed.

2. Jaimini who believed that the knowledge of Brahman was subsidiary to rites held that it was only a reflection but no action, and, therefore, it was not अनुष्ठेय 'to be performed,' like a sacrifice. He held that there can be no Injunction which would make the knowledge of Brahman an action just as Jyotiṣṭoma is made an action by an Injunction (ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत !)

3. अपवदति हि—This is the reason why Jaimini believed that the knowledge of Brahman cannot be an Injunction or an action to be performed. *The Śruti rejects actions as a means to the knowledge of Brahman.* (1) परीक्ष्य लोकान्कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन । (Mu. Upa. I. 2. 12). 'अपवदति' may be a reference to the whole of Mu. Upa. I. 2. 1-10, Chā. Upa. V. 10, and similar passages. Also,

न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवैस्तपसा कर्मणा वा ।
ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्वस्ततस्तु तं पश्यते निष्कलं ध्यायमानः ॥

(Mu. Upa. III. 1. 8).

In this Śruti कर्मन् is denied to be a means to the realization of Brahman, though *jñāna* and *dhyāna* are said to be means to it. From this, Jaimini concluded that the knowledge of Brahman is no action to be pefromed (अनुष्ठेय).

4. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra mentions Jaimini's view that Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1 and other texts do not establish

the existence of the celibate orders of life. But the Sūtrakāra has already mentioned these आश्रमs under the word "ऊर्ध्वरेतसः" in Sūtra 17, as if nobody doubted their existence. It is Śaṅkara who raises a doubt about them in his bhāṣya on Sūtra 17, perhaps in order to introduce thereby his interpretation of Sūtra 18. *It was not the business of the Brahmasūtras to plead for the injunction of the orders of life.* The Smṛtis, like that of Manu, were ment for it and do it. But here Śaṅkara holds that the Sūtrakāra argues that the Śruti lays down the आश्रमs.

According to Śaṅkara Jaimini held that in these Śrutis there is a reference (परामर्श) to other orders of life, but no Injunction for them, because in these texts (*i. e.* Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1, *etc.*,) there is no word *laying* down the आश्रमs. As to the Śruti "ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्" (Jā. 4) Śaṅkara says that this discussion of Jaimini proceeds without considering that Śruti. As to the question, how can there be a reference to the आश्रमs if they do not exist, Śaṅkara says, their existence is well known from the Smṛti and practice, but not from the Śruti. As to the other question, how is the गृहस्थाश्रम known, Śaṅkara makes Jaimini opine that it is known from the Śruti in sc far as it lays down अग्निहोत्रादि for the householder.

It is apparent that here Śaṅkara ascribes to Jaimini a view which probably he never held. The Brahamasūtrakāra was not bound to discuss whether the आश्रमs were based upon Śruti or Smṛti and, owing to the Jābāla Śruti, there was no possibility of the doubt put in the mouth of Jaimini. Śaṅkara's defence of what he supposes Jaimini to have held is very lame. How can there be even a reference to the आश्रमs in a Śruti if another Śruti did not already establish them. *Moreover*, in Sūtra 18, there is no suggestion about the Śrutis and आश्रमs, rather the context shows that a question about the *nature of the knowledge of Brahman* is discussed in this Adhikaraṇa, आश्रमs having been taken as granted in Sūtra 17, and being again mentioned in Sūtras 32–34. What is the purpose

of mere reference to the आश्रमs if they do not exist? Śaṅkara says, "स्तुत्यर्थ एवायं परामर्शः न चोदनार्थः" How can there be स्तुति of things non-existent? Moreover, see Sūtras 35, 36, 39 below. These Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara in support of his interpretation of 'अपवदति हि' do not deny the orders other than that of a householder; they simply sanction the latter.

Sūtra 19

5. Bādarāyaṇa holds that the knowledge of Brahman is something to be performed. He tries to prove this *without saying that* आत्मज्ञान *is a* कर्म (*a rite*). आत्मज्ञान *is not a* कर्म, *but also it is not a mere reflection* (परामर्श); *it is something to be performed.* This seems to be the view of Bādarāyaṇa. He does not say it is कर्मन्, but he clearly says, it is अनुष्ठेय. See also Sūtra 34.

6. साम्यश्रुतेः — "Because of the Śruti about the *likeness of Brahmavidyā to the knowledge of* Karman." The *reference seems to be to Mu. Upa. I. 1. 4-5*, "द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये", in which *both* Brahman and Karman are said to be 'Vidyās to be known.' The Sūtrakāra seems to emphasize this similarity between the two topics, Brahman and Karman. On this similarity he argues that if Karman is अनुष्ठेय, Brahman (or its knowledge) is also अनुष्ठेय.

7. After अनुष्ठेयम् Śaṅkara adds आश्रमान्तरम् and he gives the reason वेदे श्रवणात्. Both these additions are not even suggested in Sūtras 18-19 and are not favoured by the context. After giving that हेतु, he gives the हेतु mentioned in the Sūtra *viz.* साम्यश्रुतेः. Śaṅkara says, 'त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धाः' *etc.*, is a Śruti referring to आश्रमान्तर *as* to गार्हस्थ्य.

Sūtra 20

8. Jaimini has said that the knowledge *of Brahman* is not of the form of a विधि. Now Bādarāyaṇa says that it is a विधि *i. e.*, चोदना. In Sūtra 19 he depended upon साम्यश्रुति, in

this Sūtra he depends upon a विधि about आत्मज्ञान. He refers to sentences like आत्मा वाऽरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः। (Bṛ. Upa. II. 4. 5), स क्रतुं कुर्वीत (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 1). This is a विधि just as the विधि of remembering the text (*viz.* स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः). The next Sūtra gives the reason why आत्मज्ञान is a विधि and not a स्तुति or अर्थवाद.

9. Śaṅkara explains the Sūtra as विधिर्वायमाश्रमान्तरस्य न परामर्शमात्रम्। But there are very strong objections to interpreting in this way the Śruti (Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1) to which Śaṅkara refers this Sūtra. The greatest fault underlying this interpretation of Śaṅkara of Sūtras 18–20, is that he has to say that Bādarāyaṇa like Jaimini undertook this discussion without taking into consideration the जाबालश्रुति (अनपेक्ष्यैव जाबालश्रुतिमाश्रमान्तरविधायिनीमयमाचार्येण विचारः प्रवर्तितः—Śā. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 20). See also the last sentence of his भाष्य on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 18.

Another fact to be noted is that Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on this Sūtra (20) adds the हेतु " अपूर्वत्वात् " for proving the विधि. In fact this हेतु is given in the next Sūtra. This shows that the next Sūtra is closely connected with this Sūtra. Regarding the Sūtrakāra's meaning of Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1 see Sūtra 32.

Sūtra 21

10. Some opponent like Jaimini may argue that the आत्मज्ञान is only a glorification of the individual soul since it is received in the performance of sacrifices.

11. Bādarāyaṇa replies that आत्मज्ञान mentioned in the Upaniṣads is अपूर्व " not known in the earlier texts, " so, it fulfils the condition of being a विधि mentioned in the पूर्वमीमांसा. Hence it is not a स्तुति or अर्थवाद. ' अपूर्वत्वात् ' is meant to answer the objection of स्तुतिमात्रत्व (Sūtra 21) and also thereby to prove that, like धारण, " आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः " is a विधि because that विधि is not to be found elsewhere. It was for this double purpose that ' अपूर्वत्व ' is mentioned in Sūtra 21 instead of in Sūtra 20.

12. The fact that Śaṅkara takes 'अपूर्वत्वात्' as understood in Sūtra 20 proves that Sūtra 20 and Sūtra 21 belong to the same Adhikaraṇa.

13. Śaṅkara begins a new Adhikaraṇa with Sūtra 21. This does not seem to us to be correct for the reasons given above. According to him Sūtras 21–22 discuss whether Śrutis like Chā. Upa. I. 1. 3, I. 6. 1, *etc.*, are meant for the glorification of उद्गीथ or for उपासनाविधि. Though the question here is undoubtedly whether a particular item is स्तुति or विधि, *the Sūtra itself does not contain* any suggestion for the reference to उद्गीथादि. Rather, according to the context *the question* seems to refer to ब्रह्मज्ञान. 'उपादानात्' means "because these Śrutis are stated *with reference to* the subsidiary rites of उद्गीथ *etc.*" 'उपादान' should mean mere 'receiving' or 'being taken' or 'acceptance.' Here it would be the acceptance of आत्मज्ञान in sacrifices. The fact that Śaṅkara takes 'विध्यर्थता' as understood proves that this Sūtra is connected with the preceding one where विध्यर्थता is to be proved.

Sūtra 22

14. "भावशब्द" also proves that आत्मज्ञान is not स्तुतिमात्र but a विधि. If 'भावशब्द' means 'विधिशब्द' as Śaṅkara holds, the Sūtra refers to such Śrutis as (आत्मेत्येव) उपासीत (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 7); स क्रतुं कुर्वीत (Chā. Upa. III. 14. 1), *etc.* If, however, भावशब्द means *the word of the existence of Brahman* or the Supreme Being, which would prove that the Śrutis about it are not glorification of the individual soul, but really express a really existing principle, then the word refers to such texts as सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् (Chā. Upa. VI. 2. 1); अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यः । (Ka. Upa. VI. 13); असन्नेव स भवति असद्ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत् (Tai. Upa. II 6). If Brahman really exists, the texts about ब्रह्मन् are not स्तुति or glorification, but they describe the really existing Brahman. 'स्तुति' in the sense of the Mīmāṁsā belongs to what a thing really is not.

भाव shows that Brahman is really as is described. Generally the Sūtra uses the word भाव in the sense of "existence" and भाव does not mean 'विधि'.

15. Śaṅkara takes भावशब्द in the sense of 'विधिशब्द' and quotes such texts as सामोपासीत (Chā. Upa. II. 2. 1), उद्गीथमुपासीत (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 1).

Sūtra 23

16. Śaṅkara is quite correct in his interpretation of this Sūtra, if his explanation of 'विशेषितत्वात्' is correct. The fact that this Sūtra aims at showing that the episodes of the Upaniṣads are not meant to be used in the पारिप्लव rite, proves that the topic of Sūtra 18 is continued in all these Sūtras. In this Adhikaraṇa the Sūtrakāra tries to prove that ब्रह्मज्ञान is अनुष्ठेय or rather a विधि. To this an opponent may object by saying that the episodes of the Upaniṣads are like those of the पारिप्लव rite and, therefore, are meant for the same purpose in the sacrifices. The Sūtrakāra answers this objection by pointing out the fact that in Śrutis like नाचिकेतमुपाख्यानं मृत्युप्रोक्तꣳसनातनम् । उक्त्वा श्रुत्वा च मेधावी ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥ १६ ॥ य इमं परमं गुह्यं श्रावयेद्ब्रह्मसंसदि । प्रयतः श्राद्धकाले वा तदानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥१७॥ (Kaṭha Upa. III. 16–17) distinguish these उपाख्यानs from those to be recited at the पारिप्लव ceremony.

Śaṅkara explains विशेषितत्वात् to mean that only certain episodes are useful for the पारिप्लव rite and not all, and that those have been mentioned in the पूर्वकाण्ड. Thus, Śaṅkara also supports the statement which, we believe, the Sūtrakāra makes in Sūtra 19.

Sūtra 24

17. This seems to be the conclusion drawn from the arguments in Sūtras 19–23. आत्मज्ञान is अनुष्ठेय or rather a विधि and only in this way आत्मज्ञान and कर्मज्ञान have unanimity of sense; both are *similar*, (see साम्यश्रुति in Sūtra 19) both teach

something to be performed and both lay down Injunctions, both are अपूर्व in their own way. It is thus that both are parts of the same Scripture.

The Sūtrakāra has tried to explain Brahman or meditation on it on the lines of the Pūrvamīmāṁsā; see चोदनाद्यविशेष in Sūtra III. 3. 1, विधिशेषवत् in Sūtra III. 3. 5, अपूर्वम् in Sūtra III. 3. 18. Both are laid down by independent विधिs, so both are meant for different persons; and, thus, the sense of आत्मज्ञान does not conflict with that of कर्मज्ञान. There would be no एकवाक्यता if कर्मज्ञान were अनुष्ठेय, while आत्मज्ञान were परामर्श, says the Sūtrakāra.

Compare with the above view:—

अथ यो ह वा अस्माल्लोकात्स्वं लोकमदृष्ट्वा प्रैति स एनमविदितो न भुनक्ति यथा वेदो वाननूक्तोऽन्यद्वा कर्माकृतम्। (Bṛ. Upa. I. 4. 15).

The unanimity of पूर्वकाण्ड *and* उत्तरकाण्ड *is not by subjecting one to the other, but by explaining both by means of independent* विधिs *and* अपूर्वs. The method of taking आत्मज्ञान as परामर्श would subjugate it to कर्मन्, like that of taking आत्मज्ञान as कर्मशेष, and hence there will be a conflict between the two. There would be a conflict also if कर्मकाण्ड is made subordinate to आत्मज्ञान. The best way is to take both as established by different विधिs. This seems to be the view of the Sūtrakāra. This conclusion is supported by Sūtras III. 3. 20–24.

18. The question of एकवाक्यता, as shown by us, refers to the एकवाक्यता of the two Sciences being parts of the same Scripture *viz.* Śruti or Veda. And generally, 'एकयाक्यता' should refer to the unanimity of the two parts of the same literature. But Śaṅkara explains एकवाक्यता in Sūtra 24 as the एकवाक्यता of the various episodes *with* the various विद्याs taught in them individually. In fact, this cannot be called एकवाक्यता because a *passage* is bound to be consistent with its *teaching* or Lore. According to Śaṅkara, an episode of the Upaniṣads is consistent in sense with its विद्या because that episode

serves the purpose of प्ररोचन 'alluring the student to study it' or that of प्रतिपत्तिसौकर्य "ease of understanding". This somewhat strange interpretation of Sūtra 24 is due to Śaṅkara's taking Sūtra 23 as beginning a separate Adhikaraṇa.

Sūtra 25

19. अत एव च shows that the same Adhikaraṇa is continued.

20. Because the एकवाक्यता of कर्मकाण्ड and आत्मकाण्ड is based on independent विधिs for each of them, the आत्मज्ञान does not stand in need of fire or the sacred fires, fuel, *etc.*, though it is अनुष्ठेय like कर्मज्ञान. If आत्मज्ञान were स्तुतिमात्र or पारिप्लवार्थ, then the fire, the fuel, *etc.*, would have been required in attaining its aim. But it is not so, and the एकवाक्यता (unanimity) of the two sections of the Scripture is established by taking each of them independently, by independent विधिs; therefore कर्मज्ञान requires fire, fuel, *etc.*, but आत्मज्ञान does not need those things.

21. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as an independent Adhikaraṇa. This is inconsistent with 'अत एव च' which shows that this is a corrolary of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sūtra.

22. Śaṅkara connects this Sūtra with Bra. Sū. III. 4. 1 and remarks, "पुरुषार्थोऽतः शब्दात्" (ब्र० सू० ३ । ४ । १ ।) इत्येतद् व्यवहितमपि संभवादतः इति परामृश्यते । And Śaṅkara says that "Because the ब्रह्मविद्या is meant for the achievement of the aim of human life, the विद्या does not need in fulfilling its aim the *duties* of the order [of a householder] *viz.* the fire, the fuel, *etc.*". He says that this Sūtra gives briefly the result or conclusion of the *first* Adhikaraṇa of this Pāda with the intention of saying something further.

It seems to us that the sense of this Sūtra can be well explained in consistency with that of the preceding Sūtra, (and also the succeeding Sūtra, see below), and, therefore,

it is not necessary to connect it with Bra. Sū. III. 4. 1. Moreover, अग्नि, इन्धन, *etc.*, are not the *duties* of the order of a householder; they are means to those duties. The next Sūtra emphasizes this point.

Sūtra 26

23. It was said in Sūtra 25 that आत्मज्ञान does not require fire, fuel, *etc.* But there is a Śruti in which यज्ञ, दान, तपः are said to be the means to the knowledge of Brahman. So, the opponent may ask, "How is this sacrifice which is a help to the knowledge of Atman to be performed?" The answer to this question seems to have been given by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra (26).

24. यज्ञादिश्रुतेः — This is undoubtedly a reference to a text like the one quoted by Śaṅkara, *viz.* तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन। (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22). This very Śruti is referred to here as is shown by तेषाम् in the next Sūtra (तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम्।).

25. अश्ववत्—This seems to be a reference to the description of the horse given in Bṛ. Upa. I. 1, *viz.*, उषा वा अश्वस्य मेध्यस्य शिरः॥ सूर्यश्चक्षुर्वातः प्राणो व्यात्तमग्निर्वैश्वानरः संवत्सर आत्माश्वस्य मेध्यस्य॥............(Bṛ. Upa. I. 1. 1–2). The horse of an allegorical sacrifice is described here.

26. सर्वापेक्षा च यज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत्। The Sūtrakāra says that all need of the Śruti mentioning यज्ञ, दान, *etc.*, as means of the knowledge of Atman is like that of the horse described in Bṛ. Upa. I. 1. 1–2. The Śruti mentioning the sacrifice as a means does not require the sacred fire, fuel, *etc.*, as said in Sūtra 25, but it requires to be performed allegorically, not physically. In short, a man seeking to know Brahman need not perform the material sacrifice, but he should know the allegorical or spiritual sense of a sacrifice. *Cf.*

ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविर्ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतम्।
ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना॥ (Bha. Gī. IV. 24)

In the case of the गृहस्थ seeker of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra makes a special mention, see Sūtra 48 below.

27. Śaṅkara also says that the requirements of the आत्मविद्या are discussed here. That shows that this Sūtra is a part of the Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding Sūtra belongs. According to him, Sūtra 25 lays down that no duties of the आश्रमs are required for the science of Brahman, while Sūtra 26 says that this non-requirement is partial, not absolute. There is an inconsistency in this statement and Śaṅkara tries to solve it by saying उत्पन्ना हि विद्या फलसिद्धिं प्रति न किंचिदन्यदपेक्षत उत्पत्तिं प्रति त्वपेक्षते ।* To us it appears that there is no such inconsistency, because Sūtra 25 says that ब्रह्मविद्या does not require fire, fuel, *etc.*, while Sūtra 26 explains that its needs arising from यज्ञादिश्रुति are like the horse. According to Śaṅkara, 'सर्वापेक्षा' means 'the need of all आश्रमकर्मs'. In fact, the utility of आश्रमकर्मs in ब्रह्मविद्या is discussed in Sūtra 32. So, in Sūtra 26, the Sūtrakāra discusses the *nature* of यज्ञादिs needed in ब्रह्मविद्या as a means to it. The Śruti in question (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22) lays down वेदानुवचन, यज्ञ, दान, तपस् without a reference to आश्रमs. Śaṅkara makes a distinction between विविदिषन्ति and, let us say, विदन्ति. The Sūtrakāra does not seem to mention this. 'अश्ववत्' is explained by Śaṅkara in such a way as to get a Scriptural sanction for his distinction between विविदिषन्ति and विदन्ति *i. e.*, to show that आश्रमकर्मs are meant for the rise of the विद्या, but not for the achievement of the fruit of the विद्या, the विद्या by itself produces the fruit. Śaṅkara says that a horse is not used for the cultivation of land, but for driving a chariot only, similarly आश्रमकर्मन्s are needed for not the फलोत्पत्ति, but for विद्योत्पत्ति only. From this it would appear as if विद्याफलोत्पत्ति is lower than विद्योत्पत्ति; but we are not to carry the simile so far. The simile itself, however, seems to us *to be explained by referring the horse to the allegorical horse* in Bṛ. Upa. I. 1. The Sūtrakāra refers to it as if it were well known.

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* The Sūtrakāra does not seem to make this subtle distinction.

SECTION III

Control of the mind, the senses, etc., the very basis. Sacrifice, donation, austerity and the duties of the orders of life must be compulsorily performed by seekers. Their duties in adversity. Optional supperssion of the actions of an order allowed to a Seeker.

Sūtras III. 4. 27–39

(२७) शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम् ।

(२८) सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात् ।

(२९) अबाधाच्च ।

(३०) अपि च स्मर्यते ।

(३१) शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ।

(३२) विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि ।

(३३) सहकारित्वेन च ।

(३४) सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् ।

(३५) अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ।

(३६) अन्तरा चापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।

(३७) अपि च स्मर्यते ।

(३८) विशेषानुग्रहश्च ।

(३९) अतस्त्वितरज्ज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

[A seeker of 'release'] should be possessed of control over mind, control over senses, *etc.*, but even then, because the Injunction for those [virtues] is subsidiary to those [means *viz.*, sacrifice, donation, penance, referred to in the preceding Sūtra], the latter must invariably be performed. 27

—And the sanction about the food of all [men] is given on the occasion of danger to life, because the Śruti shows it (28), because there is no objection (from the Śruti) (29), and also the Śruti mentions it (30), and for this reason the Word applies to what is done with reluctance (in order to save life) (31).— 28-31

And the duties of the orders of life should also be performed because they are laid down, 32

and as a help [to the achievement of Mokṣa]. 33

In any case a seeker of absolution should perform only those two because of the twofold indicatory texts. 34

And the Śruti shows the non-suppression [of the duties of the orders of life], 35

and, however, *also without* [those duties], because it is shown in the Śruti, 36

and also it is mentioned in the Smṛti, 37

and [in that case] special favour [of the Lord on the seeker, is mentioned in the Smṛti], 38

but the other one is superior to this, [on account of Smṛti] and indicatory Śruti. 39

NOTES

Sūtra 27

1. शमदमादि refers to तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति। (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23), as Śaṅkara points out.

2. तथाऽपि तु—The Sūtrakāra says that *even though* one may be possessed of शमदमादि, as he shall be (because Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23 is a विधि), he shall *invariably* perform यज्ञ, दान, तपस्. In the case of orders other than that of a householder (see Sūtra 48), the sacrifice *etc.,* are allegorical, as said in Sūtra 26. These, sacrifice and other means, are to be performed even by those who possess control over mind, senses, and other virtues. A householder who possesses these virtues should perform the real sacrifices *etc.*, if he seeks the knowledge of Brahman. This seems to us to be the significance of तथापि. The difference between the performance of यज्ञादि by a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman and that by another man is that the former is accompanied by शमदमादि, while the latter is not. The difference in the mental attitude behind the performance of sacrifice *etc.*, is the test of the thirst for the knowledge of Brahman. In this way, the sacrifice which is ज्ञानमय in the case of आश्रमs other than गृहस्थ, and द्रव्यमय in the case of गृहस्थाश्रम, becomes a means to the knowledge of Brahman.

3. तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया—The injunction of शमदमादि is subsidiary to that of the sacrifice, donation, penance *etc.* शमदमादिs are acquired by the knowledge that Brahman, which one seeks, is beyond वृद्धि and ह्रास caused by action and is such that after knowing it, the knower is not stained by sinful actions (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23). Sacrifices performed without शमदमादि

lead to the increase of desires, but when performed with शमदमादि they become means to the knowledge of Brahman. एतमेव प्रव्राजिनो लोकमिच्छन्तः प्रव्रजन्ति. This renunciation is also the result of शमदमादि and itself results in the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, the विधि of शमदमादि is 'a part of' or is subsidiary to the sacrifice, donation *etc.*

4. तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वम्—'अनुष्ठेयत्व' *primarily* applies to the sacrifice, donation *etc.*, rather than to शमदमादि. And 'तेषाम्' seems to be a reference to the (allegorical) sacrifice *etc.*, mentioned in the preceding Sūtra (26).

5. The Adhikaraṇa consisting of Sūtras 18–26 aims at proving that आत्मज्ञान is not a कर्मन्, but yet it is अनुष्ठेय, it is not merely a reflection (परामर्श). To prove this, the Sūtrakāra goes even so far as to assert that आत्मज्ञान is a विधि (20), not स्तुति (Sūtras 21–22), nor are the texts about आत्मज्ञान meant for पारिप्लवकर्म. Because it is अनुष्ठेय without being a कर्मन् or a rite, आत्मज्ञान does not require अग्नि, इन्धन *etc.*, the sacrifices which are means to आत्मज्ञान are allegorical like the horse in Bṛ. Upa. I. 1 (Sūtras 25–26). Thus, the Adhikaraṇa of Sūtras 18–26 was meant to explain the nature of आत्मज्ञान; it is not a reflection but it is something to be performed without being a rite or कर्मन्. The example is that of the allegorical horse. The presence of च in Sūtra 26 is indicative of the end of the Adhikaraṇa. In the new Adhikaraṇa beginning with Sūtra 27, the Sūtrakāra tells us what actions are to be performed (अनुष्ठेय) by a seeker of release as a means to the knowledge of Brahman. Thus the topics of the two Adhikaraṇas are also different. For this reason Sūtra III. 4. 27 in our opinion begins a new Adhikaraṇa.

6. Śaṅkara connects तथापि तु with what he takes as understood *viz.*, an objection against sacrifice *etc.*, being a means to the knowledge of Brahman. Thereby he brings out the conclusion that the sacrifice *etc.*, are not really the means, but

the real help is control over mind, senses *etc.* But this removal of तथापि तु from its position in the Sūtra is not legitimate; it cannot be connected with something not mentioned or implied in the Sūtras.

तद्विधेः तदङ्गतया—The विधि of शमदमादि is a means to विद्या; तत् in ' तदङ्गतया ' means विद्या, according to Śaṅkara. 'तेषाम्' refers to शमदमादि in his opinion. So, control over mind *etc.*, is to be *invariably* performed, not the sacrifice, donation, *etc.* All this interpretation is based upon the supposed context of तथापि तु. तत् in तदङ्गतया and तेषाम् should refer to what the Sūtrakāra has said in the preceding Adhikaraṇa. अनुष्ठेयत्वम् can be construed only with यज्ञादिs. Śaṅkara does not tell us how शम, दम, *etc.*, can be performed. As to the association of यज्ञादि and शमदमादि with the आश्रमs, see Sūtra 32, where the Sūtrakāra for the first time discusses the utility of the आश्रम duties. Śaṅkara interprets एवंविद् (in तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्तः *etc.*,) differently from "विविदिषन्ति" (in ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन ।), but we cannot say that एवंविद् refers to anybody else but one who desires to know Brahman, as possessd of the characteristics described there; it cannot, indeed mean one who has realized Brahman. One should become शान्त, दान्त *etc.*, because he knows that Brahman to be realized is such as neither ' increases ' nor ' decreases ' through action, *etc.*, (न वर्धते कर्मणा नो कनीयान्). He gives up कर्मन् and tries to see Atman. ' आत्मानं पश्यति ' of the Kāṇva recension is to be interpreted as आत्मानं पश्येत् as is given in the माध्यंदिन recension, as Śaṅkara himself says.

Sūtra 28

7. The preceding Sūtra mentioned control over mind and senses and other virtues. Connected with this, we find the rules of food eatable and uneatable in the Scripture. So, in connection with Sūtra 27, the Sūtrakāra discusses that rule about food in Sūtras 28–31, and then continues the topic of what (actions) are to be performed by a seeker of absolution

in Sūtras 32–33. Thus, Sūtra 32 being a continuation of Sūtra 27, the intervening Sūtras form a parenthetical topic.

8. It may be argued that if a seeker of Absolution is possessed of control over mind, control over senses, cessation of all activities (उपरति) *etc.*, he need not perform the sacrifice and other means laid down for knowing Brahman in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22. To this a reply was given in Sūtra 27 that the शमदमादिविधि was subsidiary to यज्ञादिविधि. Now on the same ground of शमदमादि being subsidiary to यज्ञादिविधि, it may be argued that he need not observe the rules of legitimate and illegitimate food, the rules of purification, *etc.* To this a reply is given in this Sūtra (28).

9. The sanction of all food or food from all persons does not follow from the fact that शमदमादिविधि is a subsidiary विधि for a seeker of absolution. The eating of all food is allowed in his case only on the occasion of danger of losing life (प्राणात्यये), not otherwise.

10. तद्दर्शनात्—As Śaṅkara shows this is a reference to the story of उषस्ति चाक्रायण (Chā. Upa. I. 10) who ate the pulse (कुल्माष) '*from what the rich man was himself eating*' because he (उषस्ति) would have otherwise died, but who did not take water from what the rich man was drinking because he could live without it. प्राणात्यये in the Sūtra refers to 'न वा अजीविष्यमिमानखादन्' in Chā. Upa. I. 10. 4.

11. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 28 begins a new Adhikaraṇa. To us it seems to answer a point arising from the fact that the शमदमादिविधि for a seeker is secondary to यज्ञादिविधि as explained above, and therefore it is a part of the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtra 27, though a secondary part only as we have explained above (Note 8). According to Śaṅkara the पूर्वपक्ष is based upon Śrutis like Chā. Upa. V. 2. 1 and Bṛ. Upa. VI. 1. 14. To us it appears that these texts are referred to by Sūtra 29, which therefore shows the

way of interpreting them. If we take Sūtra 28 as शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथापि तु सर्वान्नानुमतिः प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्, we can well explain why the topic of food is discussed in this context. 'च' shows that the topic of Sūtra 28 is connected with that of Sūtra 27. According to Śaṅkara the question is whether the sanction for all food is laid down as a विद्याङ्गविधि a means for the knowledge of Prāṇa" or it is only स्तुति, just as शमदमादि, and he decides in favour of the latter alterative. As Śaṅkara himself shows such an argument would be prima facie impossible because शमदमादिs are laid down by all Scriptures, while सर्वान्नभक्षण is opposed by them. Moreover, there is no विधि in the Śrutis concerned on the ground of which the opponent may base his conclusion. So, Sūtra 28 should be connected with Sūtra 27 rather than with Chā. Upa. V. 2. 1 and Bṛ. Upa. VI. 1. 14. Though the शमदमादिविधि is subsidiary to यज्ञादिविधि, it does not allow all food as legitimate for a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman.

Sūtra 29

12. अबाधात्—As Smṛti is mentioned in the next Sūtra, this अबाध 'absence of inconsistency' refers to the अबाध from the Śruti. So, अबाध seems to be a reference to न ह वा एवंविदि किंचनानन्नं भवति। (Chā. Upa. V. 2. 1), न ह वा अस्यानन्नं जग्धं भवति नानन्नं प्रतिगृहीतम्। (Bṛ. Upa. VI. 1. 14). These Śrutis show that in order to save प्राणs, one may eat all food. The important point is that these Śrutis mention प्राण; the Sūtrakāra, therefore, says that only on the occasion of danger to life (प्राण) all food is allowed by the Scripture.

13. Śaṅkara seems to have missed the above point altogether. He refers the अबाध neither to a Śruti nor to a Smṛti. He could not refer it to a Śruti because the possible Śrutis have been used by him as an argument in Sūtra 28, and to a Smṛti because it is referred to in Sūtra 30. If by भक्ष्याभक्ष्यविभागशास्त्र (in his explanation of Sūtra 29) he refers to the Smṛti, Sūtra 30 becomes unnecessary.

Sūtra 30

14. The Sūtrakāra refers to a Smṛti like Manu X. 104, quoted by Śaṅkara in order to support his view that even to a seeker of absolution the Scripture allows all food only when there is a danger to life. "यतस्ततः" in the Smṛti and the fact that उषस्ति ate कुल्माषs from what the rich man was eating would rather suggest that 'सर्वान्न' in Sūtra 28 means food from all; but in fact it is food of all kinds, which would also include the food eaten by Uṣasti. For this reason, the Sūtrakāra seems to refer to

प्राणस्यान्नमिदं सर्वं प्रजापतिरकल्पयत् ।
स्थावरं जङ्गमं चैव सर्वं प्राणस्य भोजनम् ॥ (Manu. V. 28)

This would also better agree with the Śrutis in question.

15. None of these Sūtras (29–31, see below) refer to Śaṅkara's conclusion under Sūtra 28, *viz.*, Chā. Upa. V. 2. 1 is अर्थवाद, not a विधि. This also proves our view about the पूर्वपक्ष in Sūtra 28.

16. Regarding Śaṅkara's explanation of Sūtra 30, see Note 13, 14 above.

Sūtra 31

17. अतः—The Sūtrakāra seems to draw a general conclusion from the discussion in Sūtras 28–30.

18. Owing to the fact that all food is allowed when life is in danger, we may apply this Word to what actions are done 'without desire' or per force *i. e.* in order to save life.

19. शब्दः may be a reference to the text mentioned in Sūtra 28 *viz.*, Chā. Upa. I. 10. In that text when Uṣasti does not drink water from that from which the rich man has drunk, he says, "कामो मे उदपानम्" (Chā. Upa. I. 10. 4). So, we may say that eating the कुल्माष was against his wish (अकामकारे).

Or, perhaps the शब्द refers to a text like "एवंविद्यद्यपि बह्विव पापं कुरुते सर्वमेव तत्संप्साय शुद्धः पूतोऽजरोऽमृतः संभवति ॥" (Bṛ.

Upa. V. 14. 8); नैनं पाप्मा तरति सर्वं पाप्मानं तरति नैनं पाप्मा तपति सर्वं पाप्मानं तपति । (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23), तरति शोकं तरति पाप्मानम् (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 9), एवमेवंविदि पापं कर्म न श्लिष्यते (Chā. Upa. IV. 14. 3), एतं ह वाव न तपति किमहं साधु नाकरवम् । किमहं पापमकरवमिति । स य एवं विद्वानेते आत्मानं स्पृणुते ॥ उभे ह्येवैष एते आत्मानं स्पृणुते (Tai. Upa. II. 9), *etc. etc.*

The Sūtrakāra means that all these Śrutis refer to sins or violations done by a seeker of absolution *against his wish.*

20. It seems that in Sūtra 31 the Sūtrakāra arrives at a general conclusion; and that to this conclusion he refers under Sūtra 42 (Vide Sūtra 42).

21. Śaṅkara takes अतः as referring to his conclusion in Sūtra 28 *viz.*, Chā. Upa. V. 2. 1 is an अर्थवाद, not a विधि. See Note 15 above. अतः should refer to the conclusion in all the Sūtras. 'शब्द' according to Śaṅkara refers to तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः सुरां न पिबेत् a quotation from the Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā as Śaṅkara says. This text is, according to him, अनन्नस्य प्रतिषेधकः *i. e.*, कामकारनिवृत्तिप्रयोजनः "meant to prevent him from wanton deeds." To us it appears that 'अकामकार' means "all things done against one's wish," as shown above. This is supported by कामो मे उदपानम् in the story of Uṣasti (Chā. Upa. I. 10. 4) and by the use of 'कामकार' in Sūtra III. 4. 15.

Sūtra 32

22. Having finished the subtopic of "duties in adversity" (आपद्धर्म) for a seeker of absolution, the Sūtrakāra now resumes the main topic of what actions he should perform. Sacrifice, *etc.*, were declared to be अनुष्ठेय in Sūtra 27. Now, in Sūtras 32–33 the Sūtrakāra says that आश्रमकर्मन्s also should be performed by him.

23. अपि—This word shows that *in addition to* यज्ञ, दान and तपस् mentioned in Sūtra 27 as अनुष्ठेय, आश्रमकर्मन्s the duties of the various orders of life are *also* to be performed

(अनुष्ठेय) by the seekers of absolution. The Sūtrakāra holds that only these two types of duties are necessary for the seeker of Brahmajñāna (See Sūtra 34).

24. आश्रम—As no particular order is mentioned it follows that persons in *all the four orders of life* can pursue the search after the knowledge of Brahman. The professional duties in the case of a seeker are discussed in Sūtras 41–46.

25. विहितत्वात्—The duties of the orders of life are *laid down in the Upaniṣads* for a seeker of Brahman. The Śruti in question seems to us to be the following :–त्रयो धर्मस्कन्धाः यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमः तप एव द्वितीयो ब्रह्मचार्याचार्यकुलवासी तृतीयोऽत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन्सर्व एते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति ब्रह्मसंस्थोऽमृतत्वमेति॥ In this Śruti तपस्, according to a commentary older than that of Śaṅkara, means both the वानप्रस्थ and संन्यास orders (See Śā. bhā. on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 20). The Sūtrakāra seems to us to mean that this Śruti lays down the आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker of Brahman, just as Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22, lays down यज्ञ, दान, तपः for all seekers of Brahman *irrespective of the stages of life.* (See Sūtra 27 above.) In any case 'विहित' means 'laid down in the Upaniṣads for a seeker of Brahman'. The Sūtrakāra does not accept any कर्मन् for a seeker of Brahman only because it is laid down in the Smṛti. If he does, he mentions the word Smṛti, *e. g.*, in Sūtra 43. In the case of the professional duties, the Sūtrakāra mentions two opinions according to one of which the professional duties of direct concern with the seeker were not allowed in the case of a seeker of Brahman though they are *laid down by the Smṛti* (See Sūtras 44–45). For these reasons, we believe 'विहितत्वात्' refers to an Injunction in an Upaniṣad regarding the आश्रमकर्मन्s as those to be performed by the seeker of Brahman.

26. According to Śaṅkara, Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 and Sūtra 26 lay down the आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker. As no word meaning आश्रम occurs either in that Śruti or in that Sūtra, as the Sūtrakāra (in Sūtra 26) seems to us to lay down यज्ञ *etc.*, in

an allegorical form (inconsistent with the Smārta order of a householder), as the same are laid down (in Sūtra 27) for all the orders seeking absolution, and lastly as the express word meaning an order (आश्रम) is found in Sūtra 32 and Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1 (स्कन्ध) respectively, we suggest that Sūtra 32 discusses the question of the performance of the duties of the various orders in the case of a seeker of Brahman (See also Sūtra 34).

According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra discusses whether one who does not seek absolution should perform the duties of the stages or not. The आश्रममात्रनिष्ठ अमुमुक्षु is neither known from the context, nor from the Sūtra and does not come within the province of the knowledge of Atman directly or indirectly. So, the question is not discussed here at all. ' विहित ' in the Sūtra does not seem to refer to " यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति " but it refers to an Upaniṣadic text laying down the आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker of Brahman. Moreover, the next two Sūtras go against Śaṅkara's interpretation of this Sūtra.

Sūtra 33

27. In the यज्ञादिविधि (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22) it is clearly stated that यज्ञ *etc.*, are to be performed as a help to the knowledge of Brahman (तमेतं......ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति।) but in the आश्रमकर्मविधि (Chā Upa. II. 23. 1) it is not stated that the duties of the orders are to be performed by a seeker as a means to avoid प्रत्यवाय or as a सहकारिन् to the knowledge of Atman, because that Śruti only lays down the आश्रमकर्मन्s as consistent with ब्रह्मविद्या. For this reason, the Sūtrakāra, in Sūtra 33 makes it clear that आश्रमकर्मन्s are to be performed by a seeker as a help to the knowledge of Brahman, not for avoiding प्रत्यवाय as is the case when they are performed by by the one who does not seek absolution. सहकारित्व is given by the Sūtrakāra independently of any Śruti, but consistently

with Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1. He does not refer to any Śruti in Sūtra 33.

28. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 33 answers a doubt raised in Śaṅkara's commentary on Sūtra 32. In itself this is a wrong procedure; and Sūtra 33 can be well connected with Sūtra 32 as we have shown. The fact that सहकारित्वेन refers to the आश्रमकर्मन्s performed by a seeker of Brahman proves that Sūtra 32 deals with the same topic. According to Saṅkara, the आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker are laid down in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 26 and a doubt raised regarding the same is replied in Sūtra 33. This is indeed very strange. Śaṅkara is at great pains to prove that the विद्यासहकारित्व of आश्रमकर्मन्s is not stated with reference to विद्याफल but only as regards विद्योत्पत्ति. The Sūtra (33) itself, however, does not seem even to distinguish विद्याफलोत्पत्ति from विद्योत्पत्ति. See also तत्कार्यायैव in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 16.

Sūtra 34

29. This Sūtra seems to be a summary of Sūtras 27–33.

30. त एव means ते एव कर्मणी अनुष्ठेये. In any case only those two types of actions, *viz.*, यज्ञादि as established in Sūtra 27 and आश्रमकर्म as proved in Sūtra 32 are to be performed by a seeker of Brahman as help to the knowledge of Brahman.

There is a third (तृतीयम्) type of सहकारिकर्मन्s mentioned in Sūtra 47. This is excluded by एव in ते एव and is made optional by सर्वथाऽपि. In any case, under any circumstances, the two types of कर्मन्s mentioned above should be compulsorily (सर्वथाऽपि) performed, while the third type of सहकारिकर्मन्s is optional (See पक्षेण in Sūtra 47).

31. उभयलिङ्गात्—This refers to त एव *i. e.* the two types of सहकारिकर्मन्s meant by त एव. So, the expression 'उभयलिङ्ग' is a reference to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 (Sūtra 27) and Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1 (Sūtra 32).

32. Śaṅkara takes ते एव as a plural form and adds धर्माः as understood. But as we have shown त एव should be construed with कर्मणी as understood because the word कर्म in the sense of type of actions occurs in Sūtra 32, because तृतीयं a third type of optional helping actions is mentioned in Sūtra 47, and because " उभय " in उभयलिङ्गात् shows that only two types of actions are meant by त एव. So, we cannot take ' धर्माः ' as understood and interpret त एव in the plural number. According to Śaṅkara, the question in this Sūtra is whether the अग्निहोत्रादिधर्मs performed as आश्रमकर्म by a non-seeker and as help to the knowledge of Atman differ or not; and ' सर्वथाऽपि ' means in both the forms *i. e.*, both as आश्रमकर्म and विद्यासहकारिकर्म. But, ' सर्वथाऽपि ' means ' compulsion ' in the case of the two types of actions, as shown by ' पक्षेण ' which refers to the option in the case of the third type of helping actions. Śaṅkara holds that एव excludes the doubt regarding the difference in the nature of आश्रमकर्मन्s, but it should, according to the context, exclude some actions and as shown above it excludes a third type of सहकारि actions; nor do the उभयलिङ्गs as interpreted by Śaṅkara expressly mention the sameness of आश्रमकर्मन्s. Śaṅkara explains उभयलिङ्गs as श्रुतिलिङ्ग and स्मृतिलिङ्ग and refers them to texts which do not seem to help him. Rather उभयलिङ्ग refers to two Śruti texts about यज्ञादिकर्मन् and आश्रमकर्मन्. Sūtra 33 itself shows that the same आश्रमकर्मन्s as are laid down in the Upaniṣads are to be performed as सहकारिकर्मन्s; and Sūtra IV. 1. 16 shows that अग्निहोत्रादि done by a seeker of absolution is meant for producing that same effect.

Sūtra 35

33. ' अनभिभव ' should refer to the non-suppression of the आश्रमकर्मन्s and यज्ञादिकर्मन्s mentioned in Sūtras 32–33 and 27 respectively. So, Sūtra 35 gives one more reason as to why these two types of कर्मन्s should be done. But the Sūtrakāra does not accept that हेतु for his conclusion, which

he, therefore, draws in the preceding Sūtra (34). 'तु' in Sūtra 36 also shows that Sūtra 35 is to be treated as a पूर्वपक्ष.

34. दर्शयति—Here we have got the exact distinction between the two हेतुs *viz.*, लिङ्ग and दर्शन or दृष्ट or दृष्टि. लिङ्ग is a sentence directly making a required statement. It is of the nature of a rule as it were. दर्शन or दृष्टि, दर्शयति, दृष्टं means an illustration or a description which corroborates the particular conclusion. Both लिङ्ग and दर्शन refer to Śruti only.

Thus, उभयलिङ्ग should mean both the types of (indicatory) Śrutis; see Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11 (उभयव्यपदेशात् has the same sense in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 27); III. 4. 34 (the present Sūtra). This shows that Śaṅkara's explanation of उभयलिङ्गात् in the present Sūtra is not correct.

For the distinction of लिङ्ग and दर्शन or दृष्ट, दृष्टि, दर्शयति, see Sūtras I. 3. 15, III. 4. 34-35 (the present Sūtras), IV. I. 1-2 (where उपदेशात् seems to correspond to दर्शनात्), IV. 4. 20-21.

35. अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ।—This refers to Śruti texts in which seekers of Brahman do not give up performing the duties of each आश्रम and यज्ञादि-कर्मन्s, particularly those of गृहस्थाश्रम. याज्ञवल्क्य who taught जनक observed both गृहस्थाश्रम and वानप्रस्थाश्रम (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 5). शौनक who learned ब्रह्मविद्या from अङ्गिरस्, was a great householder (महाशाल :—Mu. Upa. I. 1. 3) "क्रियावन्त: श्रोत्रियाः ब्रह्मनिष्ठाः" are mentioned also in Mu. Upa. III. 2. 10.

36. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as an argument for the fact that the आश्रमकर्मन्s are to be performed by a seeker *as a help to the* knowledge of Brahman. Thus, for him this Sūtra supports सहकारित्व, not the आश्रमकर्मन्s themselves. Moreover, he uses the word 'लिङ्गदर्शन' for दर्शयति, which shows that he does not distinguish between लिङ्ग and दर्शन or दर्शयति. अनभिभव, according to him, is not the अनभिभव of आश्रमकर्मन्s, but the non-suppression of the Atman acquired by means of celibacy, through vices like passion *etc.* (ब्रह्मचर्यादिसाधनसंपन्नस्य (आत्मनः) रागादिभिः क्लेशैः अनभिभवः). He quotes Chā. Upa. VIII. 5. 3.

Sūtra 36

37. ' च ' shows that this Sūtra does not begin a new Adhikaraṇa. तु shows that the preceding Sūtra is a पूर्वपक्ष, and this Sūtra the सिद्धान्त. अपि gives an option between the view of Sūtra 35 and that of Sūtra 36.

38. Sūtra 35 refers to a Śruti showing the non-suppression or continuance of the आश्रमकर्मन्s and यज्ञादिकर्मन्s. Sūtra 36 seems to refer to the suppressin of the same by the word अन्तरा which means ' without ' or ' except ' (*e. g.*, न प्रयोजनमन्तरा चाणक्यः स्वप्नेऽपि चेष्टते). Here अन्तरा would mean " without the आश्रमकर्मन् " because in Sūtra 35, the non-suppression of these actions is mentioned.

' अनभिभव ' means that a seeker does not give up the actions of any आश्रम; अन्तरा would show that he would give up the actions of some आश्रमs and also यज्ञादिकर्मन्s. If he gives up those कर्मन्s, he belongs to another order of life. अन्तरा means अनभिभवं अन्तरा *i. e.*, without non-suppression *i. e.*, with suppression.

39. तद्दृष्टेः—This seems to be a reference to a Śruti in which the suppression of the duties of some of the orders of life is mentioned. एतद्ध स्म वै तत्पूर्वे विद्वाꣳसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करिष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्माऽयं लोक इति, ते ह स्म पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति.......... । (Br. Upa. IV. 4. 22). One may not observe a particular आश्रम and proceed *e. g.*, from the order of a student to that of an ascetic.

40. ' अपि तु ' means " but also " without non-suppression of आश्रमकर्मन्. So, Sūtra 36 gives an *option with Sūtra 35* without overruling the decision given in Sūtra 34. This means, आश्रमकर्मन्s and यज्ञादिकर्मन्s must be performed, but one may go from the order of a student directly to that of an ascetic, just as he may go gradually from one to another order and ultimately reach that of an ascetic. In any case a seeker

never remains without आश्रमकर्मन्s as said in Sūtra 34, and does not necessarily do the actions of *all* आश्रमs by stages.

41. Śaṅkara interprets this Sūtra to show that आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker are not compulsory; but this interpretation is against Sūtra 34 which makes आश्रमकर्मन्s quite compulsory. अन्तरा he does not interpret as 'अनभिभवं अन्तरा' but he takes it in the sense of अन्तरालवर्तिन् one who stands midway in an आश्रम; Śaṅkara explains it as referring to (widows,) widowers, and 'those who being very poor cannot take to the duties of any order of life'. According to him, the Sūtra discusses whether such persons are entitled to ब्रह्मविद्या or not. 'तद्दृष्टेः' refers, according to Śaṅkara, to such examples as those of रैक्व and वाचक्नवी, but it is highly doubtful whether they avoided आश्रमकर्मन्s at all. The texts in which their names occur (Chā. Upa. IV. 1–2; Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 12) do not seem to mean so. रैक्व and वाचक्नवी had already realized Brahman; and, therefore, we cannot say from the texts that they dropped आश्रमकर्मन् which are to be done as a help to the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, as अपि तु shows, Sūtra 36 is a modification of Sūtra 35. See also Sūtra 40 which contains a converse of Sūtra 36 and thereby helps in deciding the sense of Sūtra 36.

Sūtra 37

42. अपि च स्मर्यते—A Smṛti text stating the अभिभव or suppression of the duties of some order or orders of life is referred to. Such a text is *e. g.*, the following :–सर्वधर्मान्परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज । (Bha. Gī. XVIII. 66). This Smṛti verse allows a seeker (one who wants to "submit himself to the Lord alone") to give up "all duties" except, of course, that of seeking Brahman.

43. Śaṅkara refers to the examples in the Epic of संवर्त and others who wandered about naked and did not do the duties of the orders of life, and yet were great Yogins.

Sūtra 38

44. विशेषानुग्रहश्च—We may take 'स्मर्यते' as understood from Sūtra 37. 'विशेषानुग्रहः' means "special favour". This seems to be a reference to a text like the latter half of the verse quoted above, *viz.*, "अहं त्वां सर्वपापेभ्यो मोक्षयिष्यामि मा शुचः" (Bha. Gī. XVIII 66). The seeker who gives up the duties of an order of life, *e. g.*, that of a householder, and takes to the higher order for submitting himself to the Lord, receives special favour of the Lord. But this is a Smārta view and the Sūtrakāra does not seem to favour it (See below Sūtra 39).

45. Śaṅkara separates विशेष and अनुग्रह which is rather a strange procedure. विशेष is interpreted by him in the sense of धर्मविशेषs "special religious duties" and 'अनुग्रह' as 'विद्यायाः अनुग्रहः' "the favour of the Lore". The special religious duties are those of जप, repetition of a Mantra or the name of the Lord, उपवास 'fasting', देवताराधन 'propitiation of the deity', *etc.*, duties which, being connected solely with a man, can be performed by a widower and others. If a widower and such other persons carry out these duties, the Lore favours them. Śaṅkara also quotes a verse from the Manu Smṛti (II. 87) which is really meant to emphasize the repetition (जप) of the गायत्री the sacred prayer to the Sun. Śaṅkara gives a second interpretation of विशेष, *viz.*, the आश्रमकर्मन्s performed even in a previous birth or births.

Sūtra 39

46. This Sūtra shows what is to be preferred between अनभिभव and अभिभव of the duties of an order of life, between the view of Sūtra 35 and that of Sūtras 36-38. तु shows that the view of Sūtra 36-38 is not fully accepted by the Sūtrakāra, just as he did not fully agree with the view in Sūtra 35. Or rather तु shows that the Sūtrakāra rejects a view that regarded the view in Sūtras 36-38 as better than that in Sūtra 35.

47. अत:—' than the अभिभवः or suppression of आश्रम or आश्रमकर्मन् '.

48. इतरत् is a reference to a practice in which no आश्रम is dropped.

49. ज्याय:—The view that the duties of all आश्रमs must be performed is superior to that of the suppression of any आश्रम. Thus, the Sūtrakāra finally upholds the view that the आश्रमs are to be performed by turn without dropping any of them for ब्रह्मविद्या.

The Sūtrakāra seems to have in his mind the famous verse of the Bhagavadgītā "कर्म ज्यायो ह्यकर्मणः". Arjuna wanted to give up the duties of a house-holder and take to संन्यास or the order of a monk. He was told by the Lord that "the action was better than the non-action". The Sūtrakāra interprets this as meaning that if after performing the duties of a house-holder fully, one takes to the next order of life, it is a better procedure. He does not, of course, mean that it is better always to do the duties of a house-holder rather than become a monk at all.

50. लिङ्गात् — This is a reference to the लिङ्ग or the Śruti in favour of the performance of the duties of आश्रमs mentioned in Sūtra 34.

51. Saṅkara says that आश्रमवर्तित्व is a better means to विद्या than अन्तरालवर्तित्व. He quotes a श्रुति *viz.*, एष पन्था ब्रह्मणा ह्यानुवित्तस्तेनैति ब्रह्मवित्पुण्यकृत्तैजसश्च । (Br. Upa. IV. 4. 9). In this Śruti nothing is said about the अन्तरालवर्तिन् or आश्रमवर्तिन्. He also quotes a Śruti in which a द्विज is asked to perform an atonement if he remains without an order for a year, but which says nothing about आश्रमित्व being a better means for the विद्या than अन्तरालवर्तित्व. Perhaps the Upaniṣads were not at all concerned with अन्तरालवर्तिन्s, because the Smṛtis had condemned them even from the society.

SECTION IV

No reversion from monkhood and no professional duties for Monks except of a subordinate nature and that too in Adversity only.

Sūtras III. 4. 40-42

(४०) तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमातद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ।

(४१) न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात् ।

(४२) उपपूर्वमपि त्वेके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् ।

TRANSLATION

BUT one who has become that [ascetic] should not become *other than that* (अतद् *i. e.,* should not revert to the original order), [in the opinion] of Jaimini also, because of the rule, difference in the nature of those orders, and non-existence or absence, 40

and [he, who has become the ascetic, should] not [perform] even official [or professional] duties because of their disconnection (from him) due to the Smṛti about the spiritual fall. 41

However, the followers of a certain Branch of the Veda mention the *subordinate* or side existence (*upapūrvam bhāvam*) [of professional duties in the case of a monk] as they mention 'eating (beans)'; this has been explained. 42

NOTES

Sūtra 40

1. In Sūtras 36–38, it was said that one who seeks Brahman may become a monk from the stage of a student without having lived the life of a house-holder. It may be argued that in the same way one who becomes a monk for the sake of getting the knowledge of Brahman may cease to belong to that order and become a house-holder. This view is refuted by the word 'तु' in Sūtra 40.

2. तद्भूतस्य न अतद्भावः—One who has become that (*i. e.* a monk) should not become not-that *i. e., other* than that, *i. e.,* he should not become a householder again.

3. Jaimini also holds this view as does the Sūtrakāra.

4. नियमातद्रूपाभावेभ्यः—These are the reasons why having belonged to the order of monkhood one cannot revert to an original stage. नियम is the rule that from a preceding stage one can go to a succeeding stage of life. अतद्रूप seems to refer to the difference of nature between the various orders *viz.*, that a student is unmarried, that a house-holder is married, that a hermit has given up residence in the city and taken to the forest, that a monk has no wife with him. 'अभाव' seems to be the absence of a rule allowing a reversion; thus, अभाव means नियमाभाव. On account of these reasons, one who becomes a monk is not allowed to revert.

5. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra discusses the question whether the celibate orders of life *are likely* 'to fall' under any circumstances or not. Thus, he takes तद्भूतः as प्रतिपन्नोर्ध्वरेतोभावः, but अतद्भावः as "न ततः प्रच्युतिः". To explain नियम Śaṅkara quotes several sentences like अत्यन्तमात्मानमाचार्यकुलेऽवसादयन् (Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1),.........ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही भवेत् ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत् (Jā. Upa. 4.), and remarks that these Śrutis

refer to the rise of the seeker, but there are no Śrutis about his fall. 'अतद्रूप' he seems to explain by saying "न चैवमाचाराः शिष्टाः विद्यन्ते". "That there are no Śrutis about his fall", seems to be Śaṅkara's meaning of "अभाव". Thus, Śaṅkara says that for one who has become an ऊर्ध्वरेतस् (either a life-long student, or a monk, or, we should add, a hermit) there is no possibility of his प्रच्युति (अतद्रूप) through passion (रागादिवशात्) or through a desire to perform religious rites of a previous stage (पूर्वकर्मस्वनुष्ठानचिकीर्षया).

To us it seems that in Sūtra 40, the Sūtrakāra makes a rule that having assumed a succeeding order one should not revert or rather having become a monk one should not go over to another order than that, because he (the Sūtrakāra) wants to guard against a seeker's spiritual fall. Simply by the fact that a seeker assumes the order of monkhood nobody can guarantee that his fall would never occur or that he would always progress well. Rather, in order that this latter aim be achieved, the Sūtrakāra advises in this Sūtra that the monk should never revert to another order than that. He does the same in the next Sūtra also (see below).

Sūtra 41

6. 'च' shows that this Sūtra is connected with the preceding Sūtra. So, the sentence is to be construed as तद्भूतस्य आधिकारिकमपि कर्म न. Therefore, this Sūtra (41) does not begin a new Adhikaraṇa.

7. आधिकारिकम् — With this word we should take "कर्म अनुष्ठेयम्" as understood because in this Pāda the topic is that of the कर्मन्s to be done by a seeker of Brahman and कर्म was the topic in the preceding Adhikaraṇa. Sūtra 34 means सर्वथापि ते एव कर्मणी अनुष्ठेये।.

8. As it is the same Adhikaraṇa along with Sūtra 41, we have the sense: तद्भूतस्य आधिकारिकमपि कर्म न अनुष्ठेयम्। One who has become a monk cannot perform even the official

duties. 'आधिकारिक' means "official" or "professional", that which refers to अधिकार or office. The word is similarly explained by Śaṅkara in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 32 and IV. 4. 18. See also Sūtra 43 where "उभयथा" refers to आधिकारिक in this Sūtra and उपपूर्वं भावम् in Sūtra 42.

9. अपि—'also'. This word shows that a monk can neither revert to his original order of life nor can he perform the duties of that order *i. e.*, the order of a house-holder. Both these are not allowed to a monk.

10. तदयोगात्—'तद्' should refer to आधिकारिक कर्म "the official duties". The monk seeking absolution is to be dissociated from official duties also, as from a reversion to his original order. A seeker of Brahman may be in the order of a householder (See Sūtra 32), but if he becomes a monk, he cannot return to the original order (तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावः), because in that reversion lies the danger of his spiritual fall. Similarly he should not perform the official duties because these have been dissociated from him on account of the Smṛti about the spiritual fall.

11. पतनानुमानात्—Some Smṛti text mentioning the 'fall' of an ascetic is referred to by this. Manu Smṛti VI. 58 may serve as such a verse:—

अभिपूजितलाभात्तु जुगुप्सेतैव सर्वशः ।
अभिपूजितलाभैश्च यतिर्मुक्तोऽपि बध्यते ॥

On account of such Smṛtis, the Sūtrakāra dissociates 'official duties' from the ascetic.

12. According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra **41** begins a new Adhikaraṇa, but as 'च' shows this Sūtra is, we suggest, to be taken along with the preceding Sūtra, and 'तद्भूतस्य' from that Sūtra is to be connected with न चाधिकारिकमपि. He takes Sūtra **41** as referring to the Section of Adhikāralakṣaṇa in Jaiminisūtra VI. 8. 21. Śaṅkara was led to this belief only

because the word '*ādhikārika*' occurs in this Sūtra (III. 4. 41); but, as shown above, it should mean 'official' or 'professional', and should be connected with the same word elsewhere in the Sūtras, where Śaṅkara explains it in the sense of 'official'. Moreover, it looks very improbable that the author of the Brahmasūtras would criticise the Jaiminisūtras on a point which does not at all form a part of the Vedānta doctrine. Śaṅkara connects "आधिकारिक" with the word 'प्रायश्चित्त' taken, as understood, but the context shows that the word 'कर्म' should be taken as understood. This '*adhyāhāra*' is supported by all these Sūtras *viz.*, III. 4., particularly III. 4. 42, 43. Śaṅkara changes पतन into अप्रतिसमाधेयपतन. 'अनुमान' may mean "a Law Book" like that of Manu, or a text like the Mahābhārata. According to Śaṅkara's interpretation तद्योगात् in Sūtra III. 4. 41 becomes almost redundant. Śaṅkara's explanation of this and the following Sūtras shows that according to his interpretation no topic of the Vedānta doctrine proper is discussed here.

Sūtra 42

13. 'अपितु' as in Sūtra 36, shows that this Sūtra is a modification of the view in the preceding Sūtra.

14. 'भावम्' means the existence of professional or official duties and is used in opposition to 'न' in the preceding Sūtra.

15. उपपूर्वम्—The word उप as well as the word अशन seem to us to be a clear suggestion for the Śruti referred to by एके in this Sūtra. It is very likely that here the Sūtrakāra refers to Chā. Upa. I. 10–11, particularly तत्रोद्गातॄन् आस्तावे स्तोष्यमाणान् उपोपविवेश स ह प्रस्तोतारमुवाच (Chā. Upa. I. 10. 8). To this passage (particularly to 'उपोपविवेश') we propose to take उप in उपपूर्वम् as referring (For अशन see below).

16. 'उपपूर्वं भावम्' means उपपूर्वमाधिकारिकस्य कर्मणः भावम्. By this expression the Sūtrakāra not only gives a clue to

the Śruti he has in mind, but he also gives, it seems to us, his own interpretation of that Śruti. He seems to mean that "if a seeker of absolution has to do professional or official duties, they should be उपपूर्व i. e. of a subordinate or subsidiary nature." 'उप' has this sense of subordination e. g. in the famous illustration "उप हरिं सुराः" (Sk. on Pāṇini I. 4. 87). The preposition उप may also mean "superiority" e. g., in "उप निष्के कार्षापणम्". And this sense may have been as well intended by the Sūtrakāra in "उपपूर्वं भावम्". Thus, the Sūtrakāra interprets 'उपोपविवेश' to mean that उषस्ति चाक्रायण did not actually act as a priest in the sacrifice of the rich lord, but he only *supervised* over the other priests that were actually officiating there; so, this kind of secondary performance of professional duty may be allowed in the case of a monk (तद्भूत) under the conditions implied by अशनवत्.

17. अशनवत्—This has a reference to the fact that in case of dire necessity उषस्ति चाक्रायण had to eat beans out of what remained after the owner of the elephant (इभ्य) had partaken of the same. This उषस्ति did only because otherwise he would have died. He, however, refused to drink 'impure' water, because it was not necessary to save his life.

18. तदुक्तम्—This is undoubtedly a reference to Sūtra III. 4. 28, *viz.*, सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात्। There Śaṅkara rightly explains तद्दर्शनात् (in Sūtra 28) as referring to the story of उषस्ति चाक्रायण (Chā. Upa. I. 10). But, somehow or other, perhaps due to the loss of tradition, he fails to realize that अशनवत् in Sūtra 42 is a reference to the eating of beans by उषस्ति and that तदुक्तम् in Sūtra 42, therefore, refers to the explanation of the eating of the beans by उषस्ति given in Sūtra 28 and to the rule laid down by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 31 (शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे।). Thus, the Sūtrakāra says that some hold that a monk may perform official duties of a *subordinate* nature only when otherwise he would die. उषस्ति चाक्रायण was a seeker of absolution and perhaps he was not a monk

but a hermit with his wife, like Yājñavalkya with Maitreyī, but yet, owing to dire necessity performed official duties of a secondary nature (उपोपविवेश). The Sūtrakāra applies this illustration to the case of a monk or even a hermit, because 'तद्भूत' can be interpreted as referring to both without any difficulty.

19. Śaṅkara interprets उपपूर्व in the sense of उपपातक and here, too, the topic of the Sūtra as given by him, though important for the discipline of students, has nothing to do with the Vedānta doctrine. The discussion of the relative sinfulness of a confirmed celibate co-habitting with any other woman but his teacher's wife is quite out of place in the Brahmasūtras. He explains भावम् as प्रायश्चित्तस्य भावम् and अशनवत् as the case in which a student who eats honey and meat (मधुमांसाशन) breaks his vow and is made to undergo a second initiation ceremony. He explains तदुक्तम् as a reference to Jai. Sū. I. 3. 8–9.

SECTION V

Duties of a Seeker who is outside monkhood.

Sūtras III. 4. 43–46

(४३) बहिस्तूभयथाऽपि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।

(४४) स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ।

(४५) आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रियते ।

(४६) श्रुतेश्च ।

TRANSLATION

BUT outside [the order of hermit and that of monk a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman may live] even in both the ways, because of the Smṛti text and because of the practice. 43

" [He should do the work] on behalf of a master, because of the Śruti which says that the fruit [of whatever a servant does, belongs] to the master ", so says Ātreya. 44

" [He should do only] priestly duties [at a sacrifice] ", so says Auḍulomi, " because those duties are fully bought over (परि) for him, " 45

" and because of a Śruti." 46

NOTES

Sūtra 43

1. 'बहिः' is opposite of 'तद्भूत' in Sūtra 40. The previous Adhikaraṇa stated what the seeker of Brahman who has become a hermit or a monk should do; this Adhikaraṇa seems to us to say what a seeker who is outside those orders should do.

2. 'तु' shows that the rule in the preceding Adhikaraṇa is not accepted in the case of one who is outside the order of a monk.

3. उभयथापि—This has a reference to the two forms of duties, primary and secondary, official or professional duties, mentioned in Sūtras 41 and 42. A house-holder who seeks the knowledge of Brahman may do even both these types of duties.

4. स्मृतेराचाराच्च—The Smṛtis like that of Manu lay down certain duties for the householders of all the three castes. These professional duties may be done by a householder seeking Brahman. Smṛti may refer to the illustrations of जाजलि and तुलाधार in the Mahābhārata. 'आचारात्' may be a reference to the practice of persons like Yājñavalkya who taught Janaka and accepted rich gifts from him when he was a householder and a seeker of absolution.

5. Sūtra 43 seems to be the view of Bādarāyaṇa himself, while the views of other famous teachers *on the same topic* are mentioned in Sūtras 44–46.

6. Śaṅkara says that if members of the celibate orders commit either महापातक or उपपातक, they should be excommunicated by the good. Thus, he takes बहिः as बहिष्कर्तव्याः; he does not

make it refer to तद्भूत in Sūtra 40. He takes उभयथा as referring to महापातक and उपपातक though only उपपातक is mentioned in Sūtra 42 according to his interpretation. He quotes Smṛti verses and refers to the practice of the good regarding the celibates who commit the *great* and *small* sins.

Sūtra 44

7. This Sūtra seems to us to give the opinion of Ātreya as to what actions a seeker of Brahman *outside the order of monk* should do.

8. स्वामिनः—Ātreya thinks that one who seeks Brahman but has not become a monk should not do any official or professional, primary or secondary duties on his own account, but he may do such duties *on behalf of a master*. Thus, any twice-born of the three castes, seeker of Brahman, would be allowed to do any duty of his own caste, *e. g.*, a Brahmaṇa householder who seeks absolution may do याजन, अध्यापन and प्रतिग्रह on behalf of a master; similarly a क्षत्रिय and a वैश्य may do their own professional duties under a master when they are householders seeking absolution.

9. फलश्रुतेः—Ātreya refers to a Śruti stating the fruit of the labour of a servant as going to the master in support of his view.

Ātreya seems to have in his mind some Śruti which was like the following verse from the Manusmṛti or which he interpreted like it ;—

भार्या पुत्रश्च दासश्च त्रय एवाधनाः स्मृताः ।
यत्ते समधिगच्छन्ति यस्य ते तस्य तद्धनम् ॥ (Manu VIII. 416).

तेन तं ह बको दाल्भ्यो विदांचकार ॥ स ह नैमिषीयानामुद्गाता बभूव स ह स्मैभ्यः कामानागायति ॥ १३ ॥ आगाता ह वै कामानां भवति य एतदेवं विद्वानक्षरमुद्गीथमुपास्ते इत्यध्यात्मम् ॥ १४ ॥ (Chā. Upa. I. 2. 13–14). तस्मादु हैवंविदुद्गाता ब्रूयात् ॥ ८ ॥ कं ते काममागायानीत्येष ह्येव कामगानस्येष्टे य एवं विद्वान्साम गायति साम गायति ॥ ९ ॥ (Chā. Upa. I. 7. 8–9).

These are फलश्रुतिs. They state that the फल belongs to the master and not to the employed. From these, Ātreya seems to have argued that because फल belongs to the master, a house-holder seeking absolution should do all professional duties on behalf of a master. But he should not do any duties on his own behalf, because that would lead to spiritual fall.

10. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 44 begins a new Adhikaraṇa and has nothing to do with the topic of the preceding Adhikaraṇa. The subject of the Sūtra he holds to be whether the minor meditations are the actions of the Sacrificer or those of the priest. The conclusion according to Ātreya, interpreted by Śaṅkara, is that the अङ्गोपासनs are the duties of the Sacrificer, not of the priest. By फलश्रुति he quotes a line from the Chā. Upa. which does not state that the अङ्गोपासनs are the actions of the Sacrificer, but which rather says that the fruit goes to the priest who performs the minor meditation or to the Sacrificer if the priest would so wish. Therefore, Śaṅkara finds it necessary to give an argument (तच्च स्वामिगामि न्याय्यम्। तस्य साङ्गे प्रयोगेऽधिकृतत्वात्। अधिकृताधिकारत्वाच्चैवंजातीयकस्य। फलं च कर्तर्युपासनानां श्रूयते वर्षत्यस्मै य उपास्ते।) to prove that the अङ्गोपासनs are done by the Sacrificer. The Śruti itself does not serve his purpose. अङ्गोपासनs of the ब्रह्मविद्या are mentioned in Sūtras III. 3. 55 ff; the Sūtrakāra was not likely to discuss the अङ्गोपासनs of the secrificial rites for their own sake.

Sūtra 45

11. Auḍulomi held that the Brahmaṇa householder seeking absolution should do only priestly duties (आर्त्विज्यम्) on behalf of a master, but not those of teaching and receiving religious gifts (अध्यापन and प्रतिग्रह).

12. तस्मै हि परिक्रियते—It is only for the priestly duties. that a Brahmaṇa is bought and employed by a Sacrificer. He is not bought for the purpose of teaching or any other purpose. The Brahmaṇas never taught for fixed fees. Auḍulomi held that

the only professional duty for a Brahmaṇa householder (who being a householder was outside the order of monkhood and) who was seeking absolution, was that of a priest, because only for that duty a Brahmaṇa was employed on service.

13. According to Śaṅkara Auḍulomi held that the अङ्गोपासनs of ritualism were not the duties of a Sacrificer, but of a priest, because a priest was employed to do them. " तस्मै " he takes as साङ्गाय कर्मणे the entire rite together with its subsidiary parts. Śaṅkara does not think that आर्त्विज्य mentioned here is one of the आधिकारिक or official duties mentioned in Sūtra 41 and declared to be done by one who is outside the order of Monkhood in Sūtra 43. There is no negation in Sūtra 45 but Śaṅkara takes one as understood.

14. Ātraya gave a wider option, in as much as he allowed a householder—seeker of absolution to do all duties on behalf of a master. Auḍulomi made the range of official duties limited, because he allowed only the priestly duties to be done. His argument is that only for priestly duties can a Brahmaṇa be bought.

Sūtra 46

15. श्रुतेश्च—In Sūtra 45 Auḍulomi reffered to the *practice* that a Brahmaṇa was employed to do priestly duties. In this Sūtra he quotes a Śruti in favour of his argument. The Śruti in question is that about a priest being employed and paid fixed salary for doing priestly duties at a sacrfice. स होवाच भगवन्तं वा अहमेभिः सर्वैः आर्त्विज्यैः पर्यैशिषं भवतो वा अहमवित्त्यान्यानवृषि ॥ २ ॥ भगवाꣳस्त्वेव मे सर्वैरार्त्विज्यैरिति तथेत्यथ तर्ह्येत एव समतिसृष्टाः स्तुवतां यावत्त्वेभ्यो धनं दद्यास्तावन्मम दद्या इति तथेति ह यजमान उवाच ॥ ३ ॥ (Chā. Upa. I. 11. 2–3). Also तस्मादार्त्विज्यं करिष्यन् वाचि स्वरमिच्छेत तया वाचा स्वरसम्पन्नयार्त्विज्यं कुर्यात्तस्माद्यज्ञे स्वरवन्तं दिदृक्षन्ते........ (Bṛ. Upa. I. 3. 25). These Śrutis show that a priest *is employed* for the priestly duties.

Does Sūtra 46 refer to a Śruti in which a Brahmaṇa householder seeking absolution does priestly duties only?

16. It may be noticed here that Sūtras 43–46 ask a householder seeker of liberation to do those duties which he can without earning a religious reward (*e. g.*, heaven, or wordly property in the next life or even in this life) *for himself*. He is to do them only *for his master*. We may compare this view with that of the Bhagavadgītā which asks a seeker to do *all* his duties *distinterestedly* *i. e.*, without the expectation of a reward or by dedicating the actions to the Lord.

Cf. तस्मादसक्तः सततं कार्यं कर्म समाचर ।
असक्तो ह्याचरन् कर्म परमाप्नोति पूरुषः ॥ Bha. Gī. III. 19.

and ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि सङ्गं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः ।
लिप्यते न स पापेन पद्मपत्रमिवाम्भसा ॥ Bha. Gī. V. 10.

17. Śaṅkara quotes Chā. Upa. I. 7. 8–9 and says that according to that Śruti the fruit of a meditation (विज्ञान=अङ्गोपासन) in a rite performed by a priest belongs to a sacrificer.

SECTION VI

The Injunction of other helping actions is optional except in the case of a householder.

Sūtras III. 4. 47–50.

(४७) सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् ।

(४८) कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः ।

(४९) मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् ।

(५०) अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् ।

TRANSLATION

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—The Injunction of other helping means is to be regarded as optional and is a third type of duties, like the Injuction, *etc.*, [for action] in the case of one who has [committed] that [text to memory]. 47

[Siddhānta]—But a collection [of those optional means] should be made by the householder because of his completeness, 48

because of the teaching about other helping means, like that of silence. 49

[' Silence ' means] " without making a show [of his learning] " because of the connection [of words]. 50

NOTES

Sūtra 47

1. तृतीयम्—Two helping means have been mentioned in Sūtras 27, 32 and particularly in Sūtra 34 *viz.*, the sacrifice *etc.*, and the duties of the orders of life. A *third* type of helping action is mentioned in this Sūtra.

2. पक्षेण—This third type of helping act or acts is not compulsory (सर्वथा) like the other two (Sūtra 34) but it is optional or is only partly helpful (पक्षेण).

3. सहकार्यन्तर—It seems to us that the पूर्वपक्ष understands only one सहकारि कर्म by this word *viz.*, वेदानुवचन. This is suggested by तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् in which तद्वतः refers to अध्ययनमात्रवतः in Sūtra 12 (See also Sūtra 6), and also by the fact that the Siddhāntin points out that other helps *also* are taught in the Scripture (Sūtra 49). In तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन । (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22). वेदानुवचन is mentioned as a सहकारि कर्म for knowing Brahman. Out of these, यज्ञादिs have been already considered; among other acts the duties of the orders have also been discussed. The पूर्वपक्ष says that this other सहकारिकर्म *viz.*, वेदानुवचन, is a secondary one (पक्षेण).

4. तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्—This is an illustration of a secondary सहकारिकर्म. One who has committed the text to memory is asked to perform sacrifices; the performance of sacrifices depends mainly upon his life as a गृहस्थ and other circumstances; so वेदाध्ययन is itself a secondary help to the performance of sacrifices. 'तद्वतः विधिः' is undoubtedly a reference to Sūtras 6 (तद्वतो विधानात् ।) and 12 (अध्ययनमात्रवतः ।). By तद् in तद्वतः in this Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to suggest what सहकार्यन्तर is meant here. It is, of course, वेदाध्ययन or वेदानुवचन as said in the Śruti (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22).

By आदि in विध्यादिवत्, Sūtra 7 and Sūtras 13-15 seem to have been referred to. Doing of actions according to Īśa. 4 is a स्तुति or अनुमति; so practicising or performing other सहकारि actions than the two mentioned in Sūtra 14 is also स्तुति or अनुमति. Sūtra 15 points out that the performance of actions is optional; so the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the performance of other सहकारिन्s is also optional.

5. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra discusses whether silence (मौन in Bṛ. Upa. III. 5.1) is laid down as an Injunction or not. बाल्य and पाण्डित्य are सहकारिन् and मौन is सहकार्यन्तर. And by " सहकार्यन्तरविधि " the Sūtra lays down मौन as a सहकारिन्. But this seems to be impossible because मौन and other सहकारिन्s are mentioned for the first time in Sūtras 49–50. Moreover, ' तु ' in Sūtra 48 shows that Sūtra 47 is to be treated as a " पूर्वपक्षसूत्र ".

Again, ' तद्वतः ' implies that सहकार्यन्तर meant here is वेदाध्ययन. ' पक्षेण ' is explained by Śaṅkara as तस्माद्बाल्यपाण्डित्यापेक्षया तृतीयमिदं मौनं ज्ञानातिशयरूपं विधीयते ।. Thus, Śaṅkara connects पक्षेण with तृतीयम्, but it seems to us that ' सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण' should be taken as the construction, so that the Sūtra makes this Injunction only partly or optionally applicable; this view is supported by सर्वथा in Sūtra 34, and by the illustrations in तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्; and by the next Sūtra (48) which makes this सहकार्यन्तर compulsory for a householder. ' तृतीयम् ' is taken by Śaṅkara as meaning that मौन is the third as compared with बाल्य and पाण्डित्य; but ' तृतीयम् ' is connected with the *two* actions (यज्ञादि and आश्रमकर्म) mentioned in Sūtra 34. He separates तद्वतः and विध्यादिवत्; but this is inconsistent with Sūtras 6, 12, 13–15 which are undoubtedly referred to by तद्वतो विध्यादिवत्. Śaṅkara connects तद्वतः with his explanation of सहकार्यन्तरविधिः *i. e.,* the मौनविधि is for तद्वत् *i. e*, a संन्यासिन्. This is the sense he makes out from his construction of तद्वतः with सहकार्यन्तरविधिः. Moreover, how can we explain तद्वतः as विद्यावतः and the latter as संन्यासिनः ? ' तद् ' in तद्वतः should

refer to something in the Sūtra (*viz.*, अध्ययन which is meant by सहकार्यन्तर) and 'विद्या' is not mentioned in the Sūtra. Otherwise, "तद्वतः विध्यादिवत्" should be taken as a known illustration, in the light of which सहकार्यन्तरविधि is to be explained, as we have proposed above. Moreover, all those who have got the knowledge need not be only monks according to the Sūtrakāra (See Sūtras 32, 42). Śaṅkara seems to explain 'पक्षेण' in a different way also, if बाल्यपाण्डित्यापेक्षया तृतीयम् is his first interpretation of पक्षेण. Thus, पक्षेण is to be connected with सहकार्यन्तरविधिः. And for this last explanation he takes 'विध्यादिवत्' as an illustration. He refers this विधि to "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत" which is not विधिप्रधान, yet which should be taken as a विधि. Similarly, he says, the Śruti (Bṛ. Upa. III. 5. 1) is not principally a विधि, but yet it has to be construed as मौनविधि.

Sūtra 48

6. 'तु' shows that the view in Sūtra 47 is not accepted by the Sūtrakāra. In that Sūtra, the opponent argued that the Injunction of the other helping act *viz.*, वेदाध्ययन, was optional. The Sūtrakāra does not agree with him so far as the order of a householder is concerned.

7. गृहिणोपसंहारः — The Sūtrakāra says that a householder must collect the other सहकारिन् कर्मन्; in his case it is not optional. To those in the other orders of life the Sūtrakāra agrees to give an option in the case of सहकार्यन्तरविधि.

8. कृत्स्नभावात् — This is one reason why the householder is not given an option regarding सहकार्यन्तरविधि. He is 'complete' (कृत्स्न) in all things; and, therefore, he should completely carry out the सहकारिन्s for the knowledge of Brahman. Thus, his completeness is the reason why he is not allowed any concession regarding the helps to the knowledge of Brahman.

9. According to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra answers a question

why the Chā. Upaniṣad is brought to an end by the mention of a householder (in Chā. Upa. VIII. 15. 1). This question arises, says Śaṅkara, because if the उपसंहार of the Chā. Upa. is meant to show the importance of the householder, the monk loses his importance. It seems to us that Śaṅkara has totally missed the meaning of the word 'उपसंहार' in this Sūtra. It has here very probably the same meaning as in उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्धि। (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 24) and उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च। (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 5). उपसंहार means "collecting *all* the helps for one particular purpose," here the purpose being the knowledge of Brahman. 'तु' means a 'qualification' or 'distinction' of the householder, *viz.*, that the householder is particularly 'कृत्स्न' while members of the other orders are not कृत्स्न or complete. But कृत्स्नभाव or completeness of the householder, in the opinion of Śaṅkara, consists in the great burden laid upon the householder, *viz.*, that he is asked to do sacrifices and other duties which are many and which involve much trouble and hardship and also he is asked to observe non-injury to living beings, control over senses, *etc.*, which are in fact the duties of the other orders of life. It is because of this great burden (कृत्स्नभावात्) that the Chā. Upa. is *concluded* (उपसंहार) with the mention of a householder. This does not mean that he is superior to a monk, says Śaṅkara. To us कृत्स्नभाव seems to mean the facilities, rather than the hardships of a householder, as compared with the wants and scarcity of a वानप्रस्थ or an ascetic. The householder has a family, he carries out his own professional duties, he enjoys so many other privileges. All these are wanting in the case of a monk. Because of this "Completeness" he is not given the concession shown to others.

Sūtra 49

10. This Sūtra gives another reason why a householder should *carry out all* the सहकारिन्s to the knowledge of Brahman (उपसंहारः). There are some सहकारिन्s which can be performed only by a householder, who is a seeker of absolution. These

were not noticed by the opponent in Sūtra 47; so the Sūtrakāra seems to draw his attention to them, in this Sūtra, and to argue on that ground that a householder should collect them.

11. मौनवत्—This is a reference to Bṛ. Upa. III. 5. 1 *viz.*, " एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पुत्रैषणायाश्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति या ह्येव पुत्रैषणा सा वित्तैषणा या वितैषणा सा लौकैषणोभे ह्येते एषणे एव भवतस्तस्माद् ब्राह्मणः पाण्डित्यं निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद्बाल्यं च पाण्डित्यं च निर्विद्याथ मुनिरमौनं च मौनं च निर्विद्याथ ब्राह्मणः ।" In this Śruti several helps to the knowledge of Brahman are taught.

12. 'इतरेषाम्' seems to mean 'others' than that referred to by the opponent in Sūtra 47. "मौन" is an example of "these others," and it serves to help us in identifying the Śruti in question. The opponent had not taken these into consideration and the Sūtrakāra points to them as an argument why a householder who seeks absolution should collect all the helps to it.

If a seeker gives up the desire for a son, the desire for wealth and the desire for heaven, he becomes a hermit or a monk. When a householder becomes disgusted with scholarship, with बाल्य (show of his *strength* of conviction) and even with the consciousness of the fact that he keeps quiet inspite of his learning, as did Yājñavalkya, he becomes a monk. (For the meaning of बाल्य see Chā. Upa. VII. 7-8 where बल is said to be a higher manifestation of Brahman than विज्ञान.) One is asked to be disgusted with मौन also; and this applies chiefly to the order of the householder who living in the people would keep quiet about his knowledge (Sūtra 50) but would think too much of his quietness and is therefore advised to be disgusted with this self-consciousness of quietness. *In fact Sūtra 50 is meant to show how* मौन *also applies to a householder.*

13. 'अपि' shows that not only वेदानुवचन is a सहकार्यन्तर (a help in addition to यज्ञादि and आश्रमकर्म) but also पाण्डित्य, बाल्य and मौन are to be taken in the list of सहकार्यन्तरs which form a third type of helps.

14. इतरेषामप्युपदेशात् —Because पाण्डित्य, बाल्य and मौन are laid down in the Śruti, the householder should collect all these सहकारिन्s to the knowledge of Brahman. The Sūtrakāra seems to mean that पाण्डित्य, बाल्य and मौन are helps useful chiefly to the householder and therefore he should collect them. This is a second reason for his collecting the सहकारिन्s which are optional to other orders of life.

15. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 49 is intended to establish that *all the four* orders are taught in the Scripture without distinction. Thus, according to him Sūtra 49 is only a repetition of Sūtra 26 as interpreted by him. From his interpretation of Sūtra 49, he draws a conclusion *viz.*, the four orders may be accepted all of them or some of them, but this conclusion is not mentioned in the Sūtra itself. 'मौन' is explained by him as the order of monk, but this is inconsistent with Sūtra 50, which shows that मौन is 'keeping quiet about one's knowledge' and with the fact that according to the Sūtrakāra a householder is *to eollect* मौन as a help to the knowledge of Brahman. मौनवत् means 'यथा मौनं गार्हस्थ्यं च,' thus he adds गार्हस्थ्य though it is not mentioned in the Sūtra. The word 'श्रुतिमत्' 'stated in the Śruti' is also not found in the Sūtra, though मौनवत् can be interpreted as "यथा मौनस्य उपदेशः तथा". 'इतरेषाम्' is taken by Śaṅkara as referring to वानप्रस्थ and गुरुकुलवास inspite of the plural number, which he tries to explain by saying "इतरेषामिति द्वयोराश्रमयोर्बहुवचनं वृत्तिभेदापेक्षयानुष्ठातृभेदापेक्षया वेति द्रष्टव्यम् ।". This is hardly satisfactory. Moreover, इतरेषाम् should mean "others than" what is stated in the preceding Sūtras of the Adhikaraṇa, *i. e.*, other सहकारिन्s or helps than the one meant in Sūtra 47. And lastly the ablative case of उपदेशात् should serve to establish गृहिणोपसंहार like the same of कृत्स्नभावात् in Sūtra 48.

Sūtra 50

16. This Sūtra is intended to explain मौन and thereby, it seems to us, to show how मौनविधि is applicable chiefly to a householder.

SECTION VII

A gṛhastha seeker may perform worldly duties also, though not as help to his knowledge of Brahman.

Sūtra III. 4. 51

(५१) ऐहिकमप्यप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ।

TRANSLATION

[ONE who is outside the order of asceticism and who seeks Mokṣa, may do] the worldly duties also in order that there be no obstruction in what he has already begun; because we find such examples (in the Upaniṣads). 51

NOTES

Sūtra 51

1. In this Section we should take बहिस्तु as understood from Sūtra 42. Also, the गृहिन् is mentioned in Sūtra 48.

2. ऐहिकम्—What is the विशेष्य ? We suggest that कर्म is implied. The context throughout this Pāda is that of actions or duties to be done by a Mumukṣu. In Sūtra 47, सहकार्यन्तर means सहकार्यन्तर कर्म; in Sūtra 49 इतरेषाम् means इतरेषां कर्मणाम्; in Sūtra 41 आधिकारिकम् and in Sūtra 42 उपपूर्वम् have been shown by us to refer to कर्म to be taken as implied. Vide also our Notes on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 32.

3. अपि — This word shows that in addition to the two types of actions *viz.*, the professional and subsidiary duties which a gṛhastha seeker is allowed to do (उभयथा in Sūtra 43) and also in addition to the सहकार्यन्तर कर्मन्s which he is asked to perform compulsorily (Sūtra 48), he should do also the worldy duties, like the marriages of his own children, the investiture of his sons with the sacred thread, *etc.*

4. अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे — The gṛhastha Mumukṣu is here allowed to do himself these kinds of really worldly duties in order that there be no obstacle (प्रतिबन्ध) in the worldly life which he has begun (प्रस्तुत). The other duties *viz.*, यज्ञादि (Sūtra III. 4. 26), आश्रमकर्म (Sūtra. III. 4. 32), the third type of सहकारि कर्मन्s (Sūtra III. 4. 47) are to be done by the gṛhastha Mumukṣu in order that they be useful to him in the attainment of Mokṣa; but the worldly duties like the sons' investiture with the sacred thread, *etc.*, are to be done by him in order to avoid any hindrance in his wordly life.

5. तद्दर्शनात्—This refers to the examples of Yājñavalkya and others who sought Mokṣa but who when gṛhasthas

continued doing their worldly duties. Thus, Yājñavalkya was going to divide his property between his two wives *before* he thought of renouncing the world. The example of उषस्ति चाक्रायण who *maintained his wife* can also be given.

6. Śaṅkara takes ऐहिकम् as ऐहिकं विद्याफलम् and in fact the single word ऐहिकम् means to him ' इह जन्मनि विद्याफलं सिद्ध्यति ' *i. e.*, ' The reward of the Lore of Brahman is achieved in this very life. ' We find no justification for his changing the sense of ऐहिक (" in this world " to " in this life ") and for his addition of विद्याजन्म which is not even suggested by the context of the Adhikaraṇa or the Sūtra. Moreover, Śaṅkara explains अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे as असति प्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे. He takes प्रस्तुत as विद्यासाधन which is *the topic in hand* in Bra. Sū. III. We must also say that if प्रस्तुत refers to the book of Brahmasūtra then it can refer to विद्यासाधन; but how can we be sure that प्रस्तुत refers to the book of Brahmasūtra ? Rather, प्रस्तुत should refer to what is begun in the life of the seeker who is outside the order of monkhood. Again, if we take प्रस्तुत as विद्यासाधन, then the सूत्र means " विद्यासाधनप्रतिबन्धे असति विद्याफलस्य जन्म ऐहिकमेव भवति; "; thus अपि will have to be interpreted as एव, which is not the sense of अपि at all. अपि means *also* and will include the possiblity of the other (*life*, according to Śaṅkara), but his interpretation of अप्रस्तुत-प्रतिबन्धे excludes all such possibilities. Lastly, he takes दर्शयति as श्रुतिः दुर्बोधत्वमात्मनो दर्शयति, which is in accordance with *his own* interpretation of ऐहिक and अप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्ध and *his own* addition of विद्याफलजन्म. Really speaking, he ought to have given the example of one who attained the विद्याफल in this life *after* performing the means of विद्याफल; but he gives no such example. We cannot add to the सूत्र " आत्मनो दुर्बोधत्वम् " also.

SECTION VIII

No Time-rule regarding the Achievement of the Mokṣa, even after the practise of its Means.

Sūtra III. 4. 52.

(५२) एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः ।

इति तृतीयाध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

THERE is no (time--) rule regarding the fruit in the form of release (to be achieved) thus, because of the definite statement about those who are in the seeker's state (for a long, long period). 52

NOTES

Sūtra 52

1. 'एवम्' seems to refer to the fact that the seeker of Brahman has to do the several duties enumerated in Bra. Sū. III. 4 as help to the knowledge of Brahman, *viz.*, (1) the sacrifice, donation, and penance, (2) the duties of his order of life, and (3) other helping duties if he belongs to the householder's order.

2. मुक्तिफल—The fruit in the form of liberation is mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 38–39 (फलमत उपपत्तेः । श्रुतत्वाच्च ।). It is stated there that this fruit is to be obtained from Brahman itself because this is quite proper and because this is stated in the Śruti.

3. अनियमः—The Sūtrakāra here asserts that there is no rule regarding the attainment of the fruit in the form of release after a seeker has begun his effort to get the knowledge of Brahman and to perform the actions intended to be a help to that knowledge in the achievement of liberation. We believe, this absence of rule refers to the absence of a *rule regarding the time of release* after a seeker begins his course on the Path to emancipation. The Sūtrakāra here seems to us to contrast the मुक्तिफल with the स्वर्गफल; the latter which is achieved solely by performing the Jyotiṣṭoma Sacrifice is obtained immediately in the next birth after the sacrificer has performed that sacrifice; but the मुक्तिफल the attainment of which depends upon the knowledge of Brahman helped by the performance of certain duties cannot be assured to the seeker even after one or any number of years. Here we may quote a line from the Bhagavadgītā :—

अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् । (Bha. Gī. VI. 45)

There is no rule that मुक्तिफल can be achieved immediately after the particular life in which a seeker who makes an effort comes to an end. Innumerable lives of such efforts may still follow before the emancipation is realized.

We make the above suggestion about the interpretation of अनियमः on the following grounds :—

(i) The मुक्तिफल is dependent upon the knowledge and also certain actions. We think, this fact is referred to in the Sūtra by the word 'एवम्' "thus", which, as we stated above, should be taken as a reference to the subject-matter of this whole Pāda or even to that of this entire Adhyāya.

(ii) We believe that the next Sūtra (आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् । Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1) refers to the *return* of the seeker to this world *many times* before he obtains the knowledge of Brahman (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13) and conveys a sense similar to

अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् । (Bha. Gī. VI. 45)

(iii) The third reason is तदवस्थावधृतेः which we shall explain below.

4. तदवस्थावधृतेः — There is a definite statement (अवधृति) about those seekers who are in the state or stage of that *i. e.* in the state of (carrying out) the साधनs mentioned in the third Adhyāya (called साधनाध्याय). As this Adhyāya finishes the statement of the साधनs and as Sūtra IV. 1. 13 (तदधिगमे) refers to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, we may conclude that तदवस्थ means those who are in the seeker's stage not for one life, *but for many lives.* The Sūtrakāra may be referring to texts like the following verse:—

वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥
(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 6).

"परान्तकाले" would mean that these seekers are freed at the time of the end of the Para; so that they are not released for

a long, long period. They continue to be seekers only till then. This shows that a seeker may be born and reborn on this earth many a time before he attains the realization of Brahman which entitles him to Mokṣa after exhausting his *prārabdha karmans* in his *last* birth on this earth.

5. तत् in तदवस्थावधृतेः should refer to ब्रह्मज्ञान which is said to be the means to मुक्ति in Sūtra III. 4. 1 (पुरुषार्थोऽतः, शब्दात्......) and to which some कर्मन्s are said to be सहकारिन् in this Pāda. 'तदस्वथ' would be ज्ञानावस्थ, one who is in the state of the knowledge of Brahman, but not as yet मुक्त्यवस्थ, in the state of liberation.

6. Śaṅkara takes एवम् as a reference to the preceding Sūtra (51) as interpreted by him. But his interpretation does not seem to be that of the Sūtrakāra, as we have tried to show. Moreover, एवम् would go with मुक्तिफल and would refer to the means to that goal discussed in this and other Pādas of the Brahmasūtras. Śaṅkara explains 'अनियमः' as एवंभूतः अनियमः *i. e.*, as एवंभूतः विशेषप्रतिनियमः न आशङ्कितव्यः। Thus, he interprets अनियम as the absence of a rule about the difference of degrees in मुक्ति. नियम cannot be legitimately changed to विशेषप्रतिनियमः Moreover, the point of discussion in this chapter is the Means to liberation, and not the फल itself. The मुक्तिफले विशेषप्रतिनियमः would be a proper topic for the fourth Pāda of the fourth chapter. He takes तदवस्था (separated from तदवस्थावधृतेः) as मुक्त्यवस्था and 'अवधृति' he explains by एकरूपैव अवधार्यते. Thus, he adds 'एकरूपैव' to the Sūtra in order to deny the विशेष which he has added to नियम. From the mention of एवं मुक्तिफल and from the context it would appear that तत् refers to ज्ञान, the knowledge of Brahman. Śaṅkara does not quote a Śruti in which मुक्ति is definitely stated to be one and uniform (एकरूपा), but he gives an argument *viz.*, ब्रह्मैव मुक्त्यावस्था, न च ब्रह्मणोऽनेकाकारयोगोऽस्ति; and then he mentions Śrutis about the nature of Brahman (Bṛ. Upa. III. 8. 8, Chā. Upa. VII. 24. 1).

CHAPTER IV

SECTION I

Return of the Seeker of the knowledge of Brahman

Sūtras IV. I 1–2

(१) आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ।

(२) लिङ्गाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

[THE seeker of the knowledge of Brahman] returns to this world frequently, because of the teaching, 1

and because of an indicatory text. 2

NOTES

Sūtra 1

1. In the third Adhyāya the Sūtrakāra has stated all the means to the knowledge of Brahman and at the end (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 52) we are told that there is no fixity regarding the time for the attainment of the fruit of Liberation. This last Sūtra makes it clear that now no more means to the knowledge of Brahman remain to be stated in the Brahmasūtras. The uncertaintity about the fruit in the form of Liberation is, of course, not due to any defect in the means of Liberation *viz.*, knowledge of Brahman, but is due to the fact that it cannot be told definitely when a man who carries out all the means to the knowledge of Brahman stated in Bra. Sū. III., would attain that knowledge. It is in this respect that the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman and the performance of a sacrifice differ, and consequently their results, liberation and attainment of heaven, also differ.

In the case of a sacrificer we know that at a particular time he finishes the sacrifice and that now in the next birth he is entitled to, and will surely, obtain heaven. In the case of seeker of Mokṣa, which is to be obtained through the knowledge of Brahman, we do not know *when* he would *realize* Brahman or get the right knowledge of Brahman and therefore we cannot say when he would get Libration. He may be required to carry out the means to the knowledge of Brahman (mentioned in Bra. Sū. III) through a series of births before he finally knows it. Thus, in his various births he has to learn nothing new, but he has to practise the same means till he gets the knowledge of a Brahman.

In other words, we may distinguish between persons of three stages *viz.*, one who has to know and carry out the

means to ब्रह्मज्ञान, (2) one who has known and who has to repeat the means to ब्रह्मज्ञान (अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परं पदम्- Bha. Gī. VI. 45), (3) ond one who has known Brahman and " has to wait till he is released from the body " (तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये। Chā. Upa. VI. 14. 2). The first is the stage of pure or mere जिज्ञासा, the second that of परोक्षज्ञान, and the third that of अपरोक्षज्ञान. We shall see that the last stage is followed by उत्क्रान्ति (Bra. Sū. IV. 2), the journey on the Path of gods (Bra. Sū. IV. 3), परसंपत्ति 'union with the Para' and आविर्भाव 'the manifestation of the liberated from the Supreme One after union' (Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1–2).

The first stage is finished with Bra. Sū. III, the second stage seems to be described in Bra. Sū. IV. I. 1–12 and the third in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13–19.

The fourth Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtra is the chapter of the Fruit (फलाध्याय). For this reason also we have to conclude that the third Adhyāya has finished the description of the means to Liberation and that the fourth is concerned *only* with the result of those means.

The first Sūtra (Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1) if referring to the rebirths of the seeker of ब्रह्मज्ञान shows that the साधनs have been completely mentioned in Bra. Sū. III and that now the condition of a seeker who has carried out those साधनs is described in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1.

2. आवृत्तिः— This word ordinarily means 'return' *i. e.* return to this world. In Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 22 (अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ।) the word 'अनावृत्तिः' is used in the sense of non-return to this world and that Sūtra refers to such Śrutis as Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 and Chā. Upa. VIII. 15. 1. In the case of gods who attain the knowldge of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra says that there is no inconsistency even if gods *return* to their place after they know Brahman (समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्य-विरोधो दर्शनात्स्मृतेश्च ।—Bra. Sū. 1. 3. 30)

In the Āruṇika Upaniṣad we read "सर्वेषु वेदेष्वारण्यकमावर्तयेदुपनिषदमावर्तयेत्। (Āru. Upa. 2). This is a very late Upaniṣad and it is not likely that the Sūtrakāra would refer to it. Morover, in Sūtra IV. 1. 3 we are told that these seekers of ब्रह्मज्ञान understand Brahman as their Atman and make others understand it as such; so, we cannot say that the Sūtrakāra here (in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1) asks the seeker "to revise" his texts. For the same reasons also, we cannot agree with Śaṅkara who explains आवृत्ति as प्रत्ययावृत्ति 'repetition of the cognition of Brahman.' It is the फलाध्याय and the फल or fruit of the means mentioned in Bra. Sū. III seems to be discussed here. Moreover, this kind of repetition is already implied in the act of meditation taught in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16, 35–36, *etc.*,

3. 'असकृत्' should be taken with आवृत्तिः rather than with उपदेशात् as Saṅkare does, because along with 'आवृत्ति' the question arises '*how many times* the return is to take place (or the repetition of the cognition is to be carried out).' The expression 'असकृदावर्तीनि' in Chā. Upa. V. 10. 8 also supports this view of 'असकृत्'.

4. उपदेशात्—This is a reference to a text teaching that the means to ब्रह्मज्ञान are to be carried out in a series of births, or that ब्रह्मज्ञान 'the right understanding of Brahman' is obtained not always in a single birth but after a series of births, or a seeker of absolution is said to return to this world frequently before the gets it.

5. According to Śaṅkara, the Sūtrakāra here uses 'आवृत्ति' in the sense of repetition or revision and he explains आवृत्ति as प्रत्ययावृत्ति 'the repetition of the cognition of Brahman.' He takes असकृत् with उपदेशात् and says that the precept of hearing, pondering over, and realizing is given *frequently* (असकृत्) in the Upaniṣad; and, therefore, that precept suggests प्रत्ययावृत्ति 'the revision of the cognition'. Even in the texts where precept is given only once, the

cognition should be frequently repeated, says Śaṅkara (See our notes on आवृत्ति and असकृत् above). We think, उपदेश, should be a reference to a text in which the return of a seeker of absolution is mentioned. Even if we take असकृत् with उपदेश, there should be *many* texts mentioning आवृत्ति, which should be pointed out as referred to by the Sūtra.

Śaṅkara says that Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1–12 is साधनशेष.

Sūtra 2

6. लिङ्गात् — This is a reference to a text in which the return of a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman is mentioned *e. g.*, अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परं पदम् । (Bha. Gī. VI. 45), बहूनां जन्मनामन्ते ज्ञानवान्मां प्रपद्यते । (Bha. Gī. VII. 19).

7. Śaṅkara says that also *liṅga*, by which he quotes a Śruti, shows the repetition of the cognition of Brahman. His Śruti is Chā. Upa. I. 5. 1–2 in which the knowledge of the Sun is said to give only one son, while the knowledge of the rays of the Sun is taught as a means to getting many sons. Śaṅkara says that this teaching of Chā. Upa. I. 5. 1–2 proves the repetition of the cognition; and, therefore, all cognitions require to be repeated. This seems to be his application of Chā. Upa. I. 5. 1–2 to the knowledge of Brahman.

After explaining the two Sūtras, Śaṅkara enters into a discussion as to whether प्रत्ययावृत्ति is necessary or not for knowing Brahman. The result of the discussion is that Śaṅkara admits that प्रत्ययावृत्ति is not useful to the best type of student (उत्तमाधिकारिन्), which is, of course, rare; it is useful to the dull-minded or mediocre student only. As regards Śaṅkara's contention that ब्रह्मन् and ब्रह्मज्ञान are not subject to विधि, see Bra. Sū. III 4. 18–26.

SECTION II

Work of the reborn Seeker: His approach to and His Precept about Brahman. The Symbol of Brahman, and Parts of Brahman.

Sūtras IV. 1. 3-6

(३) आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।

(४) न प्रतीके न हि सः ।

(५) ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् ।

(६) आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्ग उपपत्तेः ।

TRANSLATION

BUT they approach and make others understand [Brahman] as their very Self (Atman). 3

Not in the case of the Symbol, because it is not That. 4

[They] view [the Symbol] as Brahman, because of the excellence [of the Symbol]. 5

And [they have] the notions of the Sun, *etc.*, in the parts of Brahman. 6

NOTES

Sūtra 3

1. This Adhikaraṇa seems to describe what the ब्रह्मजिज्ञासु, the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman, who has been carrying out the means to that knowledge, does when he returns to this world frequently.

2. आत्मेति — In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16 (आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्), we are told that Brahman or Puruṣa is to be meditated upon as identical with the soul of the meditator. In consistency with this, the Sūtrakāra says that seekers of the knowledge of Brahman returning to this world approach Brahman as their Atman and make others understand It as such.

3. उपगच्छन्ति — The Sūtrakāra seems to use this verb significantly. The seeker of the knowledge of Brahman who has been carrying out the means to Brahmajñāna, the meditation on Brahman as Atman (the Self of the meditator–Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16) and the other helping actions, when reborn, approaches Brahman as his very Self and also makes others understand it as such. This shows that in his case no *new* meansf or the knowledge of Brahman remains to be practised. On his return he accepts *Brahman* and *approaches* It as Atman ; this he does till he himself realizes It as such. We may reasonably suppose that on the realization of Brahman he ceases also to teach It to others. The Sūtrakāra mentions only the disposal of the actions *after* the attainment of the knowledge (तदधिगमे Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 13), and nothing else.

4. ग्राहयन्ति—As shown above, it is only the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman who has been for a long time carrying out the means to it and is constantly reborn in this world, who teaches and makes others understand Brahman as Atman. The man who *has understood* It as such, gives up

teaching It to others. *Cf.* आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्। Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16.

With ' आत्मेति ग्राहयन्ति ' we should compare Bra. Sū. I. 1. 29–30 *viz.*, न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन्। and शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्. Both these Sūtras refer to Śrutis according to which those who know Brahman (theoretically ?) taught it to others as Atman. The former Sūtra refers to what Indra told Pratardana Daivodāsi, *viz.*, स होवाच प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामायुरमृतमित्युपास्स्व। (Kau. Upa. III. 2). He meant that Brahman is to be meditated upon as the Self of the meditator. It was in this sense that he said ' मामेव विजानीहि। ' (Kau. Upa. III. 1). The second Sūtra refers to the illustration of Vāmadeva who actually realized Brahman and the whole world as identical with his own Self (Bṛ. Upa. 1. 4. 10).

5. ' तु ' shows that because the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman returns to this world, we should not suppose that he does worldly actions, or that he has to go through the primary steps preceding the approach to Brahman (or acceptance of Brahman) as Atman. The only thing that he does is to approach Brahman as Atman and to teach It as such. *Cf.* Bha. Gī. VI. 42–44

अथवा योगिनामेव कुले भवति धीमताम्।
\+ \+ \+
तत्र तं बुद्धिसंयोगं लभते पौर्वदेहिकम्।
यतते च ततो भूयः संसिद्धौ कुरुनन्दन ॥ ४३ ॥
पूर्वाभ्यासेन तेनैव ह्रियते ह्यवशोऽपि सः।
जिज्ञासुरपि योगस्य शब्दब्रह्मातिवर्तते ॥ ४४ ॥

6. According to Śaṅkara this Adhikaraṇa discusses the question whether the Supreme Lord is to be understood as identical with the self of the seeker or as different from one's own self. But, as we have already shown, this question seems to have been discussed in the Chapter of the Means *viz.*, Bra. Sū. III. 3. 16–17. According to Śaṅkara the subject of उपगच्छन्ति is जाबालाः and others and that of ग्राहयन्ति is वेदान्त-

वाक्यानि. Thus, really, "उपगच्छन्ति" and "ग्राहयन्ति" have the same sense according to Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara in his commentary on this Sūtra raises several objections against his view about the complete identity of the individual soul with Brahman and answers them; but, in fact, this is the topic of Bra. Sū. II. 3. 28–32.

Sūtra 4

7. This Sūtra is closely connected with the preceding Sūtra, as will be seen from the interpretation given below; and, therefore, we propose that it should be joined to the preceding Sūtra and should not be taken as forming a new Adhikaraṇa.

8. 'प्रतीक' should mean a symbol and here it means the symbol of Brahman which is the object of उपगच्छन्ति and ग्राहयन्ति in the preceding Sūtra. Under Sūtras III. 3. 25–26 we have already suggested that the Sūtrakāra in those Sūtras seems to us to discuss the question of the meditation on the syllable 'Om'. In those two Sūtras the Sūtrakāra has stated nothing about the procedure of the meditation on the Praṇava, though he does say that the Pradhāna (*i. e.*, the arūpvat aspect) and the Puruṣa (*i. e.* the rūpvat aspect of Brahman) are each of them to be meditated upon as the very Self of the Seeker (*Vide* Bra. Sū. III 3. 16 and 43). However, from Mu. Upa. I. 2. 2–3 which is the viṣayavākya of the Sūtra dealing with the meditation on the Praṇava (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 35) we learn that the Praṇava is the bow, the individual soul is the arrow and Brahman is the aim to be hit (Mu. Upa. I. 2. 4). In the present Sūtra (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 4–5) the Sūtrakāra seems to tell us how the Seeker when reborn on this earth in an advanced stage looks upon the syllable Om which is the symbol of Brahman.

We may add here that the word प्रतीक in this Sūtra cannot mean the symbols (?) of Brahman like *manas*, Āditya, *etc.* If by *manas*, Āditya, *etc.*, are meant those which are meditated

upon in the *voluntary* meditations on Brahman (Brahmaṇaḥ-kāmya-upāsanāḥ-Bra. Sū. III. 3. 60), we suggest that no *kāmya* meditation on Brahman is likely to be discussed in the present context (Bra. Sū. IV. 1). We even doubt whether in the kāmya meditation on Brahman, the mind, the Sun, *etc.*, stand at all as a symbol of Brahman properly so called. What is done in those meditations is that the Seeker of a particular fruit meditates on नाम, आदित्य, *etc.*, as Brahman, but he does know that the Brahman is *much more* than नाम *etc.* In the meditation on the syllable Om, on the other hand, the Seeker of emancipation does know that 'Om' is the representation of the entire Brahman and, therefore, in that case 'Om' is rightly the symbol of Brahman.

Again, the word प्रतीक cannot mean the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, *etc.*, which are the aṅgas † (parts or limbs) of Brahman and the meditation regarding which is discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55, because these also cannot be properly called the symbols of Brahman and because the Sūtrakāra discusses them separately in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 6.

For these reasons the word प्रतीक seems to us to mean the only symbol of Brahman, *viz.*, the syllable Om.

9. न प्रतीके — In the preceding Sūtra it is said that the seekers of the knowledge of Brahman approach Brahman and make others understand Brahman as their Atman. In this Sūtra we are told that the seekers do not look upon Om the Symbol of Brahman as their Atman. We have to add आत्मेति उपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च from the preceding Sūtra to this Sūtra.

10. न हि सः—' सः ' means आत्मा mentioned in the preceding Sūtra.

न हि सः — This gives the reason why the seekers of the knowledge do not look upon the Symbol of Brahman as Atman.

† *Aṅga* means a part or a limb and, therefore, also the अग्नि, चन्द्र, दिशः, वायुः, पृथ्वी, *etc.*, cannot be symbols of Brahman.

"न हि सः" means "because the Symbol is not Atman". Brahman is the Atman of the meditator, but not so the Symbol of Brahman, *viz.*, Om.

11. Śaṅkara interprets प्रतीक as referring to the various meditations of the mind, the Sun, *etc.*, as Brahman. And according to him, the question discussed here is whether आत्मग्रह should be made in those meditations or not. To us it appears that the process of the meditations on मनस्, आदित्य, *etc.* which are to be meditated upon in the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः has been already explained in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 61–66. Moreover, it would be rather very improbable, if not ridiculous, that a seeker of Brahman would be at all thinking of meditation on नाम, आदित्य as his own Self (आत्मा). We have suggested that the Sūtra discusses the possibility of 'Om' being looked upon by the meditator as his own Self.

With न प्रतीके Śaṅkara takes 'आत्ममतिं बध्नीयात्' as understood; but the context requires us to take as understood 'आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च' from the preceding Sūtra. 'सः', in the Sūtra, means, according to Śaṅkara, 'उपासकः' and to "न हि सः" Śaṅkara adds "प्रतीकानि व्यस्तानि आत्मत्वेनाकलयेत्." Thus, 'न प्रतीके' means "न प्रतीकेष्वात्ममतिं बध्नीयात्," and न हि सः means "न हि सः उपासकः प्रतीकानि व्यस्तानि आत्मत्वेनाकलयेत्"; thus 'न हि सः' is not explained by Śaṅkara as a reason for "न प्रतीके"; but in fact, according to him, both the sentences have almost the same sense. 'न हि सः' should mean, 'The प्रतीक is not that (*i. e.*, Atman)', 'सः' being a reference to Atman in the preceding Sūtra. According to Śaṅkara, the व्यस्तोपासन in the case of आत्मा वैश्वानर is already denied in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 57. The other reasons against identifying प्रतीक with the Self of the meditator are not given in the Sūtra.

To us this Sūtra does not appear to discuss the question of the procedure of what Śaṅkara calls प्रतीकोपासनाs, but it tells how the seeker of the knowledge of Brahman when 'frequently reborn' on this earth before getting the knowledge

looks upon Om, the symbol of Brahman. He looks upon the Praṇave not as Atman because It is not Atman. He regards it as Brahman (See the next Sūtra).

Sūtra 5

12. In the preceding Sūtra we were told that the seekers of the knowledge of Brahman do not look upon the Symbol of Brahman as Atman. This Sūtra seems to state that they look upon the Symbol as Brahman. Thus, this Sūtra is connected closely with the preceding Sūtra and should not be taken as a new Adhikaraṇa, as Śaṅkara does.

13. ब्रह्मदृष्टिः—' ब्रह्मदृष्टिः ' meane ब्रह्म इति उपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च and the object of these verbs is the प्रतीक. The seekers of the knowledge of Brahman look upon the प्रतीक as Brahman. ' प्रतीके ' should be taken as understood from the preceding Sūtra; so, the Sūtra would be प्रतीके ब्रह्मदृष्टिः.

14. उत्कर्षात्—This gives the reason why the seekers look upon the प्रतीक of Brahman as Brahman. They do so on account of the excellence of the प्रतीक. Thus, the excellence (उत्कर्ष) here means the excellence of the प्रतीक or the Symbal of Brahman, *viz.*, Om. *Cf.* the statement of Mu. Upa. I. 2. 3 in which the Syllable Om is said to be the great Weapon of the Upaniṣads (औपनिषद महास्त्र).

15. Śaṅkara says that this Sūtra discusses the question whether in the प्रतीकोपासनs (?) like (मनोब्रह्मेत्युपासीत, आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः, *etc.*) the mind, the Sun, *etc.* are to be meditated upon as Brahman or whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as the mind, the Sun, *etc.* To us it seems that this point is already decided by the conclusion in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 65-66. Śaṅkara connects ब्रह्मदृष्टिः with आदित्यादिषु taken as *understood.* He explains ' उत्कर्षात् ' as एवमुत्कर्षेण आदित्यादयो दृष्टाः भवन्ति। उत्कृष्टदृष्टेस्तेष्वध्यासात्। The arguments for the identification of the mind, the Sun, *etc.* with the parts or limbs of Brahman seem to have been given by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III. 3.

65–66. To us this Sūtra seems to state how a seeker of Brahman, asked not to look upon 'Om' as his Self, would regard the Praṇava when reborn on this earth in an advanced stage. He approaches Om as Brahman because of Its excellence as a meens of liberation (औपनिषद् महास्त्र — Mu. Upa. I. 2. 3).

Sūtra 6

16. In the preceding Adhikaraṇa we were told how an advanced seeker of the knowledge of Brahman looks upon 'Om' the प्रतीक of Brahman. In this Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra seems to tell us how he looks upon the Sun, the Fire, *etc.* which are the limbs of Brahman. This context as well as 'च' in this Sūtra shows that this Sūtra is part of the same Adhikaraṇa, as the preceding Sūtra. This 'च' also shows that Sūtra 6 is the last Sūtra in the Adhikaraṇa.

17. 'अङ्गे' in this Sūtra should be *contrasted* with प्रतीके in Sūtra 4 and in Sūtra 5 in which it is implied. Just as प्रतीके meant ब्रह्मणः प्रतीके, so अङ्गे in this Sūtra would mean ब्रह्मणः अङ्गे.

18. आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्गे—The advanced seeker has the notions of the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, the Fire, the Wind, *etc.*, in the limbs or parts of Brahman, in the body of Brahman. *Cf.* अग्निर्मूर्धा, चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूर्यौ दिशः श्रोत्रे वाग्विवृताश्च वेदाः। वायुः प्राणो हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्येष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा ॥ (Mu. Upa. II. 1. 4). He looks upon the Sun, *etc.*, as the अङ्ग or body of Brahman and teaches them to others as such (उपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च in Sūtra IV. 1. 3). In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 61–64 the अङ्गs or parts of Brahman like the द्यौः, the Sun, the Wind, the Ether, the Water, the Earth, *etc.*, in the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः were taught to be meditated upon as the आश्रयs, *viz.*, the head, the eye, the breath, the body (संदेहः), the bladder (बस्ति), the feet, *etc.*, (Chā. Upa. V. 12–18), and in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 65–66 another view about this process of meditation was established. In this Sūtra (IV. 1. 6) the Sūtrakāra tells us that the advanced seeker looks upon the Sun, *etc.*, as forming

(the parts of) the body of Brahman. Thus, Sūtras III. 3. 61-66 give the earlier stage, while Sūtra IV. 1. 6 gives the later, more advanced stage. The former stage is that of साधन, the latter describes a period *after* the साधनs have been carried out but *before* the knowledge of Brahman is acquired.

19. उपपत्तेः — This gives the arguments for आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्गे. It is quite reasonable that the advanced seeker has the notions of the Sun, *etc.*, in the parts of Brahman. On Brahman itself he look upon as his own Atman, and on 'Om' the Symbol of Brahman he looks upon as Brahman; so, it is quite proper, that in the limbs of Brahman he has the notions of the Sun and others. Whether he has adopted the procedure of meditating on the parts of Brahman as their respective आश्रयs or whether he has meditated upon Brahman as consisting of so many parts (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 61-64; III. 3. 65-66); in an advanced stage he comes to believe that the Sun, *etc.* are parts or अङ्गs (of the body) of Brahman (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 6).

20. अङ्गे — It seems that अङ्गे should be understood as अङ्गेषु. Śaṅkara also takes it similarly. The plural of मति (in आदित्यादिमतयः) and the form अङ्गेषु in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 61 with which this Sūtra is connected support our view.

21. Śaṅkara says that this Sūtra deals with the question whether in such texts as Chā. Upa. I. 3. 1, Chā. Upa. II. 2. 1, *etc.*, the Sun, *etc.*, are prescribed to be looked upon as the उद्गीथ, *etc.* or *vice versa*. He takes अङ्ग in the sense of कर्माङ्ग; उद्गीथ, *etc.*, are कर्माङ्गs; the Sun *etc.*, are not कर्माङ्गs. So, according to Śaṅkara, the Sūtra means that आदित्यादिमतिs are to be superimposed on उद्गीथादि the अङ्गs of कर्मन्. He explains " उपपत्तेः " as उपपद्यते ह्येवमपूर्वसंनिकर्षादादित्यादिमतिभिः संस्क्रियमाणेषूद्गीथादिषु कर्मसमृद्धिः ।

In fact, the Sūtrakāra is not bound to discuss the कर्मसमृद्धि; and, therefore, there is little likelihood of its being found in

the Brahmasūtras. In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 32, he mentions the meditations on the attributes of Brahman connected with the priestly duties *performed by a seeker* and allows him to meditate on them as long as he continues doing those duties. The अङ्गs mentioned in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55 and 61 are the अङ्गs of Brahman, and those Sūtras discuss the अङ्गावबद्धाः ब्रह्मोपासनाः. According to Śaṅkara, the topic of कर्माङ्गोपासनाs is discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 55–66. So, if Sūtra 6 refers to कर्माङ्ग, it would have been better explained there.

SECTION III

State of the reborn Seeker of the knowledge of Brahman.

Sūtras IV. I. 7-10

(७) आसीनः सम्भवात् ।

(८) ध्यानाच्च ।

(९) अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य ।

(१०) स्मरन्ति च ।

TRANSLATION

THE advanced seeker of Brahman when reborn here keeps sitting, because it is the only possibility, 7

because of his meditation on Brahman, 8

and with regard to the steadiness, 9

and the Smṛti also mentions it. 10

NOTES

Sūtra 7

1. This Section describes further the state of a seeker of ब्रह्मज्ञान in an advanced stage.

2. He will be always in a sitting posture, because that is the only posture possible in his case. The Sūtrakāra has said that the advanced seeker of Brahman teaches others how to understand Brahman as identical with their own Self (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 3). This teaching work is possible only if the knower keeps *sitting*. As he has not to do any other work, he will be always found sitting in meditation.

3. Śaṅkara says that the question of 'sitting' does not arise in the meditations which are conneated with ritualism nor in the right knowledge, *i. e.*, ब्रह्मज्ञान. After saying this, he further says that the question of 'sitting' does arise in 'other meditations' *i. e.*, he means that in the meditation on the सगुण ब्रह्मन् of his school 'sitting' is required. Thus, he adds 'उपासीत' to the Sūtra ("आसीनःउपासीत"). This addition does not seem to us to be supported by the context. The Sūtra does not seem to us to prescribe 'sitting' *for* the purpose of 'meditation,' but rather it infers 'sitting' *on account of* the teaching work that an advanced seeker of Brahman does. संभवात् is interpreted by Śaṅkara as 'उपासनस्य संभवात्'. This addition of 'उपासन' makes redundant the next Sūtra in which is ध्यान mentioned.

Sūtra 8

4. This gives another reason as to why the advanced seeker of Brahman keeps always sitting. He is always occupied with meditation and therefore he will be keeping *sitting*. The Sūtra is not ध्यानाय or ध्यानार्थम्, but ध्यानात्; so, maditation is the reason of 'sitting', not the aim of 'sitting'. Meditation has become a habit, so the advanced seeker is found sitting.

5. Śaṅkara explains ध्यान to be समानप्रत्ययप्रवाहकरण, just as he explained उपासन in his commentary on the preceding Sūtra. Thus, संभवात् means ध्यानसंभवात् and 'ध्यानात्' also means according to Śaṅkara ध्यानसंभवात्. As already said Śaṅkara's interpretation makes one of Sūtras 7 and 8 redundant. The Sūtrakāra gives ध्यान as the cause, rather than the aim of 'sitting'.

Sūtra 9

6. अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य—The advanced seeker of Brahman has to guard himself against all temptations, so he has to keep himself and his senses steady and should not allow himself to waver. He must control his mind and senses. This steadiness and control requires that he always keeps sitting.

It is in this Sūtra that the *aim* of 'sitting' is mentioned. The purpose of his keeping sitting is the steadiness that he must preserve, till he leaves the body. It is stated in the Bhagavadgītā and some times in the Upaniṣadas that the knower of Brahman must keep up his steadiness *till* the last moment of his departure from the body (Sūtra IV. 1. 12).

7. Śaṅkara unnecessarily connects this Sūtra with Śrutis like Chā. Upa. VII. 6. 1; he says that such texts use the verb 'ध्यायति' with reference to the sense of steadiness, and he adds that such a use of 'ध्यायति' is an indication that meditation can be practised only by sitting. Thus, he unnecessarily refers this Sūtra to a text like Chā. Upa. VII. 6. 1 and then adds "ध्यायतिवादो भवति" to the Sūtra, and then connects आसीन with that enlarged Sūtra.

Sūtra 10

8. स्मरन्ति च—The Upaniṣads do not mention the seeker in an advanced stage as keeping sitting or do not generally mention his behaviour; therefore, the Sūtrakāra does not refer to a Śruti, but he refers to a Smṛti because the Smṛti, particularly the Bhagavadgītā, mentions the behaviour of an advanced student. The Sūtrakāra seems to refer to Bha. Gī. II. 6. 1:—

तानि सर्वाणि संयम्य युक्त आसीत मत्परः ।
वशे हि यस्येन्द्रियाणि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥

In this verse the स्थितप्रज्ञ who is युक्त 'well disciplined' is asked to keep *sitting* with his mind devoted to the Lord. This is the ब्राह्मी स्थिति (Bha. Gī. II. 72). Also Bha. Gī. XIV. 23 may have been referred to :—

उदासीनवदासीनो गुणैर्यो न विचाल्यते ।
गुणा वर्तन्त इत्येव योऽवतिष्ठति नेंगते ॥

This verse describes the गुणातीत who like स्थितप्रज्ञ is an advanced seeker of Brahman. He keeps sitting (आसीनः) like one who is unaffected by any environment and he is not agitated by the three constituents of the Prakṛti.

9. The fact that there are some Śrutis particularly in the Kaṭha and the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads which refer to the Yogic posture (आसन) for the practice of meditation, but none of these are referred to by the Sūtrakāra while a Smṛti text is quoted by him in support of his view, proves that the Sūtrakāra does not here *lay down* the sitting posture for the purpose of meditation for a seeker, but rather he describes the possible position and behaviour of one who has advanced a great deal but has not yet attained the knowledge of Brahman.

10. Śaṅkara refers the Sūtra to Bha. Gī. VI. 11. He does not say why the Sūtrakāra does not quote a Śruti about the same topic.

Moreover, if the Sūtrakāra wanted to prescribe आसन for उपासन or ध्यान why did he drop the other योगाङ्गs and if at all these साधनs were to be mentioned in the Brahmasūtras, their proper place was in the third chapter. Even in the Yogasūtras the arguments of संभव, ध्यान and अचलत्वापेक्षा are not given for explaining the necessity of ध्यान (See साधनपाद of the Yogasūtras).

SECTION IV

Residence of the reborn Seeker of the knowledge of Brahman.

Sūtra IV. 1. 11

(११) यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ।

TRANSLATION

THE advanced seeker of the knowledge of Brahman resides in a place where concentration of the mind [is possible], because of the equality [of all such places to him.] 11

NOTES

Sūtra 11

1. In fact the advanced seeker of Brahman, who is waiting for knowledge to shine upon him, is a man without any home of his own; he has no home, no possessions. He is अनिकेतन, homeless. So, he resides in that place where he can concerntrate his mind.

2. अविशेषात् — To him all places are the same. He himself makes no distinction between one place and another. He would make no distinctions between places which make meditation possible; all such places are equally good to him, well-come to him, his aim being only steadiness of senses.

3. Śaṅkara says that this Sūtra rejects any restriction caused by direction, place and time in the case of a seeker of the knowledge of Brahman. So, यत्र refers to a direction, place and also time. He adds "उपासीत" and thereby brings out the sense that in this Sūtra absence of restriction regarding दिक्, देश and काल is prescribed. Thus, instead of being forced to meditate at day time, a ब्रह्मजिज्ञासु may meditate at night, if he finds concentration then. अविशेषात् is explained by Śaṅkara as एकाग्रतायाः इष्टायाः सर्वत्र अविशेषात्. To us it seems that अविशेषात् means "सर्वेषां स्थानानामविशेषात्". In fact Śaṅkara knows that his explanation of अविशेषात् conflicts with the Śrutis which particularise the places for meditation in various ways; so, he says that Bādarāyaṇa makes a concession by way of friendship, if the concentration were the same in a place *with* शर्करा, वह्नि, *etc.*, as the concentration in a place without them. It seems to us that if the Sūtrakāra were here to mention the *proper place* of meditation for a seeker of ब्रह्मज्ञान, he would stick to विशेष or the difference in the place of meditation for a beginner, such as is mentioned in the Śrutis quoted by Śaṅkara (Śve. Upa. II. 10), because in his case some worldly bonds still exist. But in the case of an advanced seeker reborn on this earth no such bonds appear to exist, and, therefore, the place does not matter much to him, if he can keep up his concentration there. So he may be found staying anywhere.

SECTION V

The Same State to be kept till Departure.

Sūtra IV. 1. 12

(१२) आप्रायणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE advanced seeker of the knowledge of Brahman remains so] upto the departure from the body, because that is shown in the Śruti even in that [state]. 12

NOTES

Sūtra 12

1. The seeker of Brahman keeps up his particular attitude towards Brahman, Its प्रतीक, and Its parts the Sun, *etc.*, his state of sitting and meditating as described in the preceding Sūtras (3-11) *till* he finally leaves the body.

2. तत्रापि हि दृष्टम्—This is a reference to a Śruti which mentions the practice of meditation even at the time of his departure from the body. Most probably the Śruti in the Sūtrakāra's view is Pra. Upa. *viz.*, स यो ह वैतद्भगवन्मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोङ्कारमभिध्यायीत ॥ कतमं वाव स तेन लोकं जयतीति ॥ (Pra. Upa. V. 1). This Śruti asks a meditator to meditate on Om upto the *end of the departure* from the body. So, the seeker of Brahman keeps sitting and meditating even during his departure from the body, and, of course, till the departure.

For the explanation of the fact that the Praśna Upa. Śruti referred to in the Sūtra mentions the attainment of Brahman the Supreme One, *vide* Sūtra I. 3. 13, and IV. 3. 15.

The occurence of the word प्रायण in Pra. Upa. V. 1 is a further proof that the same Śruti is referred to by the Sūtra.

The same idea as in the above Śruti and the Sūtra is also found in the Bhagavadgītā, *e. g.*,

> एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थ नैनां प्राप्य विमुह्यति ।
> स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्वाणमृच्छति ॥ (Bha. Gī. II. 72).

It is very necessary that the meditation continues even during the last moments of departure from the body. See Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17, Bha. Gī. VII. 30 and VIII. 5–10.

3. There is a difference between दृष्टम् and लिङ्गम् as can be seen by comparing the various Sūtras in which these words

occur. दृष्ट is more like an example from which we are to infer the rule, while लिङ्ग is a direct statement (of the Śruti). Thus, in Pra. Upa. V. 1 the meditation on Om, the symbol of Brahman, is mentioned, and from that we are to infer the Śruti required for the meditation on Brahman to be practised upto the end of the departure from the body.

4. Śaṅkara takes the first Sūtra of this Pāda (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 1) as referring to the meditation on निर्गुण Brahman, and also to सगुण meditations; and in Sūtra 7 he refers to ' सगुण meditations '. He seems to explain Sūtra 11 as dealing with *all* the meditations. But again he takes Sūtra 12 as referring only to अभ्युदयफलानि उपासनानि " meditations the aim of which is prosperity ". Thus, according to him this Sūtra lays down the meditation (for prosperity in the next birth) as to be practised till the departure from the body. He takes " तत्रापि हि " as " कर्मण्यपि हि......भावनाविज्ञानं प्रायणकाले (तत्रापि ?) आक्षिपन्ति ". By ' दृष्टम् ' Śaṅkara quotes both Śruti and Smṛti which, in his opinion, mention a meditation for prosperity in the next birth to be practised even at the time of leaving the body. To us it seems that in all these Sūtras (IV. 1. 3–12) the state of an advanced seeker of the knowledge of Brahman is mentioned because the next Sūtra tells what happens immediately *on the attainment of the knowledge.*

SECTION VI

Disposal of the actions of the Seeker.

Sūtras IV. 1. 13–19

(१३) तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् ।

(१४) इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु ।

(१५) अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः ।

(१६) अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् ।

(१७) अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषाम् ।

(१८) उभयोर्यदेव विद्ययेति हि ।

(१९) भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा सम्पद्यते ।

इति चतुर्थाध्यायस्य प्रथमः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

ON the attainment of that knowledge of Brahman the succeeding and the preceding sins do not touch him and perish respectively; because of a statement about them. 13

Similarly the other [*i. e.*, religious merit] also does not touch him, but on the fall [of the body]. 14

But the preceding sin [which perishes] and the preceding merit [which does not touch him] are only those the effect of which has not begun, because of the limit about them. 15

But the obligatory rites [of the orders of life] like the offering of the fire-oblations, *etc.*, [which are 'good deeds' preceding the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman and the result of which is not begun as yet become useful] for the very effect of that [knowledge of Brahman], because it is shown in the Śruti; 16

also " other good deeds " than these, [which are of a different type than *agnihotrādi*] become useful for the same purpose because it is so stated in the text of a certain Branch; 17

because the Śruti (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10): " *whatever* rite is performed with the allegorical knowledge...... " belongs to both [the types of good deeds which are *anārabdha-kārya* and *pūrva*]. 18

But, having exhausted other [good and bad] deeds [than the anārabdhakārya deeds, the seeker] gets union [with Brahman]. 19

NOTES

Sūtra 13

1. **तदधिगमे**—This word is to be contrasted with **पाते** in the next Sūtra. The advanced seeker of the knowledge of Brahman is the topic in the preceding Sūtra; so, '**तद्**' should mean the knowledge of Brahman. '**तदधिगम**' means the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. '**पात**' is the fall of the body, **देहपात**. The sins are affected *as soon as* the knowledge of Brahman is attained; the merits remain till the fall of the body. See Note 5 below on '**एवंविदि**'.

2. **अश्लेषविनाशौ**—'**अश्लेष**' refers to the succeeding sins, and **विनाश** to the preceding sins.

3. **तद्व्यपदेशात्**—A statement about the **उत्तराघाश्लेष** is **यथा पुष्करपलाश आपो न श्लिष्यन्त एवमेवंविदि पापं कर्म न श्लिष्यते।** (Chā. Upa. IV. 14. 3). A Śruti about the destruction of the 'preceding sins' is **तद्यथेषीकातूलमग्नौ प्रोतं प्रदूयेतैवं हास्य सर्वे पाप्मानः प्रदूयन्ते।** (Chā. Upa. V. 24. 3).

4. **पूर्वाघविनाश**—As '**तु**' in Sūtra 15 shows this Sūtra (13) is not the final statement of the Sūtrakāra on this point. *All* the preceding sins are not destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, but *only those* which have not begun to produce their effect, *i. e.*, the **संचित** sins, and those sins which he did before getting the knowledge of Brahman and which have not given their result to him.

5. '**एवंविदि**' in the Śruti clearly shows that '**तदधिगमे**' in the Sūtra means 'on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman'.

6. Śaṅkara takes **तदधिगमे** in the sense of 'on the attainment of Brahman.' But the contrast of **तदधिगमे** with **पाते तु** in the next Sūtra and the word '**एवंविदि**' in the Śruti and also the context of the preceding Sūtras show that '**तदधिगमे**'

means " on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. " The question discussed here is not whether the sins and the good deeds (See Śaṅkara's पूर्वपक्ष in the next Sūtra) are *destroyed or not*; because there are Śrutis mentioning the *destruction* of both and *all* kinds of actions in general. The Sūtrakāra wants to explain which actions are destroyed and when, because on these two points the Śrutis are not clear.

While answering objections to the statement in the Sūtra, which he has himself raised, Śaṅkara says that though the sins and the good deeds of a knower of Brahman are discussed here, the individual soul really is no agent at all, and that, therefore, the word अश्लेष is used for the future bad deeds, and the word 'विनाश' also means "*disappearance* caused by right knowledge". The Sūtrakāra does not seem to make any suggestion about these meanings of these two words. ' अश्लेष ' cannot mean that the knower of Brahman *cannot do* any (sinfnl) deeds at all, because the Śruti (Chā. Upa. IV. 14. 3) shows that पापं कर्म does not affect the knower and also because there are Śrutis like तं विदित्वा न लिप्यते कर्मणा पापकेन। (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 23); एतं ह वाव न तपति किमहं साधु नाकरवम्। किमहं पापमकरवमिति॥ (Tai. Upa. II. 9); न स ह तैराचरन् पाप्मना लिप्यते (Chā. Upa. V. 10. 10). As to the word ' विनाश ', the fact that the Sūtra restricts this विनाश of the past sins only to those sins which have not begun to give their fruit (Sūtra 15), proves that the effect of these sins is a reality and therefore the sins also are really committed by the seeker in the past births. It is the knowledge of Brahman which destroys the sins; not the knowledge of the actionless Atman.

Sūtra 14

7. इतरस्य means ' पुण्यस्य ' and it consists of all the good deeds preceding and succeeding the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Out of these two types of good deeds, the preceding good deeds are only those preceding good deeds which have not begun to produce their effect (See Sūtra 15).

8. पाते — The sins either do not touch the knower of Brahman or are destroyed *on the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman,* because even the succeeding sins do not, rather cannot, form an obstacle to the attainment of liberation. The good deeds, however, cease to touch him not on the attainment of knowledge, but only *on the fall of the body*. This is consistent with what the Sūtrakāra has said in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 33-34 *viz.,* यज्ञ, दान and तपस् and आश्रमकर्मन्s which all should be included in good deeds, work as help (सहकारिन्) to the knowledge of Brahman for the purpose of getting liberation, which is to be had on the fall of the body. This seems to be the difference between तदधिगमे and पाते.

9. अश्लेषः — In the case of sins, there is a *destruction of* sins which precede the attainment of knowledge. But in the case of good deeds, there is no such destruction of preceding good deeds. The preceding † अग्निहोत्रादि आश्रमकर्मन् and also the preceding यज्ञ, दान and तपस् are not destroyed but they work as help to the knowledge of Brahman for the purpose of achieving liberation (See Bra. Sūtras IV. 1. 16–18).

10. 'एवम्' shows the similarity between sins and merits only so far as असंश्लेष is concerned, because there is the dissimilarity between the two in points of (1) the time (तदधिगमे and पाते) and (2) the विनाश which though taking place in the case of the sins, does not take place in the case of the merits.

11. In the preceding Sūtra, the word अश्लेष was used, while we find the word असंश्लेष here. Why ? *Matri causa* ?

12. On the strength of एवम् Śaṅkara takes 'असंश्लेष' to mean both असंश्लेष and विनाश. But this is rather going directly against the singular number of असंश्लेष and also against the fact that the Sūtrakāra seems to take good deeds both preceding and succeeding the knowledge of Brahman *as a help* to that knowledge in getting liberation. Śaṅkara's argument for this

† *i. e.,* preceding the attainment of knowledge.

addition (*viz.*, तस्यापि स्वफलहेतुत्वेन ज्ञानफलप्रतिबन्धित्वप्रसङ्गात्) is directly inconsistent with the fact that the Sūtrakāra lays down यज्ञ, दान and तपस् and आश्रमकर्मन्s as सहकारिन् or help to the knowledge of Brahman in the aim of achieving liberation in Bra. Sū. III. 4 and also with what the Sūtrakāra says in Sūtras IV. 1. 16-18. The Śrutis which Śaṅkara quotes are not referred to in the Sūtra, because either the Sūtrakāra does not agree with those Śrutis, or what is more possible, he does not interpret them in the way of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara gives several other arguments, *e. g.*, the fruit of good deeds is inferior to that of knowledge; but this is not the Sūtrakāra's argument. Śaṅkara does not take तु as emphasizing the difference between तदधिगमे and पाते but he takes it in the sense of 'एव' or 'determination.' He explains पाते as "अवश्यंभाविनी विदुषः शरीरपाते मुक्तिः।". Thus, he adds मुक्ति and makes an independent sentence of 'पाते तु'. This addition is hardly legitimate looking to the context. तु rejects the suggestion of तदधिगमे in the preceding Sūtra. Moreover, the Sūtrakāra himself has said that there is no fixity regarding the fruit in the form of liberation (See Bra. Sū. III. 4. 52) and the time of संपत्ति or union (with Brahman ?) is suggested by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 19, not in this Sūtra.

Sūtra 15

13. पूर्वे—This means the sins and the merits which precede the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman.

14. In Sūtras 13-14 it was stated that *all* the preceding sins are destroyed and *all* the preceding merits do not touch the knower of Brahman. Now, the Sūtrakāra makes a modification in the statement by the words "अनारब्धकार्ये पूर्वे". The preceding good and bad deeds could consist of what are called संचितकर्मन्s and प्रारब्धकर्मन्s and also the good and the bad deeds which the seeker did in this life before the attainment of the knowledge. All these deeds are पूर्व or those done before

the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. Out of these only the अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s *i. e.*, all पूर्वकर्मन्s except the प्रारब्धकर्मन्s are those which come within the scope of Sūtras 13–14. The अनारब्धकार्य पूर्व sins are destroyed on the attainment of ब्रह्मज्ञान, and the अनारब्धकार्यपूर्व good deeds do not *touch* the knower of Brahman on the fall of the body. The rule about the preceding sins and merits stated in Sūtras 13–14 does not apply to प्रारब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s.

15. 'एव' excludes प्रारब्धकार्यपूर्वकर्मन्s from the list of पूर्वकर्मन्s mentioned in Sūtra 13–14.

16. 'तु' is used to reject the application of the rule about पूर्वकर्मन्s in Sūtras 13–14 so far as the प्रारब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s are concerned.

17. तदवधेः—"Because of that limit". 'तद्' refers to पात in the preceding Sūtra. 'तदवधेः' refers to तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये । (Chā. Upa. VI. 14. 2), as Śaṅkara points out. In this Śruti the release from the body or in other words the fall of the body is made the limit for संपत्ति "union with Brahman". The fall of the body takes place after the प्रारब्धकर्मन्s are exhausted, because that is the very function of प्रारब्धकर्मन्s.

18. Śaṅkara raises a question that though all कर्मन्s were explained by him as being destroyed by the right knowledge of Atman, how it is that the knowledge is not able to destroy some कर्मन्s *viz*, the प्रारब्धकर्मन्s and that these latter are destroyed only after finishing their effect. He also gives an answer to this. Both this doubt and answer are not mentioned in the Sūtra. Moreover, according to the Sūtrakāra the good deeds which precede the knowledge of Brahman are not destroyed at all by that knowledge. As already shown (Sūtra 14) Śaṅkara's addition of विनाश to Sūtra 14 is not implied by the Sūtra itself. By raising this doubt and giving its answer, Śaṅkara anticipates Sūtra 19 in his commentary on Sūtra 15.

Sūtra 16

19. The succeeding sins do not touch him on the attainment of ब्रह्मज्ञान; and the succeeding merits do not touch him on the fall of the body. This means that the succeeding sins become impossible from the time of the attainment of ब्रह्मज्ञान and the succeeding good deeds are impossible from the time of the departure from the body. Thus, after the attainment of ब्रह्मज्ञान, the knower never does any sin, but he continues doing good deeds till the end of the body. Even after getting ब्रह्मज्ञान, the मुमुक्षु goes on doing the good deeds as help to the knowledge of Brahman for the attainment of liberation, just as he did before getting it also. मुमुक्षुत्व preceds and follows ब्रह्मज्ञान, it continues till मुक्ति becomes a fact. For this reason the doing of good deeds precedes and follows ब्रह्मज्ञान; it begins with मुमुक्षुत्व, which indeed precedes ब्रह्मज्ञान and ends with मुक्ति in the achievement of which good deeds serve as सहकारिन् to the ज्ञान of Brahman.

20. In Sūtras 16–18 the Sūtrakāra seems to tell us what happens of the ज्ञानपूर्वकृतअनारब्ध (or संचित)पुण्यकर्मन्s which are not destroyed but which do not touch him on the fall of the body, as said in Sūtra 14. These are the अनारब्धपूर्वकृत-पुण्यकर्मन्s which were not done with the intention of making them a help to ब्रह्मज्ञान in the achievement of liberation. This point remains unexplained by Sūtras 14–15. The पूर्वअनारब्धकार्य-पुण्यकर्मन्s which preceded मुमुक्षा the rise of the desire to achieve liberation consist of अग्निहोत्रादि आश्रमकर्मन्s and other कर्मन्s like यज्ञ, दान and तपस्. The former are discussed in Sūtra 16 and the latter in Sūtra 17, and both in Sūtra 18.

21. The संचित or अनारब्धकार्य पुण्यकर्मन् in the form of अग्निहोत्रादिआश्रमकर्मन् is not destroyed like the sins of the same type. This is the significance of तु.

22. तत्कार्यायैव — The अग्निहोत्रादिकर्मन्s described above are useful *only for* producing the effect of that knowledge of Brahman *viz.*, liberation. By 'एव' the possibility of the संचित

or अनारब्धअग्निहोत्रादिआश्रमकर्मन् producing *any other effect* is denied. It may be argued that as the संचितअग्निहोत्रादिs were not performed with the intention of helping ब्रह्मज्ञान in the achievement of मोक्ष, they should give their usual fruit to the performer in a new birth or they should go to the well-wishers of the seeker in accordance with a Śruti to that effect (Kau. Upa.) if they are not to be taken as destroyed by the ब्रह्मज्ञान. To this the Sūtrakāra replies that they do no other function but that of helping the ब्रह्मज्ञान in its aim.

23. तद्दर्शनात्—This refers to Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1. In Bra. Sū. III. 4. 32–33 this same Śruti was used to ask the seeker to perform the duties of the orders. Here it is used to show that the duties of the orders done by a seeker, which are not आरब्धकार्य, become also a help to ब्रह्मज्ञान in achieving liberation. This is possible because these are not आरब्धकार्यकर्मन्s, and because अग्निहोत्रादि can help the seeker.

24. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra as referring to the पुण्यs both preceding and succeeding ब्रह्मज्ञान because he takes the same पुण्य about which अश्लेष and विनाश were taught in Sūtra 14, to be the subject of this Sūtra. तत्कार्यायैव is also interpreted by Śaṅkara as referring to the effect of the knowtedge, *viz.*, the release. But ' तद्दर्शनात् ' refers to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 according to Śaṅkara. To us it seems that by अग्निहोत्रादि the Sūtrakāra refers to आश्रमकर्मन्s and that therefore Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1 which lays down आश्रमकर्मन्s for a seeker is referred to here by the Sūtra. Here also Śaṅkara proves that अग्निहोत्रादि only produces the ब्रह्मज्ञान, but not मोक्ष which is the effect of Brahmajñāna. But in doing so he goes beyond the meaning of तत्कार्यायैव given by himself. These remarks and also the assertion that the आश्रमकर्मन् is helpful only in the सगुणा विद्या the Lore of the limited Brahman are not supported by the word of the Sūtra.

Sūtra 17

25. In this Sūtra we should take ' तत्कार्यायैव ' as understood from the preceding Sūtra on the ground of the context.

The Sūtrakāra says that the good deeds other than the आश्रमकर्मन्s also help the ज्ञान of Brahman in achieving its aim *viz.*, release.

26. 'अतः अन्या' = Religious duties other than the आश्रमकर्मन्s. 'अतः' refers to अग्निहोत्रादि mentioned in the preceding Sūtra.

27. अपि shows that in addition to अग्निहोत्रादि the Sūtrakāra considers *other* religious merits as doing the same work as the knowledge of Brahman.

28. एकेषाम् — This gives the authority for the conclusion that यज्ञ, दान, तपः, *etc.*, which are अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन्s become useful to the seeker as a help to the knowledge of Brahman in the attainment of liberation. As the Chā. Upa. Śruti (II. 23. 1) is referred to in Sūtra 16, एकेषाम् refers to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22 which mentions यज्ञ, दान and तपस् which are not the duties of the orders as in the case of Chā. Upa. II. 23. 1, as help to the knowledge of Brahman.

29. 'उभयोः' — This word seems to us to form part of the next Sūtra. Sūtra 16 explains that the आश्रमकर्मन्s which are अनारब्धकार्य become help to the achievement of Brahman. Sūtra 17 does the same as regards अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन्s "which are other than the आश्रमकर्मन्s". In each case a Śruti supporting each conclusion was referred to in the Sūtra. Now, in Sūtra 18 the Sūtrakāra seems to us to quote a Śruti in support of *both these kinds of* पुण्यकर्मन्s. For this reason we propose to transfer उभयोः to Sūtra 18. Śaṅkara takes उभयोः to mean "the approval of both the Ācāryas *viz.*, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa". But this seems to be rather unnecessary because "एकेषाम्" is itself the proof of the approval of the Śruti and there is no reason why the approval of the two Ācāryas be necessary when there is already the approval of the Śruti. In the whole work there is hardly any Sūtra which quotes the authority of Śruti and Ācāryas in the same Sūtra.

30. Śaṅkara takes Sūtra 16 as referring to the पुण्यकर्मन्s useful for the attainment of liberation; but according to him Sūtra

17 discusses the Śruti about the *assignment* of the good deeds to the friends of the liberated one (See Śā. bhā. on Br. Sū. III. 3. 26). The Sūtra itself contains no word expressing a reference to that Śruti. The force of अपि seems to be to assert that the good deeds other than अग्निहोत्रादि are *also* useful for the effect of that knowledge. 'अपि' shows the addition of some more good deeds to the list of those useful for liberation mentioned in the preceding Sūtra. Simply the feminine gender of 'अन्या' cannot be a reference to सुहृदः साधुकृत्याम्..............Śaṅkara has to add तस्या एष विनियोग उक्तः to the Sūtra to make out a reply to the पूर्वपक्ष he has given for this Sūtra. He does not seem to give any interpretation of 'हि' which makes the Śruti referred to by एकेषाम् the argument for the statement "अतोऽन्यापि (तत्कार्यैव)". Śaṅkara also adds "तस्या एव चेदमघवदश्लेषविनाशनिरूपणमितरस्याप्येवमश्लेष इति।". Out of the word "उभयोः" also he makes out a complete sentence. See Note 29 above.

Sūtra 18

31. We have proposed to take उभयोः as a part of this Sūtra. See above Note 29.

32. यदेव विद्यया इति — This is undoubtedly a reference to Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10 as Śaṅkara rightly points out.

33. 'हि' shows that this Sūtra is given as an argument to prove a conclusion which should ordinarily be the same conclusion as in the preceding Sūtras unless a new conclusion is stated by the Sūtrakāra. There is here no such conclusion, according to Śaṅkara's reading; yet Śaṅkara makes out a new Adhikaraṇa of this Sūtra. To us it seems that 'उभयोः' (in the preceding Sūtra according to Śaṅkara) belongs to this Sūtra; and that this "उभयोः" refers to both अग्निहोत्रादि (Sūtra 16) and अतोऽन्यापि (Sūtra 17) and therefore this Sūtra should be a part of the same Adhikaraṇa to which the preceding two Sūtras belong. 'हि' also shows the same.

The conclusion of the preceding two Sūtras is supported further by this Sūtra.

34. The Śruti (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10) in question refers to any kind of good deeds, so that it would be understood as covering both the अग्निहोत्रादि and other rites. " यदेव " in the Śruti is a general reference to *all* good deeds. All good deeds performed with the knowledge (विद्या), with faith, *etc.*, produce a result superior to that of a deed performed without the knowledge (विद्या). This superior result is ' तत्कार्य ' (Sūtra 16) the effect of the knowledge of Brahman, *viz.*, liberation. In Sūtras III. 4. 4 and 10 the Sūtrakāra has shown that the विद्या in this Śruti (Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10) is not particularly the ब्रह्मविद्या. The Sūtrakāra here quotes this Śruti to prove that actions done with some विद्या (the inner, allegorical sense of the rite, not particularly ब्रह्मविद्या) also give a result other and better than their usual result (फल). In Sūtras 16 and 17 the Sūtrakāra quoted a Śruti which dealt with the actions done definitely with the aim of achieving the knowledge of Brahman and liberation; in this Sūtra (18) he quotes a Śruti which does not mention acts done definitely with such an aim, but yet which produce a result better than their usual one because they are done with a particular kind of knowledge (विद्या). From these texts he concludes that *all* the अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन्s become useful to the seeker in the attainment of liberation the effect of the knowledge. The वीर्यवत्तरकार्य in Chā. Upa. I. 1. 10 can be तत्कार्य or ज्ञानकार्य according to the Sūtrakāra.

35. Śaṅkara takes Sūtra 18 as connected with the question discussed in Sūtra 16, *viz.*, whether अग्निहोत्रादि which is useful in the attainment of liberation is the one performed with the कर्माङ्गविद्या ' the knowledge related to the rites ' or not or whether there is an option. This question does not seem to us to be even suggested by the context. It has been already stated in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 33 that the duties of the orders

should be performed by the seeker with the idea of making them a help to the knowledge of Brahman in its aim. He interprets the Sutra to mean that अग्निहोत्रादि which become useful in the achievement of liberation is that done with the allegorical knowledge of the rite and *also* that done without it. It is strange that he makes no special case of the rite done with the knowledge, though the Śruti uses the word वीर्यवत्तर as distinguished from वीर्यवत्. The Sūtrakāra seems to us to take वीर्यवत्तर as referring to ज्ञानकार्य the effect of knowledge.

Sūtra 19

36. The topic of this Sūtra is the disposal of the आरब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s both good and bad. The word "इतरे" means 'other than those discussed in the preceding Sūtras' *i. e.*, other than the आरब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s. This also shows that Sūtras 16–18 were intended to explain what happened of the अनारब्धकार्य पुण्यकर्मन्s which preceded the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman. The topic of Sūtra 15 is अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वकर्मन्s good and bad deeds 'which have not begun to give their result' and which preceded the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, but that Sūtra does not say what happens of the अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन्s; this latter is the topic of Sūtras 16–18.

The यज्ञादिकर्मन्s and the आश्रमकर्मन्s (Sūtra III. 4. 27, III. 4. 32–34) as well as the knowledge of Brahman (Sū. III. 4. 1) are laid down by the Sūtrakāra as means to the attainment of liberation; so, it is not necessary for the Sūtrakāra to say anything as to how these are disposed of when liberation is attained.

The Sūtrakāra does not seem to believe in the theory that some of the good and the bad deeds of the seeker are transferred to those who love and those who hate him.

37. The आरब्धकार्य कर्मन्s — both good and bad – are आरब्धकर्मन्s *i. e.* their result is already being worked out; in other

words, they are the foundation of this present birth of the seeker. Their result (कार्य) is already decided and has been already begun before the seeker attains the knowledge of Brahman. For this reason, they cannot be made a help to the knowledge of Brahman in the latter's goal of liberation, as were the अनारब्धकार्य पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन्s. The आरब्धकार्य evil deeds must also give the result which has already been fixed. Thus, the आरब्धकार्य कर्मन्s are destroyed only after their result is experienced (भोग) by the seeker.

38. संपद्यते — After these actions are exhausted the seeker gets liberation in the form of union with Brahman (संपत्ति). The reference in this Sūtra is clearly made to Chā. Upa. VI. 14. 2 *viz.*, तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये.

39. Śaṅkara's remarks in the beginning of his commentary on this Sūtra (अनारब्धकार्ययोः पुण्यपापयोः विद्यासामर्थ्यात् क्षय उक्तः) are to be understood only in a general way because he himself has explained that the अनारब्धकार्य अग्निहोत्रादिरूप पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन् becomes a help to the knowledge of Brahman for the achievement of liberation (Sūtra 16). We have shown that Sūtra 17 explains the अनारब्धकार्य अग्निहोत्रादीतर पूर्वपुण्यकर्मन् as becoming similarly useful.

CHAPTER V

SECTION I

The Union of the Senses with the Mind.

Sūtras IV. 2. 1–11

(१) वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च ।

(२) अत एव च सर्वाण्यनु ।

(३) तन्मनः प्राण उत्तरात् ।

(४) सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ।

(५) भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

(६) नैकस्मिन्दर्शयतो हि ।

(७) समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य ।

(८) तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात् ।

(९) सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः ।

(१०) नोपमर्देनातः ।

(११) अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरेष उष्मा ।

TRANSLATION

THE Speech [of the seeker who is departing from the body to join Brahman unites] with his mind because it is shown in the Śruti and because of the Word. 1

And on the same grounds [the Speech unites with the mind] after all other senses [have united with the Speech]. 2

That mind unites with the breath, because of the subsequent sentence. 3

That breath unites with the governor [of the body] on account of the approach [of the senses and the breath] to him, and other reasons. 4

He unites with the elements because of the Śruti about them; 5

Not with one element because both the Śruti and Smṛti show it. 6

[This departure] is the same both from the beginning of the Path [of gods] and after having attained immortality, 7

because the union [of the senses, the mind, the breath, the soul, and the elements] during that time is called " transmigration "; 8

and [that is] the subtle body, because it is found to be so on the strength of the evidence, 9

hence it is not destroyed by the destruction of the gross body, 10

and this warmth belongs to this [subtle body] only because of its reasonableness. 11

NOTES

Sūtra 1

1. The Sūtras forming this Adhikaraṇa deal with such Śrutis as :—

(*a*) अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनःप्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजःपरस्यां देवतायाम् ॥ (Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 6).

(*b*) एवमेवेममात्मानमन्तकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति......(Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 38). स यत्रायमात्माऽबल्यं नेत्यसंमोहमिवन्येत्यथैनमेते प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति स एतास्तेजोमात्राः समभ्याददानो हृदयमेवान्ववक्रामति स यत्रैष चाक्षुसः पुरुषः पराङ् पर्यावर्ततेऽथारूपज्ञो भवति ॥ १ ॥ (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 1).

(*c*) स परेऽक्षरे आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते ॥ ९ ॥........॥ विज्ञानात्मा सह देवैश्च सर्वैः प्राणा भूतानि संप्रतिष्ठन्ति यत्र ॥ तदक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु सोम्य स सर्वज्ञः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति ॥ ११ ॥ (Pra. Upa. IV. 9, 11).

(*d*) पुरुषं सोम्योपतापिनं ज्ञातयः पर्युपासते जानासि मां जानासि मामिति तस्य यावन्न वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायां तावज्जानाति ॥ १ ॥ अथ यदास्य वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायामथ न जानाति ॥ (Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1–2).

2. In the last Adhikaraṇa of the preceding Pāda, the union [with Brahman] was stated to take place after all the प्रारब्धकार्याणि कर्माणि were exhausted through the individual soul experiencing their fruit. Now the Sūtrakāra shows *how* the soul leaves the body and unites with Brahman. The topic introduced in the last Adhikaraṇa of the preceding Pāda by the word 'संपद्यते' is continued in this Pāda, as is shown by the विषयवाक्य of Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 1.

3. दर्शनात् — This argument of 'दर्शन' refers always in Brahmasūtras to what is shown *in the Upaniṣads* and not to what we find in the world. And the Śruti referred to by दर्शनात् is

mostly of the kind of *an example*, rather than a direct rule. So, the present argument of दर्शन seems to refer to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1.

4. 'शब्दात्' may be a reference to a Śruti like Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2 or VI. 8. 6. Since 'संपद्यते' in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 19 is a reference to Chā. Upa. VI 14. 2, and "दर्शनात्" refers to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1, it is very likely that 'शब्दात्' refers to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2.

5. The reference to Chā. Upa. VI. 14. 2 in Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 19 and to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1-2 in Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 1 is also a written proof for the fact that Bra. Sū. IV. 2 deals with the knower of the Supreme Brahman.

6. According to Śaṅkara's system there is no departure (from the body) of the *knower of* Brahman, so he says that the order of the senses departing from the body mentioned here refers to *the lower lores* for which also the देवयानः पन्थाः is described in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. Thus, he does not see any connection between Bra. Sū. IV. 2-3 and Bra. Sū. IV. 1. We have already given above two arguments to show that all these Pādas, at least the last Adhikaraṇa of Bra. Sū. IV. 1 and the first Adhikaraṇa of Bra. Sū. IV. 2, are closely connected (See above Notes 2, 5). For Śaṅkara's argument based upon Sūtra 7, see our Notes there. Śaṅkara tries to show that वाक् 'Speech' in the Sūtra means the function of the sense of Speech, not the sense itself. His argument based upon Sūtra IV. 2. 16 does not stand because the word 'अविभाग' in that Sūtra does not mean, 'dissolution'; but only telescopic 'union' (See our Notes there), and the 'अविभाग' does not refer only to the *last* item, but it refers to *all* the items. His other argument (अतत्प्रकृतित्व) is not given by the Sūtrakāra directly or indirectly. 'दर्शन' should refer to a text rather than only to what we see taking place when a man leaves the body. And as we have already shown, दर्शन probably refers to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1. The Sūtrakāra seems

to understand the Śruti to mean that the sense of Speech unites with the mind in a telescopic manner. He takes संपत्ति not in the sense of dissolution, but in the sense of "union". Śaṅkara may be understood as taking शब्द to refer to Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2 instead of Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 6. He interprets the word वाक् as वागिन्द्रिय and argues that the Śruti uses वाक् for वागिन्द्रिय through the वृत्तिवृत्तिमतोः अभेदोपचारः.

Sūtra 2

7. "अत एव" can mean a reference to the arguments given in the preceding Sūtras *viz.*, दर्शनात् and शब्दात्. But there seem to be no Śrutis to which दर्शन and शब्द supporting the sense of सर्वाणि अनु (See below) can be traced. Therefore, we should here interpret "अत एव" in another way in which it is used and interpreted elsewhere in the Sūtras, *e. g.*, III. 4. 25 (अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा), and I. 3. 29 (अत एव च नित्यत्वम्). If we compare the sense of अत एव in all the Sūtras where the expression occurs, we shall find that in all the places it means a reference to the *statement* in the preceding Sūtra, rather than to the source of argumeut therein.

8. सर्वाणि is undoubtedly a reference to सर्वाणि इन्द्रियाणि as Śaṅkara points out.

9. 'अनु' is to be taken as a preposition governing 'सर्वाणि'. We cannot add to it वर्तन्ते and make it a part of अनुवर्तन्ते, because not only it involves a clear addition to the Sūtra, but it also makes सर्वाणि a subject *i. e.* a nominative form which it does not seem to be. Moreover, in that case we have to take 'मनः' as an implied object of 'अनुवर्तन्ते'.

10. सर्वाणि अनु — The Speech unites with the mind *after all the senses.* This can mean either that all the senses first unite with the sense of Speech and *then* the Speech unites with the mind or that all the senses unite with the mind and *then* the sense of Speech unites with the mind. Out of these two possibi-

lities the former interpretation seems to us to be the better because it agrees better with the meaning of अत एव (" because the Speech unites with the mind "). *Because the Speech unites with the mind, we shall conclude that it does so after all the senses unite with the Speech.* The Chā. Upa. Śruti (VI. 15. 2) says that the Speech unites with the mind. From this we should infer that the Speech does so after all the senses unite with the Speech. We make this suggestion on the ground of the Śrutis in which वाक् or the sense of Speech stands for all the senses *e. g.* (1) यतो वाचो निवर्तन्तेऽप्राप्य मनसा सह । (Tai. Upa. II. 4. 1), (2) यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञः (Ka. Upa. III. 13) where Śaṅkara remarks " वागत्रोपलक्षणार्था सर्वेषामिन्द्रियाणाम् ".† (3) *Cf.* also अस्तमिते आदित्ये याज्ञवल्क्य चन्द्रमस्यस्तमिते शान्तेऽग्नौ किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति वागेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति वाचैवायं ज्योतिषास्ते पल्ययते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीति तस्माद्वै सम्राडपि यत्र स्वः पाणिर्न विनिर्ज्ञायतेऽथ यत्र वागुच्चरयत्युपैव तत्र न्येतीत्येवमेवैतद्याज्ञवल्क्य ॥ (Chā. Upa. IV. 3. 5). The Sūtrakāra who follows the Chāndogya Upaniṣad Śruti seems to *us to reconcile it* with Pra. Upa. III. 9 which Śaṅkara quotes, by saying that the Speech unites with the mind after *all* the senses have united with it (with the Speech). Thus, he sticks to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad statement that it is the Speech which unites with the mind.

11. This interpretation of सर्वाणि as सर्वाणि इन्द्रियाणि, given by Śaṅkara also, shows that here the Sūtrakāra and the Śrutis speak of the union of all the senses, not of the dissolution of their functions.

12. Śaṅkara takes ' अत एव ' to mean a reference to the very arguments *viz.*, दर्शन and शब्द (and तत्त्वप्रलयासंभव for which see below), given in Sūtra 1. He takes अनु as अनुवर्तन्ते and takes मनः as understood, thus interpreting ' मनोऽनुवर्तन्ते ' as " मनसि संपत्तिः ", and making सर्वाणि a nom. plural. Thereby in the Pra. Upa. Śruti he brings out the sense that all the

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† See Ānandgiri on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* ननूपसंहारेऽपि वाच इतरेन्द्रियाणां सव्यापाराणामनुपसंहारे तन्मात्रं न ज्ञानसाधनमित्याशङ्क्याह ॥

functions of the senses merge into the mind, but not the senses themselves.

It may be asked, "If the Sūtrakāra follows the Praśna Upa. Śruti (as Śaṅkara's interpretation of Sūtra 2 explains), why does he mention the Chā. Upa. Śruti, in which only Speech is mentioned, in Sūtra 1 ?" To this he replies that the *separate mention* of the merging of the Speech into the mind in Sūtra 1 is out of regard for the Chā. Upa. Śruti. This explanation of Śaṅkara is hardly consistent with the method of the Sūtrakāra as revealed in his work. Generally, in the case of slightly differing Śrutis, the Sūtrakāra never collects them all in several Sūtras, as is the case here according to Śaṅkara. Rather he sticks to the old tradition *i. e.*, to the Chā. and the Bṛ. Upaniṣads, and explains the difference in other Upaniṣads by making the latter secondary as compared with the Chā. and Bṛ. Upaniṣads. Here also the fact seems to be that the Sūtrakāra sticks to the Chā. Upaniṣad and explains the statement in the Pra. Upa. by saying that all the senses (except the Speech) unite with the Speech and then the Speech unites with the mind; in the opinion of the Sūtrakāra this is the reason why the Chā. Upa. speaks of only the Speech as uniting with the mind.

Sūtra 3

13. 'तन्मनः' means the mind with which the Speech unites.

14. उत्तरात्—This is a reference to 'मनः प्राणे' which *follows* 'वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते' in Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2.

15. It seems that the Sūtrakāra in these Sūtras makes clear the order of the senses at the time of the departure from the body. This order is not mentioned in such Śrutis about the departure, as

(*a*) Pra. Upa. IV. 9. 10 (See Notes on Sūtra 1), and

(*b*) गताः कलाः पञ्चदश प्रतिष्ठा देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु ।
कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परे अव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति ॥
(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7).

The purpose of the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras IV. 2. 1-15 is to tell us the order of this union of all these in the Supreme One in the case of the knower of Brahman. The order also is not the same in all the Śrutis where it is given. So, he reconciles these Śrutis also. In none of these Śrutis we find the mention of the वृत्ति or function of the senses or the mind. And the अविभाग in Sūtra 16 is a union, not dissolution, as explained in Sūtra 16. For these reasons Śaṅkara's view that the वृत्तिप्रलय is established here by rejecting the Pūrvapakṣa of the dissolution of the sense or the mind does not seem to us to respresent the Sūtrakāra's view (See Note on Sūtra 5).

16. For Śaṅkara's exlpanation that the *function* of the mind is dissolved into the Prāṇa, see Note on the preceding Sūtra. The उत्तर (वाक्य) also does not refer to the *function* of the mind. The arguments of दर्शन and अतत्प्रकृतित्व are not given in the Sūtra.

17. Śaṅkara gives the argument of अतत्प्रकृतित्व in Sūtras 1-3 and the words " नेत्याह । अतत्प्रकृतित्वात् " in his *bhaṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 1 sound as if he is quoting an argument from the Sūtra itself. But it is not found in any Pāṭha of the Sūtras. The Ratnaprabhā explains ' नेत्याह ' as नेत्याह श्रुतिः. There is no Śruti with the required negation.

Sūtra 4

18. ' सः ' refers to the Prāṇa with which the mind has united.

19. अध्यक्षे — With अध्यक्षे we have to take संपद्यते as understood. This word ' अध्यक्ष ' means the जीव as Śaṅkara points out. The Sūtrakāra uses the word अध्यक्ष in the sense of the lord; here it means the lord of the body, just as it means the lord of the कार्य (an effect-world) in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 10 (कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सह).

20. तदुपगमादिभ्यः—' तदुपगम ' means the approach of प्राण to the जीव. This is a reference to such a text as एवमिममात्मानमन्तकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभिसमायन्ति यत्रैतदूर्ध्वोच्छ्वासी भवति (Br. Upa. IV. 3. 38, IV. 4. 1). In Pra. Upa. IV. 9, 11, it is stated that the individual soul approaches the Supreme Immutable One; but it is not stated there (or even in Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7) at what stage the individual soul joins the process of departure. Moreover, in Chā. Upa. VI. 15, the individual soul is not mentioned though it is mentioned in other Śrutis. So, the Sūtrakāra makes these doubts clear by this Sūtra.

21. " आदि " in the Sūtra may be taken as referring to Br. Upa. IV. 4. 2 (तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति प्राणमनूत्क्रामन्तꣳसर्वे प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति ।) as Śaṅkara points out.

22. As in other Sūtras, here we find no reference in the Sūtra to the *function* of the प्राण being dissolved into the individual soul.

Sūtra 5

23. The individual soul unites with the elements. " तच्छ्रुतेः" refers to a Śruti about the elements (भूतs). Such a Śruti would be Pra. Upa. IV. 11, *viz.*,

विज्ञानात्मा सह देवैश्च सर्वैः प्राणा भूतानि संप्रतिष्ठन्ति यत्र ।
तदक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु सोम्य स सर्वज्ञः सर्वमेवाविवेशेति ॥

The Sūtrakāra refers to a Śruti mentioning *all* the elements; he does not say that the Śruti he refers to states that " the individual soul resorts to the element "; so, तत् in ' तच्छ्रुतेः ' refers only to the elements and not to a statement about the individual soul resorting to the elements. This requirement is fulfilled by the above Śruti, and perhaps in all the (ten) Upaniṣads recognised by the Sūtrakāra, that is the only Śruti mentioning (all) the elements with regard to the departure.

24. Śaṅkara who takes " प्राणस्तेजसि " (Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 6) as the Śruti referred to by the Sūtra has to explain भूतेषु

as तेजःसहचरितेषु भूतेषु. This modification of the word भूतेषु in the Sūtra as well as the objection which Śaṅkara answers by giving the example of a journey to Pāṭaliputra from Srughna via Mathurā, also shows that Pra. Upa. IV. 11 is a better विषयवाक्य of this Sūtra than Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 6.

25. In the case of Speech, mind and breath, Śaṅkara argued that the functions only of these are dissolved into the succeeding ones, and not they themselves. It was not possible to give a similar explanation regarding the contact of the individual soul with the elements; so, Śaṅkara says that the ruler of the body stays in the elements (अध्यक्षस्य भूतेषु अवस्थानम्). To us it appears that this alone (अवस्थान) was meant by the Śruti and the Sūtras rather than any kind of dissolution of the function.

Sūtra 6

26. 'एकस्मिन्' means 'एकस्मिन् भूते'. This expression is cleverly used by the Sūtrakāra to refer to तेजस् and also the Water.

27. न एकस्मिन्—एकस्मिन् refers first to तेजस् in the Śruti "प्राणस्तेजसि" (Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2). The resort of the individual soul is not only one element *viz.*, the light which is mentioned in the Chā. Upa. Śruti (VI. 15. 2) about the departure.

28. दर्शयतः—The fact that the soul does not reside only in one element has been proved in Bra. Sū. III. 1. 1-2 on the ground of a question and an answer. The Śruti discussed there was Chā. Upa. V. 3. 3 and "the one element" was the Water. It was to bring out this reference that the Sūtrakāra used the expression 'एकस्मिन्' instead of the words 'तेजसि एव' as required by the Chā. Upa. text.

29. Śaṅkara gives also another explanation of दर्शयतः as 'दर्शयतः श्रुतिस्मृती'; but as the Smṛti reference can not be traced to the Bhagavadgītā or the Mahābhārata and as 'एकस्मिन्'

may be taken also as referring to the Water, because each of Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2 and Chā. Upa. V. 3. 3 mentions only one element and gives rise to a similar discussion.

Śaṅkara mentions a *pūrvapakṣa* on the ground of the fact that in Bṛ. Upa. III. 2. 13 the individual soul is described as resorting to his *actions* at the time of the departure instead of to the elements. The answer to this doubt can be had from Sūtras 7–8. But it is not quite correct to hold that "the receiving of the elements" is mentioned here because a new gross body is to be assumed by the departing soul. Also in the last departure when the knower of Brahman is to attain immortality (अमृतत्व–Sūtra 7) and is no more going to be reborn with a new mundane body, the soul does resort to the elements which unite with the Supreme Being in the heart (Sūtras 12, 15, 17).

Sūtra 7

30. 'समाना'—This process of departure (उत्क्रान्ति) is the same; it remains unchanged between the two points mentioned in the Sūtra.

'समाना' means unchanged because the last उत्क्रान्ति is slightly different from this उत्क्रान्ति. In the last उत्क्रान्ति the elements in their turn resort to पर ब्रह्मन् (Sūtra 15) by the relation of union (Sūtra 16) and there are other noticeable features mentioned in Sūtra 17. These are not present in all the उत्क्रान्तिs which precede the last one and, therefore, all those उत्क्रान्तिs are similar while the last one is dissimilar.

31. आसृत्युपक्रमात्—"From the begining of the Path" *viz.*, "the Path of the gods (देवयान)." सृति means a path *e. g.*, नैते सृती पार्थ जानन्योगी मुह्यति कश्चन (Bha. Gī. VIII 26). Though both the path of the Pitṛs and that of the gods can be called 'सृति'; here the Sūtrakāra means the Path leading to immortality, so the सृति in this Sūtra should be taken as the Path of the gods (देवयान). The various worlds to which one can go when

he is on this Path are described in the next Pāda (Bra. Sū. IV. 3).

The Sūtrakāra seems to say that after one begins this Path or takes to this Path the method of departure described in the preceding Sūtras takes place.

32. **अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य**—'**उपोष्य**' should be derived from **उप+वस्** to fast. **उपोष्य** would mean "having fasted;" so **अनुपोष्य** would mean "having tasted" *i. e.*, having reached, having got. '**अमृतत्वम्**' should be taken as the object of **अनुपोष्य.** "**अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य**" means "and having attained immortality." The Sūtrakāra says that the departure described in the preceding Sūtras is the same from the begining of the Path of gods, and [it is also the same] after one has attained immortality. Thus, this departure is here said to be the same also after one has attained immortality.

33, Śaṅkara does not interpret the Sūtra to mean that the departure is the same from the beginning of the Path in the sense that it is the same for *all* the stations or the worlds on the Path of gods. But he raises a question whether this departure is the same for the knower and for the non-knower or whether it is different. In fact, the question about the departure of the subtle body (together with the senses)+ in the case of those who do not know the Atman § has already been discussed in Bra. Sū. III. 1. The going of the elements (Bra. Sū. III. 1. 2) and that of the senses (Bra. Sū. III. 1. 3) is a clear reference to the departure or **उत्क्रान्ति** of these subtle constituents from the body in the case of those who do not know the Atman. Moreover, the context of Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 7 suggests that here the question of the **उत्क्रान्ति** of only the knower of Atman is considered. In the first Pada

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+ तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति सं परिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् । त्र्यात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वात् । प्राणगतेश्च ॥ (Bra. Sū. III. 1. 1–2).

§ भाक्तं वानात्मवित्त्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति । (Bra. Sū. III. 1. 7).

the disposal of his actions is mentioned (Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 12–19), and in the third the various worlds situated on the Path of the gods are mentioned in due order (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 1). Moreover, the attainment of immortality mentioned in this Sūtra (7) also suggests that सृति here is the Path of gods. It is on that Path that we read " न स पुनरावर्तते ", " he returns not ". So, the उत्क्रान्ति of the senses *etc.*, takes place in the case of both the knower and the non-knower (or the ritualist); but in the former case there is an order regarding how the senses, the mind, the breath, the soul and the elements join with each succeeding one, while in the case of the ritualist the subtle body together with the soul leaves the body without any such conscious procedure regarding their union. For these reasons, there is no likelihood of the question of the non-knower being discussed here. As Śaṅkara himself notices, the regularly developing उत्क्रान्ति *i. e.*, the उत्क्रान्ति in which each preceding item joins each succeeding one, is mentioned *in the Upaniṣads* only where the context is about the knowledge of the Atman; while such a regular development and preparation for the departure on the part of the members of the subtle body is never mentioned in the Upaniṣads in the case of the ritualists. This also suggests that the Sūtrakāra would do the same.

Again, the पूर्वपक्ष based upon न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6) is discussed in Sūtra 12, and it actually arises from the statement (अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य) in Sūtra 7. So, that पूर्वपक्ष is out of point here.

Śaṅkara's reply (अविशेषश्रवणात्) is his own, it is not given in the Sūtra itself, though he tries to bring out this meaning out of आसृत्युपक्रमात्.

Śaṅkara does not make अमृतत्वम् an object of " अनुपोष्य, " but he separates the two words and he interprets अनुपोष्य as अदग्ध्वा and construes it with अविद्यादीन् क्लेशान् taken as under-

stood; and, thereby, he changes the entire sense of अमृतत्वम्, in so far as he concludes अपरविद्यासामर्थ्यात् आपेक्षिकं अमृतत्वं प्रेप्सते ।. There is no suggestion in the Sūtra, which would justify us in explaining अमृतत्वम् as आपेक्षिकममृतत्वम्. If a Śruti mentions गति and अमृतत्वम् in the same context, one is hardly justified in explaining that अमृतत्वम् as आपेक्षिक, unless one resorts to independent arguments not mentioned in the Śruti.

Sūtra 8

34. This Sūtra gives only an argument and from the context it seems to be an argument for the statement in Sūtra 7.

35. 'तदा' would 'mean during the time from the beginning of the Path of the gods till after the attainment of immortality.'

36. 'अपीति' is the mixing, uniting, *i. e.* the union of the senses with the mind, upto the union of the soul with the elements described in Sūtras 1–6.

37. अपीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात् — This union of the items of the subtle body during the time already stated is called the transmigration 'संसार'. The Sūtra tells us that the union (अपीति) is called संसार. In the case of the अपीति taking place after the attainment of immortality, the अपीति so far described is a part of the प्रारब्धकर्मन्. So, it will be even then a part of the transmigration of the soul (संसार).

The further part of the union (Sūtra 15) is not called संसार. This seems to be the point of difference between the union described in Sūtras 1–6 and that in Sūtra 15.

Because the union during the time from the beginning of the Path of gods till after the attainment of immortality is called संसार, the union during that period is the same or is of the same kind. The प्रारब्धकर्म ends there, *i. e.*, it ends on the union of the soul with the elements. The union beyond that time, during the उत्क्रान्ति is not called संसार, and, therefore, it *differs* from the one described in Sūtras 1–6.

38. We have taken ' तदापीतेः ' as तदा and अपीतेः ; Śaṅkara takes it as तद् and आपीतेः (आ अपीतेः), and adds अवतिष्ठते and makes संसारव्यपदेशात् an argument for " तदापीतेः अवतिष्ठते ". It is in this manner that he makes out a new Adhikaraṇa beginning with Sūtra 8. To us it seems that the addition of 'अवतिष्ठते' is unnecessary and therefore, not legitimate and that ' अपीतेः ' should be directly connected with संसारव्यपदेशात्. Moreover, according to Śaṅkara, this Sūtra discusses the nature of the union of the तेजस् with the Supreme Deity mentioned in Chā. Upa. VI. 8. 6 (तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्); whether it is absolute or relative. But to us it seems that *this point is considered in Bra. Sū.* IV. 2. 15–16 and, therefore, it is not the topic here. Again, तद् (in तद् + आपीतेः according to Śaṅkara) does not mean only तेजः, but it has to be explained as तेजःआदिभूतसूक्ष्मं श्रोत्रादिकरणाश्रयभूतम्. This is rather not very harmonious with the fact that the Sūtrakāra has rejected the singular form तेजः, and has established the view about the plural number of the elements (forming the subtle body of the knower of Atman. See Sūtras 5–6) and he follows that view again in Sūtra 15.

' आऽपीतेः ' — Even if we follow this reading of separating तदापीतेः as तद् and आपीतेः, the word अपीति cannot mean संसारमोक्ष because here the liberation itself is not the topic; rather the अपीति mentioned in these Sūtras (1–6) is the one taking place as a part of the उत्क्रान्ति. Śaṅkara explains संसारव्यपदेश as the statement about transmigration, not as " being called (व्यपदिश् to give a name to something) transmigration ". The तेज आदिभूतसूक्ष्म continues till liberation is achieved chiefly because the अविद्या of the soul continues ; not because संसार is mentioned in the Śrutis like Kaṭha Upa. V. 7. The continuation of भूतसूक्ष्म is itself the संसार. The fact that the भूतसूक्ष्म *accompanies* the soul during transmigration has been already established in Bra. Sū. III. 1. 1–4, which was the proper place in the Sūtras for the discussion of that question, rather than Bra. Sū. IV. 2 which is chiefly meant to describe the procedure

of the उत्क्रान्ति of the knower of Brahman. Lastly, the union of the तेजः (or the elements) with the Supreme Deity never takes place as a part of (in) the departure (उत्क्रान्ति) occurring during the transmigration (संसार) of the soul. If that union takes place, the immediately next step is liberation (*Vide* Sūtras 15–17). Even in Śaṅkara's system after that union takes plaee, the soul goes to हिरण्यगर्भ and never returns to this world. It is the union of the soul with the Supreme One during deep-sleep state which is not final (See Sūtras IV. 2. 15–16 below).

Sūtra 9

39. Sūtras 9–11 seem to give one more argument why the departure (उत्क्रान्ति) of the senses, the mind, the breath and the elements takes place in the case of one on the Path of the gods and also after the attainment of immortality. These senses, *etc.*, form the subtle body and hence when the gross body is destroyed that subtle body is not destroyed. Thus, the only possibility is that it accompanies the soul on the Path of the gods and even after he attains immortality.

40. The body made of the senses, *etc.*, is a subtle one because it is found to be so on the strength of the evidence (of the Śruti and the Smṛti). *Cf.* Bhagavadgītā XV. 7–9, and also Bra. Sū. III. 1. 7. As regards the proof of the Śruti see Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6.

41. Śaṅkara takes सूक्ष्मम् with इतरभूतसहितं तेजः. We may as well take सूक्ष्मम् with शरीरम् understood (See Śaṅkara on the next Sūtra). च should mean an additional argument besides that in Sūtra 8; but Śaṅkara takes it in the sense of समुच्चय, and interprets it as स्वरूपतश्च. Śaṅkara interprets तथोपलब्धेः as an explanation of प्रमाणतः, and takes 'the *finding*' as a reference to the Śruti of the departure of the soul with the subtle body from the hundred-and-first artery (*viz.*, Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6). This is quite consistent with the fact that उपलब्धि in the Sūtras

always refers to what we *find* in the Scripture particularly the the Śruti. For this reason, प्रमाण or 'proof' can only mean the proof of the Scripture.

Sūtra 10

42. अतः—'Because the body is subtle'.

43. 'उपमर्द' (destruction) refers to that of the gross body, as Śaṅkara rightly explains it. By the destruction of the gross body the subtle body being subtle is not destroyed. This has been stated in Sūtra III. 1. 4. It is mentioned here again in order to show that the subtle body must accompany even one who has attained immortality, because only then it will be destroyed.

Sūtra 11

44. This warmth which we feel when we touch the gross body and which is not felt when even a knower of Brahman departs, must reasonably belong to this subtle body (See Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 1). The Sūtrakāra here gives another proof why the subtle body must accompany one who has attained immortality. Even when after death the gross body is not burnt, we find it cold. This means the subtle body to which the warmth belongs is not destroyed but has accompanied the departing soul.

Thus, the nature of the subtle body is itself a proof that the senses, the mind, the breath and the elements accompany those on the Path of the gods and those who have attained immortality.

45. In the case of Sūtras 9–11 Śaṅkara does not tell us why the description of the subtle body is given in this place in the Sūtras. Probably he only thinks that here the Sūtras describe only the nature of the subtle body, which, according to him, is referred to by तद् in तद्+आऽपीतेः in Sūtra 8. To us it appears that Sūtra 8 gives an argument for the statement in Sūtra 7 and that Sūtras 9–11 give another argument for the same. 'च' in Sūtra 9 shows this.

CONTINUATION OF SECTION I

Departure of the senses, etc., even after the Attainment of Immortality.

Sūtras IV. 2. 12–14

(१२) प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शारीरात् ।

(१३) स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम् ।

(१४) स्मर्यते च ।

TRANSLATION

[IF it be argued that there is no departure of the senses, *etc.*, after the attainment of immortality] because there is a negation in the Śruti, we reply, " No ". [The negation is about the departure of these] *from* the individual soul, 12

because [the negation *from* him] is clear in the text of the followers of one of the Branches of the Veda, 13

and it is stated in the Smṛti. 14

NOTES

Sūtra 12

1. Sūtra 12 gives a पूर्वपक्ष against the Proposition made by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras 7–11. In Sūtra 7 it was said that the departure (उत्क्रान्ति) is the same even after the attainment of immortality, and Sūtras 8–11 give arguments for the same conclusion. Now, Sūtra 12 raises an objection against it and Sūtras 13–14 give an answer to it.

2. प्रतिषेधात् — This is clearly a reference to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6, *viz.*, न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति. In this Śruti it is clearly stated that the senses together with the vital airs do not depart from the body in the case of the seeker who desirelessly seeks only the Atman. This is a contradiction of the assertion that the departure of the senses, *etc.*, is the same even after the attainment of immortality, made in Sūtra 7 and supported by arguments in Sūtras 8–11.

3. न — The Sūtrakāra does not accept the opponent's view that Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6 negatives the departure of the senses, *etc.*, from the gross body in the case of one who seeks Atman.

4. शारीरात् — In this word the Sūtrakāra gives his interpretation of तस्य in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6. तस्य means शारीरस्य, but the Sūtrakāra takes it in the sense of शारीरात्. It is not that the senses, *etc.*, *of the soul seeking* Atman do not depart; but the Śruti means that the senses, *etc.*, do not depart *from the soul seeking* Atman. According to Sūtras 1-7, the senses unite with the mind, the mind then unites with the breath, *that breath with the soul* and the soul with the subtle elements. Thus, if the प्राण्s at all depart, they must depart only from the soul. Having this procedure in his mind, the Sūtrakāra says that the senses do not depart *from the soul-in-the-body*. Thus, तस्य in the Śruti means 'तस्मात्' according to Sūtra 12.

5. As shown above the topic in Sūtras 7–11 is continued in Sūtra 12. So this Sūtra (12) forms part of the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtras 7–11. Therefore, Sūtra 12 cannot be taken as beginning a new Adhikaraṇa. Similarly Sūtras 13–14 belong to the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtras 7–11.

6. Śaṅkara takes the whole of Sūtra 12 as a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र; so that 'प्रतिषेधात्' is an argument of the सिद्धान्तिन् presupposed by the पूर्वपक्ष; and 'न शारीरात्' is a view of the पूर्वपक्ष. The सिद्धान्तिन् here holds the view that the प्राणs of those who get absolute immortality do not depart from the body; the पूर्वपक्षिन् says that the negation in the Śruti tells us that his प्राणs do not depart from him, but that they do depart from his body.

We have shown that Sūtras 7–11 discuss the problem of the departure of the प्राणs (the senses and the breath) of one who has attained absolute immortality; they are the Siddhānta Sūtras and they assert that the उत्क्रान्ति in his case is the same as described in Sūtras 1–6. Now, प्रतिषेध, as we have shown, should mean an objection to the Siddhāntin's view that the प्राणs of a seeker of Atman depart after he attains immortality. Thus, प्रतिषेधात् is a real पूर्वपक्ष against the view expressed in the Siddhānta Sūtras and 'न शारीरात्' is the Siddhāntin's own view, which is established in Sūtras 7–11. There is no indication in Sūtra 12 that *the whole* of that Sūtra is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र, nor is such an indication (*e. g.*, a word like तु) found in Sūtra 13. Rather 'हि' in Sūtra 13 expressly shows that 'न शारीरात्' in Sūtra 12 is the Siddhāntin's view. 'हि' is never used in the Sūtras to show that the preceding Sūtra is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र; it always shows that the Sūtra in which it occurs is an additional argument supporting the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sūtra.

Śaṅkara says that the अमृतत्व in Sūtra 7 is आपेक्षिक and that from that fact an inference may be made (by the पूर्वपक्षिन्) that the Sūtrakāra holds the view that in the case of the attainment of absolute immortality, there is no उत्क्रान्ति and गति. This

very argument of Śaṅkara rather shows that अमृतत्व in Sūtra 7 is absolute immortality and that 'प्रतिषेधात्' is a पूर्वपक्ष against it. So, the argument itself argues against Śaṅkara. Moreover, the very fact that Sūtra 12 is required to be explained as a continuation of Sūtra 7 shows that Sūtras 9–11 do not form an independent Adhikaraṇa, but should be interpreted as we have done.

Śaṅkara's explanation of 'न शारीरात्' (which is a पूर्वपक्ष view according to him), as the negation of the departure of the sense, *etc.*, from the *soul*, but no negation from the *body* is rather a strange one, because in the procedure of उत्क्रान्ति which requires that the प्राणs unite with the soul and that the soul then unites with the elements, there is no possibility of the प्राणs leaving the body unless they do so by *accompanying* the soul. Moreover, as we have shown, 'शारीरात्' is an explanation of the Sūtrakāra for 'तस्य' in the Śruti and the Sūtrakāra seems to have no intention of suggesting that the senses depart from the body. The प्राणs do not depart from the soul, not because the Śruti says so, but because they cannot. Of course, Śaṅkara makes it a पूर्वपक्ष argument, but even then it cannot be so absurd; it must have an apparently possible meaning.

The शाखान्तरवाक्य which Śaṅkara quotes in order to support his interpretation of शारीरात् is in fact not considered by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtra 12, but it is referred to in Sūtra 13.

Sūtra 13.

7. स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्—The Sūtrakāra supports his explanation of तस्य in 'न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति'. He has explained तस्य as शारीरात्. He holds that तस्य being a genetive form is not a clear form, because it can be interpreted as implying various relations. So, he refers to the ablative form in the School of the माध्यन्दिनs *viz.*, न तस्मात्प्राणा ह्युत्क्रामन्ति. This ablative form makes it clear that तस्य in the काण्व recension is to be understood as तस्मात्.

8. 'एकेषाम्' shows that the Sūtrakāra refers to the text of other Branch of the Veda than the one referred to in Sūtra 12.

9. Śaṅkara unnecessarily quotes the माध्यन्दिन text under Sūtra 12. The result of that attitude is that एकेषाम् in Sūtra 13 is also taken by him to refer to the *same* Branch as in Sūtra 12, because in the latter the विषयवाक्य is Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 6 and in Sūtra 13 it is Bṛ. Upa. III. 2. 11, thus the विषयवाक्यs in both the Sūtras are from the same Branch of the Veda. This is inconsistent with the sense of एकेषाम् in the Sūtras.

Moreover, Śaṅkara does not interpret Sūtra 13 as supporting Sūtra 12, as is required by 'हि' in Sūtra 13; but according to him Sūtra 13 is meant to be the सिद्धान्तसूत्र and to deny the view established in Sūtra 12. We have already shown above (See Note on Sūtra 12) that Sūtra 13 gives one more argument for the conclusion 'न शारीरात्' in Sūtra 12. There is no 'न' in Sūtra 13, though Śaṅkara mentions it in his commentary. To take 'न' as understood is undoubtedly very dangerous to a correct interpretation of the Sūtra.

Śaṅkara supports his position in Sūtras 12–13 by interpreting अस्मात् and सः in Bṛ. Upa. III. 2. 11 as referring to the body and not to the soul, though (1) according to the question (यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते उद्स्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो नेति), the पुरुष is distinctly the topic of discussion, and is referred to by अस्मात्, and (2) though 'सः' should be taken as a reference to the same पुरुष, उच्छ्वास and आध्मान which primarily belong to the body being secondarily attributed to him. The argument that "देहादुत्क्रान्तिः प्राप्ता न देहिनः" is not correct because when the प्राणs depart from the body, they *have* to depart from the soul inasmuch as at the time of the soul's उत्क्रान्ति the प्राणs lie united with (or having restored to) the soul through the mind and the vital airs, so that if the प्राणs at all depart, they can do so only from the soul, otherwise the soul keeps them within himself when he comes out through the

hundred-and-first artery (Sūtra 17). The Śruti also expressly mentions the पुरुष who is referred to by 'अस्मात्'. Also in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2 'तम्' is a clear reference to the soul. As regards Śaṅkara's argument that Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2 refers to the अविद्वान्, see Sūtra III. 4. 11, and Śaṅkara's commentary on it. The Sūtrakāra takes that Śruti as referring to the विद्वान् and the 'कर्मन्' only as referring to the अविद्वान्. This is the विभाग of विद्या and कर्मन् mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2. So, it is not correct to say or at least to hold the Sūtrakāra to have believed that Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2 refers only to the अविद्वान्. The question of उपपत्ति *i. e.*, the reasonableness of the उत्क्रान्ति and गति of one who knows Brahman is not always identical with that of the interpretation of the text itself because उपपत्ति may differ according to the argumentator.

Sūtra 14

9. The Sūtrakāra quoted a Śruti in his favour in the preceding Sūtra. Here he quotes a Smṛti which says that at the time of the departure of one who knows Brahman the प्राणs remain with the soul. Such a Smṛti would be the following :—

सर्वद्वाराणि संयम्य मनो हृदि निरुध्य च ।
मूर्ध्न्याधायात्मनः प्राणमास्थितो योगधारणाम् ॥
ओमित्येकाक्षरं ब्रह्म व्याहरन्मामनुस्मरन् ।
यः प्रयाति त्यजन्देहं स याति परमां गतिम् ॥ (Bha. Gī. VIII. 12–13).

In this Smṛti the senses and the breath are said to be with the individual soul in the body at the time of the departure of the knower of Brahman. Thus, this Smṛti is referred to in Sūtra 14 to show that the प्राणs do not depart from the *knower* of Brahman at the time of उत्क्रान्ति.

10. According to Śaṅkara a Smṛti from the Mahābhārata stating the absence of गति and उत्क्रान्ति in the case of a knower of Brahman is referred to by the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra. This interpretation regarding the nature of the Smṛti meant by the

Sūtrakāra depends upon the interpretation of Sūtra 13 and therefore what we have said on the subject in Sūtra 13 applies to Sūtra 14 also. In fact, a Smṛti supporting the absence of the departure of the प्राणs from the soul seeking absolute immortality is referred to by the Sūtrakāra. There is no discussion of the गति of the knower of Brahman here. As Śaṅkara himself says, the गतिश्रुतिs are discussed later on (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7).

SECTION II

The Union with the Supreme One in the heart.

Sūtra IV. 2. 15

(१५) तानि परे तथा ह्याह ।

TRANSLATION

THOSE elements [with which the soul has united, mix] with the Supreme One [present in the heart of the knower], because so says the Śruti. 15

NOTES

Sūtra 15

1. In the preceding Adhikaraṇa (Sūtras 7–14), it was stated that the उत्क्रान्ति described in Sūtras 1–6 is the same also *after* the attainment of absolute immortality. In this Sūtra (15) the Sūtrakāra describes what happens after the common उत्क्रान्ति upto that of the भूतs has taken place.

2. 'तानि' refers to भूतानि in Sūtras 5–6. After the individual soul resorts to or unites with the elements (Sūtras 4, 5), those elements unite with the Supreme Being (पर).

3. तथा ह्याह-(1) तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्। (Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2);
(2) कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति।
(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7).

4. पर—The Para is the Supreme One called परा देवता in Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 2, and 'पर अव्यय' in Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7. This Para is the Supreme Being *presnt in the human heart.* It is the process of उत्क्रान्ति which is described here and it takes place *in the body.* 'पर' meant by the Sūtrakāra is the Supreme Being *residing in the heart.* Sūtra 17 is a proof of this. तत् in 'तदोकः' refers to पर and that Sūtra (17) describes what happens further after the union of the elements (in which the individual soul is sheltering itself) with the Supreme Being in the heart takes place. Thus, the context of the Sūtras makes it quite clear that पर in Sūtra 15 means *the Supreme One in the heart* of the seeker of absolution. The Bṛ. Upa. Śruti (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 1) which is referred to in Sūtra 17 also helps us in this respect. The soul, it says, together with the elements (in which that of the Light predominates) proceeds to the heart itself and then we are told that it unites (एकीभवति), *i. e.,* it unites with the Supreme Being

in the heart, and finally the soul comes out from the body through the hundred-and-first artery and joins with the rays of the Sun. All this shows that पर in Sūtra 15 is the Sūpreme One in the heart.

Also the Śrutis seem to us to be clear on this point. Thus, Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1 (तस्य यावन्न वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायां तावज्जानाति ।) says that the departing soul is able to know and recognise his relatives as long as the elements (Sūtras 5–6) do not unite with the Supreme Deity called पर in Sūtra (15); this shows that the Deity is the Deity present in the heart. As distinguished from this Śruti we have another Chā. Upa. Śruti *viz.*, एवमेवैष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते । (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3). This Śruti does not deal with the problem of उत्क्रान्ति, but it tells us what happens after the soul having been carried to the Supreme Light by the Carrier (आतिवाहिक) on the end of the Path of gods unites with that परं ज्योतिः and reappears in its *own* form. The Sūtras also are clear. Sūtras IV. 2. 15 and 17 deal with the union of the elements (with which the soul has united) with the Para in the heart, while Sūtras IV. 4. 1–4 discuss the union of only the soul with the Supreme One at the end of the journey on the Path of gods. One more point is that when during the उत्क्रान्ति the elements with the soul unite with the Para in the heart, the Para helps the soul in coming out of the body and the subtle elements do not leave the body [but are burnt therein (?)]; while when after the उत्क्रान्ति the soul unites with the Para, the former resumes its own form and reappears with that form.

5. Śaṅkara does not seem to notice the fact that तानि refers to the elements *with which the individual soul has united* (Sūtras 5–6). His interpretation of Sūtras 7–14 seems to have led him to give up the link between Sūtras 5–6 and Sūtra 15. Thus, indirectly his explanation of Sūtra 15 supports the interpretation of Sūtras 7–14 suggested by us.

Śaṅkara takes तानि as the senses and the elements of the soul who has attained absolute immortality according to his view of Sūtras 12–14. Thus, in his view 'तानि' does not mean the elements to which the soul has resorted or with which the soul has united, but only the parts of the body of the knower of Brahman. Thus, तानि means, according to him, even the *gross* elements of the body. By तथा ह्याह Śaṅkara does not refer to those Śrutis which mention the उत्क्रान्ति-process and in which it is stated that the soul with the subtle elements unites with the Supreme One in the heart at the time of the departure from the body. Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 *a–b* quoted by Śaṅkara mentions the disposal of the *gross* body of the knower of Brahman. But according to the Sūtrakāra the destruction of the gross body does not lead to the destruction of the subtle body (Sūtra 10); so, even when the gross body of the knower of Brahman is destroyed by the dissolution of the gross elements, the disposal of his subtle elements and senses yet remains to be explained. Another point is that even in the case of the knower of Brahman the gross elements of the gross body do not unite with or do not return to the Supreme One, but, as in the case of those of the ignorant, they return to the gross elements of Nature from which they were derived. This is clear from the Śrutis dealing with that problem, *e. g.*, Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 a–b and also from the fact that an objection is raised on this very point in Śaṅkara's commentary itself. The latter half of Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 c–d (कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति।) which is not considered by Śaṅkara along with Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 a–b which he quotes, solves the problem, because that latter half states that the senses and the soul unite with the Supreme Unchanging One. As to the Praśna Upa. Śruti (VI. 5.) quoted by Śaṅkara, the sixteen parts† (कलाs) would

† *Cf.* also Chā. Upa. VI. 7 where षोडश कला: means the sixteen subtle parts, not the gross parts.

mean the five senses of knowledge, the mind, the five vital airs and the five subtle elements; and so, that Śruti describes the union of the subtle elements (with which the individual soul is already united) with the Para in the heart; also the first part of Pra. Upa. VI. 5 which corresponds to Mu. Upa. III. 2. 8 proves that the latter part of Pra. Upa. VI. 5. corresponds to Mu. Upa. III. 7 *c–d.* Thus, the Śrutis distinguish between the subtle parts of the body which accompany the soul even after the attainment of (absolute) immortality and mix with the Para in the heart and the gross parts of the body which the knower as well as the ignorant leave behind them and which return to the corresponding parts in Nature. Therefore, it is not correct that Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 *a–b* refers to व्यवहार 'comparative reality', while Pra. Upa. VI. 5 refers to the absolutely real and is meant for the right knowledge of the knower of Brahman. It is not that both the gross and subtle parts of the body of the knower of Brahman become united with Brahman in the heart. Śaṅkara has also not noticed the important point that the Para in the Sūtra is the Para in the heart. The fact that the Para in the heart is meant in Sūtra 15 is also another proof that तानि means only the subtle elements with which the soul has united.

SECTION III

The Nature of the Union: Non-Separation.

Sūtra IV. 2. 16

(१६) अविभागो वचनात् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE union of the senses, the mind, the breath, the soul, the elements is of the nature of] non-separation, because of the express statement. 16

NOTES

Sūtra 16

1. **अविभागः**—This word explains the meaning of

   (*a*) **संपत्ति** "the union" expressed in such Śrutis as **वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्,**

   (*b*) **एकीभाव** 'unification' *e. g.*, in **कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवन्ति।** (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7 *c–d*); also **एकीभवति न पश्यति......**(Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2), and

   (*c*) **अस्तंगमन** *e. g.*, **एवमेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमाः षोडश कलाः पुरुषायणाः पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छन्ति।** (Pra. Upa. VI. 5).

Thus, **अविभाग** explains all these different expressions used to denote the union of the subtle parts and the soul of the knower of Brahman with one another and with the Supreme One ultimately.

2. **वचनात्**—This word gives us an idea regarding the Śruti to which '**अविभाग**' refers. '**वचनात्**' means that the Sūtrakāra refers to a Śruti in which **अविभाग** is expressly mentioned. Such a Śruti is Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 23-30 *viz.*, **यद्वै तन्न पश्यति पश्यन्वै तन्न पश्यति न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वान्न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तं यत्पश्येत्।** *etc., etc.* Śaṅkara does not quote this Śruti under Sūtra IV. 2. 16, but he does so under Sūtra IV. 4. 4 (**अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात्।**), though in that Sūtra the argument is "**दृष्टत्वात्**".

Thus, '**विभाग**' means the distinction of being a second entity (**द्वितीयम्......ततोऽन्यद्विभक्तम्**); so **अविभाग** or 'non-separation' means that there is no numerical duality. **अविभाग** is therefore numerical unity. Thus, **एकीभाव, संपत्ति,** and all such words mean 'union' as distinguished from absolute dissolution or complete fusion (**प्रलय**) and disunion or duality (**विभाग**).

This is the meaning of संपत्ति in all its references. Thus, the union of वाच् with the mind is also a union or combination, and not a fusion or dissolution or dualism. This also proves that the senses themselves unite with the mind, and not their functions. Similarly we have to explain the union of the mind with the breath, that of the breath with the soul, that of the soul with the elements and that of these elements with the Para.

3. Śaṅkara takes this Sūtra (16) as explaining only the union (संपत्ति) of the gross and subtle parts of the knower of Brahman with Brahman outside the body. But to us it seems to explain all the unions, as explained above, which take place during the departure of the subtle body and the soul of the knower of Brahman and also that of the subtle elements with the Para in the heart. The Sūtrakāra wanted to explain all the various terms like संपत्ति, एकीभाव, अस्तंगमन, *etc.*, by the word अविभाग, not to remove the fault of विभागापत्ति and establish absolute dissolution. The word 'वचनात्' suggests a reference to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 23-30 rather than to Pra. Upa. VI. 5, as already noticed. For अविभाग the Sūtrakāra depends upon the word expressive of it, rather than on the argument given by Śaṅkara in addition to a quotation.

SECTION IV

Departure of the Soul from the Body through the hundred-and-first Artery.

Sūtra IV. 2. 17

(१७) तदोकोऽग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात्तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतः शताधिकया ।

TRANSLATION

[THEN there is] the burning of the top of the residence of that [Supreme Being]. The gate [of the soul for his departure] is brightened by that [burning]. Being graced by the One residing in the heart due to the power of his knowledge of Brahman and due to his remembering [Brahman which is] the goal to which that knowledge is subordinate, [the soul comes out from the body] through the hundred-and-first artery. 17

NOTES

Sūtra 17

1. As already said, Sūtra 15 explained how the elements, with which the Soul has already united, uuites with the Para. How this final union (संपत्ति) takes place is to be explained now. First of all the Sūtrakāra tells us how the उत्क्रान्ति begun in Sūtras 1–6 completes itself, *i. e.*, what happens after the soul is united with the elements.

2. It is clear that ' तदोकोग्रज्वलनम् ' refers to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2, *viz.*, तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति चक्षुष्टो वा मूर्ध्नो वाऽन्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यस्तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति प्राणमनूत्क्रामन्तं सर्वे प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति ।

In Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 1 we are told that the soul taking with him the subtle elements (तेजोमात्राः) approaches the heart, and we have already shown on the strength of Chā. Upa. VI. 15. 1 (तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्) and other Śruti texts and the Brahma-sūtras and also on other grounds that the subtle elements with which the soul has united, unite further with the Supreme One in the heart. तत् in तदोकः refers to the Para with which the elements unite (Sūtra 15), and तदोकः ' the residence of the Para ' means the heart. This also shows that the Para in Sūtra 15 is the Para *in the heart.* The shining of the top of the heart is described in the Śruti referred to by the Sūtra (तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते ।).

3. तत्प्रकाशितद्वारः—The word द्वार refers to the gates from which the soul ultimately leaves the body. In the Śruti, the eye, the head, or any other part of the body is said to be the gate through which the soul of the knower leaves the body. As the soul departs through the hundred-and-first artery and as this artery proceeds from the heart to the head, only those gates to which that artery would lead are meant by the word

द्वार in the Sūtra and by the word शरीरदेश in the Śruti. The Sūtrakāra says that when the soul departs, the door of its departure is brightened by the burning of the top of the heart. *Cf.* तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति ।. The Sūtrakāra follows the Bṛ. Upa. Śruti in not insisting that the soul leaves the body only through the head.

4. विद्यासामर्थ्य—The Śruti in question mentions both विद्या and कर्मन् (तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च ।). The Sūtrakāra has already said that this विद्या is the मुक्तिविद्या and that the विद्या refers to the knower of Brahman and the कर्म refers to one who does not know Brahman and thus, there is a separate scope and function of each of the two (Bra. Sū. III. 4. 11). Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. III. 4. 11 differs from the Sūtrakāra on this point.

5. तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगात्–'तच्छेष'–means विद्याशेष and तच्छेषगति is the Path of gods which depends upon the knowledge of Brahman. तच्छेषगति may also mean the goal in the form of Brahman to whom the knowledge is subsidiary. The knower of Brahman remembers even at the time of his departure Brahman to which his knowledge is subordinate. The Sūtrakāra has said that the fruit in the form of release is obtained by the seeker from the Supreme One (फलमतः उपपत्तेः ।; श्रुतत्वाच्च । Bra. Sū. III. 2. 38, 39). So, the विद्या depends upon the Supreme One in order that its fruit be realized by the knower of the विद्या. The seeker has to remember the Supreme One even during his last moments of departure from the body, (see Bra. Sū. IV. 1. 12). There are hardly any Śrutis asking the seeker to remember the Path of gods to which the knowledge leads; but there are many texts asking him to remember the Supreme One also during his departure from the body.

6. हार्दानुगृहीतः —The विद्या and the remembrance of the Supreme One to whom the विद्या is subordinate get for the knower of Brahman the favour of the Para in the heart.

The Sūtrakāra refers to the favour or the grace of Brahman also in Bra. Sū. III. 4. 38 (विशेषानुग्रहश्च ।).

7. शताधिकया—This is a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6 quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary. The one-hundred-and-first artery starts from the heart and goes up to the head. The knower of Brahman leaves the body through that artery, because going upwards through that alone does a knower of Brahman attain (absolute) immortality (तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृतत्वमेति ।). This also shows that अमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य in Sūtra 7 also refers to absolute immortality.

8. Śaṅkara remarks at the beginning of his commentary on this Sūtra as follows :-समाप्ता प्रासङ्गिकी परविद्यागता चिन्ता । संप्रति त्वपरविद्याविषयामेव चिन्तामनुवर्तयति ।. Thus, he connects Sūtra 17 with Sūtras 1–11. According to him Sūtras 12–16 deal with the absolute reality. As we have shown there is no justification for this interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 12–16 as it involves an interpolation or rather an interruption of the topic begun in Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 1. The direct connection of Sūtra 17 is, according to Śaṅkara, with Sūtra 7, because, he explains Sūtras 8–11 as teaching that the subtle body of a man lasts till liberation is achieved and that its dissolution before that achievement is only partial, not complete.

Śaṅkara takes तत् in तदोकः as referring to the individual soul (विज्ञानात्मा); but, as we have shown, तत् should refer to पर in Sūtra 15, who resides in the heart. The word हार्द supports this interpretation of तदोकः. There are many Sūtras in which this doctrine is taught in the Brahmasūtras.

Śaṅkara adds: समानेऽपि विद्वदविदुषोर्हृदयाग्रप्रद्योतने तत्प्रकाशितद्वारत्वे च मूर्धस्थानादेव विद्वान् निष्क्रामति स्थानान्तरेभ्यस्त्वितरे । कुतः, विद्यासामर्थ्यात्.........तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च । It seems to us that विद्यासामर्थ्यात् and तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगात् are two arguments for the grace of the Para in the heart, and not for the knower of Brahman leaving the body through the head only. The word

'द्वार' is a general term for the gate of departure and the Śrutis in question (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 2, Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 6) do not lay down a rule as expressed by Śaṅkara. The only rule is that the knower leaves the body through the hundred-and-first artery only.

Śaṅkara explains 'अनुगृहीतः' as तद्भावं समापन्नः "who has reached that state", *i. e.*, who has reached the state of Brahman in the heart. As we have shown, the Sūtrakāra believes in the doctrine of the grace of God.

SECTION V

He joins the Rays of the Sun immediately on his Departure.

Sūtras IV. 2. 18–21

(१८) रश्म्यनुसारी ।

(१९) निशि नेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वाद् दर्शयति च ।

(२०) अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ।

(२१) योगिनः प्रति च स्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते ।

इति चतुर्थाध्यायस्य द्वितीयः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

[HE comes out from the body] following the rays of the Sun. 18

[If it be argued], " Not, [if he dies] at night," we reply, " No, because the connection [of the rays with the artery] lasts as long as [the soul is in] the body, [or, because the connection (of the Brahmajñānin with the rays) is possible when (the soul is in) the body]," and the Śruti shows it. 19

And hence [he comes out from the body following the rays of the sun] also in the Southern gait of the sun. 20

And there is a Smṛti text with regard to Yogins and those two [Paths mentioned there] are sanctioned by the Smṛti [only]. 21

NOTES

Sūtra 18

1. रश्म्यनुसारी — This is undoubtedly a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 5, *viz.*, अथ यत्रैतदस्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रामत्यथैतैरेव रश्मिभिरूर्ध्वमाक्रमते स ओमिति वा होद्वामीयते स यावत्क्षिप्येन्मनस्तावदादित्यं गच्छत्येतद्वै खलु लोकद्वारं विदुषां प्रपदनं निरोधोऽविदुषाम् ॥ *Cf.* Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 2. स यदोत्क्रमिष्यन् भवति शुद्धमेवैतन्मण्डलं पश्यति नैनमेते रश्मयः प्रत्यायन्ति ।

It is clearly stated in the Chā. Upa. Śruti that the knower of Brahman goes upwards through the rays of the Sun *when* he departs from the body.

Sūtra 19

2. निशि नेति चेत् — This seems to be a Pūrvapakṣa of the स्मार्तवेदान्तिन्s, the followers of the Gītā. They seem to have argued that at night there are no rays of the Sun and therefore if the knower of Brahman died *at night*, he cannot depart following the rays.

3. संबन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात्—The Sūtrakāra says that the connection of the rays with the hundred-and-first artery exists till the body exists, *i. e.*, as long as the soul is in the body, not only till the Sun is on the horizon. So, the knower of Brahman comes into contact with the rays of the Sun through the artery even at night because the body exists even at night.

4. दर्शयति च — Śaṅkara quotes Chā. Upa. VIII. 6. 2 *viz.*, अमुष्मादादित्यात्प्रतायन्ते ता आसु नाडीषु सृप्ता आभ्यो नाडीभ्यः प्रतायन्ते तेऽमुष्मिन्नादित्ये सृप्ताः । But this verse does not seem to refer to the body at all, though the नाडीs which are connected with the body as a part of the body are mentioned. Perhaps, Bṛ. Upa. V. 5. 2 is the Sruti intended by the Sūtrakāra *viz.*,

य एष एतस्मिन्मण्डले पुरुषो यश्चायं दक्षिणेऽक्षन्पुरुषस्तावेतावन्योन्यस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितौ रश्मिभिरेषोऽस्मिन् प्रतिष्ठितः प्राणैरयममुष्मिन् स यदोत्क्रमिष्यन् भवति शुद्धमेवैतन्मण्डलं पश्यति नैनमेते रश्मयः प्रत्यायन्ति ॥ In this Śruti it is stated that the individual soul is connected with the Solar orb through the vital airs. From this we may conclude that the connection between the rays and the artery lasts till the soul is in the body, and it never ends even during the night.

Sūtra 20

5. अत (एव)–Because the connection of the rays with the artery exists as long as the soul is in the body. अत एव= संबन्धस्य यावद्देहभावित्वात्.

6. अयनेऽपि दक्षिणे — Just as it was argued that at night there was no Sun and therefore the knower cannot unite with the rays at night, similarly it may be argued that during the दक्षिणायन the knower cannot come into contact with the Sun, not because there is no Sun during the days of that period, but because the Smṛti says so. To explain the source of the Pūrvapakṣa here, Śaṅkara gives three alternatives: (1) उत्तरायणमरणप्राशस्त्यप्रसिद्धेः (2) भीष्मस्य प्रतीक्षादर्शनात् (3) आपूर्यमाणपक्षाद्यान्षडुदङ्ङेतिमासांस्तान् (छा. उ. ४।१५।५) इति च श्रुतेः. As Śaṅkara himself says, the last argument is a very weak argument, because the Śruti has altogether a different meaning, as explained in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 4. So, it seems to us that it is not the follower of the Śruti who is the opponent here. The opponent is a स्मार्त वेदान्तिन्, a follower of the Gītā, as is made clear by the Sūtrakāra himself in the following Sūtra.

Sūtra 21

7. स्मर्यते—It is the Bhagavadgītā which says that a knower of Brahman who leaves the body at day during the उत्तरायण goes to non-return. (*i. e.*, attains Mokṣa), but if he leaves it during the night, *or* the dark half of the month *or* the दक्षिणायन he returns to the world inspite of his knowledge of Brahman *Cf.*

यत्र काले त्वनावृत्तिमावृत्तिं चैव योगिनः ।
प्रयाता यान्ति तं कालं वक्ष्यामि भरतर्षभ ॥ २३ ॥
अग्निर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्लः षण्मासा उत्तरायणम् ।
तत्र प्रयाता गच्छन्ति ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदो जनाः ॥ २४ ॥
धूमो रात्रिस्तथा कृष्णः षण्मासा दक्षिणायनम् ।
तत्र चान्द्रमसं ज्योति र्योगी प्राप्य निवर्तते ॥ २५ ॥
शुक्लकृष्णे गती ह्येते जगतः शाश्वते मते ।
एकया यात्यनावृत्तिमन्यया वर्तते पुनः ॥ २६ ॥
नैते सृति पार्थ जानन्योगी मुह्यति कश्चन ।
तस्मात्सर्वेषु कालेषु योगयुक्तो भवार्जुन ॥ २७ ॥
(Bha. Gī. VIII. 23–27)

8. योगिनः—The followers of the ध्यानयोग are meant here by the Sūtrakāra. The Bhagavadgītā itself gives an indication to it *e. g.*,

सर्वद्वाराणि संयम्य मनो हृदि निरुध्य च ।
मूर्ध्न्याधायात्मनः प्राणमास्थितो योगधारणाम् ॥ (Bha. Gī. VIII. 12).

See also Bha. Gī. VIII. 10 and 8. So, योगिनः in Bha. Gī. VIII. 23 are the ध्यानयोगिन्s.

9. एते—' These two Paths '. *Cf.*, नैते सृती पार्थ जानन्योगी मुह्यति कश्चन । (Bha. Gī. VIII. 27). In the Śrutis which describe these two Paths, only the knowers of Brahman are meant, and nothing is said about योग.

10. The Sūtrakāra seems to be of the opinion that if a ध्यानयोगिन् knows Brahman, he is, according to the Śruti, entitled to अनावृत्ति even if he dies at night or in the दक्षिणायन. Therefore, he makes a double statement that the Smṛti is for the Yogin and that these two Paths are mentioned only in the Smṛti and have no sanction of the Śruti.

11. Śaṅkara seems to take योगिनः in the sense of all योगिन्s or follower of any Yoga, because he explains एते as 'योगसांख्ये'. As there is the question of Paths and as the Gītā itself refers to the दक्षिणायन and उत्तरायण as Paths, it is,

perhaps, better to explain एते in the Sūtra as the two Paths of the Bhagavadgītā.

The Sūtrakāra seems to understand these two Paths as referring to time only, as said in Bha. Gī. VIII. 23, and on that ground he distinctly calls them Smārta. Śaṅkara, however, tries to give them sanction of the Śruti by asserting that alternately अग्नि, ज्योतिः, अहः, *etc.*, may be interpreted as the *carriers* mentioned in the Śruti instead of as the deities presiding over different periods of time.

CHAPTER VI

SECTION I

The Well-known Devayāna Path begins with the Flame.

Sūtra IV. 3. 1

(१) आर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः ।

TRANSLATION

[THE knower of Brahman leaving the body proceeds on his journey] by the Path beginning with the flame *(arciḥ)* because of its being well-known. 1

NOTES

Sūtra 1

1. In the previous Pāda the process of the departure of the soul from the body in the case of one who has attained immortality has been described. In Sūtra 18 of that Pāda we were told that he leaves the body and proceeds following the rays of the Sun. In this Pāda the Path beginning with the rays is first described and then the nature of the goal of the Path is discussed.

2. The 'ray' (रश्मि) of Sūtra IV. 2. 18 is the same as the flame (अर्चिः) of this Sūtra. Both the words mean 'a ray' and here it means the rays of the Sun. The word 'अर्चिः' occurs in the विषयवाक्य.

3. 'It is well-known' that the knower of Brahman reaches Brahman by the Path the first station on which is the rays of the Sun, as distinguished from the Path which begins with the 'smoke' and which takes the performer of sacrifices to his heaven. (अर्चिरादि is देवयान, धूमादि is पितृयाण). This is the sense of तत्प्रथितेः. The Upaniṣads very frequently mention these, Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5-6, Chā. Upa. V. 10. 1-2, Bṛ. Upa. V. 10, Bṛ Upa. VI. 2. 15, Kau. Upa. 1. 3. Out of all these passages, Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5-6, V. 10. 1-2, and Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 begin the Path with the rays of the Sun (अर्चिः) while Bṛ. Upa. V. 10, VI. 2. 15 and Kau. Upa. I. 3 differ in the description of the Path of gods from the other two passages.

4. If we make a list of the stations from the two identical passages (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5-6, V. 10. 1-2) we get the following order:—

(1) अर्चिः, (2) अहः, (3) आपूर्यमाण पक्ष, (4) यान्षडुदङ्ङेति-मासाꣳस्तान्, (5) संवत्सर, (6) आदित्य, (7) चन्द्रमस्, (8) विद्युत्, and (9) ब्रह्मलोक.

Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 begins the Path with अर्चिः, but adds ' देवलोक ' between मासाः and आदित्य. Bṛ. Upa. V. 10 mentions वायु (लोक), आदित्य, चन्द्रमस् and the लोक which is अशोक and अहिम. Kau. Upa. I. 3 begins the Path with अग्निलोक which is followed by वायुलोक, वरुणलोक, आदित्यलोक, इन्द्रलोक, प्रजापतिलोक and ब्रह्मलोक.

The Sūtrakāra seems to accept Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5–6, V. 10. 1–2 and Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 as the most well-known passages and in Sūtras 2–3 he locates the worlds mentioned in the other passages than these.

SECTION II

Wind, next to the Year.

Sūtra IV. 3. 2

(२) वायुमब्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् ।

TRANSLATION

HE goes to [the world of] the Wind from [the world of] the Year, on account of the difference and identity [between the Chā. Upa. Śruti with the Saṁvatsara and the Bṛ. Upa. Śruti with the Vāyu. 2

NOTES

Sūtra 2

1· The word वायु occurs in Bṛ. Upa. V. 10, *viz.*, यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति, तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचक्रस्य खं, तेन स ऊर्ध्व आक्रमते स आदित्यमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा लम्बरस्य खं, तेन स ऊर्ध्व आक्रमते, स चन्द्रमसमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते......। The word वायुलोक is found in Kau. Upa. I. 3, where the order stands as अग्निलोक, वायुलोक, and वरुणलोक.

2. अविशेषविशेषाभ्याम्—This हेतु seems to us to be applicable only to Bṛ. Upa. V. 10; therefore, that श्रुति only seems to be the विषयवाक्य, and not Kau. Upa. I. 3.

The विषयवाक्य (Bṛ. Upa. V. 10) is such that it has something in common and in difference with the Chā. Upa. Śrutis referred to in Sūtra 1, *viz.*, Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5–6 and V. 10. 1–2. The अविशेष or that in common between Bṛ. Upa. V. 10 and Chā. Upa. V. 10 is the mention of आदित्य in both the passages; so, we must place वायु before आदित्य in any case. The विशेष between the same passages is that the Chā. Upa. Śruti mentions संवत्सर which is not mentioned in Bṛ. Upa. V. 10; therefore, we must place वायु after संवत्सर. Thus, we locate वायु above संवत्सर (and before आदित्य).

The Kau. Upa. Śruti has 'अग्निलोक' which, as Śaṅkara says, can be identical with अर्चिः in the Chā. Upa. Śruti, but that identification does not help us in locating वायुलोक *after* the Year. If we take the Kau. Upa. as the विषयवाक्य, it is not possible to point out its identity and difference with any other Śruti dealing with the same point, particularly with the Chā. Upa. Śruti referred to in Sūtra 1. Śaṅkara's explanation is "स वायुलोक" (कौ० १।३) इत्यत्राविशेषोपदिष्टस्य वायोः श्रुत्यन्तरे विशेषोपदेशो दृश्यते 'यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्प्रैति स वायुमागच्छति...... स आदित्यमागच्छति' (बृ. उ. ५।१०।१) इति.

According to this explanation, the mention of वायु in the Kau. Upa. is without any particulars, but as वायुलोक in that Upaniṣad is preceded by अग्निलोक and followed by वरुणलोक and undoubtedly an order is implied in the list of the worlds because ब्रह्मलोक is mentioned as the last world, how can we say that वायुलोक in Kau. Upa. is not particularized ? Śaṅkara's reply that the Kau. Upa. Śruti gives only पदार्थोपदर्शनमात्र does not seem to be satisfactory. The Bṛ. Upa. Śruti says that he goes to the आदित्यलोक from वायुलोक. Thus, even if we grant that Kau. Upa. text does not aim at giving the names *in order*, while the Bṛ. Upa. does, we can *at most* place वायुलोक before आदित्यलोक; in no case can we place वायुलोक after संवत्सर as is done in the Sūtra. The requirements of the Sūtra would be fulfilled only if we take अविशेष and विशेष as those between the Chā. Upa. Śruti (or any other Śruti) with संवत्सर and another Śruti with वायु. Moreover, " अविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् " would mean that the Sūtrakāra gives *two* arguments, while Śaṅkara's way of interpretation reduces the expression to only *one* argument. ' अविशेष ' cannot mean ' अविशेषोपदिष्ट ', and विशेष cannot mean श्रुत्यन्तरे विशेषोपदेश. Moreover, if we take the Kau. Upa. Śruti as the विषयवाक्य, we may be asked, " Why do you not locate ' वायु ' immediately after अग्नि or अर्चिः ? " We have shown that there is an implication of order in the Kau. Upa. Śruti.

One of the विषयवाक्यs suggested by the Sūtra must in any case contain the word for the year (संवत्सर). Otherwise, वायु cannot be located after the year.

3. Why does the Sūtrakāra use the word अब्द instead of संवत्सर which is found in the विषयवाक्यश्रुति ?

4. We have already shown that Bṛ. Upa. V. 10 is the विषयवाक्य referred to by वायु in the Sūtra rather than Kau. Upa. I. 3.

Śaṅkara tries to show the consistency of Sūtra 2 according to which we have to place वायु (immediately ?) after संवत्सर (and before आदित्य) with Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 in which the knower of Brahman is said to go to आदित्य (directly ?) from देवलोक. Śaṅkara says that after संवत्सर and before वायुलोक followed by आदित्य, we should add देवलोक from Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15, thus making the series as मासाः, संवत्सर, देवलोक, वायुलोक, आदित्यलोक. But it seems to us that the Sūtrakāra does not consider the location of देवलोक, because, perhaps, he does not distinguish देवलोक from some *one* of the worlds preceding आदित्यलोक. It is likely that the Sūtrakāra drops देवलोक, because he has worded Sūtra 2 as if he meant that immediately from संवत्सर one goes to वायुलोक. देवलोक is a very general term and all these worlds are देवलोकs " worlds of gods "; even संवत्सर may be interpreted as a देवलोक. According to Bṛ. Upa. III. 6, the order of the लोकs is as follows:—(आपः and वायुः are elements), अन्तरिक्षलोक, गन्धर्वलोक, आदित्यलोक, चन्द्रलोक, नक्षत्रलोक, देवलोक, इन्द्रलोक, प्रजापतिलोक, ब्रह्मलोक (The last is अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता). Elsewhere the worlds are said to be three, मनुष्यलोक, पितृलोक, and देवलोक (Bṛ. Upa. I. 5. 16). Perhaps all the worlds which the Sūtrakāra does not consider, *e. g.*, अन्तरिक्षलोक, गन्धर्वलोक, नक्षत्रलोक and देवलोक are to be identified with one or the other of the worlds which he considers, *viz.*, those in Chā. Upa. Śruti plus वायु and वरुण (Sūtras 1, 2, 3). According to Tai. Upa. II. 8 the देवलोक seems to be above पितृलोक and इन्द्र seems to be the lord of देवलोक. It is also likely that according to the Sūtrakāra the knower of Brahman does not go to देवलोक at all, just as he does not go to इन्द्रलोक and to प्रजापतिलोक (See note on प्रजापतिलोक on Page 396).

SECTION III

Varuṇa, next to the Lightning.

Sūtra IV. 3. 3

(३) तडिकोऽधि वरुणः सम्बन्धात् ।

TRANSLATION

VARUṆA is above the Lightning, because of the connection of the two. 3

NOTES

Sūtra 3

1. 'तडित्' is used for the word विद्युत् in the Chā. Upa. Śrutis IV. 15. 5-6 and V. 10. 1-2. Why is the synonym substituted for विद्युत् ?

2. वरुण is clearly a reference to Kau. Upa. I. 3. वरुणलोक is not mentioned in the well-known Śruti about the देवयान *viz.*, the Chā. Upa. Śruti. So, the Sūtrakāra adds वरुण to the list in the Chā. Upa.

3. संबन्धात्—His reason for placing वरुण above विद्युत् is the connection between the two, both being associated with waters and वरुण being the Lord of waters (?).

4. The Kau. Upa. Śruti (1. 3.) places वरुणलोक between वायुलोक aud आदित्यलोक, but according to this Sūtra, we should place it after विद्युल्लोक in the Chā. Upa. Śruti.

5. Śaṅkara suggests that above Varuṇa there are Indra and Prajāpati, because (1) there is no other place for them, (2) because Indra and Prajāpati are mentioned in several Upaniṣads *e. g.*, Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. 1, Kau. Upa. I. 3, (3) because Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati being strangers to the Chā. Upa. text should be placed only at the end as there is no special place for them, and (4) because the Lightning is the last station, according to the Chā. Upa. on the Path of gods which begins with the Rays.

We do not think that this suggestion of Śaṅkara is in agreement with the Sūtrakāra's doctrine. From Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7-16 (See below) it seems that Bādari distinguished between Prajāpati and Brahman as two लोकs (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 8), but Bādarāyaṇa, though not absolutely identifying the

two, does not agree with Bādari. We, therefore, suggest that the Sūtrakāra purposely drops इन्द्रलोक and प्रजापतिलोक. He may be identifying प्रजापतिलोक with Brahman and explaining his view about the पुरुष aspect of the Para as the Prajāpatiloka of the Upaniṣads and, therefore, he may have dropped the mention of Prajāpatiloka in the list of the stations on the देवयान. Similarly, इन्द्रलोक would be not different from the सोमलोक where not the ब्रह्मज्ञानिन् but only the अनात्मविद् goes (Bra. Sū. III. 1. 7). It seems to be also for this same reason that the Sūtrakāra does not mention देवलोक as a station on the देवयान, on which (Path) only the ब्रह्मज्ञानिन् proceeds.

Thus, we may conclude that देवलोक, इन्द्रलोक and प्रजापतिलोक have been dropped by the Sūtrakāra because he would identify the former two with चन्द्रमस् or सोमलोक and the last one with ब्रह्मलोक or ब्रह्मन्. The world of the Moon is the goal of those who do not know Atman; the world of Brahman, which is not different from Brahman itself, is according to the Sūtrakāra, the goal of those who know Atman. However, he locates वायु and वरुण because he does not think that these two can be identified with any station mentioned in the अर्चिरादिश्रुति.

6. We do not agree with the view that there was originally a Sūtra like "वरुणादधीन्द्रप्रजापती स्थानान्तराभावात् पाठक्रमाच्च।" (See Rāmānuja and Vallabha). Śaṅkara has (in his *bhāṣya* on Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 2) explained where to locate देवलोक which he thought was not located by the Sūtrakāra; similarly, he seems to locate इन्द्र and प्रजापति in his Commentary on the present Sūtra. Also the language of स्थानान्तराभावात् and पाठक्रमात् is foreign to the Sūtrakāra. Moreover, आगन्तुकत्वादपि *etc.*, is not a Commentary on वरुणादधीन्द्रप्रजापती........., but in all we have here four arguments. In Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 8 and 16, we believe, we have the view of Bādari who distinguished between प्रजापतिलोक and ब्रह्मन् and that of Bādarāyaṇa who did not accept that distinction. On account

of these reasons we do not believe that इन्द्र and प्रजापति should be located by any commentator (About इन्द्र see above).

7. The Sūtrakāra does not mention ब्रह्मलोक, because though it is attained by गति, it is not an ordinary 'world' but it is the Para. In the case of the पुरुष aspect of Brahman he clearly says that " though there is something common between पुरुष and a world, the former is not subject to the fault of लोकापत्ति " (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 51).

SECTION IV

Rays etc, are Conductors.

Sūtras IV. 3. 4–5

(४) आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात् ।

(५) उभयव्यामोहात्तत्सिद्धेः ।

TRANSLATION

[THE Rays, and others, are] conductors, because of a Śruti expressly stating it. 4

Because of the bewilderment of both [the Rays, *etc.*, and the knower of Brahman], the fact [of the Rays, *etc.*, being conductors] is proved. 5

NOTES

Sūtra 4

1. The Sūtrakāra here describes the nature of अर्चिः, अहः, शुक्लः पक्षः, षण्मासाः, संवत्सर, *etc.* He says that these mentioned in the Śrutis of the देवयान are conductors conducting the knower of Brahman on his journey on the Path of gods.

2. 'तल्लिङ्गात्' refers to a definite Śruti in which the rays, *etc.*, are distinctly said to be doing the work of a conductor. Very probably the following Śruti is referred to:—तं नयन्त्येताः सूर्यस्य रश्मयो यत्र देवानां पतिरेकोऽधिवासः। (Mu. Upa. 1. 2. 5). This Śruti is a proof that the rays are conductors, though it may not prove that the performer of sacrifices is conducted by the rays. 'लिङ्ग' is generally used in the Sūtras in the sense of a *direct definite statement* in the Śruti, and not in that of an indirect inference.

3. As it is the question of a knower of Brahman, there is no possibility of रश्मयः, अहः, *etc.*, being भोगभूमयः. By तल्लिङ्ग Śaṅkara refers to Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5 (चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान्ब्रह्म गमयति), and says that from that Śruti we are to infer that in the previous case (rays, day, the bright half) there are *human* conductors, because in the विद्युत् there is said to be a *superhuman* conductor. This does not seem to us to be the sense of 'लिङ्ग'; nor, even according to Śaṅkara, does the Sūtrakāra mean that there are conductors *in* these worlds of rays, *etc.*, but he only says that these rays, *etc.*, are *themselves* conductors.

Sūtra 5

4. If any more proof were wanted, the Sūtrakāra gives us the evidence here. If रश्मिs, अहः, *etc.*, were not conductors, both the रश्मिs, अहः, *etc.*, and the knower of Brahman would

be in bewilderment. Perhaps the bewilderment is due to the absence of any third agency acting as a conductor. The deity of the rays, the day, *etc.*, would not know how to guide the knower of Brahman and the latter, though indeed conscious, would not be at all in possession of the knowledge required for the onward journey. This seems to be the nature of the bewilderment. The fact that the Sūtrakāra speaks of the bewilderment of the rays, the day, *etc.*, shows that he does not at all understand them to be without consciousness.

5. तत्सिद्धेः — Because there is the possibility of both being bewildered in the absence of any conductor, the rays, the day, *etc.*, are proved to be the conductors.

SECTION V

Conductor of the Lightening leads the Jñānin onwards.

Sūtra IV. 3. 6

(६) वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः ।

TRANSLATION

FROM the world of the Lightning [the knower of Brahman is conducted to his destination] by only the conductor belonging to that world, because of a Śruti about it. 6

NOTES

Sūtra 6

1. This Sūtra tells us what conductor takes the knower of Brahman to his destination. The Sūtrakāra says that the conductor belonging to the world of the Lightning takes the knower of Brahman to his destination. This also explains the meaning of 'अमानव' in Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5, Chā. Upa. V. 10. 2, Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15 and clears a doubt that perhaps a conductor in the वरुणलोक (इन्द्रलोक and प्रजापतिलोक not being accepted as being separate लोकs) leads the knower in his journey beyond the world of the Lightning.

2. ततः तच्छ्रुतेः — A conductor who finally conducts the knower of Brahman to Brahman is mentioned in the Śruti *from the world of* the Lightning, and, therefore, the conductor of that world only takes him to Brahman. The Śruti referred to is "चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोऽमानवः स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति" (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5-6; V. 10. 2).

SECTION VI

How far can the Vaidyuta Conductor lead the Knower of Brahman?

Sūtras IV. 3. 7-16

(७) कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ।

(८) विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

(९) सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः ।

(१०) कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात् ।

(११) स्मृतेश्च ।

(१२) परं जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात् ।

(१३) दर्शनाच्च ।

(१४) न च कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसन्धिः ।

(१५) अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथा दोषात्तत्क्रतुश्च ।

(१६) विशेषश्च दर्शयति ।

इति चतुर्थाध्याये तृतीयः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

BĀDARI [holds that the conductor carries the knower of Brahman to a world which is] an effect [of Brahman] because the going of this conductor [to that world only] is appropriate, 7

and because [the world which is an effect of Brahman is] distinguished [from that of Brahman]. 8

But, the designation of ' Brahman ' [is given in some Śrutis to the destination where the conductor takes him] on account of its vicinity. 9

On the destruction of the effect [the knower of Brahman goes] further than this effect along with its governor, because it is said so in the Śruti, 10

and because of the Smṛti. 11

Jaimini holds that the conductor carries [the knower of Brahman] to the Supreme One, because of its being the chief aspect, 12

and because it is shown in the Śruti [that the knower is bound for the chief aspect], 13

and there is no intention for the knowledge of the effect. 14

Bādarāyaṇa holds that [the conductor] carries those who do not resort to the Symbol [Om] because there is no fault in either case; and the knower of Brahman has made a specific thought for It, 15

and the Śruti shows the difference between the ' effect ' and the Supreme One. 16

NOTES

Sūtra 7

1. It seems that Sūtras 7–16 form one Adhikaraṇa. Bādarāyaṇa's view is given in Sūtra 15, and generally in the Sūtras his view is given when also those of others from whom he differs are given. Moreover, उभयथा in Sūtra 15 seems to be a reference to the two views expressed in Sūtras 7–11 and 12–14 respectively. The view to take Sūtras 7–14 as one Adhikaraṇa and Sūtras 15–16 as another Adhikaraṇa is a view older even than Śaṅkara's, as we learn from a discussion about it given by Śaṅkara in his commentary. But Rāmānuja takes all these Sūtras (7–16) as forming one Adhikaraṇa.

2. The discussion in Sūtras 7–9 seems to be on 'स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति' (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5) as Śaṅkara rightly points out. Bādari holds that the conductor from the world of the Lightning carries the people to a world which is an effect of Brahman, created by Brahman, *viz.*, प्रजापतिलोक.

3. 'अस्य' in the Sūtra seems to us to refer to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक mentioned in the preceding Sūtra (IV. 3. 6). This conductor is not a knower of Brahman and, therefore, argues Bādari, he can go upto कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक only, he cannot go to पर ब्रह्मन्.

4. अस्य गत्युपपत्तेः—Because the conductor can only go upto कार्य, 'ब्रह्मन्' in "स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति" (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5) and 'ब्रह्मलोकान्' in "ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति" (Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15) mean प्रजापतिलोक or कार्य of Brahman. The conductor cannot go to कारण or पर and therefore he cannot carry the knower of Brahman to पर.

5. As वैद्युत आतिवाहिक is said to be the carrier or conductor of the knower of Brahman in the preceding Sūtra and as the nature of the destination of the journey with him is not

mentioned as yet, we believe that Sūtra 7 begins the discussion of the question: " Where does the conductor carry the knower of Brahman ? " This is a different question from that of " What is the nature of *Mukti* or where does the Brahmajñānin go in the state of emancipation ? " The आतिवाहिक being himself not entitled to go to the ब्रह्मलोक or ब्रह्मन् cannot take the knower of Brahman there, while the Śrutis say that he takes the *jñānin* to Brahman; thus, a discussion arose on this question. But as regards the conception of *Mukti*, all the three thinkers, Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa seem to have held the same view, *viz.*, that the knower of Brahman *goes* to the Para which is higher than the कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक, in the state of liberation and that having gone there the original form of the soul becomes manifest. All of them agreed to call this manifestation of the original form of the soul ' *Mukti* ' (Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1–2). The अर्चिरादिका श्रुति does not say that the emancipation is attained when the soul knowing Brahman reaches the place where the आतिवाहिक can take him. From these Sūtras (7–16) it seems clear that all these three thinkers agreed that reaching the Para was the goal, (see पर in Sūtras 10, 12) and that reaching the कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक was not the goal. None of these Sūtras shows that any doubt about this was ever raised. They differed only as to *where* or *how far* the conductor could carry the knower of Brahman. That this is the topic in Sūtra IV. 3. 7–16 is clear from अस्य being a reference to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक mentioned in Sūtra 6 and also नयति in Sūtra 15 being a reference to the same आतिवाहिक. Beyond the प्रजापतिलोक the आतिवाहिक could not carry the ब्रह्मज्ञानिन्, but प्रजापति or ब्रह्मन् (*m.*) himself accompanied him to परं at the end (प्रलय) of the प्रजापतिलोक, according to Bādari (Sūtra IV. 3. 10).

8. But Śaṅkara takes अस्य in Sūtra 7 as referring to कार्य (instead of to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक) and, therefore he has to explain गति as गन्तव्यता. Why गन्तव्यता of कार्य only is possible ? To

answer this question Śaṅkara gives two reasons :—(1) सर्वगतत्वात् and (2) प्रत्यगात्मत्वात्.

We think that the question of the nature of *Mukti* or, in other words, the question about the impossibility of the Para being an object or place to be reached by journey, is not at all discussed here. That question is based upon the two arguments of सर्वगतत्व and प्रत्यगात्मत्व which are not mentioned by Bādari and these arguments are answered by neither Jaimini nor Bādarāyaṇa; but Śaṅkara himself gives the supposed replies to these objections of Bādari in *his commentary* on Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 14 (लोके गतस्यापि गन्तव्यता देशान्तरविशिष्टा दृष्टा........). This leads us to conclude that in the Sūtras we have no discussion of परब्रह्मणः गन्तव्यता or अगन्तव्यता. The only question is whether the *conductor can go* to परब्रह्मन् or to कार्य. गति is the act of going, not गन्तव्यता.

Sūtra 8

7. In the अर्चिरादिश्रुतिs (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5, Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15) the कार्य and परम् are not distinguished. The Sūtrakāra has taken those Śrutis as the authentic text of देवयान (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 1). But in other Śrutis like Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. 1, IV. 3. 31 and Kau. Upa. I. 3 the प्रजापतिलोक is distinguished from the Brahmaloka. The Sūtrakāra did not mention प्रजापतिलोक in the list of the stations on the देवयान given in Sūtras IV. 3. 1–3, because it was to be indirectly discussed here (Sūtras IV. 3. 7–16). Bādari seems to refer to the Śrutis where प्रजापतिलोक and ब्रह्मलोक are distinguished and most probably to Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. 1 (कस्मिन्नु खलु प्रजापतिलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ब्रह्मलोकेषु गार्गीति कस्मिन्नु खलु ब्रह्मलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्च इति स होवाच गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीर्मा ते मूर्धा व्यपप्तदनतिप्रश्न्यां वै देवतामतिपृच्छसि गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीरिति ततो ह गार्गी वाचक्नव्युपरराम ।). The कार्य and पर are distinguished in this Śruti; ब्रह्मलोक is the पर, प्रजापतिलोक is the कार्य. Beyond प्रजापतिलोक, there is ब्रह्मलोक, but beyond this latter there is no *loka*. So, Bādari seems to mean that the conductor can go to and, therefore, can lead the knower

of Brahman to only the Prajāpatiloka, though this *loka* is not mentioned in the अर्चिरादिका श्रुति.

8. Śaṅkara refers विशेषितत्व to the *plural number* of ब्रह्मलोक in 'ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति' (Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15). But, rather he ought to have taken it as referring to the word लोक in that Śruti, which is absent in Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5. In fact the *plural number* is also used in the case of अन्तरिक्षलोक, गन्धर्वलोक, आदित्यलोक, चन्द्रलोक, नक्षत्रलोक, देवलोक, इन्द्रलोक, प्रजापतिलोक and ब्रह्मलोक in Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. The विशेषितत्व cannot also be explained as referring to the word लोक in ब्रह्मलोकान् because to Bādari, Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa there was no difference between ब्रह्मन् and ब्रह्मलोक so long as 'गमयति' was used along with them. Sūtra 8 rather refers to a distinction between कार्य and पर or कारण and that suggests a reference to Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. 1 where ब्रह्मलोक is said to be 'अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता' and the प्रजापतिलोक is traced to it.

Sūtra 9

9. Since Bādari believes that the conductor can take the knower of Brahman only to the प्रजापतिलोक, he has got to explain why the अर्चिरादि श्रुति says that he takes the ब्रह्मज्ञानिन् to ब्रह्मन् or ब्रह्मलोक the पर. So, in this Sūtra he says that ब्रह्मन् or ब्रह्मलोक is *very near* प्रजापतिलोक and, therefore, though really the conductor takes ब्रह्मज्ञानिन् to प्रजापतिलोक, the Śruti says that he takes him to ब्रह्मलोक the पर.

10. तु is intended to refute the view that the conductor can take or takes the knower of Brahman to the Para.

11. Śaṅkara seems to take सामीप्य in a metaphorical sense. We think, it really refers to the view of Bādari and others that ब्रह्मलोक or पर is *near* प्रजापतिलोक. In the next Sūtra, Bādari says that on the dissolution of the कार्य the knower of Brahman goes to ब्रह्मलोक which is *higher* than this. In Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 17, the Sūtrakāra says that the form of the

liberated is devoid of the dealings of the world because it is *remote* from the world (जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।).

According to Śaṅkara, the सगुणब्रह्मन् (of his School) is very *near* the निर्गुणब्रह्मन् and therefore the expression ब्रह्मन् is used in स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 5), instead of ब्रह्मलोक or प्रजापतिलोक. (For Śaṅkara's explanation of this Sūtra, see Śā. Bhā. on Bra. Sū. I. 2. 1 where Chā. Upa. III. 14. 1–2 is discussed.)

Sūtra 10

12. This Sūtra tells us how those who are carried by the conductor to कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक would be carried further to the पर.

13. Instead of any conductor, the governor of the कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक accompanies the knower of Brahman to the Para. The knower of Brahman *goes to the Para* from the Prajāpatiloka on the dissolution of the latter. This is Bādari's reply to the question who will take the knower of Brahman to the Para if not the conductor.

14. अभिधानात्—This argument is also given by the Sūtrakāra in other Sūtras. It means that there is a Śruti *expressing* the statement, here a Śruti expressively stating that the knowers of Brahman (who are in a world *produced* by Brahman) *are released* on the destruction of that world. Such a Śruti is possibly the following:—

वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः सन्न्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे॥

(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7)

The word " परस्यान्ते " occurs also in the Smṛti quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentary on Sūtra 11. Perhaps from this verse Bādari infers that the knowers of Brahman go to a world which is an effect of Brahman and gain liberation at the time of its destruction.

15. Śaṅkara argues that Sūtra 10 is Bādari's reply to a doubt based upon the अनावृत्तिश्रुतिs. We believe, it is Bādari's reply to a probable question, *viz.*, who will carry the knower of Brahman to the Para, if not the conductor, and when. Going to the प्रजापतिलोक is no *Mukti*, not even क्रममुक्ति; because for *Mukti* it is necessary to go to the ब्रह्मलोक. In fact, अनावृत्तिश्रुति has another meaning and it is not in conflict with Bādari's view that *the conductor can take* the knower only to the कार्य. There is no reply to this so-called argument (in Sūtra 10) of Bādari based on अनावृत्तिश्रुति, in Jaimini's arguments; and the अनावृत्तिश्रुतिs are in fact discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 22.

Śaṅkara takes अभिधानात् as referring to the अनावृत्तिश्रुतिs, but in those Śrutis there is no mention of कार्यात्यय, तदध्यक्ष or अतः परम्. Besides, the अनावृत्तिश्रुतिs, as discussed in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 22, have a different meaning according to the Sūtrakāra.

Śaṅkara adds that in the कार्यलोक the individual soul carried there by the conductor gets right knowledge (तत्रैवोत्पन्नदर्शनाः). But in fact, there is no such suggestion in the Sūtra. Bādari believes and Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa agree with him that it is *the knower of Brahman* whom the conductor carries to a place where the latter can carry him.

Śaṅkara connects Sūtra IV. 3. 10 with Sūtra IV. 4. 22. We think, the Sūtrakāra does not intend any such connection (See our notes on IV. 4. 22).

Thus, Sūtra IV. 3. 10 does not prove Śaṅkara's conclusion that it is impossible *to go* to the Para.

Sūtra 11

16. A Smṛti like the one quoted by Śaṅkara is meant by the Sūtra. But Bādari refers to it to show that *it is in company of Brahman* or Prajāpati the Governor of the कार्य that the conductor takes them to the Para.

17. Śaṅkara says, "तस्मात्कार्यब्रह्मविषया गतिः श्रूयते ". This is correct only so far as Bādari's view about the गति of the आतिवाहिक is concerned. But Bādari's view about the गति of ब्रह्मज्ञानिन्s is that they *go* to the Para *along with* Prajāpati. He does not say that the Para is not an object of गति. He only says that the आतिवाहिक cannot go to the Para.

Sūtra 12

18. Jaimini believes that the conductor takes the knower of Brahman to the Para, according to "स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति" (Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 6). We should connect " परम् " in the Sūtra with गमयति in the विषयवाक्य.

19. मुख्यत्वात्—We think, this word मुख्य corresponds to the word प्रधान in Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14 (अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात्) and in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11 (आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य) as also in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 43 (प्रधानवदेव तदुक्तम्-*v. l.*). Jaimini says that ब्रह्मन् in स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति is the chief aspect of the Supreme One and therefore the conductor takes the knower of Brahman to the Para and not to कार्य. Bādari also agrees that ब्रह्मन् in this Śruti is the Para (See Sūtra IV. 3. 9).

20. Śaṅkara takes मुख्य in the sense of 'primary *sense*' (ब्रह्मशब्दस्य मुख्यमालम्बनम्). We think, 'मुख्य' is here used for 'प्रधान', because the two are synonyms. The Sūtra is not worded as मुख्यार्थत्वात् or मुख्यालम्बनत्वात्.

Moreover, according to Śaṅkara, Jaimini's view is a Pūrvapakṣa and Bādari's is the Siddhānta. We have already said that Bādarāyaṇa's view mentioned in Sūtras 15–16 is the Siddhānta, and consequently the views of both Bādari and Jaimini are in a sense Pūrvapakṣas.

Sūtra 13

21. A Śruti in which the knower of Brahman is described as going to or attaining the Para the Supreme One is here meant. Such a Śruti is "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्"। (Tai. Upa. II. 1),

and also 'परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते' (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 2), पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः (Ka. Upa. III. 11), परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 8), परमेवाक्षरं प्रतिपद्यते (Pra. Upa. IV. 10), तमोंकारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान् यत्तच्छान्तमजरममृतमभयं परं चेति (Pra. Upa. V. 7). On the strength of these Śrutis Jaimini argues that the *conductor takes* the knower of Brahman to the Para. In these Śrutis it is clearly stated that the ब्रह्मज्ञानिन् goes to or attains the Para and in Chā. Upa. IV. 15. 6 it is stated that he is led by an आतिवाहिक; so Jaimini concludes that the carrier takes the knower of Brahman to the Para.

22. Śaṅkara does not quote any Śruti in which the Para is said to be the goal reached by the knower of Brahman, and, as usual, does not notice the context that here the question is as to *where the conductor can take* the knower of Brahman.

Sūtra 14

23. Jaimini argues that the knower of Brahman does not aim (अभिसंधि) at *knowing* कार्य (प्रतिपत्ति). So, the conductor must be supposed to take him to the Para and not to the कार्य. Jaimini draws attention to the fact that Śrutis like Tai. Upa. II. 1, Chā. Upa. VI. 2, ask or advise a man to know the Para, and not the कार्य or प्रजापतिलोक.

24. Śaṅkara takes 'प्रतिपत्ति' in the sense of 'entering,' but the Sūtrakāra uses the word in the sense of 'knowledge' (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 27). And in the preceding Sūtra the Sūtrakāra already refers to such Śrutis as state that the *goal* of the seeker of liberation is the Para. So, we think, in this Sūtra the *object* of the knowledge of the seeker is used as an argument to prove that the conductor takes the man to the Para.

25. Śaṅkara's arguments that Jaimini's view, though mentioned second should be taken as a Pūrvapakṣa and that Bādari's view, though stated first should be regarded as the Siddhānta do not seem to us to be convincing, because

Bādarāyaṇa's view given in Sūtras 15–16 seems to us to be the Siddhānta.

26. Śaṅkara mentions an interpretation of these Sūtras by a predecessor of his, who took Sūtras 7–11 as the Sūtras of the Pūrvapakṣa and Sūtras 12–14 as those of the Siddhānta. We think, this predecessor had no correct reading of the Adhikaraṇa, which, we believe, consists of Sūtras 7–16. Moreover, the predecessor also thinks that गति means गन्तव्यता and अस्य means कार्यस्य in Sūtra 7, just as Śaṅkara believes. For this reason we are led to think that this predecessor had no correct account of the traditional interpretation of these Sūtras.

Śaṅkara's other arguments like (1) प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः, (2) विशेषनिराकरणश्रुतीनामनन्यार्थत्वात्, (3) उत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनामेकत्वप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्, (4) उत्पत्त्यादिश्रुतीनां शेषत्वं न पुनरितरशेषत्वमितरासाम्, *etc.*, *etc.*, are neither expressly nor implicitly meant in these Sūtras.

One can hardly agree with Śaṅkara's view about the introduction of Jaimini's opinion in the Brahmasūtras, *viz.*, "तस्मात्कार्यं बादरिः (ब्र. सू. ४।३।७) इत्येष एव स्थितः पक्षः। 'परं जैमिनिः' (ब्र. सू. ४।३।१२) इति तु पक्षान्तरप्रतिभानमात्रप्रदर्शनं प्रज्ञाविकासनायेति द्रष्टव्यम्।".

Sūtra 15

27. As we have already stated, Sūtras 15–16 form a part of the same Adhikaraṇa as Sūtras 7–14. Sūtras 7–11 and 12–14 gave respectively the views of Bādari and Jaimini; now Sūtras 15–16 give that of Bādarāyaṇa.

28. We have said that the topic of this Adhikaraṇa is, where the conductor can take the knower of Brahman, because अस्य in Sūtra 7 seems to us to refer to the वैद्युत आतिवाहिक in Sūtra 6. Also नयति in Sūtra 15 shows the same.

29. प्रतीकालम्बन—प्रतीकs of Brahman are the symbols under which Brahman is meditated upon, *e. g.*, the Syllable Om,

the Sun, the Name, *etc.*, *etc.* The result of the meditation on the Pratīkas is either some worldly enrichment (*Cf.* Chā. Upa. VII. 1–14) and the result of the meditation on the Syllable Om is the attainment of Brahman (Pra. Upa., Mu. Upa., Kaṭha Upa., and Bra. Su. III. 3. 25–26).

30. We do not think that in this Adhyāya there is any possibility of a direct discussion about meditations not leading to the attainment of Brahman. Therefore, we believe, it is not likely that the meditations on the Sun, the Name, the Speech, *etc.*, as Brahman can be possibly referred to by the Sūtrakāra here. Only such meditations as result in the attainment of Brahman are likely to be mentioned here. The meditation on Brahman through the आलम्बन of the Symbol Om is the only प्रतीकोपासना that leads to the achievement of liberation. The Syllable Om is called 'आलम्बन' in the Kaṭha Upa. Thus, the possibility of the Om being the topic here on account of the reference to प्रतीकालम्बन, and the word नयति suggest that the Sūtrakāra has in his view the Pra. Upa. Śruti which discusses the meditation on Om leading to Brahman (Pra. Upa. V). The next Sūtra refers to the विशेष between the two aspects of Brahman (which Bādari would distinguish as कार्य and पर) and, as the Praśna Upaniṣad refers to two aspects of Brahman, we believe, Sūtra 16 also supports our view that Pra. Upa. V is referred to by Sūtra 15.

31. If we take Praśna Upaniṣad V as referred to in these two Sūtras, the view of Bādarāyaṇa would seem to be as follows:—

He says that "The conductor carries (upto the place where he *can* go) those meditators of Brahman who meditate on Brahman *without* the resort or help of the Syllable Om" (अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयति इति बादरायणः). This is consistent with the Pra. Upa. Śruti. According to it he who meditates on Om as consisting of three *mātras* (parts) *is carried upwards by the Sāmans* to the ब्रह्मलोक जीवघन and sees the Puruṣa who is

higher than " this highest जीवघन" (एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्परं पुरुषम्)-Pra. Upa. V. 5. Now, as the meditator who resorts to this Pratīka is carried upwards by the Sāmans, Bādarāyaṇa says that those meditators on Brahman who do *not* resort to the Symbol Om *are carried by the conductors.*

32. Bādrāyaṇa held the above view because both Bādari and Jaimini were correct (उभयथाऽदोषात्). Both of them were correct according to Bādarāyaṇa and, *therefore,* he gave his own view that the conductor carried only those knowers of Brahman who did not resort to the Syllable Om. These अप्रतीकालम्बनs may meditate on प्रधान or पुरुष as stated in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11–54. Therefore, जैमिनि and बादरि are both of them respectively correct.

33. तत्क्रतुश्च — Bādari has not considered and Jaimini has not pointed out in favour of his own view, that the meditator on Brahman (without resorting to the Syllable Om) makes a determinate thought about reaching Brahman, and, therefore, we must suppose that in either case he reaches Brahman immediately after leaving this world. The argument of 'तत्क्रतुः' seems to be a reference to सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीताथ खलु क्रतुमयः पुरुषो यथा क्रतुरस्मिँल्लोके पुरुषो भवति तथेतः प्रेत्य भवति स क्रतुं कुर्वीत।.........सर्वकर्मा सर्वकामः सर्वगन्धः सर्वरसः सर्वमिदमभ्यात्तोऽवाक्यनादरः एष म आत्मान्तर्हृदय एतद् ब्रह्मैतमितः प्रेत्याभिसंभवितास्मीति......(Chā. Upa. III. 14). In this Śruti we find a definite determination or resolve on the part of the meditator that he *would be born unto this Atman,* this Brahman *after leaving this world.* This is one more argument according to Bādarāyaṇa as to why *both* Bādari and Jaimini are right in their views (See Sūtra 16). Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini do not consider the point whether the conductor can go upto the कार्य or upto the पर; they emphasize the fact that the specific thought of the meditator about his goal and his object of knowledge shows that he must be conducted to his goal.

34. Śaṅkara takes Sūtras 15-16 as forming an independent Adhikaraṇa. According to him " अप्रतीकालम्बनान् " means " अप्रतीकालम्बनान् विकारालम्बनान् " " those who resort to an effect of Brahman [as Brahman] but who are other than those resorting to प्रतीकs *i. e.*, " those meditators of Brahman who meditate on some विकारs of Brahman other than the प्रतीकविकारs, as Brahman. " Śaṅkara seems to divide meditation on Brahman into two classes, (1) those who meditate on the pure Brahman, *i. e.*, those who realize Brahman itself, and (2) those who meditate on an effect of Brahman; this second would consist of (a) the so called सगुणोपासकs and (b) the प्रतीकोपासकs ' meditators on नामन्, वाक्, *etc.*, as in Chā. Upa. VII. In Sūtra III. 3. 31 as interpreted by Śaṅkara, it was stated that the देवयानगति is the गति of (a) and (b). Now, says Śaṅkara, in Sūtra IV. 3. 16, the Sūtrakāra asserts that the देवयानगति is the गति of only (a); thus, according to Śaṅkara, the Sūtrakāra in this Sūtra modifies what he has said in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 31, because here (in Sūtra 15) he excludes the प्रतीकालम्बनान् सगुणोपासकान् (= विकारोपासकान्) from those mentioned in Sūtra III. 3. 31. Thus, according to Śaṅkara's interpretation, Sūtra III. 3. 31 which was a Siddhānta Sūtra in Adhyāya III becomes as it were a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra in Adhyāya IV. This kind of context itself makes Śaṅkara's explanation of Sūtra IV. 3. 15 and of Sutra III. 3. 31 doubtful. It is very rarely that the Sūtrakāra ever withdraws or modifies in a later Adhyāya what he has established as a Siddhānta in a preceding Adhyāya.

It seems to us that the Sūtrakāra never distinguishes between the meditators (or rather the knowers) of Brahman in the pure form and those in its " effect " form. He does distinguish between the meditators on Brahman itself and on Symbols of Brahman. In the Sūtra (15) there is no word to suggest the modification of the sense of अप्रतीकालम्बनान् by the addition of विकारालम्बनान् instead of by adding ब्रह्मोपासकान्

taken as understood. Moreover, because of the fact that here the question is about *being guided* or *carried by the conductor*, we think that *all* the प्रतीकs are not considered here but only the Symbol Om is the point of reference here (See the above Note).

'उभयथा' according to Śaṅkara means the fact (1) that the Sūtrakāra holds that all the सगुणोपासकs, whether depending on प्रतीकs or not, go by the देवयान, as in Sūtra III. 3. 31, and again, (2) now he says that only those सगुणोपासकs who do not resort to प्रतीकs, go by the देवयान, in Sūtra IV. 3. 15. But to us it seems that उभयथा should be a reference to *two* exactly *opposite* views about *one and the same point* and that in this particular case it refers to Bādari's view that the conductor takes (the knower of Brahman) to a world which is an effect of Brahman and the view of Jaimini that he takes (the same person) to the Supreme One itself. We have proposed to connect अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति with उभयथा अदोषात् as Proposition and Argument; Śaṅkara takes them separately and, then, gives his own reason for अदोषात् *viz.*, "अनियमन्यायस्य प्रतीकव्यतिरिक्तेषु अपि उपासनेषूपपत्तेः". This reason is not suggested by any word in the Sūtra itself, but it results, according to Śaṅkara, from the relation which he *understands* between this Sūtra (15) and Sūtra III. 3. 31. Śaṅkara says that "तत्क्रतुः" is an argument for उभयथाभाव and then he says that in सगुणोपासनाs without प्रतीक there is तत्क्रतुन्याय and in सगुणोपासनाs with प्रतीक there is no तत्क्रतु. 'तत्क्रतु' is, according to him, not a क्रतु mentioned definitely in any Śruti, *e. g.*, in Chā. Upa. III. 14. 4, but only 'ब्रह्मक्रतु'.

It seems to us that the topic here is about 'नयति' as distinguished from प्राप्नोति or गच्छति. In the case of नामादि-रूपप्रतीकोपासना, there is possibility for neither of the two, unless one meditates on Brahman as भूमन् which is the last stage in that series and which (भूमन्) is explained by the Sūtrakāra (Sūtra I. 3. 8) as Brahman itself. For this reason,

it is not possible that the Sūtrakāra would at all discuss नामादिप्रतीकोपासनाs here.

Sūtra 16

35. विशेषं च दर्शयति—From the context we think that the विशेष or difference meant here is that between the two aspects of Brahman regarding which there is a differerence between Bādari and Jaimini as to where the conductor takes the knower of Brahman and, which the Sūtrakāra seeks to reconcile in Sūtra 15.

36. Moreover, as Bādarāyaṇa particularly refers to a Śruti about the difference between the aspects of Brahman, we think that he does not entirely accept the view of Bādari and Jaimini regarding the same; but rather he partly differs from both and partly agrees with them.

37. As the विशेष here is the difference between the two aspects of Brahman, we think, the Sūtra refers to Pra. Upa. V. 2–7, where the difference between पर and अपर ब्रह्मन् is mentioned. This is more likely because the same Śruti is indirectly referred to in Sūtra 15.

38. If Pra. Upa. V. 2–7 is the विषयवाक्य in Sūtra 16, we cannot interpret either the Śruti or the Sūtra independently of Sūtra I. 3. 13 (ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः), where the Sūtrakāra's interpretation of the पुरुष in Pra. Upa. V. 5 is given, and of Sūtra III. 3. 39 (तत्र च आयतनादिभ्यः) where he again refers to his own view about the Śrutis discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3., one of which is the present Śruti.

39. Now, we think, in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13 the Sūtrakāra says that जीवघन ब्रह्मलोक of Pra. Upa. V. 5 is the पुरुष, who is the object of the act of seeing (ईक्षतिकर्म). In Bra. Sū. I. 1–3, the Sūtrakāra takes up one word in a Śruti and says that the particular term means Paramātman (or Puruṣa). Thus, द्युभ्वाद्यायतन is Paramātman because of स्वशब्द (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 1), भूमन् is Paramātman because of संप्रसादादध्युपदेश (Bra. Sū. I.

3. 8), अक्षर is Paramātman because of अम्बरान्तधृति (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 10), दहर is Paramātman because of the succeeding sentences (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 14), प्रमितः is Paramātman because of the Śabda itself (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 24), (we may say that) प्राण is Paramātman because of कम्पन (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 39), ज्योतिः is Paramātman because of दर्शन, and आकाश is Paramātman because of अर्थान्तरादिव्यपदेश (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 41). On the analogy of all these cases, we suggest that 'सः' in Sūtra I. 3. 13 means 'जीवघनः' and the Sūtra would be 'जीवघनः ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्' meaning "The Principle called जीवघन (or ब्रह्मलोक) is Pramātman because he is called पुरुष (lit. 'the object of the act of seeing' *viz.*, पुरुष)". जीवघन is a term of doubtful meaning and the Sūtrakāra clears it by this Sūtra. In the first Sūtra of *each* Adhikaraṇa there is a term of doubtful meaning, which it is the purpose of the Adhikaraṇa to explain. So, in this particular Śruti the Sūtrakāra explains जीवघन as पुरुष or परमात्मन्.¶

In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39 (*Vide* our interpretation of that Sūtra), the Sūtrakāra says that the Srutis or thoughts discussed in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 1 and the succeeding Sūtras may be optionally applied to the अरूपवत् or निराकार aspect of Brahman, though the Sūtrakāra has explained them as those belonging to or dealing with the साकार or पुरुष aspect. So, on the strength of Bra. Sū. III. 3. 39 we are given the option of interpreting जीवघन as निराकार or अव्यक्त aspect of Brahman though it may also be taken as the साकार or पुरुष aspect, as the Sūtrakāra has done in Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13.

40. In the light of the above consideration, it seems to us that the Sūtrakāra takes the निराकार or जीवघन and साकार or पुरुष aspect as two aspects taught in Pra. Upa. V. 5 and referred to as पर and अपर ब्रह्मन् in Pra. Upa. V. 2 (एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोंकारस्तस्माद्विद्वान् एतेनैवायतनेनैकतरमन्वेति).

According to the Sūtrakāra निराकार and साकार are two aspects of Brahman and similarly it is called अव्यक्त and पुरुष

¶ We have used 'परमात्मन्' in the sense of the साकार aspect here.

and the distinction between these two is like that between अहि and कुण्डल (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27). We have shown that the Sūtrakāra mentions these two aspects in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 8 which refers to Bra. Sū. III. 2. 27, and in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 10, and that in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 11-54 he deals with the meditation on these two aspects of Brahman.

On the strength of Bra. Sū. I. 3. 13 and III. 3. 39 जीवघन is the निराकार or अव्यक्त aspect and पुरुष is the साकार aspect, as shown above. The Sūtrakāra seems to think that जीवघन is a term like रसघन and प्रज्ञानघन. Now, according to him, Brahman is mainly निराकार or, अरूपवत् is the *chief* aspect of Brahman (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 14) and पुरुष is the साकार aspect. Thus, जीवघन in Pra. Upa. V. 5 would be the Para Brahman (परं ब्रह्म) and पुरुष would be the अपर ब्रह्म mentioned in Pra. Upa. V. 2.

41. The above being the difference between the two aspects of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra would take the जीवघन or निराकार to be the पर ब्रह्मन् of Jaimini and पुरुष to be the कार्य of Bādari. The distinction between the two aspects mentioned by Bādari in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 8 is to be similarly undetrstood, according to the Sūtrakāra. प्रजापतिलोक in Bṛ. Upa. III. 6. 1 is the अपर ब्रह्म, and ब्रह्मलोक which is the अनतिप्रश्न्या देवता is the पर ब्रह्म. According to the Sūtrakāra these two are *not two* लोकs in the ordinary sense; in the case of पुरुष, the Sūtrakāra clearly says that there is no लोकापत्ति and this is further proved by the fact that he drops the mention of प्रजापतिलोक after Sūtra IV. 3. 3;† प्रजापतिलोक is not a कार्य of Brahman, but it is another aspect of Brahman, *viz.*, the साकार aspect of Brahman, which stands on an equal level with the निराकार as being ब्रह्मविद्या and as giving absolute final emancipation (Bra. Sū. III. 3. 44-54). The same Brahman is at the same time,

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† It is in accordance with the Chā. Upa that the Sūtrakāra drops प्रजापतिलोक.

in all the different states, both अरूपवत् and रूपवत् (Bra. Sū. III. 2. 11). Thus, the Sūtrakāra does not agree with Bādari that the साकार or पुरुष aspect is a कार्य of the निराकार or अव्यक्त aspect, and he also does not agree with Jaimini that निराकार or पर ब्रह्मन् is *higher* than or different from what Bādari called कार्य. Both Bādari and Jaimini thought that the प्रजापतिलोक is a कार्य, but Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the प्रजापतिलोक is no लोक (in the ordinary sense), no कार्य, but another aspect of the कारण itself.

In short, the difference between the two aspects is not that between कार्य and पर, but it is the difference between two names given to the same object from different standpoints, like the names अहि and कुण्डल given to a serpent. Taken in this sense, Bādarāyaṇa says, that the आतिवाहिक carries the अप्रतीकालम्बन ब्रह्मोपासक to his goal *viz.*, Brahman, whether he meditates on Brahman as अव्यक्त (= निराकार) or पुरुष (= साकार). In this sense, both Bādari and Jaimini are correct and therefore acceptable to Bādarāyaṇa, when we understand the विशेष or difference between these two aspects in the above way.

We believe, this is the interpretation of Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 16. Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the question as to *where* the conductor can take the knower of Brahman is decided (1) by the question as to *whom* he takes (अप्रतीकालम्बनान् and तत्क्रतु) and (2) by the question what is the *difference* between कार्य of Bādari and पर of Jaimini. अप्रतीकालम्बन ब्रह्मोपासक may be a meditator on either of the two aspects of Brahman and he has made a specific thought that he is to go to Brahman after leaving this world. Therefore, he must be carried by the conductor to his goal. And again, there is no fundamental difference between what Bādari calls कार्य (प्रजापतिलोक or पुरुष or साकार aspect) and what Jaimini regards to be the पर (ब्रह्मलोक, अव्यक्त or निराकार aspect). One who meditates on Brahman through the Syllable Om is carried by the Sāmans, but who one meditates on it otherwise *must necessarily* be carried by a conductor, because the conductor is mentioned with

reference to this latter, while his function is performed by Sāmans with reference to the former.

42. According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 16 discusses the nature of the fruit of नामादिप्रतीकोपासनाs. In his opinion, as in Sūtra15 it was said that the प्रतीकोपासकs do not go to ब्रह्मलोक the कार्य; it remained still to explain what is the result of प्रतीकोपासनाs. 'विशेष' is not the विशेष between कार्य and पर, but between the various प्रतीकोपासनफलs; thus, विशेष is 'प्रतीकोपासनफलविशेष'; according to Śaṅkara 'दर्शयति' refers to Chā. Upa. VII. But, it seems to us that the काम्य ब्रह्मोपासनाs such as are described in Chā. Upa. VII have been discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. III. 3. 60.

CHAPTER VII

SECTION I

Manifestation of the Original Form of the Released Soul after Union with Brahman.

Sūtras IV. 4. 1–3

(१) सम्पद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात् ।

(२) मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ।

(३) आत्मा प्रकरणात् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE individual soul] having been united [with the Supreme One], there is the manifestation [of the real nature of the individual soul] because of the Śruti with the words " with his own ". (*i. e.*, Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3). 1

It is the liberated one [who becomes manifest], because of the main Proposition. 2

It is the soul [of the liberated one, who becomes manifest], because of the context. 3

NOTES

Sūtra 1

1. ' संपद्य ' is undoubtedly a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3, as Śaṅkara points out. In the last Adhikaraṇa of the preceding Pāda it was decided that if the released soul has not resorted to the Symbol Om, he is led by the conductor to the Supreme One; and that if he has ressorted to it the Sāmans lead him to the same. Now the Sūtrakāra tells us what happens after he unites with the Supreme One.

2. आविर्भावः — The Sūtrakāra does not hold that the संपत्ति or union at the end of the देवयान is absolute merging of the individual soul into Brahman, because he says that after union there is the manifestation of the real form of the soul. Śaṅkara does not seem to emphasize this point sufficiently.

3. स्वेनशब्दात् — Some Śrutis like the following are not clear on the point of manifestation, *e. g.*,

यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तंगच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय ।
तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः परात्परं पुरुषमुपैति दिव्यम् ॥
(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 8).

The Sūtrakāra gives a proof for the fact that after union with the Supreme One, there is a manifestation of the individual soul. The verb " अभिनिष्पद्यते " in the Śruti (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3) may be interpreted in the sense of production (उत्पत्ति), as Śaṅkara says. But " स्वेनरूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते " can only mean that the individual soul becomes manifest in his own real nature.

4. With this Sūtra (IV. 4. 1) we should compare

(*a*) पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् (Bra. Sū. II. 3. 31). This Sūtra says that the गुणs of परमात्मन् which are substantially present in the soul become manifest in liberation (See Bra. Sū. II. 3. 29), and

(*b*) उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 19), where the Sūtrakāra refers to the same Śruti as is referred to in the present Sūtra and says that the Śruti describes an individual soul whose real nature has become manifest.

5. According to Śaṅkara the very first Sūtra discusses whether the soul becomes manifest *with any new accidental* (आगन्तुक) *attributes* or without them. According to us this question is considered in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 5–7. Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1 asserts that there is a *manifestation after union, i. e.*, manifestion of the liberated soul after union with the Supreme One attained at the end of देवयान. The argument 'स्वेनशब्दात्' seems to us to have been used by the Sūtrakāra to explain 'अभिनिष्पत्ति' as 'आविर्भाव'. Śaṅkara argues that स्वेनशब्द proves that only the Atman becomes manifest, not with any new attributes. But, this does not seem to be the point discussed here at all. The fact that only the Atman of the liberated becomes manifest is in our opinion mentioned in Sūtra IV. 4. 3 (See below). The Sūtras quoted above (I. 3. 19, II. 3. 31) show that according to the Sūtrakāra the real form of the soul is concealed during bondage and that he becomes manifest in his own natural form in liberation. Śaṅkara himself also knows that 'स्व' has the sense of आत्मीय "the soul's own (real form)", but he tries to show that 'स्व' means आत्मा, not आत्मीय.

Sūtra 2

6. In this Sūtra the author tells us that the one who becomes manifest after union is *the liberated one* (मुक्त). Cf. उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 19), where also it was said that the Śurti described a liberated soul. It is the liberated one who becomes manifest after union with the Supreme One.

It should be here noted that the Sūtrakāra here gives us his own idea about "मुक्ति" or liberation. मुक्ति is not the

complete merging or fusion of the individual soul into the Supreme One, but it is the manifestation of the soul in its own form, after having been united with the Para.

7. **प्रतिज्ञानात्**–'**प्रतिज्ञान**' here seems to have been used for **प्रतिज्ञा** the main proposition. Generally the Sūtrakāra uses the word '**प्रतिज्ञा**' itself in this sense, *e. g.*, I. 4. 20 and 23, II. 2. 21, II. 3. 6. So, why does he use **प्रतिज्ञान** here instead of the usual word **प्रतिज्ञा**?

The main Proposition in the present case is what Śaṅkara points out in his commentary, *viz.*, **य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः ॥** (Chā. Upa. VIII. 7. 1).

The words **अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः** *etc.*, show that the passage describes the liberated soul. The fact that the Sūtrakāra takes Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 as dealing with the liberated one is also known from **उत्तराच्चेत्तदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु** (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 19). The word '**उत्तरात्**' in this Sūtra is a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 which is the **विषयवाक्य** of this Adhikaraṇa.

8. Śaṅkara explains '**मुक्तः**' as **योऽत्राभिनिष्पद्यत इत्युक्तः स सर्वबन्धविनिर्मुक्तः शुद्धेनैवात्मनाऽवतिष्ठते.** Does he mean that the Sūtrakāra here tells us that the liberated one is no longer 'bound' again? If so, we should point out that it is the last Sūtra (IV. 4. 22) which tells us that the liberated never return to this world, or are never reborn in this world. Here the topic is not that of the liberated being born again in this world, but the Sūtrakāra seems to tell us that it is the liberated soul who becomes manifest after union with the Supreme One.

Sūtra 3

9. It is the individual *soul* who becomes manifest. The Sūtrakāra uses the word '**आत्मा**' in the sense of the *individual* soul. The body does not become manifest. The subtle body in the company of which the individual soul united with the Supreme One in the heart at the time of the departure *did not come out with*

the soul when he left the body through the hundred-and-first artery. It seems to have been burnt by the flame of the top of the heart (Bra. Sū. IV. 2. 17). This point does not seem to us to have been clearly stated in the Sūtra; so it is doubtful as to what happened of the subtle body. It may be that the subtle body accompanies the soul also when he is led by the conductor to the Supreme One (पर) and when he becomes manifest in his real form after union with the Para, only the soul becomes manifest. This latter seems to be the point emphasized in Sūtra 3.

10. प्रकरणात् seems to be a reference to the fact that in all these sections (Chā. Upa. VIII. 7–12) the individual soul is the topic of discussion, as Śaṅkara explains in his commentary on Sūtra IV. 4. 2. Thus, the context shows that it is the individual soul that becomes manifest in its real form after union with the Para.

11. Śaṅkara holds that this Sūtra explains the परंज्योतिः in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 as परमात्मान् the Supreme One. But as he himself remarks, this is the topic of Bra. Sū. I. 3. 40 (ज्योतिर्दर्शनात्). And, that the destination of the knowner of Brahman described variously as ब्रह्मन्, ब्रह्मलोक, परंज्योतिः, *etc., etc.,* is पर and not कार्य, has been decided in Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 7–16. So, we do not think that either of these questions is touched here once again. The question here is " Who becomes manifest after having been united with the Supreme One ? " And the Sūtrakāra tells us that it is the individual *soul in liberation*, that becomes manifest in that way. Śaṅkara takes आत्मन् in Chā. Upa. VIII. 7. 1 as the liberated soul, in his commentary on Sūtra IV. 4. 2 and as परमात्मन् in his commentary on Sūtra IV. 4. 3.

SECTION II

Non-separation of the Revealed Soul from the Supreme One.

Sūtra IV. 4. 4

(४) अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ।

TRANSLATION

[THE liberated soul who becomes manifest after being united with the Supreme One becomes manifest] in non-separation with the Supreme One, because it has been shown in the Śruti. 4

NOTES

Sūtra 4

1. It has been said in the preceding Adhikaraṇa that the individual soul in liberation becomes manifest after union with the Supreme One. Now the Sūtrakāra tells us that he becomes manifest and he remains in non-separation from the Supreme One from whom he becomes manifest. In the 'bondage' he lives in separation, but not so in liberation.

2. दृष्टत्वात् seems to be a reference to Śrutis like न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद् विभक्तं यत्पश्येत् (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 23–32). See Note on Sūtra IV. 2. 16 where the अविभाग meant by the Sūtrakāra is explained with reference to the union of the subtle elements with the Supreme One in the heart. In the विषयवाक्यश्रुति, Bṛ.. Upa. IV. 3. 20–31 is intended to explain the identity or union of the soul with the Supreme Being in deep sleep and Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 32 says that the same is also the case in the state of liberation (एषाऽस्य परमा गतिरेषास्य परमा संपद् ।)

Thus, the Sūtrakāra describes the state of liberation or absolution as that of non–separation of the soul from the Supreme One. The word अविभाग is based upon the Śruti न तु तद् द्वितीयमस्ति ततोऽन्यद् विभक्तम् and should be contrasted with the word विभाग in Sūtras like यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवद् (Bra. Sū. II. 3. 7). Also *Cf.* न कर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वात् (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 35), and भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् (Bra. Sū. II. 1. 13).

The exact nature of अविभाग in Sūtra IV. 4. 4 would be clear from the Sūtras which follow it.

3. Śaṅkara quotes many other Śrutis besides the above one as referred to by दृष्टत्वात्. But it seems to us from Sūtras IV. 2. 16 and IV. 4. 4 that the Sūtrakāra attaches importance to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 23-31 and would explain the other Śrutis describing liberation in the light of that Śruti. Śaṅkara explains अविभाग as absolute identity of the soul with Brahman and makes use of other Śrutis besides Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 23-31 to support his conclusions.

SECTION III

Nature of the Revealed Form of the Soul: Three views.

Sūtras IV. 4. 5–7

(५) ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः ।

(६) चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

(७) एवमप्युपन्यासात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः ।

TRANSLATION

(JAIMINI holds that the liberated soul becomes manifest in his own original form *i. e.,*) in a Brāhma form, on account of the mention of that form (in the list of the forms which the soul assumes) in the Śruti, and other reason. 5

" In the subtle form of consciousness, because the individual soul consists of it ", holds Auḍulomi. 6

Bādarāyaṇa holds that ' Also thus, there is no inconsistency (with the Śruti, *viz.,* स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते) because of the mention (and) because of the original existence. ' 7

NOTES

Sūtra 5

1. In this Adhikaraṇa the Sūtrakāra seems to explain the nature of the libterated soul's *own* form in which the liberated soul becomes manifest, as said in Sūtra 1 (स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3). It has been said in Sūtra 3 that only the soul of the liberated becomes manifest. Now, we are told what is the nature of the soul's *own* form.

2. उपन्यास — This is a reference to the word ब्राह्म in such a Śruti as तद्यथा पेशस्कारी पेशसो मात्रामुपादायान्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं तनुते एवमेवायमात्मेदꣳशरीरं निहत्याविद्यां गमयित्वाऽन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते पित्र्यं वा गान्धर्वं वा दैवं वा प्राजापत्यं वा ब्राह्मं वाऽन्येषां वा भूतानाम् ॥ (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 4). Out of the various forms mentioned here it is the ब्राह्म form in which, according to Jaimini, the liberated soul becomes manifest.

By 'आदि' we may take such arguments as the fact that the soul is in non-separation with the पर ब्रह्मन्; so, his form also is ब्राह्म.

3. Śaṅkara explains ब्राह्म as referring to य आत्माऽपहतपाप्मा विजरोविमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः । (Chā. Upa. VIII. 7. 1). But to us it appears that 'उपन्यास' refers to Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 4 where the very word ब्राह्म is given; and ब्राह्म would mean "possessed of all the attributes of Brahman". In Bra. Sū. II. 3. 29 the Sūtrakāra says that the soul has all the attributes of the Supreme One in substance and in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 31 he says that they become manifest in liberation. By 'आदि' Śaṅkara understands several other Śrutis to have been referred to.

Sūtra 6

4. Auḍulomi believes that the individual soul consists of 'consciousness' and therefore the liberated soul becomes mani-

fest in a form of *mere consciousness.* In the opinion of Jaimini the soul in liberation would be possessed of all the attributes of Brahman, and *all* would mean not only consciousness (चिति), but आनन्द and all other attributes of Brahman mentioned in Bra. Sū. I. 1–3. Auḍulomi seems to hold that the individual soul does not consist of आनन्द, *etc.*, but only of consciousness, and that therefore he becomes manifest only as mere consciousness (चिति) or thought.

5. Śaṅkara seems to find Auḍulomi's view very agreeable to him and thinks that it is better than that of Jaimini. He had taken 'उपन्यास' in the preceding Sūtra as referring to Chā. Upa. VIII. 7. 1; so, he says that Jaimini's view gave only a negative description, while Auḍulomi's view gives a positive one. He goes further and says that सत्यकामत्व, *etc.*, belong to Brahman on account of its उपाधिs, so they cannot really belong to the individual soul in liberation. They do not form the स्वरूप of the liberated as does चैतन्य; so, the जक्षण, आत्मक्रीडा, *etc.*, demonstrated in the Śruti as the attributes of the liberated are only meant to convey the idea of mere absence of misery. The Sūtrakāra does not seem to understand चितितन्मात्रेण as not admitting of any kind of positive enjoyment. The question of positive enjoyment in the state of liberation is discussed by the Sūtrakāra in Sūtras IV. 4. 13–14, and 17–21.

Sūtra 7

6. Bādarāyaṇa seems to think that both the views of Jaimini and Auḍulomi are *consistent with the Śruti.* ब्रह्मन् is more than mere consciousness, because it is also Bliss, *etc.* So, we cannot say that Bādarāyaṇa regarded the views of Jaimini and Auḍulomi as *consistent with each other.* Therefore we must conclude that अविरोध here means "consistency with the Śruti." As both the views are said to be consistent with the Śruti, we should also conclude that Bādarāyaṇa held that Śrutis gave an option to the liberated soul on this point.

7. एवमपि 'also so' or 'even so' means 'also according to the view of Auḍulomi' there is no contradiction of the Śruti, becuase of उपन्यास (and पूर्वभाव). The Sūtrakāra says that just as Jaimini's view is supported by उपन्यास (and पूर्वभाव), so also Auḍulomi's view is supported by the same arguments. Thus, एवमपि supports the conclusion stated in the above note. एवमपि अविरोधम्—There is no contradiction with the Śruti in both the ways, according to the view of Jaimini *and also* according to that of Auḍulomi.

8. उपन्यासात्—The Sūtrakāra refers to the *mention* of the nature of the individual soul as mere consciousness, in the Śruti. There are many such texts:—

(*a*) न हि विज्ञातुर्विज्ञातेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यतेऽविनाशित्वात् (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 30). This Śruti says that in the state of liberation the consciousness of the soul (विज्ञाति) does not disappear.

(*b*) यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन् विज्ञानादन्तरो यं विज्ञानं न वेद यस्य विज्ञानं शरीरम् (Bṛ. Upa. III. 7. 22). This Śruti according to the Sūtrakāra (I. 2. 20) describes the individual soul as consciousness.

(*c*) योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 22).

(*d*) कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा (Mu. Upa. III. 2. 7).

(*e*) विज्ञानात्मा सह देवैश्च सर्वैः (Pra. Upa. IV. 11).
Cf. तदात्मकत्वात् in Sūtra IV. 4. 6.

In all these passages the individual soul is stated to be consciousness or consisting of consciousness. The Sūtrakāra says that just as there is the mention of the ब्राह्मरूप of the soul, similarly there is also the mention of the विज्ञान or चिति रूप of the soul.

9. पूर्वभावात् 'By his original existence' *i. e.*, before he was 'bound,' he was only consciousness; thus his original form was that of consciousness. The Śruti (स्वेन रूपेण अभिनिष्पद्यते।)

says that in liberation the soul becomes manifest in his own form; thus it teaches that he becomes manifest in his original form *i. e.,* in the form of consciousness.

Thus, Bādarāyaṇa holds that even according to the view of Auḍulomi there is no inconsistency between the form of the liberated soul and the Śruti *viz.,* Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3, as there is no such inconsistency according to that of Jaimini. Both the views are mentioned in the Śruti.

10. Śaṅkara says that Auḍulomi's view is to be accepted as *the absolute truth* and Jaimini's as *the practical truth.* Perhaps this sense he brings out from एवमपि and his interpretation of Sūtra 6. To us एवमपि seems to mean that even the view of Auḍulomi is supported by the Śruti, thus both the views, of Jaimini and of Auḍulomi, being proved to be supported by the Śruti (उपन्यास). The Sūtrakāra seems to us to support both the views *equally* on the ground of उपन्यास, so that there is no distinction of one being the absolute, the other the relative view. Śaṅkara understands उपन्यास as the उपन्यास of the ब्राह्मरूप, instead of the उपन्यास of the चितिमात्ररूप as we have proposed to take it. 'पूर्वभाव' means according to Śaṅkara "पूर्वस्य= उपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मस्य ऐश्वर्यरूपस्य (भावात् =) अप्रत्याख्यानात्". Thus, 'पूर्व' is interpreted by him as referring to the Sūtra preceding Sūtra 6, and भावात् as अप्रत्याख्यानात्. To us 'पूर्वभाव' seems to mean 'former or original existence' and to refer to 'स्वेन रूपेण' in the Śruti. Śaṅkara interprets "अविरोध" as "अविरोध" between the views of Jaimini and Auḍulomi. But, if there was real अविरोध, why should the two teachers have differed at all ? Moreover, taking one view as absolutely real and another as practically or relatively real shows that a kind of विरोध is admitted, which is tried to be solved by resorting to the scheme of पारमार्थिक and व्यावहारिक truth. The Sūtrakāra, however, seems to admit both the views as consistent with the Śruti; this conclusion is supported by 'एवमपि' 'also so', in the Sūtra. We think, 'एवमप्युपन्यासात्' would be *more*

naturally interpreted as we have done it; and 'अविरोधम्' is like 'अविरोधम्' in Sūtra IV. 4. 12. And though पूर्व in other सूत्रs, refers to what is said in a *preceding* Sūtra, the compound-word पूर्वभाव is never found in the Brahmasūtras in the sense of पूर्वस्य (=पूर्वोक्तस्य) भावात्. Besides, 'स्वेन रूपेण' in the Śruti and आविर्भाव in the Sūtra, makes it clear that according to the context there is here the mention of an original existence. So, we believe that Bādarāyaṇa here supports both the views, of Jaimini and of Auḍulomi, *equally*. Moreover, भाव should be interpreted as existence rather than अप्रत्याख्यान. पूर्वभावात् cannot mean व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्य अप्रत्याख्यानात्. Śaṅkara takes उपन्यासात् = उपन्यासादिभ्यः अवगतस्य.

SECTION IV

Fulfilment of every Desire of the Released Soul by mere Will: Self-lordship.

Sūtras IV. 4. 8–9

(८) संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

(९) अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः ।

TRANSLATION

BUT, the released soul gets every object of desire only by will, because of the Śruti about it. 8

And for this very reason he is without a lord other than himself. 9

NOTES

Sūtra 8

1. As the विषयवाक्यश्रुति shows, this Adhikaraṇa tells us how the released soul attains the fulfilment of his desires. In the आविर्भावश्रुति (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12) we read about the enjoyment of desired objects by the released soul, *viz.*, स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा । (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3). The Sūtrakāra says that this enjoyment on the part of the released soul takes place merely by his will. He has to make a desire, and the desired object is present before him. *Cf.* also मनसैतान् कामान् पश्यन् रमते ॥५॥ य एते ब्रह्मलोके (Chā. Upa. VIII. 13. 5–6).

2. From the Chā. Upa. Śruti (VIII. 12. 3), it may be supposed that women, vehicles, and relatives of the released soul are present in the world of Brahman (neu.) for the enjoyment of the released one. This supposition is rejected by तु in the Sūtra.

3. तच्छ्रुतेः—This is undoubtedly a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 2, as Śaṅkara points out. There it is stated that if the released soul wishes to see his father or ancestors, his mother, his brother, his sister; these persons arise before him *from his pure will* (संकल्पादेव) and he enjoys in their company. Thus, the relatives (ज्ञातिभिः in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3) become present in ब्रह्मलोक only through the will of the released one (संकल्पादेव Chā. Upa. VIII. 2). Similarly, all other objects of enjoyment like friends, garlands and perfumes, food and drinks (*Cf.* जक्षन् in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3), songs and music and ladies (*Cf.* स्त्रीभिः in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3) arise *out of the will* of the liberated one.

It seems that this topic is taken up for discussion immediately after the various topics arising out of the आविर्भावश्रुति in order to show that this part of the आविर्भावश्रुति (the

meeting of the released soul with his relatives and others) is to be interpreted in the light of Chā. Upa. VIII. 2.

4. According to Śaṅkara the पूर्वपक्ष of this Sūtra arises from Chā. Upa. VIII. 2 itself because, though in that Śruti it is clearly stated that the objects of desire arise out of only desire, it may be supposed by a पूर्वपक्ष that as in the world, the संकल्प of the released also requires some other निमित्त, like a human effort, in order to produce the things required. We think that because the very words 'संकल्पादेव' occur in the विषयवाक्य as in the Sūtra, and because the topic in Chā. Upa. VIII. 2 is that of the liberated, there is no room for such a doubt arising out of Chā. Upa. VIII. 2. The Sūtra, therefore, seems to us to remove doubts arising out of other Śrutis like Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3, Tai. Upa. II. 1, *etc.*, which may lead to the supposition that these *objects are present in* ब्रह्मलोक as in the heaven (स्वर्ग) of Gods. It is in Sūtra IV. 4. 21 that कर्तृत्व is denied and भोक्तृत्व alone is established in the state of release. In Sūtra 8, the purpose seems to be to tell us that the मुक्त is not dependent upon others for his भोग (see the word अनन्याधिपति in the next Sūtra).

Sūtra 9

5. 'अत एव', as in other Sūtras, means 'on account of the very reason mentioned in Sūtra 8.'

6. Because all the objects of enjoyment arise in the case of the liberated from his will only and he has not to depend upon others, he is master of himself, he has no lord over him. 'अनन्याधिपति' may be a reference to Śrutis like स स्वराड्भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति। अथ येऽन्यथाऽतो विदुरन्यराजानस्ते क्षय्यलोका भवन्ति तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेष्वकामचारो भवति। (Chā. Upa. VII. 25). Compare also Chā. Upa. VIII. 1. 6 quoted by Śaṅkara.

7. In the case of the soul in bondage, he does the actions, but the fruit of his actions is given by God (Bra.

Sū. II. 3. 41 and Śā. Bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. III. 2. 38–41). But in the case of liberation as soon as the soul makes a wish he gets the thing.

8. Sūtra 9 explains the Śrutis in which the individual soul is said to be ईश्वर or identical with ईश्वर. *Cf.* Śā. Bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 17–21.

SECTION V

Option of a Body in the case of the Released: consistent with Fulfilment of Desires.

Sūtras IV. 4. 10–14

(१०) अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम् ।

(११) भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् ।

(१२) द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः ।

(१३) तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्तेः ।

(१४) भावे जाग्रद्वत् ।

TRANSLATION

BĀDARI holds that there is non-existence of a body in the case of a liberated soul, because the Śruti says so. 10

Jaimini holds that there is existence of a body in his case, because of the mention in the Śruti of an option regarding the number of bodies of a liberated soul. 11

Bādarāyaṇa holds that the revealed form of the released soul is of both the kinds, as in the case of the Dvādaśāha sacrifice, on the ground of these (Śrutis), 12

because of the explicability of enjoyments as in dream, in the case of the non-existence of a body, 13

[and] as in the waking state, in the case of the existence of a body. 14

NOTES

Sūtra 10

1. As Sūtra 13 indicates, the topic of this Adhikaraṇa is whether the released soul, who becomes manifest in its real nature, has a body or not. The question of the body must follow that of the nature of the soul.

2. Bādari holds that there is no body in the case of a released soul.

3. आह ह्येवम्—This seems to be a reference to such a Śruti as (*a*) मघवन्मर्त्यं वा इदꣳ शरीरमात्तं मृत्युना तदस्यामृतस्याशरीरस्यात्मनोऽधिष्ठानमात्तो वै सशरीरः प्रियाप्रियाभ्यां, न वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्त्यशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः। (Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 1), (*b*) तद्यथाऽहिर्निल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदꣳ शरीरं शेतेऽथायमशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव । (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 7). These Śrutis state that the soul in liberation has no body.

4. According to Śaṅkara the released soul *has a mind* as is proved by the fact that he gets every object of enjoyment by mere thought of it (संकल्प–Sūtra 8). He does not take आह ह्येवम् as referring to a Śruti stating that the released soul has no body, but he takes it as a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 5 (मनसैतान्कामान् पश्यन् रमते) and says that that Śruti proves that the released soul has no body. To us it appears that some Śruti stating that the released soul has no body is referred to by the Sūtra, as shown by us.

Sūtra 11

5. Jaimini holds that the released one has a body.

6. विकल्पामननात्—This refers to Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 2 where the released soul is stated to have as many bodies *as he likes,* as Śaṅkara rightly points out. स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति । (Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 2).

7. Śaṅkara remarks that this option of the number of bodies to be assumed is mentioned in the भूमविद्या and that though this भूमविद्या is निर्गुणब्रह्मविद्या, this power of assuming

many bodies belongs to सगुणविद्या and is mentioned in भूमविद्या for "the praise" of भूमविद्या. This should be understood to be Śaṅkara's own view. Jaimini seems to believe that the power to assume many bodies is the result of the knowledge of the Supreme One (see Sūtras IV. 3. 12–14).

Sūtra 12

8. 'अतः' means 'on account of the twofold Śrutis,' *viz.*, those which say that the liberated soul has no body *e. g.*, Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 1, Bṛ. Upa. IV. 4. 7, and those which state that the liberated soul can assume as many bodies as he likes (Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 2).

9. Bādarāyaṇa holds that the subject admits of both the possibilities on account of the twofold Śrutis.

10. द्वादशाह is a sacrifice and as Śaṅkara says, it is both a सत्र (a sacrifice with many sacrificers) and अहीन (a sacrifice with one sacrificer); similarly, the knower of Brahman gone to the Para may have a body or may have no body.

Sūtra 13

11. In Sūtras 13–14 Bādarāyaṇa gives arguments showing that a released soul may have a body or may not have any body at all, and yet the enjoyment of objects of desire taking place in the state of liberation is possible.

12. If he has no body the enjoyment of objects would be possible as in the state of dream (see. Bra. Sū. III. 2. 1–3).

Sūtra 14

13. Śaṅkara rightly says that the liberated even may reasonably have enjoyments as we in our waking state, when the liberated has a body. But his word 'मुक्तस्य' cannot have been written here in its literal sense, because thereby he would contradict himself on Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 11. But see Śā. bhāṣya on Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 16.

14. This Adhikaraṇa proves that the liberated soul may or may not have a body.

SECTION VI

Pervading Nature of the Released Soul.

Sūtras IV. 4. 15-16

(१५) प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथाहि दर्शयति ।

(१६) स्वाप्ययसम्पत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।

TRANSLATION

THE entering [into all, of a released soul] is like that of a lamp, because the Śruti shows it. 15

Because [the original form of the liberated soul is] made manifest with regard to [either of the two states of] deep-sleep and union (with the Para) or liberation. 16

NOTES

Sūtra 15

1. In the case of the liberated soul the Śrutis say that 'he enters all' or he pervades all. His all-pervasion is often mentioned in the Upaniṣads. So, in this Sūtra, the Sūtrakāra seems to us to mention that all-pervasion and also to explain the same.

2. He says that in the case of the released soul there is a pervasion (आवेश) like that of a lamp. By giving this simile the Sūtrakāra seems to intend to convey his view that the liberated soul does not merge into Brahman or does not lose his individuality when he becomes all-pervading. The आवेश or rather सर्वावेश of the liberated soul is like that of a lamp. The lamp keeps up its individual existence and yet pervades all things around it.

3. तथाहि दर्शयति—There are Śrutis about the आवेश of the liberated soul, *e. g.*,

(*a*) संप्राप्यैतमृषयो ज्ञानतृप्ताः कृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशान्ताः ।
ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्तात्मानः सर्वमेवाविशन्ति ॥
(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 5)

(*b*) तदक्षरं वेदयते यस्तु सौम्य स सर्वज्ञः सर्वमेवाविवेशेति ॥
(Pra. Upa. IV. 11).

Strictly speaking we require a Śruti in which the all-pervasion of the released soul is compared with that of a lamp.

4. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra discusses the question *how* the released soul occupies many bodies at a time. In the preceding Adhikaraṇa the released soul is given the option of having a body; and there is mention of his assuming many bodies in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 11. However, the following points need be considered:—(1) Only आवेश is mentioned in this

Sūtra, but not the entrance into many bodies. (2) " तथाहि दर्शयति " is a vague reference for our purpose. (3) Moreover neither प्रदीप nor आवेश is mentioned in the विषयवाक्य given by Śaṅkara and, really, that was the विषयवाक्य in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 11; so we believe that his विषयवाक्य (Chā. Upa. VII. 26. 2) is not the correct one. (4) The next Sūtra which should be taken as an argument of आवेश does not support the entrance into many bodies, but rather it supports our view of the pervasion of the released soul as the topic of this Sūtra. For these reasons we do not think that Śaṅkara's view about the topic of this Adhikaraṇa is correct. See Note (7) below.

Sūtra 16

5. This Sūtra gives an argument in support of the आवेश mentioned in the preceding Sūtra. And as it (this Sūtra) clearly supports आवेश in the sense of " pervasion ", व्यापकत्व, we believe that Sūtra 15 also discusses only the व्यापकत्व of the released soul, without referring to any particular question of pervading many bodies at a time. The word ' हि ' clearly shows that Sūtra 16 gives an argument for the statement in Sūtra 15.

6. The lamp-like pervasion of the individual soul in the released state is possible, because his original form is made manifest with reference to the two states of deep sleep and union with Brahman.

This Sūtra has reference to many Sūtras. The soul is said to be possessed of the substance of the attributes of Brahman (Bra. Sū. II. 3. 29), and it is said that this form of the soul becomes manifest in the state of liberation, just as manliness which is latently existing in childhood becomes manifest in youth (Bra. Sū. II. 3. 31). व्यापकत्वगुणसारत्व is one of these attributes. Similarly, Sūtra III. 2. 7 (तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च ।) and IV. 4. 1 (संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेनशब्दात्) also corroborate the sense of this Sūtra.

Another important point to be noticed is that the pervasion of the liberated soul is like that of a lamp and is similar to his pervasion in the deep-sleep state. So the manifestation of his substance of व्यापकत्व does not conflict with his अणुत्व mentioned in Bra. Sū. II. 3. 21-27. And also the view that the soul has the substance of the गुणs of God is corroborated in as much as the soul is not व्यापक like God but he has व्यापकत्वगुणसार.

7 As already said, Śaṅkara found that Sūtra 16 does not support his interpretation of Sūtra 15, but rather contradicts it. It was this feeling, on account of which Śaṅkara could not connect Sūtra 16 with Sūtra 15, as an argument (हेतु) and proposition respectively. For his interpretation of Sūtra 16, he found it necessary to give an introduction about the विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनम् of the soul in liberation, mentioned in several Śrutis. So, to Sūtra 16 we are to add विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनम् (स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षम्); and then we are to interpret 'आविष्कृतं हि' as an argument of that sentence. He takes 'आविष्कृतं' as तत्रैव (उपनिषत्सु अधिकारवशात् यद्विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनं स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमित्येतद्) आविष्कृतम्—We believe, it is not proper to divide Sūtra 16 (which is a हेतुसूत्र) into two sentences, and to add 'विशेषविज्ञानाभाववचनम्' to the Sūtra. आविष्कृतम् is the जीवात्मनः स्वं स्वरूपम् as in Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3 and Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 1. Śaṅkara takes आविष्कृतम् in the sense of 'expounded'. As a result of his wrong interpretation of आवेश in Sūtra 15, Śaṅkara has to say that Sūtra 15 deals with सगुणविद्या while Sūtra 16 deals with निर्गुणविद्या.

However, if Sūtras 15–16 are to be taken as explaining *how* the released soul occupies many bodies at a time, we believe that the Sūtras do not support Śaṅkara's view that it is through उपाधि. Rather Sūtra 16 speaks of the pervasion of the released soul in general and it shows that the soul pervades the bodies and remains also outside the bodies like a lamp (from which other lamps are lighted, or which pervades the place where it is lighted).

SECTION VII

Revealed Form of the Soul devoid of Worldly Dealings and Changeless.

Sūtras IV. 4. 17–21

(१७) जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च ।
(१८) प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः ।
(१९) विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह ।
(२०) दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ।
(२१) भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।

TRANSLATION

[THE revealed (or re–manifested) form of the released one is] devoid of the worldly operations (influence, workings), because of the context and because of its being remote [from the world]. 17

If it be argued that " [It is not so] because of a Śruti or direct statement ", we reply, " No, because it is a statement about those who belong to the group of officers; 18

and [that revealed form] is not subject to change, because the Śruti mentions its continuation or permanence. 19

And the Śruti and Smṛti show it similarly, 20

and because of the text about the similarity [between the soul in this world and the revealed state of the released soul] in the point of enjoyment of desires only. 21

NOTES

Sūtra 17

1. In the preceding Sūtra the revealed or remanifested form of the released soul is mentioned. So, we believe we have here to take that form to be qualified by जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्. This section, therefore, seems to us to deal with the state or form of the released soul.

2. The form of the released soul is not subject to the workings or dealings of the world, *i. e.*, it is not subject to birth and death, and also other operations of the world.

3. प्रकरणात् as the preceding Sūtra आविष्कृतम् and Sūtra 1 of this Pāda refer to Chā. Upa. VIII. 12. 3, we may take 'the context' as a reference to Chā. Upa. VIII. 7. 1, *viz.*, य आत्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोकोऽविजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसंकल्पः सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः...... ।

Here the soul which becomes manifest when released is said to be अपहतपाप्मा 'free from sins,' विजर 'without old age,' विमृत्यु 'without death,' विशोक 'free from sorrow,' *etc.*, *etc.* The Sūtrakāra seems to think that the dealings or workings of the world, like old age, death, sorrow, *etc.*, are absent in the remanifested form of the liberated soul, because the context shows that it is so. The word 'स्वाप्यय' in the preceding Sūtra also suggests that जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् may be explained by quoting Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 22, अत्र पिताऽपिता भवति माताऽमाता लोका अलोका देवा अदेवा वेदा अवेदा, अत्र स्तेनोऽस्तेनो भवति भ्रूणहाऽभ्रूणहा चाण्डालोऽचाण्डालः पौल्कसोऽपौल्कसः श्रमणोऽश्रमणस्तापसोऽतापसोऽनन्वागतं पुण्येनानन्वागतं पापेन तीर्णो हि तदा सर्वाञ्छोकान्हृदयस्य भवति । All dealings of the world are here denied of the remanifested form of the soul. The description applies both to the deep-sleep state and to the state of liberation (*Cf.* Bra. Sū. III. 2. 7).

4. असन्निहितत्वात् । In the discussion of the problem of ब्रह्मकार्य or परब्रह्म being the goal, it was argued by बादरि that ब्रह्मकार्य was called ब्रह्म because the two were near each other (सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः । Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 9).

In contrast to this, the Sūtrakāra says in Sū. IV. 4. 17 that the revealed form of the released soul is so remote from the world that the former is not influenced by the latter at all.

5. According to Śaṅkara this Sūtra discusses the question whether the meditators of सगुण ब्रह्मन् who get the state of equality (सायुज्य) with Hiraṇyagarbha gain absolute or limited Lordship. The reply is that their lordship is limited because they get अणिमाद्यैश्वर्य but not the lordship of creating and destroying the world which belongs only to the नित्यईश्वर, the permanent Lord. To us it appears that according to the context of the Pāda and also of the immediately preceding Sūtra, 'जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्' refers to आविष्कृतं मुक्तस्वरूपम् which is referred to in the preceding Sūtra and which becomes manifest in liberation (Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 16); and जगद्व्यापार means birth, death, the relationship of father and son, *etc.*, *etc.*, castes, *etc.* By प्रकरणात् Śaṅkara does not refer to any particular text where the आविष्कृत-मुक्तस्वरूप is mentioned, but he takes it as नित्येश्वरस्य जगद्व्यापारे (= तत्र ?) प्रकृतत्वात् "because in the matter of creation and destruction of the world the permanent Lord is the topic". And असन्निहितत्व does not mean the (spiritual) distance between जगत् and the मुक्तस्वरूप, but it means that " the सगुण meditators are 'remote' in the matter of जगद्व्यापार ". Thus, according to Śaṅkara प्रकृतत्वात् has the same sense as असन्निहितत्वात्. ईश्वर is प्रकृत while मुक्तs are असन्निहित in the matter of जगद्व्यापार. But we think, प्रकृतत्व and असन्निहितत्व are spoken of as the *same entity* here, *viz.*, मुक्तस्वरूप. In fact no "ऐश्वर्य" is referred to or implied in the preceding Sūtra or this Sūtra.

Sūtra 18

6. प्रत्यक्षोपदेशात्—This Sūtra gives ano bjection to जगद्व्यापार-वर्जम्. The opponent argues that the Śruti itself says that

" the मुक्तs or the liberated experience death in the ब्रह्मलोक at the time of the end of the Para ". ' प्रत्यक्ष ' means the Śruti. And प्रत्यक्षोपदेश may refer to such a text as

" वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्वाः ।
ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृताः परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वे ॥

(Mu. Upa. III. 2. 6).

The first half of this verse may be taken as a direct or express mention (प्रत्यक्षोपदेश) of the released. In Sūtras IV. 3. 7–15 it has been decided that ब्रह्मलोकान् in such texts as ब्रह्मलोकान् गमयति ते तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु पराः परावतो वसन्ति (Br. Upa. VI. 2. 15), means the Supreme Brahman. ' परिमुच्यन्ति ' would mean ' are released ' *i. e.*, ' become free from body ' as in तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्ये (Chā. Upa. VI. 14. 2). Moreover, ' परान्तकाल ' would be a direct statement about the destruction of the Para or the Supreme One. So, this Śruti may be referred to as mentioning ' the operations of the world ' in the case of the released.

7. आधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः—The Sūtrakāra does not grant the opponent's interpretation of the above Śruti. He says that the statement of that Śruti refers to those who belong to the group of officers, Indra, Prajāpati and others. They also are entitled to the study of the Vedanta and they remain in their office even after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman (Bra. Sū. I. 3. 30) and are released when those worlds over which they rule are destroyed. Thus, the Śruti pointed out by the opponent refers to those who have got ब्रह्मज्ञान and who are in the group of officers, and not to the released who have attained the Para.

8. According to Śaṅkara ' प्रत्यक्षोपदेश ' refers to such texts as Tai. Upa. I. 6. 2, ' आप्नोति स्वाराज्यम् ', ' The released one gets sovereignty.' He says that in this Śruti the released one is said to get ' unlimited lordship.' He solves the compound आधिकारिकमंडलस्थोक्तेः as आधिकारिको यः सवितृमण्डलादिषु विशेषायतने-

व्यवस्थितः परः ईश्वरस्तदायत्तैवेयं स्वाराज्यप्राप्तिरुच्यते । Can we say that पर ईश्वर is an (appointed) officer (आधिकारिक) ? And why should it be सवितृमण्डल ? The sun is not at all referred to in the Sūtra. आधिकारिकमण्डल would mean "the group of officers" and would mean the Sun, the Varuṇa, Indra, Prajāpati and other officers. We cannot say that like the disc or orb of the Sun, there are similar orbs in other worlds of वरुण,, वायु, *etc.*, *etc.* So the interpretation of मण्डल as सवितृमण्डलादिषु आयतनेषु is also foreign to the Sūtra. The various आयतनs are not at all referred to in the Sūtra. Moreover, the 'स्वाराज्यप्राप्ति' (उक्ति) is not mentioned in either of these two Sūtras (17–18) but is derived from the word 'ऐश्वर्य' which Śaṅkara takes as implied in Sūtra 17.

In fact the explanation of those Śrutis in which the liberated soul is said to be ईश्वर or Lord seems to have been given by the Sūtrakāra in Bra. Sū. IV. 4. 9 (अतएव चानन्याधिपतिः।) and II. 3. 29 (तद्गुणसारवत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः), *etc.*; and Chā. Upa. VII. 25. 2 and VIII. 1. 6 (स स्वराड्भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति ।) which Śaṅkara quotes under Sūtras 27–28 is also quoted by him as the विषयवाक्य of Sūtra IV. 4. 9. Such Śrutis, according to Sūtra IV. 4. 9, do not mean that स्वाराज्यप्राप्ति mentioned therein *depends upon* 'पर ईश्वर'; but rather the Sūtrakāra interprets them as showing the power of the liberated to gain any desired object *from mere wish* (संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः। Sūtra IV. 4. 8) without depending upon anybody else but themselves.

Sūtra 19

9. This Sūtra seems to us to give one more argument for the statement in Sūtra 17. Thus, with विकारावर्ति we should take as understood "मुक्तस्वरूपम्". The revealed form of the liberated one is *not subject to change* and that shows that it is devoid of the dealings of the world, like birth, death, sorrow, *etc.*

10. तथाहि स्थितिमाह। The abiding nature or the permanence

or, we may say, the continuance of the revealed form of the liberated is mentioned in Śrutis like (1) स लोकमागच्छति अशोकमहिमं तस्मिन् वसति शाश्वतीः समाः (Bṛ. Upa. V. 10. 1); (2) तेषु ब्रह्मलोकेषु पराः परावतो वसन्ति (Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15). In these Śrutis the liberated are said *to continue* staying in Brahman for eternal ages. The released is said to live in the "world of Brahman" for eternal ages, for unlimited years. So, the form of the liberated is eternal or permanent.

11. 'स्थिति' shows that by जगद्व्यापार we are to understand जन्म and मरण. Out of these three conditions, only स्थिति is the condition of the form of the liberated.

12. Śaṅkara takes 'च' in the sense of *in addition to* 'विकार(मात्र)गोचरं सवितृमण्डलाद्यधिष्ठानं पारमेश्वरं रूपम्'. As the latter or विकारवर्ति रूप is not mentioned in the preceding Sūtras, we do not think this *addition* can be justified on the ground of the context. Moreover 'च' can have the sense of समुच्चय proper only if it occurs in the first Sūtra of an Adhikaraṇa *e. g.*, II. 2. 1, but when it occurs in a Sūtra in the middle of an Adhikaraṇa, it has the sense of the समुच्चय of the preceding arguments only. We propose to take it (विकारावर्ति) as an additional argument for जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्; so that जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् and विकारावर्ति are both of them adjectives to the same thing *viz.*, आविष्कृतं मुक्तस्वरूपम्. If we wish to distinguish between these two adjectives, we may say that जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् refers to birth, death *etc.*, and also to the relation of father and son, *etc.*, while 'विकारावर्ति' refers to only 'the impossibility of change' or 'changelessness'. This changelessness is proved by the स्थिति mentioned in Śrutis. Śaṅkara explains स्थिति as existence instead of as continuation and having taken 'च' in the above sense, he explains 'स्थितिम्' as 'द्विरुपां स्थितिम्'. We think 'स्थितिम्' means continuance or abiding state and therefore it is an argument against विकार or change.

According to Śaṅkara, Sūtra 18 explained the विकारगोचररूप of Brahman and Sūtra 19 explains the विकारावर्तिरूप of Brahman;

thus he seeks to prove his doctrine of सगुण and निर्गुण forms of Brahman from these Sūtras. And the purpose of the reference to निर्विकाररूप in Sūtra 19 is given by Śaṅkara in the following words " न च तन्निर्विकारं रूपमितरालम्बनाः प्राप्नुवन्तीति शक्यं वक्तुमतत्क्रतुत्वात्तेषाम्। अतश्च यथैव द्विरूपे परमेश्वरे निर्गुणं रूपमनवाप्य सगुण एवावतिष्ठन्ते एवं सगुणेऽपि निरवग्रहमैश्वर्यमनवाप्य सावग्रह एवावतिष्ठन्त इति द्रष्टव्यम्।" We think, we cannot interpret the Sūtra in such a way as it would be necessary to add all these sentences to make its meaning and purpose clear.

Sūtra 20

13. The Śruti shows that the form of the released soul is changeless and devoid of the dealings of the world. In the latter case the Bṛ. Upa. Śruti (Bṛ. Upa. IV. 3. 22) quoted by us under Sūtra 17 may be meant by the Sūtrakāra.

14. अनुमान — The Smṛti also shows that the form of the released soul is changeless and abiding. A Smṛti text like the following may be referred to by this Sūtra:—

(1) इदं ज्ञानमुपाश्रित्य मम साधर्म्यमागताः।
सर्गेऽपि नोपजायन्ते प्रलये न व्यथन्ति च॥ Bha. Gī. XIV. 2.

(2) मामुपेत्य तु कौन्तेय पुनर्जन्म न विद्यते (Bha. Gī. VIII. 16).

15. Śaṅkara quotes Śruti and Smṛti texts which, he says, show that the Supreme *Light* is not subject to change. But his quotations state that no विकारs like सूर्य, चन्द्र are present in ब्रह्मन्, rather than that, ब्रह्म is without विकार. The latter type of Śruti is quoted by Śaṅkara under Sūtra 19.

Sūtra 21

16. As च shows, this Sūtra is the last argument for विकारावर्ति and जगद्व्यापारवर्जम्. It is the last Sūtra in the Adhikaraṇa.

17. The form of the released soul is not subject to change and is devoid of the worldly dealings, because the only point

of similarity between that form and his form in this world is that of enjoyment of desired objects. There is a Śruti text about this. This may be a reference to such a Śruti as सोऽश्नुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता। (Tai. Upa. II. 1). These Śrutis show that the soul in liberation is an enjoyer just as he is in this world. There are no Śrutis showing that the मुक्त does any *actions* in ब्रह्मलोक except those of enjoyment. भोक्तृत्व without कर्तृत्व is the nature of मुक्त.

18. मात्र—This word is used to exclude the soul in liberation being *an agent* (कर्तृ) or a sufferer of sins *etc.*, as he is in this world. He is only a भोक्तृ without being a कर्तृ in the state of liberation. As he is not a कर्ता he does not undergo birth and death.

19. In Bra. Sū. III. 3. 51 (न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहि लोकापत्तिः) it is proved that सामान्य is the भोगसामान्य.

20. According to Śaṅkara Sūtra 20 shows परस्य ज्योतिषः विकारावर्तित्व but Sūtra 21 is meant to prove that the meditators on सगुण ब्रह्मन् do not gain unlimited lordship by giving a reference to a Śruti about the similarity of those who attain to सगुण ब्रह्मन् *with* ईश्वर in the point of भोग only. But he does not quote any such Śruti. He draws his conclusion on the strength of a Śruti which, he says, distinguishes between the सगुणोपासक's goal and ईश्वर. We think, there is no mention of ईश्वर in this Adhikaraṇa and the भोगमात्रसाम्य between the soul in this world and in the state of liberation is meant here. There is no mention also of विकारालम्बनs in this Adhikaraṇa, as also of ऐश्वर्य.

SECTION VIII

Non-Return of the Released Soul.

Sūtra IV. 4. 22

(२२) अनावृत्तिः शब्दादनावृत्तिः शब्दात् ।

इति चतुर्थाध्यायस्य चतुर्थः पादः ।

TRANSLATION

NON-RETURN, from the Word; Non-return, from the Word. 22

NOTES

Sūtra 22

1. We think, this Sūtra is not connected with the preceding Sūtra, because there is a च in the preceding Sūtra and there is no च in this Sūtra. So this Sūtra forms a new Adhikaraṇa.

2. As in other Sūtras, शब्द is used here in the sense of Śruti. It is clearly a reference to such Śrutis as (1) ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंपद्यते न च पुनरावर्तते (Chā. Upa. VIII. 15. 1), (2) एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इमं मानवमावर्तं नावर्तन्ते नावर्तन्ते (Chā. Upa. V. 15. 6), and (3) तेषां न पुनरावृत्तिः (Bṛ. Upa. VI. 2. 15). These Śrutis show that those who reach the Para do not return to this world.

3. Śaṅkara does not make a new Adhikaraṇa of this Sūtra. He realizes that the topic of the preceding Sūtras, as interpreted by him is inconsistent with this Sūtra. So he reconciles that topic by saying अन्तवत्त्वेऽपित्वैश्वर्यस्य यथाऽनावृत्तिस्तथा वर्णितम् "कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परम्" (Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 10).

We think it is impossible that this Sūtra (IV. 4. 22) is meant to be connected with Bra. Sū. IV. 3. 10. Moreover, we have already shown that the latter Sūtra is a पूर्वपक्षसूत्र. The Sūtra seems to mention the non-return of those who reach the highest goal possible. To us, it seems that though the goal is अरूपवत् Brahman, the Sūtrakāra takes उत्क्रान्ति and गति as consistent with that goal, and consequently he mentions अनावृत्ति.

I

General Index.

II

Index of Sanskrit Words.

III

Index of Works Quoted.

A. Upaniṣads.

B. Other Works.

By the Same Author.

I. Akṣara: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy. 1932. Rs. 5/-

Contents—This is the thesis presented by Dr. Modi for the Ph. D. Degree in the University of Kiel.

This is a thought-provoking work. Dr. Modi has traced the theory of 'Akṣara' from the earliest Upaniṣads upto the times of the Vedāntasūtras. He starts with a comparative table setting forth the meanings attributed by Indian ācaryas and Western translators to 'akṣara' in the eleven passages of the Bhagavadgītā where it occurs in a philosophical sense. He shows how the Chāndogya and Bṛhadāraṇyaka, the early prose Upaniṣads, speak of both akṣara (impersonal Absolute) and puruṣa (personal absolute) and how they are not concerned to decide whether the final reality is personal or impersonal. He then proceeds to the earlier metrical Upaniṣads (like the Kaṭha and Muṇḍaka) and holds that they placed *puruṣa* higher than *akṣara*, that both were regarded as the goals and both were styled *vidyās*. The next stage is reached in the Bhagavadgītā which accepts the distinction between akṣara and puruṣa taught by the earlier metrical Upaniṣads and also says that puruṣa is beyond (*para*) akṣara. The Gītā develops the theory that meditation on puruṣa is preferable to that on akṣara, because the former is easier than the latter; and the Gītā says that puruṣa presides over akṣara which is the abode (*dhāman*). Gītā identifies Kṛṣṇa with puruṣa and is always careful not to identify puruṣa with *brahman* which is identified with akṣara. The Gītā teaches three paths of absolution, the *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga* and *Upāsanā* or *bhakti* and that akṣara or puruṣa can be reached by anyone of these paths. Sāṅkhya and Yoga in the Gītā mean respectively 'renunciation' (with knowledge) and 'path of actions' (with knowledge). They are not two steps on the same path (as Śaṅkarācārya says) but two paths to either of the two goals, *viz.* akṣara and puruṣa. The learned author then examines the twelfth *parvan* of the Mahābhārata and finds that therein the tenets of four different schools are set out, *viz.* the Aupaniṣadas (chap. 182-253), the Sāṅkhya (chap. 302-317), Yoga (chap. 308) and Pāñcarātra (chap. 334-352). Dr. Modi takes great

pains to point out how the Sāṅkhya in the Mahābhārata differs from the classical Sāṅkhya, how both Hopkins and Deussen are wrong in their interpretation of chap. 308, how the Mahābhārata mentions two schools of Yoga, one founded by Hiraṇyagarbha and the other by Rudra. He states that the Pāñcarātra school in the Mahābhārata completely identifies akṣara and puruṣa under the name of Nārāyaṇa, that according to that school the supreme Reality is possessed of contradictory attributes. Dr. Modi then comes to the treatment of akṣara in the Brahmasūtras. He believes (p. 92) that he has discovered the key to the elucidation of that somewhat abstruse and recondite work. According to Dr. Modi, the Sūtrakāra discriminates between akṣara and puruṣa and the most striking feature in the sūtrakāra's view of the Highest Being (*para*) is the systematic and rational interpretation which he gives for the first time in the history of Indian Philosophy to the twofold contradictory statements regarding the attributes of the supreme one.

The author of the Brahmasūtras, according to Dr. Modi, does not regard akṣara as lower than puruṣa but rather treats the two as identical and holds that the distinction made between the two in some texts is for the purpose of meditation only and that the same Supreme Being called *para* is to be meditated upon as akṣara or puruṣa. Thus though akṣara taught in the ancient Upaniṣads and the Gītā is still recognisable even in Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras, even the traces of akṣara disappear in the work of Śaṅkarācārya, the renowned successor of Bādarāyaṇa. It is hence that Dr. Modi describes the history of akṣara as a forgotten chapter.

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(From a review of the work in the Journal of the B. B. R. A. S. by Mahāmahopādhāya P. V. Kane).

SOME OPINIONS.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University, Benares:—It is a piece of sound and careful scholarship. I believe there is a great need for such intensive scholarship on such topics in Indian Philosophy, and trust that you will continue your work in this subject.

Prof. Dr. W. Schubring, Altona-Klein Flottbek, Germany :—Let me heartily congratulate you for having thrown light, in a most scientific manner, on an untrodden path in the field of Indian thought...Certainly German scientific method has influenced the internal and technical side of your working out your thesis. But I am sure that few places only are fit to preserve that spirit equally well as **Bhavnagar** is, renowned as it is for its religious and literary atmosphere. A few days' stay in your place early in 1928 belongs to my finest Indian recollections.

Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Mysore University, Mysore: —I have read the thesis and I find that though it modestly claims to treat only of the history of a single conception, it deals with practically all the important problems raised in early Indian philosophy. I think that several of your conclusions will be acceptable to many. ... But even those that disagree will readily admit the value of your discussions of the details bearing upon these topics. In this respect, the chapter on the Mahābhārata is very useful; and I can easily understand the trouble it must have cost you to put into shape the teaching of the Mokṣa-dharma with its vague and elusive terminology.

A. Berridale Keith, University of Edinburgh :—I have read it with the interest which attaches to any serious effort to reconstruct the evolution of Indian philosophy. I recognise the care which you have devoted to the topic.

Prof F. W. Thomas, Oxford University, Oxford :—I think that you have discovered a new topic in early Indian philosophy and have shed light upon some of the most difficult points in its history.

Dr. H. Ui, Seminary of Indian Philosophy, The Tokyo Imperial University, Japan :—You have done much to puzzle out one of the metaphysical terms of the Gītā and give us many valuable informations in the field of Indian Philosophy; your view and interpretations concerning the passages quoted through the work are on the whole interesting and acceptable. I would recommend your work to my fellow students in this country.

K. P. Jayaswal, Patna :—Your treatment is remarkable. You have successfully given the exact connotation of **akṣara**. I hope, you

will similarly intrepret other terms which are taken by the **tīkākāras** as loose expressions.

Prof. R. D. Karmarkar, Poona:--I think, it is a valuable piece of research.

Dr. Laxman Sarup, Punjab University, Lahore:--I am very much impressed with the maturity of the spirit in the work of so young a scholar.

Prof. Dr. M. Winternits, Prague, Czechoslovakia:—I can see that it is a highly valuable contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy. The method of your investigation seems to me very recommendable. There is certainly no other way to get at the bottom of Indian Philosophical terminology. If you can destroy the impression of vagueness which we so often have of the Sanskrit terms, not only in Bhagvadgītā but also else-where, you will have done great service indeed to Indological Research.

Prof. Kokileshwar Shastri, Calcutta--I have been struck with the admirable learning and the thorough grasp. ...You possess a deep penetrating insight and a devotedness to independence of thought......

Mahāmahopādhyāya P. V. Kane, M. A., L. L. M., writes in the Journal of the Bombay Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 9, 1933:-- This is a thought-provoking work. Dr. Modi ... displays learning, industry and acuteness. He is not afraid of differing from such great Savants as Prof. Hopkins, Dr. Deussen and very often crosses swords with them.

Bharatan Kumarappa, Nasik Road Central Prison:—I am greatly impressed by the critical method that he brings to bear on his subject. I am convinced that such efforts as that of Dr. Modi to throw light on the terminology of the ancient texts are most necessary, and yet upto now altogether neglected. I do hope Dr. Modi will continue to do more such work.

I am surprised that within the two years he spent in Germany, he has been able to obtain full hold of the German method in the study of ancient texts, and has applied it so efficiently. I congratulate him on this.

Prof. A. K. Trivedi, Senior Professor of Philosophy, Baroda College:—Dr. Modi, has, with a freshness of outlook and impartiality and intellectual courage, tried to throw new light and offered his synthesis in the matter of the history of the *akṣara-puruṣa* conception. His documentation is exact and his investigation as thorough as original. His thesis is a most valuable contribution to Indian dārs'anic investigations.

Principal Gopinath Kaviraj, Government Sanskrit College, Benares:—I have been highly impressed with the scholarly and critical nature of the treatment you have accorded to an almost neglected problem in the history of Indian philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Sten Konow, Oslo:—I have read it with great interest and admiration of your earnest and penetrating exposition of the problem. You have chosen a very important subject for your dissertation, and I hope that you will, as you indicate, return to it in greater breadth.

2. Translation of the Siddhāntabindu. Rs. 5/–

Contents—This work is an interpretation and translation of the Siddhāntabindu, the well-known commentary on Śaṅkarācārya's Das'as'lokī, by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, for which the author was given the Sujña Gokulji Jhala Vedanta Prize (1921) in a competition among graduates of any Indian University of any years' standing.

The translation itself contains (1) marginal summaries, (2) analytical headings, (3) statements of Query (*pūrvapakṣa*) and Determination (*siddhānta*), (4) explanatory foot-notes. The arguments and conclusions are properly numbered and divided. The Introduction of 54 pages deals with the life, literary activity, and doctrinal attitude of Madhusūdana. The appendices give critical and historical details connected with the text and discuss Madhusūdana's conception of *bhakti* or devotion as a means to salvation and the important differences between him and Śaṅkara on this point. In fact they present an analysis of Madhusūdana's Bhaktirasāyana.

Rev. Fr. R. Zimmermann, Bombay :—Prof. Modi's translation and interpretation shows a happy **entente cordiale** between East and West ... The monograph is a fine specimen of work done and promise for the future.

Prof. A. B. Keith, University of Edinburgh :—I cordially agree with Prof. Zimmermann's appreciation of its merits.

Prof. Franklin Edgerton, Yale University, America :— ... I found Madhusūdana very difficult and am sure your translation of his work will be useful.

Prof. Hermann Jacobi, Bonn :—I admire your thorough knowledge and masterly treating of so intricate a subject, and am sure that you are the most competent interpreter of Madhusūdana Saraswatī's Philosophical writings and ideas.

3. A Critique of the Brahmasūtra: Part I.

Interpretation of the Sūtras (III. 2. 11–IV). Rs. 12/–

Prof M. Hiriyanna, Mysore University, Mysore :—It is a careful and minute study of the Vedantsūtra that we have here. The numerous discussions in it as well as the conclusions reached through them will be of immense value in reconstructing the early history of Indian Philosophy, and I hope that the book will receive from the scholars the close attention which it deserves.

Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor, Benares Hindu University, Benares :—I have now read through parts of the proofs you were good enough to send me, and I congratulate you on the courage, conviction and ability with which you have carried out a great task.

Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, King George V. Professor of Mental and Moral Science, Calcutta University, Calcutta :—Dr Modi has done an inestimable service in attempting a critical study of at least a part of the Brahmsūtras ... He has practically succeeded in evolving a scheme, a sort of critical apparatus, which may be successfully applied to the Brahmasūtras to make them yield their own meaning.

૪. હિન્દુ ધર્મનાં મૂળતત્ત્વો (શાળોપયોગી), (ચોથી આવૃત્તિ ટૂંક સમયમાં બહાર પડશે).

અભિપ્રાયો.

મહાત્મા ગાંધીજી—તમારું પુસ્તક મળ્યું છે. તે વાંચી જવું મને ગમે....

કાકા કાલેલકર—મને બહુ જ ગમી. આ ચોપડી લખવા માટે તમને અભિનન્દન ઘટે છે.

ગુજરાત સાહિત્ય સભા, અમદાવાદ, કાર્યવહી સને ૧૯૪૦-૪૧ સમીક્ષક: પ્રો. ર. મ. જોશી—ઉપનિષદ, ગીતા, મનુસ્મૃતિ વગેરે પુસ્તકોનું પચાવેલું જ્ઞાન તેમાં છે. ... પ્રો. આનન્દશંકર ધ્રુવ "આપણો ધર્મ" માં પાંડિત્યપૂર્વક હિન્દુ ધર્મનાં તત્ત્વો સમજાવે છે; તો ડૉ. મોદી એકધારી સળંગતાથી કિશોરો પણ સમજી શકે એવી સરળ ભાષામાં ધર્મનાં સર્વવ્યાપી તત્ત્વો રજૂ કરે છે. ... વિદ્વત્તા અને અભ્યાસથી મુગ્ધ કરતું આ પુસ્તક છે.

પ્રો. અનન્તરાય રાવળ, ગુજરાત કોલેજ, અમદાવાદ—એમાં સરળ ભાષામાં હિન્દુ ધર્મ ને તત્ત્વજ્ઞાનના મૂળ તત્ત્વોની શ્રુતિ-સ્મૃતિ-ગીતા-પુરાણાદિના અવતરણો સાથે એવી **સાધાર** અને **વ્યવસ્થિત** માહિતી આપવામાં આવી છે, જે આટલા કદના અન્ય કોઇ ગુજરાતી પુસ્તક દ્વારા મળી નથી. હું તો સૌને આ પુસ્તક વાંચવાની ભલામણ કરતો જ રહું એવું મન થાય છે.

કુલછાબ—જ્ઞાનયુક્ત ધાર્મિક સંસ્કારવાળી સામાન્ય જનતાને હિન્દુ ધર્મનું સારરૂપ સંપૂર્ણ જ્ઞાન મળી રહે એવું છે. ... આવડા નાના પુસ્તકમાં હિન્દુ ધર્મનો સમગ્ર સાર વિષયને જરાય વિકૃત કર્યા સિવાય આપી દેવાનું કાર્ય અભ્યાસ સાથે ઊંડી સમજ પણ માગી લે છે.

5. Bhagavadgītā with Śaṅkara's Commentary. A New Approach. In Two Parts. (In the Press).

Contents—The texts of the original work and the commentary are properly analysed and their contents classified. Summaries in English of the topics discussed at length by Śaṅkara are given in the foot-notes. The Notes include an exhaustive criticism of the interpretations of the Gītā by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhusūdana, Deussen, Garbe, Rudolph Otto, Edgerton, Hill, Barnett, Sir R. Bhandarkar, Prof. Belvalkar,

C. V. Vaidya, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, Tilak, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jñāneshwara, and many others.

The author's own interpretation and contribution to the Gītā studies are that **each** Adhyāya of the Gītā is **an independent unit** and presents **one particular process of achieving Yoga** "Equality of Mind in the Success or Failure of One's Undertakings." He further holds that **the philosophical thoughts** in each Adhyāya are **peculiar to it only** and that no single so called System was intended to be given by the author of the Gītā.

Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Mysore University, Mysore—I have now read the Note; and it seems to me that your conclusion, viz., that though the Gītā is generally heterogeneous in its character, it uniformly commends disinterested action, is well warranted.